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
THE INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY


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THE INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

September-December

MDCCCCII

THE GROWTH OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER

ELWOOD MEAD

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE.

THE census of 1900 shows that more than seven and one half million acres of what was once part of the American Desert are now being cultivated by irrigation. The moisture which clouds fail to furnish has been taken from streams. The farms thus created are among the highest priced and most productive on the continent, but their value does not inhere in the soil. Because land is abundant and water scarce, it is the stream which is important, and water rights rather than land titles determine both the prosperity and the price of the irrigated farm. Land near Riverside, California, with a water right, has sold for one thousand, seven hundred and fifty dollars an acre. The same kind of land in the immediate neighborhood, but not susceptible of irrigation, would not sell for ten dollars an acre. This immense difference in values is due to the difference in production. The irrigated acre will grow oranges; the unirrigated, cactus and stunted grass.

On many irrigated acres near Greeley, Colorado, the crops grown last year sold for one hundred dollars. These acres were below the ditch. Above the ditch twenty acres of the same land, unirrigated, did not grow enough grass to support a steer. The irrigated acre is no more fertile than the unirrigated one, yet it sells for one hundred dollars while the unirrigated one is not worth the government price of one dollar and twenty-five cents. A shifting of the water right from the irrigated to the unirrigated acre would exactly reverse these values.

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The value of water is beginning to equal its importance. In some localities the right to a single "inch" is worth one thousand dollars. Its rental value for a single year is forty-five dollars. In sections where water is scarce land has practically no value. A water right sells for as much without the land as with it. The rights which control the streams of Colorado are estimated to be worth ninety million dollars, and the litigation over them has cost more than two millions.

The growing value of water and the changes in men's opinions about its ownership are among the most interesting economic facts of Western settlement. On this ownership depends the value of the investments in canals for the transportation of water, and in basins for its storing. Out of this has grown a commerce of great and rapidly increasing importance in which thousands of men are employed in patrolling the ditches and canals which distribute streams among the multitude of users. The framing of water right contracts has engaged the attention of the best business and legal talent of the West, and the money paid for water rights and water rentals would have seemed incredible a quarter of a century ago.

The problems thus created were not foreseen. Hence no provision was made for their solution. The first generation of irrigators gave no thought at the outset to their right to divert or to use a creek or river. They found water running to waste and put it to use, just as they breathed the pure air or enjoyed the abundant sunshine. They saw no more need of making an official record of this use than of keeping a record of the elk and antelope they shot for food. The water of the streams and the wild animals of the plains were a part of the bounty of nature in a land of primitive conditions and of unused and unowned resources, and they shot the wild game for meat and used the streams to provide bread with equal disregard of the declining importance of the one and the growing importance of the other. It is not strange that they should not foresee that irrigation was soon to be a leading industry of many States, and that the social and industrial institutions of millions of people were to be shaped by its requirements. As yet irrigation was an experiment, with every step, from the first furrow of the ditch to the last watering of the crop, in a new and untried field. The industry and its surroundings were strange. Nothing was known of the laws and customs of other irrigated lands, and the pioneer farmer of the arid West cared nothing for such knowledge. He was occupied with physical obstacles. So long as it required all his efforts to provide food and shelter for the present, he had little concern for the future. The circumstances under which he labored were such as to cause even the most thoughtful to neglect the problems with which he was to be confronted in the course of a further develop-

ment. The early settlements were small and widely separated. There was an almost complete failure to understand the overshadowing importance of streams, or to realize that a climate so different from that of the East as to profoundly modify the structure of plants and the colors and habits of animals required a corresponding modification of laws and institutions to bring human settlement into harmony with its environment. Emigrants brought with them the ideas and inherited jurisprudence of the East where moisture came from the clouds, and, so far as they gave any thought to the matter, they planned to create in the West communities and States which should be the counterpart in laws and customs of those they left in the East. They knew the value of land, and every advance of civilized life was marked by the creation of land offices for the orderly disposal of the public domain. They did not realize that water was an equally vital element of production, and half of the arid States adopted the common law of riparian rights, which, if enforced, would prevent the diversion of rivers by requiring them to flow undiminished in volume.

So long as streams carried a surplus, water was diverted and used without restraint and with lavish prodigality. Irrigators gave scant heed to their respective rights because, so long as each had all he needed, one right was as good as another. In time, however, conditions changed. Irrigated agriculture ceased to be an experiment and became an assured success. Streams which could be diverted at small cost were sought out by ditch builders, who found them in Colorado along the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains, and in Salt Lake Valley, Utah, along the western base of that range. The charm of the climate and the productiveness of the soil of California also drew men to its valleys, and in these three favored States there were soon scores of streams where the need of the crops was greater than the water supply. Whenever this condition arose, contests appeared. In each case the causes were much the same. Where a few users had at first the entire supply, scores and even hundreds of later comers arrived in time to compete for its control. With each recurring season of low water, the owners of ditches farthest down stream watched with anxious hearts the results of their neighbors' efforts above them. Whether they saw it or not, they knew what was taking place. They knew each farm above was being watered from the supply on which they depended. They knew, as they saw the stream shrink in volume and the torrent of the mountain canyon become a tiny thread in the sand of the plain, that their calamity was not due to any change in climate or convulsion of nature, but to the fact that the water had gone into the ditches on the farms above.

The early ditch builders never doubted for a moment that water, like air, ought to be free to all alike. Where they settled near enough to the head of a stream not to be robbed by later ditches above, they retained this belief in large measure. But when they had to get along as best they could with what others left, they began to see the question in a different light. Especially was this true when they saw their own fields parched and dry, while ditches above flooded fields and roads with water running to waste. They saw that, without some control, the man at the head of the streams would use more water than he needed, and that, to make the doctrine of free water a working policy, water, like air, must be equal to the necessities of all. And this, they realized, was not the case. To save themselves from ruin, the down stream users laid aside ideas that had been handed down from their fathers, and began to work for the legal recognition of rights to streams which would secure them their share of the common supply.

Framing water laws is a complex and difficult undertaking under any conditions, and it was especially so to the remote and primitive communities scattered along Western creeks and rivers. Congress, with what seems a singular lack of foresight, ignored the whole question. It passed a law recognizing local laws and customs, and left the users and claimants of water to blaze a new trail in framing these laws and customs. The pressing emergency which confronted them was not favorable to the deliberate action needed to create an administrative code of laws equal to the needs of future generations. They were busy, practical men, with the desert around them, and it took all their time and strength to conquer it. Trees had to be planted, and when planted to be watered, or they would die. Ditches had to be built and watched. Every day the dry winds blew and the desert pressed upon them. There was no time to study economics; any law which would let the water run and the ditch building go on would do, and so Western water laws grew out of makeshifts and temporary devices,—a patchwork rather than a system.

It is now recognized that the Federal Government should have asserted the same ownership over the public water that it did over the public land and have disposed of both together. Rights to streams could then have been acquired by some orderly and systematic administrative procedure. The Government could either have granted franchises to take water for a long term of years, as is done in Italy, or have granted perpetual licenses, as is done in Canada. Under either plan, titles to water would have come from the public, and their peaceable protection would have been assured. The failure of the Federal or State Governments to assert public control

over streams, and to dispose of them as a great public resource, left water to be claimed by those seeking its possession. It belonged to no one, and men appropriated it as they would have a nugget of gold found on the public highway.

In some parts of the West riparian rights are recognized, but the greater part of the water used in irrigation is controlled under rights acquired by its appropriation under State laws, and it may serve for a better understanding of the subject to explain further some of the elements which have contributed to shape the doctrine of *appropriation* of water, and to fix the methods by which water titles are established. Because the need of the land which was remote from the stream was as great as that of the land which bordered on it, it was necessary that streams should be diverted from their channels and absorbed in watering the thirsty soil, in order to people the country and build up homes; and this required that the exclusive right of the riparian land owner should be modified. But, in creating a new doctrine, it should have been recognized that irrigation is one of the industries in which public control is a necessity. Every drop of water which enters a headgate, every drop lost by wasteful use, is a matter of public concern. No less authority than the public should be entrusted with the establishment of titles to water or with the protection of the just rights of those who depend thereon. The framers of the early water laws did not see this clearly, if at all. Water laws were not framed to promote public interests so much as to settle the private contests of water claimants. The early discussions of water rights which have been preserved show that each irrigator adopted the doctrine which promised the most water for his ditch or farm. Some claimed that there should be the same property in water as there was in the land to which the water was applied. They sought to impress on rights in streams the sort of ownership that they had in land and live-stock. Others believed that an appropriation of water gave a right to its use only, and that when the use ceased, the right ceased. To the majority of farmers the distinction between the two doctrines seemed, at first, immaterial. What the irrigator wanted was to be sure of his share in the stream whenever he needed it, and of protection from the encroachments of later comers. When the first water rights were established the appropriators were, as a rule, actual users of the water appropriated. The owner of a farm owned the ditch which watered it, and it was of little practical consequence to him whether he acquired his water right as a ditch owner or as a land owner, whether he held it as personal property or as an easement attached to the lands irrigated. It was the belief of the Mormon leaders that rights to water should be inseparable from the land on which it was used. In 1861,

Colorado enacted a water law which was reënacted in Wyoming in 1876. Under it rights were attached to land.

Before the farmers of Colorado could agree upon an irrigation law, they had a long and strenuous discussion about the nature of a water right and whether it should attach to the ditches which led to the land or to the land itself. All were agreed, however, that the water should be attached either to the land or the ditches. Those who held that the rights should attach to the land pointed out that this would prevent speculative ownership or the granting of rights to excessive amounts of water, because the needs of the land would always serve to measure the right, and on the contrary the tendency would be in the other direction. For as use went on, the land first irrigated would require less and less water, because the subsoil would become filled, and more would be left for later comers. At the same time this doctrine would work no hardship to earlier users, because it would provide them with all the water their land needed. Those who advocated this policy were able to fortify their argument by showing that it was in accord with the experience of Southern Europe.

The following reasons led, however, to appropriations being based on the estimated capacity of ditches rather than on the needs of the land. If to each ditch was given a certain volume of water that flowed all the time, a table of the ditches and of the volume of water assigned to each could be handed to the officer who divided the stream. It gave him a simple basis for division. All he had to do was to regulate the headgates. If, on the other hand, it was based on the needs of the acres irrigated, the use of water must be watched and the amount turned into each ditch would be constantly varying. All were agreed that the first user should have the better right and that the date of priorities should be fixed by the time when ditches were begun. It was but a step from making the ditch control the date of the right to having its size govern the amount of the right. As the larger and later canals were often built by individuals and corporations who did not use water, but were simply carriers, it added immensely to the value of their investments if they could own the commodity they were distributing and could fix the conditions of its disposal to users. These canals preceded settlement, because settlers could not grow crops or live without a water supply. The investors in these projects were the first on the ground and the first to study the nature of appropriations. They required laws that would give them control of the water they diverted, and saw to it that they were enacted. Irrigators, on the other hand, gave little heed to the subject. They were busy plowing their fields, planting crops, and learning how to irrigate; hence they

thought little about their rights to share directly in appropriations. The tendency to ignore this right has been strengthened by the fact that water rights are almost entirely established by litigation. The desire of farmers is generally to keep out of lawsuits. They have neither the means nor the disposition to engage in them. The owners of large irrigation enterprises furnishing water to irrigators, on the other hand, employ able attorneys to prepare their incorporation papers, to frame their water right contracts, and to look after their interests in the courts. Because it has been to the supposed interests of their clients to have the appropriation go to the ditch owner, it has gradually come about that much of the ablest legal talent of the West is retained or enlisted in favor of giving those rights to the ditch owners, separating them entirely from the land, and ignoring the claims of the actual users.

The first settlers believed that their claims were superior to those of later ditch builders, and when the encroachments of the latter cut off their water supply, they insisted that in times of scarcity the headgate of the last appropriator should be the first one closed, and the later appropriators should suffer in turn to whatever extent was necessary to protect the earlier rights. Out of this grew the doctrine of *priority*, or, first in time, first in right. Where the amounts of appropriation have been based on the water actually used, the making of the earlier rights superior to the later ones has worked well, and is a reasonable basis for dividing streams. The first builders of ditches could not anticipate how many were to follow. Unless their prior use was protected, the greater their success the sooner they would be robbed of their water supply by the development this success encouraged. On the other hand, later comers build their ditches with the knowledge that there are prior claims, and when they are cut off in times of scarcity, it is a hardship, but not an injustice. Imperfect records often prevented an accurate estimate of the extent of these claims, but that is a defect in methods rather than in principles.

The doctrine of priority, like the doctrine of appropriation, varies somewhat in different States. In Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, and Western Kansas appropriations of water for domestic purposes take precedence over appropriations for irrigation. In California, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Washington, Wyoming, Texas, North Dakota, and Oregon, no distinction is made between uses. In Utah all rights acquired prior to 1877 are equal. This plan is adopted to place pioneers on the same footing. These earlier priorities are called primary rights, and those of later date are grouped together and called secondary rights. In other States each ditch has a separate priority number.

As the need of establishing a legal title to water became more urgent,

laws were passed providing for a notice or record of appropriators' claims. In mining districts these notices were an extension of the mining custom of posting location notices on lode or placer claims. Nearly all the arid States have passed laws for recording claims to water in some public office, usually that of the county clerk or recorder. The weakness of these laws is their failure to provide that these claims shall be accurate or even reasonable. In only two States, Wyoming and Nebraska, are these claims subjected to scrutiny to see that they comply with the statute or agree with the facts. In the others any claim presented is recorded if the fees are paid. In some counties a book is provided in which the intending appropriator of water writes what he claims. Then the clerk attaches his signature. With rare exceptions these records are worthless either as an indication of actual development or as a protection of claimants' rights, but they are of interest for the light they throw on appropriators' ideas of water ownership. They show that many believe that the recording of a claim to water and its appropriation are synonymous terms, and no language is more common in water notices than the expression, "I hereby appropriate the water of ———."

A belief in the value of water right records has, however, been a matter of growth. At first irrigators relied upon "open and notorious use," and many refused to record their claims; but as water became more valuable, the filing of speculative claims became more frequent. Many came to believe that if the recorded notice was not all that was required to establish a water right, it was at least the most important thing. In one State this belief was not wholly unreasonable, for a law, long since repealed, declared that a recorded notice of appropriation should be "deemed and held as an adjudicated title to water."

None of these laws restricted the amount which might be claimed, and, as it cost no more to record a claim to a large volume than a small one, the virtue of self-denial was seldom exercised. A safe and convenient form was to claim all the water of the stream, and this was sometimes amplified to embrace all the water below the surface as well as all in sight. "Claims to all the water developed or undeveloped," "All the water which flows or can be made to flow," are stock expressions in the literature of these records. Many who sought to define with some accuracy the volume of their appropriation became hopelessly confused in dealing with the two common statutory units of measurement,—the inch under a four or five inch pressure and the cubic foot per second. A recent publication of the office of experiment stations, United States Department of Agriculture, gives some ludicrous examples of these errors. One claimed "all the water, amounting to 150 inches by hydraulic pressure or

4-feet measurement." Another notice reads, "The undersigned claim 4 feet of water from under a 4-inch pressure." Another, "to the extent of 100 square inches, miner's measurement." Still another, "100,000 cubic feet."

One proposes to divert 200 inches by means of an iron pipe two inches in diameter for the first 40 feet, thence one inch to the place of intended use (a considerable distance away). Another claims "3,000 inches of water under a 4-inch pressure in this canyon and its branches to be taken out in a pipe 1½ inches in diameter." The performance of this feat would require the water to pass through the 1½-inch pipe at the rate of almost one mile a second, or about three times the velocity of a rifle bullet. Another claims 3,000 inches, "to be taken out in a ditch 15 inches wide and 10 inches deep." It would be interesting to know how long the ditch would endure the wear of such a destructive velocity as would be required. One prudent and far-sighted man, after claiming a liberal flow of water and describing the ordinary means of diverting the same, provides for the emergency of future dry years by adding, "I also claim the right to hand or pack from here to said ranch in case of drought or too little to run down."

The law says that the appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose. Because of this, it has been claimed for every conceivable purpose to which it could be applied, and the uses stated in the notices have changed from time to time as the demand for water for different purposes has varied. At the outset, agricultural and domestic uses were the ones usually specified, except in mineral districts where mining was the use most commonly described. Later on, as cities and towns sprang up, and water for domestic use and manufacturing purposes became more important, these have been added, and still later the utilization of water for the generation of electricity has caused that to form an item in all of the comprehensive statements of appropriation. One appropriator describes the beneficial use to which water is to be applied as "irrigation, motive, and mining, and for supplying cities, towns, and villages," and then, fearing that his ingenuity in discovering uses was hardly equal to the occasion, added, "such appropriation to be exercised as circumstances may require." Another describes the beneficial use intended as "irrigation and such other uses as I may deem proper." Another, "power, irrigation, domestic, stock, agricultural, mechanical, *commercial*, and *importation*." Another ended his record with this, "And John Brown further declares that he appropriated and took said water, together with all and singly the hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging and appertaining or to accrue to the same." Just what the

"herediments and appurtenances" of running water might be, he left for the other appropriators to ascertain.

An examination of the records of one stream showed that all the earlier claims were for small volumes, varying from one cubic foot per second to five cubic feet per second. These were probably close approximations to the actual needs of the claimants; but a change came when one appropriator, desiring to secure the surplus water supply for future consumption or sale, claimed 300 cubic feet per second. This was more than twice the water carried by the stream, but every claim which followed was for 300 cubic feet per second. The records of Boise River, in Idaho, show 151 claims, amounting in the aggregate to 6,361,800 "inches." The actual flow of the river in September, 1898, was 35,000 "inches." On a little stream in Wyoming, which usually goes dry in August, there is a claim for 60,000 cubic feet of water per second, enough to irrigate 6,000,000 acres of land. The filing of this claim does not indicate that the appropriator thought he could irrigate 6,000,000 acres. He had no clear idea of what he was claiming or what the stream carried. The unit he employed had no more meaning to him than if it had been written in Greek or Chinese. It cost no more to claim a large volume than a small, and he wished to provide for contingencies.

In Wyoming and Nebraska rights are determined through a special tribunal by administrative act. In these two States the owners of land can go directly to the State for a title to the water which reclaims that land. In the other States it is necessary to go into the courts in order to establish titles to water. This is not only tedious and expensive, but very unsatisfactory. Many of the transactions in water have, however, no better basis than the claim of the appropriator. Water is sold, exchanged, and leased with little regard for legal formalities, and usually without making any official record of the transaction. A farmer finds that he has appropriated more water than he needs, and buys other land on which to apply it or sells his surplus right to a neighbor. Companies building ditches to sell or rent water issue deeds to perpetual rights, before the courts or any other authority has passed upon the validity of their asserted appropriation. The great majority of the transactions in water have back of them no definite or legally defined title. The seller does not know that he owns what he is selling and the buyer has no assurance that he will get what he is buying. Litigation and controversy under such circumstances are as inevitable as weeds in a neglected field. Sometimes these lawsuits take the form of injunctions, sometimes equitable actions to determine the respective rights of appropriators or to quiet their titles. But whatever their form, they all have one thing in common;

these lawsuits are waged as though the issue were wholly a private matter, and as if the disposal of the rains and snows that make streams were something in which the public had no concern. All the testimony is submitted by those who are seeking to control the property or by those who have adverse interests. There is no disinterested or public measurement of the ditches and streams or of the lands irrigated. The testimony submitted is often inaccurate and contradictory, but it is all the judge has on which to base his decree. Even the Government, as the owner of large areas of land requiring irrigation, is never a party to these suits, nor is the State, although nothing so vitally concerns the public welfare as the establishment of ownership or control over streams. One of the results of this lack of public investigation of actual conditions has been the granting of extravagant rights to water. The excesses in this matter have been almost as marked as in the filing of claims. In some instances appropriators have agreed among themselves as to the share of the stream which each would claim in court, and, as they furnished the testimony, there was little difficulty in securing a decree in accordance with this agreement; the court being either an unconscious or helpless instrument for giving legal sanction to a fiction if not a fraud. In some cases these excessive decrees have not stopped with giving away all the actual water supply, but grant rights to many times this volume. From one stream, which at low stages carries less than one hundred cubic feet per second, there are decreed rights for 4,741 cubic feet per second. In the earlier decrees the amounts of appropriation were based on the estimated capacity of ditches, but in recent adjudications the actual use of water is subjected to a much closer scrutiny.

The early practice was to give a right to run water all the time, but experience has shown that this leads to abuses, because it does not agree with the way irrigators use water. Continuous irrigation would be as injurious as continuous rain, and no farmer irrigates all the time; few, indeed, half the time. Some irrigate in winter and grow crops with the moisture stored up in the soil. In some sections water runs in the ditches less than a hundred days. In a recent report of the irrigation investigations of the United States Department of Agriculture, the records of sixty farmers in one State showed that they used water less than three weeks in the year. Some farmers irrigated only one week, and scarcely any of them more than one hundred days. In localities where the irrigation period extends from April to October, the use of water by individual farmers is intermittent, determined largely by the local rainfall for the season and the kind of crops grown; hence a right to the continuous flow gives control of a water supply for long periods when a

single irrigator has no use for it. Many who have received rights to a perpetual flow find that the ability to rent or sell the right to other users, during the period of their non-use, is more valuable than their own use of the water. Especially is this true on streams where more land is cultivated than can be watered. The holders of inferior rights live in fear of drought and are willing to pay high prices for the surplus of the earlier appropriations. The tendency to augment the influence and value of early priorities is becoming more manifest every year. The owners of large appropriations are applying them to new lands and extending their influence far beyond the limits of the land originally irrigated. Sales of water rights to irrigators are made under contracts which make the inch of water supplied to one farmer this week serve another farmer the following week, and a different farmer the third week, so that the inch, instead of irrigating one acre for one man, irrigates one acre each for three men. There are other ditches which can only irrigate limited areas, yet have decreed rights to ten or twenty times the volume needed. In some States the owners of these surplus rights can sell or rent them to others. As the years go on, the value of these rights is assuming fabulous proportions. The rights to City Creek, Utah, the first stream diverted by the Mormons, are now worth \$1,600,000, exclusive of either the land or ditches where the water was first used.

The speculative value of the personal ownership of running water is so great that every argument which the ingenuity and intellect of the best legal talent of the West can produce has been presented to the courts in its favor. That it is opposed to public welfare, that it places users at the mercy of appropriators, is not a matter of theory, but of experience. Every objection which has ever been urged against the granting of free and unlimited franchises to the public utilities of cities applies with greater force to giving away the water of Western streams. Nevertheless, city councils continue to grant such franchises, and speculative titles to water continue to be declared vested. The cause is the same in both cases. Organized selfishness is more potent than unorganized consideration for the public interests. The appropriator has been in court in person and by attorney. The rights of the water user apart from the ditch owner have seldom been considered. Hence it is coming to be that rights to running water are ceasing to conform to the requirements of any use, are being separated from any place of diversion or application, and are being bought and sold and leased like land or live-stock or any other property.

THE TWO IDEALISMS

A DIALOGUE IN LIMBO

GEORGE SANTAYANA

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

IN the first circle of Dante's "Inferno," amid the "thick forest" of unsatisfied and defeated souls that crowd that limbo, there is a castle standing high upon the left hand; a pleasant river forms a moat about it, and its seven concentric walls enclose a green and, as it were, enameled meadow. Here the wise spirits of antiquity are gathered together, with such as in later times lived gloriously, according to the light of nature, though without knowledge of Christ. They are condemned, Dante tells us, to no other penalty than to live in desire without hope, a fate appropriate to noble souls with a clear vision of experience.

This contemplative brotherhood of captains, poets, and philosophers receives occasional accessions from the world of action; for Dante saw, standing somewhat apart from the rest, Saladin then lately dead and not yet quite at ease in the society of Homer, Aristotle, and Trajan. We, too, could we be suddenly transported into that calm sphere from the pressing microscopic controversies of our day, might feel disconcerted in the presence of those worthies, always so nobly endowed, and now dignified still more by death and immortality. What instructive criticism might we not hear from their impartial lips,—lips that have so long enjoyed the privilege of silence! I like sometimes to imagine what they would say of us; and the attempt to imagine it, even without any gift of divination, may not be without use as an exercise and artifice to promote self-knowledge.

With this idea in mind, I had one day followed Dante again into his seven-walled castle in Limbo. Recent reading of Plato had predisposed my fancy to certain images, so that my reverie was scarcely afoot when the familiar figure of Socrates appeared before me. In fact I had started with the half-formed purpose of eliciting something from the spirit of that philosopher, who of all others was the most inclined to conversation, and would probably be the least vexed by my ignorant questions. I was accordingly hastening through the series of gates into the inner enclosure where I expected to find him. But I had only passed the second or third rampart when my attention was attracted to a group of youths and young maidens, who were gathering apples in an orchard and making much pleasant outcry in the scramble; for on that side the space between the enclosing walls became much wider and was planted thick with trees.

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In that unchanging climate all seasons are simultaneous, and accordingly fruit and flowers appeared together upon every bough. Some of the boys had climbed into the branches which they were shaking, while the girls below ran to catch the falling apples in the folds of their garments. In the midst of that bevy I was surprised suddenly to perceive the object of my search; he had stopped short in his walk and was addressing one of the older boys, who held several apples in his hands, and, as it seemed, questioning the lad about them. I approached with some diffidence, wondering how I should announce my errand; but Socrates turned to me at once with an air of recognition,—it was not my first excursion into those regions,—and began to speak.

“I am asking this boy,” he said, “to tell me which of these apples is the best in his opinion. But he will not answer me; for, not knowing my ways, he imagines that if he tells me which is the best, I will rob him of it. Nor does he know, I conceive, the wonderful myth which is told about this orchard and the great tree of which all these are saplings. But doubtless you know the tale and can tell it better than I, for it is famous among your people.”

I protested my ignorance, and he continued.

“The story, as I remember it, is as follows, but you must correct me if I repeat it inaccurately, for only an echo of your traditions reaches us here. When the Creator of the world had resolved upon making man (and he was long in doubt about the wisdom of such an undertaking), he planted in the midst of a paradise the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and he strictly forbade all beings dwelling there to taste of its fruit, for as many as did so would surely perish. But there were two creatures whom he had made last and placed in the garden, the most beautiful of all its inhabitants, for they had the form of a perfect man and a perfect woman, and only the human soul was as yet lacking; these two disobeyed the Creator’s injunction, and as soon as they had eaten they were driven for their disobedience out of that paradise; the nature which they possessed before perished forever, and they became human. The tree, since it had now served its purpose on earth, was transplanted hither for the delectation of the shades, and this whole orchard which you see has sprung up from its seed. But none here is forbidden to taste it, for it is the chief food of the human and divine part of us. Its fruit is perennial and ever renewed; so that this youth had but a foolish fear when he thought I should take his best apple away from him; for I have tasted many in my time, and now I was only inviting him to discover for himself what of all that flourishes here is most akin to his own soul.”

With these words Socrates turned from the young people and led me

towards the inner field; and, as we were walking, he put forth his hand and gave me a sprig with some leaves and a few blossoms plucked from that orchard.

"Take this token with you into the upper world," he said with a smile, "for the plant is little known in those regions, and a specimen may perhaps interest your anthologists. Whether the tree can flourish again in your climates I am not sure; its growth in any case would be slow, and your philosophers, to taste its fruit, may have to wait until they join us here."

"And do our philosophers," I asked, "ever come into this castle?"

"Not often," he replied. "During the first years of my residence in this indestructible Athens, many arrived, like Pyrrho, Cleantes, and Epicurus: later, for some ages, we received sometimes a soldier, sometimes a poet, but never a philosopher, for these were all assigned to other dwellings more congenial to the habit of mind which prevailed in those days. Latterly, however, we have again had some additions made to our number, especially from a state which now seems more than all others to cultivate the sciences, and which lies I believe beyond Scythia and Gaul, and is called Germany. Him whom they regard generally as their greatest sophist I have unfortunately never seen, for he was not admitted here, or not willing to enter in. The harmony which rules the spheres, not, as I suspect, without some malice in its art, has relegated him to the region of those empty principles to which he wished to subject his life. Not the wills but the deeds of men are honored here; and so we are deprived of his society and he of ours, and I do not know whose may be the greater loss. But several of his disciples are among us, and when I question them I often have cause to admire the novel and ingenious method they use in their replies."

"Then the Germans, Socrates, seem to you to be great men and to deserve well of philosophy."

"Great inventors," he answered, "and wonderfully deserving, when we consider their great lack of education."

I was not able to disguise my astonishment at this sally, and as soon as I could collect my wits I proceeded to enlarge on the eminence of German scholarship. "Could you read, Socrates," I said in conclusion, "what their learned men have written about you, you would be compelled to admit the accuracy of their science and their large and sympathetic intelligence."

We had reached a retired part of the inner meadow where, under a few trees, a spring bubbled up; its waters kept the garden green, and pass-

ing through subterranean arches beneath the seven walls formed the pleasant stream which wound about the castle. He motioned to me to sit down, and we stretched our legs upon the turf and reclined against some sloping and moss-covered rocks that peeped out from the hillside.

"If I asked you," he began at last, "whether a child or a man had the better memory, you would reply, would you not, that the child remembers better the trivial context of things, because he has the fresher senses, but that a man retains with more certainty what is important, because his attention is concentrated on that side of things which touches his rational interests. A good memory for impressions is then not identical with wisdom; and an instinct, such as women possess, for discovering what is going on in other people's minds, is not a sign or product of education. The ants also understand one another. Now, if by collecting many writings which record the impressions of many men a city should acquire an artificial and prodigious memory, would that city be better than a prodigious and artificial child? And if, without being able to turn their insight into art, men should acquire a miraculous sense of one another's consciousness, such as the vilest prophets and magicians sometimes seem to possess, would this art of drawing aside the curtains which nature has hung about our dreaming spirits satisfy anything but a vain and unholy curiosity? It is not by collecting what by chance has been said about me, nor by divining what by chance I may have said to myself, that instruction can be gained from Socrates. Would such reports in the least help you to answer my questions if I should ask you what your own heart pronounces to be trustworthy, and what beautiful, and what good?"

"I, too, in my youth, as your scholars have told you, listened to Anaxagoras, who talked of reason without applying it. And Thales and Heraclitus had long before me said many things, true or false, about nature and the gods, to which I might have attended had not my demon forbidden me to do so. It is not on their account that I thank the gods I was born a Greek and not a barbarian. The barbarians before and after us have surpassed us in range and volume of imagination; but they only overwhelmed and harassed the mind, while our soberer moralists and poets enriched it. The Indian sages measured the infinite and counted the sands and traced the metamorphoses of nature, real and imaginary, long before my day; and afterwards the Christians prophesied about hell and heaven, describing, not without some inaccuracies, the places where we find ourselves now. Yet I, for living reasonably in my moments, have reached this immortality without expecting it, while they, with their infinite yearning, have done nothing well in the one world nor in the

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other. Finally in your own day, or in the generation before yours, the Germans of whom we were now speaking have repeated mysteries that, in more picturable form, had come to us from the ancients,—mysteries which Hesiod recorded and which Anaximander also and Empedocles turned into systems of philosophy.

“But do you see that spirit stalking across the plain and hastening to mount the ramparts? That is the most recently arrived of all the German sect, and a wonderful creature he is, full of intelligence and eloquence and sincerity. His system is written upon his countenance; for the dome of his skull, with his deeply shaded and piercing eyes, seems the home of the Idea, while his massive neck and formidable jaw and the clinch of his large and bitter mouth seem to manifest the Will, blind, self-enchained, and infinite. He is hurrying away to avoid the presence of two other sophists of his nation, those discoursing ghosts whom you see approaching from the other side, absorbed, not as you might think, in conversation, but each in propounding and solving his own dialectical riddles. He of the Will and Idea detests the sight of them; and yet to me the difference between him and them seems to be a matter of prejudice rather than of doctrine; for the Will and Idea which the one unmasks in despair are neither worse nor better than the Will and Idea which the others reveal with exultation. His acerbity against his rivals, whom he cannot forgive for having seemed to their contemporaries more pious and successful than himself, is only one sign of that lack of discipline which, like all barbarians, he seems to me to betray. But a greater sign of illiberal nurture I find in his idea of virtue. Virtue to his mind consisted not in living well, but in not living ill, or rather in not living at all; to such a consistent but impossible conclusion did he carry the hereditary inability of your modern nations to distinguish what is naturally good. He finally adopted the unmanly doctrine of Asiatic saints and Indian gymnosophists, who were so dazed by the mysterious forms of nature around them and so frenzied by their own more monstrous imaginations, that they became incapable of conceiving a happy life. They never perceived the true dignity of freemen and mortals; they utterly ignored the joy of fruitful action and of reasonable thought. Their unchecked sensibility refined their sympathies, but turned their existence into an infinite and piteous dream. To pass from this dream into a healthy sleep was accordingly the aim of their legislation. Buddha, their great lawgiver, is not among us here; for he too eschewed the immortality which his virtues might have commanded: but what I have heard about him has surprised me; I had not thought that among either gods or men there could be found so merciful, so just, and so sad a being.

But his virtue, being founded on pity, could end only in sadness, and his justice was misapplied for want of a better knowledge of political institutions and of the benefits and injuries which one age may actually receive from another. Untaught to act, he tried to save the world by thinking and talking. Himself, indeed, he saved; but his country remained sunk in its ancient and disordered reveries. Among the barbarians superstition has always been the principle of politics and the final cure for human ills. But your German Buddhist, who knew Greek, might have learned a better wisdom from our nation. His appeal to oriental piety was the last resource of a nature that had never learned how rightly to express itself. When he reached these realms we had a good occasion to observe his true character. For Minos and Pluto, in sentencing the departed and assigning them to their appropriate abodes, seldom need to consult other witnesses than the words and demeanor of those waiting to be judged. When this philosopher appeared, the judges, who knew him only by report, were about to dismiss him into the outer void, that he might effectually deny his will to live and abolish the memory of his own existence. But when he understood that by so canceling the initial bent of his being he would no longer behold either truth or beauty, and never again be able to remember how pitilessly he had derided and refuted his opponents, he immediately begged to be suffered to remain in some haven of recollection; and Pluto and Minos, having regard to his love for truth and to his high intelligence, opened to him the seven gates of this eternal sanctuary."

"I perceive, Socrates, that you are speaking of Schopenhauer; and the shade that just passed did indeed move with the great pessimist's confident haste and air of contemptuous resolution. I could well have understood your aversion to such a personage, and am surprised at the favor which, upon the whole, you and Pluto and Minos have agreed to show him. But if the two philosophers whom he was eluding are, as I conjecture, Fichte and Hegel, I should be glad to hear your opinion of them, which I am sure will be more flattering than the one you have just delivered upon their rival. Fichte, especially, cannot be blamed by you for lack of enthusiasm or for small interest in the Vocation of Man."

"No," Socrates said, "the spirit you mention—for you are right in your conjecture—was indeed an enthusiast, and what is more,—for if once the divine madness take possession of us we may become enthusiasts about anything or even about nothing,—he was a great diver into the sea of being. The monsters that he brought up from those depths have little interest for me; although I say not that some of those slimy and unsightly oysters may not contain a hidden pearl. You will say, I know, that I

cannot understand the heart-searchings of such a man, who was attempting by force of analysis and introspection to recover some memory of the creation and to write the embryology of mind or the autobiography of the Absolute. We Greeks, you think, were a nation of happy children, keen-witted, perhaps, and well-nurtured, but not old enough for serious reflection; so that the mind which we used in reading the cosmos, and which our philosophers since Anaxagoras found manifested in its order, escaped us in ourselves. But this diver, you will insist, finished that work of self-knowledge which the Delphic oracle recommended and which I, in my tentative way, did what I could to advance; and the intelligence which our mythology had been obliged to inject into nature he traced back into its actual seat, so that man recognized himself as the true demiurgus, and the impossible reduplication of powers and faculties in the knower and in the known was reduced to a single and intelligible operation in the living spirit. This is what you will say, and I am far from denying that you may be right in saying it, for my genius does not permit me to pronounce on such a point. Yet if I may trust a plausible interpretation which, in a dream, I once overheard concerning the meaning of our ancient poets and theologians, the doctrines you esteem new were known in Hellas long before Thales and the seven sages. For, according to the poets, Chaos and infinite Night, in which all things lay together undistinguished, were first limited and divided at the birth of Love; and Love and Strife by their union bred Earth and Sky and all the gods which now rule over nature and over the arts of men. Now Strife and Love, my dream declared to be, as their names show, not alien to the human heart, but rather its indwelling and primordial motions; and Uranus and Gaia, it said, were but the two hemispheres of the revolving soul beholding and mirroring each other in the whole extent of that universe which they constituted and presently peopled with the offspring of their profound and perpetual embrace. Whether all this be different from the German theosophy or in truth the same, I leave it for you and your learned friends to declare. For these are things which, as I have said, I am not suffered to assert or to deny. The divine prohibition is so absolute within me that I believe my demon, if he were able to give me positive instruction, would roundly declare that theology is not a region of truth or error at all, but rather of poetic and ingenious fancy; and that to lay great stress on mythical symbols and analogies of that sort marks a childish understanding and an untrained sense for the good."

Socrates ceased, and looked at me as if to observe whether I took him to be in earnest; so I said: "You point out an analogy between our transcendental speculation and your mythology which had never occurred

to me, but which seems, in some respects, well grounded. For both systems breed the Many out of the One and give the name deity to a primordial or protoplasmic being—a brooding Leviathan, like Jonah's whale, with everybody in its belly. They both lead, therefore, to an all-dissolving, mystical sort of religion, from which your demon wishes to keep you free, since the gods have marked you out to be a lover of civil life and an interpreter of articulate reason. But you seem to me at the same time to overlook the point on which we moderns chiefly pride ourselves, that whereas Chaos and Night and Love were thought of as external and physical beings, our Ego and Non-Ego are figures in an internal and purely mental cosmogony. The problem of knowledge which your physiologers could never have faced is thus met and solved beforehand by our idealists."

"Can you tell me," he answered, "what you mean by the problem of knowledge, for my thoughts are not clear upon that point, and I am not sure that I am able to understand you? Is it a problem which you solve by escaping ignorance or merely by intrenching yourselves within it? If the genesis of the world be by a process of thought, the presence of that world to thought is indeed involved in its genesis, and needs no further explanation or apology; but how is that presence knowledge? The madman, too, is the author of his own world and breeds an Other to be the mirror and counterpart of his free and irresistible impulse; yet the airy dagger with which he stabs himself leaves him still alive, the fancied fountain at which he drinks leaves him still thirsty, and the art of life is defeated by his visions. It is not, therefore, the presence of thoughts that makes knowledge, but rather the utility of their presence. And the problem of knowledge which it most concerns a man to solve is not that artificial and retrospective one about the primordial articulation of our dream, but the practical and progressive problem of applying that dream to its own betterment and of transforming it into the instrument and seat of a stable happiness. Such happiness is, to my mind, the natural fruit and the natural test of knowledge.

"But as I have renounced all speculation which is irrelevant to practice and to the good, I may no longer be competent to follow the argument of your new mythologists, and may even be mistaken in regarding them as mythologists at all. There is another analogy, however, between them and our wise men which I sometimes draw in fancy and which you may perhaps approve. The German philosophy reminds me of the science of Cratylus the grammarian. He came from Asia and spoke indifferent Greek, and having no command of eloquence and little acquaintance with the politics and religion of well-constituted states, he

was prudently silent at sacred festivals and in public assemblies. But to his private pupils he disclosed marvelous secrets touching the structure and origin of discourse, secrets which they had never suspected to be the explanation and condition of conventional eloquence. For he showed them how the interjection was first among the parts of speech and the adjective second, being but an exclamation appropriate to some image present to the senses; and how out of the union of many adjectives to designate one complex experience the noun was bred, for the noun was, he said, but one adjective chosen among the rest because it designated the most conspicuous element in that complex experience, and consequently could for brevity's sake be used as a symbol and suggestion for all the other adjectives. In this manner he established the hierarchy of words and of their meanings, adding much concerning the development of cases and tenses and moods; and he propounded curious theories about the origin of masculine and feminine endings, maintaining that in the beginning men believed all things to be persons and to have sex, until gradually, for lack of evidence, the sense for that characteristic became obscured, and people invented the neuter to distinguish objects having neither force nor fecundity. But Cratylus, while he carried his pupils back in these speculations to prehistoric times, and taught them to conceive the tensions and subtle interdependencies by which discourse is made possible and significant, could not himself compose a speech or a poem or a history worth writing down; for his mind was so given over to tracing the latent relations of terms that he could never apply them in their current acceptation, much less with poetic genius and freedom; so that when he spoke of human affairs he was, in his language, an intolerable pedant, while his thoughts, if after much labor they came to be deciphered, turned out to be but puerile and vague. For that stage of grammatical feeling which his investigations were concerned with had long ago been traversed and left behind by the human intellect, which, in civilized states, moves in the articulate plane of art and reason; he, however, had fallen back upon implicit and elementary notions to which men's minds could not habitually revert without neglecting and disintegrating their higher faculties. Accordingly, although Cratylus was generally acknowledged to be the most profound of grammarians and etymologists, no Athenian would have entrusted him with the general education of his sons; for the curious knowledge he might have imparted would not have given young men a liberal mind nor a quick and ingenuous judgment about the better and the worse, but would have embarrassed them with rudimentary questions which they might have better solved unconsciously, by following their trained instinct and the genius of the Hellenic language and laws.

To attain a right use and improvement of these divine gifts, Cratylus' retrospective speculation was altogether useless, while his barbarous jargon and his little care for all that makes a beautiful and happy life rendered him a bad companion for young freemen.

A similar judgment, I believe, would have been passed upon your German philosophers if they had appeared at Athens in my time. Among you a grammarian or mythologist can be accepted as a master of life because a superstitious habit has long prevailed among you which leads you to look to the origin of things with awe and to the uses of things with contempt. You have been taught to regard creation as the chief function of deity, and consequently a theory concerning the basis and genesis of experience can pass for a while among you for a sufficient philosophy. But to us a description of things rudimentary, and, as it were subterranean and hidden below the crusts of life, could have served merely as a speculative amusement. We should have listened for a moment to your embryology of reason as we listened to Cratylus and his etymologies; but we should have proceeded without interruption under the instruction of more accomplished masters to train ourselves in the positive functions of life and of art. Our whole education would still have endeavored to keep clearly and practically before us the difference between Hellenic and barbarous laws, between wisdom and folly, between beauty and ugliness, even if some stranger had plausibly informed us that all such distinctions were due to creative movements of attention in the primitive mind. To that cause they may have been due, or to some other; but the cultivation of the rational and discriminating faculty, however first acquired, is what made us truly men, whereas the theory of that faculty and its conditions might at best have turned us into diviners and analysts of our own infancy. We should have feared that your critical disintegration of thought and reason, while giving us insight into the possibility of madness, might, if too long dwelt upon, mar the perfection of our arts, and embarrass our mastery over ourselves and over nature. We Greeks were worshippers of the young and glorious gods, Zeus, Apollo, and Athena, not of their gigantic and nebulous ancestors, Light, Chaos, Strife, and Love; for we understood that the hidden foundations of things have no other dignity or value than that which they acquire by supporting the superstructure. But the barbarians, to honor their own tenacious and unenlightened natures, hold to the memory of the earlier and wilder gods. Thus Agni, which was the name the Indians gave to Hephæstus, was nothing but the force and spirit of elemental fire, whereas among us the god was an artificer training the force and spirit of fire to the service of human life. So when a philoso-

pher arises among the barbarians, the deeper down he can burrow into the Stygian depths and the more products and achievements of rational labor he can ignore in his investigations, the greater prophet he is supposed to be and the more spiritual man. Your mystics have always had a habit, ironical as I suspect, of praising life and promising it abundantly at the same time that they condemned and suppressed all its natural forms. They often spoke, too, about the love of man, while they were tireless in their invectives against all man's ways. Such a misanthropic charity was a chief part of their religion which consisted of distaste for the world and of childish dreams with which to sweeten a Titanic egotism."

"I perceive, Socrates," I said in my turn, "that you have heard Fichte discourse upon the Blessed Life, and that his forms of expression have not pleased you. Yet he himself and his most accredited followers often declare that the unity to which they reduce the world does not abolish its variety but rather, as Plato also said in his "Parmenides," needs that variety in order itself to exist; for a principle of unity must unify something, and the many, to form a multitude, must be marshaled in one field and must be somehow congruous or comparable in their diversity. Fichte, to be sure, sometimes spoke rather mysteriously of Being and even prevailed upon himself to call this Being God, for he was driven to this abuse of words by ignorant persecutors; but by absorption in Being he should have meant only attention to the facts of nature and to the needs of man; for man and nature are the modes in which alone, according to him, Being could manifest itself or come to consciousness; nor was this manifestation inferior in reality to the Being manifested, since only by appearing could a thing be, and all appearances were intrinsically phases of Being. Therefore if Fichte reduced the religious life to empty exertion and earnest futility, this mystical issue must be attributed to his personal fantasy, and, as you have said, to his lack of genuine education. But nothing in his system itself obliges us to drown ourselves in the sea of being and to commit suicide by an abstract and indiscriminate avidity for life. Fichte's invectives against those intellectual products which were unsympathetic to him must be passed over as we should pass over Isaiah's invectives against statues of the gods. How little necessary such fanaticism is to German philosophy appears in the case of Hegel. Hegel certainly was a catholic observer of all forms of life and a great student of its higher processes. Whatever we may think of him, we cannot charge him with aversion to things as they are nor with a pious narrowness."

"No indeed," Socrates said, "the German Heraclitus—for so I call

him—was no dreamer, and had no distaste for the world; even his egotism, if not less real perhaps than that of his compatriot, was less naked and crude; it was the uncompromising self-assertion not of mere will, but of a kind of reflection. I observe that among barbarians goodness needs to be encased in a certain stupidity; their clever men readily turn satirists, as happened even among the Romans. It was not so among us. Our Heraclitus wept at the flux which he thought universal; he did not cease to love the many beautiful things which it carried away forever. But your German Heraclitus loved the mutation which he discovered, and his malicious wit, in perceiving instability, banished from his heart the love of the things that perish. His wisdom accordingly was not sad, like the Ephesian's, but sardonic. For he lacked the creative faculty of my friend Plato, to immortalize in thought the forms of what materially must disappear; and he lacked much more the gift of Hephæstus, to turn the universal fire into an instrument of human art. To his quick but impotent eye not only was every existence elusive, but every meaning was equivocal and every good deceptive. He made the flux universal indeed; the gods joined the dance and nothing remained fixed save the fact and the formula of mutation. This flux, it is true, threatened for a moment to end in its own discovery; but soon the discovery itself was compelled to move. The only change that change suffered upon the attainment of self-consciousness was that the Absolute began to pipe the tune to which it was already dancing.

“The old Heraclitus was a great philosopher in his sphere and full of profundity; and so, I believe, was the new Heraclitus too. But they both limped in the same leg and the obliquity of their thought was due to a like partiality in their interests; they were both physical philosophers only. A man does not become a moral philosopher by calling himself an idealist; for to assert that there is nothing in the world but mind cannot help to give direction to life or distinguish good from evil. Your sophists talk as if to establish infinite consciousness everywhere would serve I know not what religious or divine end, for it certainly can serve no human interest. But could they pass for a moment into this realm of fruitless and incorrigible spirit, they would pine, perhaps, for the atoms of Democritus, which in their order and fertility made a better world to live in than does this concourse of shades. Who would not gladly quit a mad-house to dwell under the economy of the stars? It is not the stuff things are made of that concerns us, but the things into which that stuff may be made. Therefore a philosopher who constructs a world out of leaping, flickering, and self-devouring thoughts is a physical philosopher only, quite as much

as if he constructed the world out of fire. Thales himself did not conceive his primeval water without making it pregnant with the potentiality of consciousness; and so your cosmographers, who call themselves idealists, do not conceive their primeval mind, or their elementary impressions, without making these pregnant with the potentiality of an earth and a sky, and of all the objects we see about us. Otherwise they would fail in the only task they propose to themselves, namely, to give an account of the basis, substance, and contents of experience. That is the task of a natural philosopher; and whether he trace the phenomena of nature and thought to an original deity or to an indwelling force or to constituent perceptions or to efficacious and impressionable substances, he is a natural philosopher and nothing more. He is looking for what underlies experience, and is able to explain events; he is studying the actual laws of actual phenomena. His glance is turned downward, inward, and backward in search of grounds, elements, and conditions; in his most abstruse and, as he imagines, sublime speculations he is still asking what must exist besides to make possible that which exists already. Yet if by chance in this pursuit of efficient or material causes he thinks he has found an omnipotent power, or in this analysis of experience a latent and infinite mind, he may fancy himself a master of moral science. Whether his science, which, however imaginative it may be, is physical science only, be true or not you must inquire of his fellow historians and physiographers; for I have no right to speak upon such matters; but that his science is not moral science, you may, if you like, accept upon my testimony; for a father should know his own child.

“Now the omission of moral philosophy is in itself no fault, and when, as in Ionia, tradition and the laws impose a just view of the good, philosophy may perhaps abstract from the ideal which is often less obscured by silence than by fanatical speech. But your mythologizing naturalists have the misfortune of living in states where education has long been under the influence of superstition; for your religion was a cosmology and theology in which moral science was a submerged element, distorted and obscured by that submersion. The ideal of knowing things as they are was defeated among you by the other, in itself perfectly compatible, ideal of making things what they ought to be; and the fantastic physics which resulted confused in turn your natural conscience and taught it to lean upon material supports. You became in this way idealists in physics and realists in morals, so that in neither department had your philosophy any validity or truth. This confusion of mind has been the common heritage of your philosophers who, whatever their system, have still allowed the sense for the better and the worse to succumb to the spell of

some fascinating monster. The worship of wicked gods is the essence of barbarism; and when the German Heraclitus, vastly amused himself at the deviltries of his Absolute, passed them off as the ways of a god, he was a consummate and delightful barbarian. For he played the trick first upon himself. His sardonic humor was but the playful expression of his profound conviction. Therein his irony was like that which people have attributed to me. Both of us were really in earnest; he about the latent constitution and process of the world, I about morals and the ideal. Beneath my banter I was the faithful and enslaved worshipper of the beautiful and the good; the sunlight of my country and the sweeter light of reasonable souls had pierced me to the marrow with an unconquerable love. These things your Heraclitus had never known, and, had he known them, would probably have despised; for beneath a sophistical enlightenment his mind was still the prey of superstition, and no liberal nurture had ever corrected there the instincts of a sombre, ancestral fanaticism. Therefore the flux and contradiction of the world fascinated him and seemed to him divine; and having poured out his whole mind in that vain contemplation he could have no love and no reverence left for mortal happiness. His philosophy elaborated an infinite monster, and that monster his soul, being herself barbaric, could look upon as a god and worship unreservedly.

“So, at least, I understand the religion of this masterful spirit, who with Heraclitus and Parmenides should be honored for his profundity and courage,—virtues which I fear his disciples have often lacked. When I consider what they have made of his system I thank the gods that my own disciples were greater than I; for they were able to understand me. But the doctrines of your Heraclitus have passed for the most part into the hands of weaklings seeking compromises with their own prejudices and those of the world. They could not endure the vision of an Absolute struggling with the infinite contradictions of its own nature, and powerless to correct them; and so they have helped themselves out of their difficulty by a lie; for when a man is launched into telling a story or building a system of the universe it is always easier and more graceful to add a false fact than to retract a false assumption. And so your feeblers idealists, faithless to their master, tell you that his Absolute is only postponing the evidences of its friendship for man, and that somewhere in the universe all your highest hopes will some day be realized. While you live in the upper world, blinded by its glare, you can give credence to these fables, little understanding the pitiful shifts and the sordid interests by which they are bred; but I, alas, in this place can hear around me, wafted over the walls of our retreat, the wailing of a myriad and a myriad hopes, once

defeated upon earth, each an immortal voice, each eternally calling for a good that was impossible. Yes, my friend, I heed those unsilenceable voices, and you should heed them too, for many of them first cried in your own bosom, and, though you soon forgot them, they are still sounding here in these eternal halls of memory and of truth. Reject and banish from your soul, therefore, the weak subterfuge by which your sophists would mitigate the radical barbarism of their religion, for it combines the two things which a true philosopher must chiefly disown,—falsehood, I mean, and inhumanity.”

“But I see a friend of mine,” he added after a pause, “coming to interrupt our conversation and to drag me away to a rite which he daily forces me to perform before the altar of his ancestors. He died young, as you see, and had given promise of many excellences. Virgil first brought him to me, after reciting with a languorous and melancholy accent the verses he had composed on the boy’s death; for my exquisite Italian insists on forgetting that I neither understand his language nor take pleasure in sobbing rhythms and melodious tears. The youth, however, whom they called Marcellus, and who was a child of the Cæsars, lays great store by his immortality in the upper world, which, as he says, he owes to Virgil, and was therefore himself the first to welcome the poet into these realms, running to him with boyish and princely thanks; for there is nothing which a youth and a Roman loves more than honor, even if it be the living who must dispense it in their ignorance. Yet he is not averse for all that to laughter and a satyr’s ways, which, being told he should find in Socrates, he has fallen into the habit of following me about with many questions, giving in turn intelligent answers to what I ask of him. Now habit is a great ruler of ghosts as of men; therefore I must leave you to go and rehearse the glories of these round headed Romans; for you see the pious Marcellus will not wait any longer and is pulling me away by the cloak.”

With these words Socrates departed, and I too passed slowly out of that sphere, as out of a pleasant dream. But while yet within the ramparts I heard the voice of one who by the strain of his eloquence I take to have been Fichte, exhorting such as flitted by to cease to be ghosts, to strive to live once more, and by force of will to clothe themselves again in their bodies. “Dead spirits,” he was shouting, “call forth from your depths the phantom of an indomitable Other, struggle manfully to exorcise the ghost you shall have raised, and behold in that struggle you shall live forever.” A few of those who heard him stopped to make the attempt, but the greater number, remembering with a shudder the various madnenses that had possessed them on earth,

passed on hastily to their appointed resting places. And when I had reached the uttermost circle and began to see the sunlight again through the drifting clouds I came upon a bevy of voluble spirits, newly arrived upon those shores and disciples, as it seemed, of Hegel; for they were loudly asseverating that the self-consciousness of the Absolute was identical with their own and at the same time (what I could hardly credit) infinitely more intense than theirs. Those voices, too, soon died away, and I found myself again in the world of mortals; but I still held in my hand a few leaves from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, ^{to} convince me that my vision had not been wholly a dream.

RELIGIOUS FUSION

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WHILE Western missionaries are preaching Christianity in Asia, some silent influence is carrying on a modest Oriental propaganda in the West. Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Babism have their adherents among the people of Europe and America; Mohammed and Buddha, it is true, have few followers, but Babism is said to number several thousand converts in this country alone. So far, these seem to be the only modern Asiatic religions that are affecting us; one hears little or nothing of Western accessions to the ranks of Brahmanism, the Brahmo Somaj, or Confucianism.

At the first blush there may appear to be little in the three missionary religions mentioned above to attract people of our race. Islam, with its rigid, unemotional deity, its uncultured historical setting, its social regulations offensive in some points to our notions of propriety, the placid atheism of Buddhism, and its pessimistic quietism with nonentity as its avowed (yet undesired) goal, Babist mysticism, incarnating God in a succession of men whose characters are far from commanding unreserved respect,—what have these to offer to the eager, bustling, critical, refined life of the Western world? To most Europeans and Americans the pretensions of these creeds seem simply ridiculous, and adherence to them by aliens appears to be a mere vagary. And doubtless in many cases it is their novelty only that attracts. We are somewhat like the Athenians of Paul's time and the whole Roman world of the first century of our era, when everything new and startling was welcome, and Isis, Cybele, Mithra, and Moses disputed with Thessalian witches the empire over men's souls. Like the Roman world we have grown tired of certain conventions, and are willing to try anything that promises an agreeable change. We have become familiar with wonderful creations, and accept with equal vivacity or equal indifference a new medicine or a new religion.

Yet this is only one side of the situation. Those who follow the foreign faiths are not all superficial devotees of novelty. Among them are serious men and women who imagine at least that they find in these creeds something that satisfies their spiritual needs and is in accord with their highest ideals. Such persons may by some accident have lost sympathy with their religious surroundings; or conceivably they may have become clearly or dimly aware of some lack in current systems and may see elsewhere the possibility of supplying the lack. So it was in the times when the Greek mysteries and the cults of Isis and Mithra obtained such

vogue; these offered to the spiritually minded something that they did not find in the traditional faiths. There is, to be sure, a great difference between those times and ours as regards rationality and breadth of current religious conceptions, and our Christianity may seem to have flexibility enough to satisfy the needs of all devout persons. Yet, if we omit the highest religious generalizations of philosophers (which are nearly the same in all ages of the world), there may be particular points in which Christianity does not sufficiently appeal to certain religious sensibilities, and in these points other faiths may appear to be more satisfactory. And this is precisely the contention of the friends of the Oriental systems above named. Recent apologists for Islam (both those born in the faith and Western converts) claim that, purified from the accidents of its historical origin and generously interpreted, it offers a simpler and nobler theism and theocracy and a purer system of morals than any to be found elsewhere. Its demand to interpret the Koran in a modern sense cannot be regarded as wholly unreasonable; all religions based on ancient documents are continually undergoing a process of reinterpretation, in accordance with the shifting points of view of successive generations, and any religion, subjected to such a process, may be held to maintain its proper individuality so long as its fundamental conceptions are not set aside. Without pronouncing opinion on the validity of modern transformations of Islam, we may see that its sober, ethical theism and its salvation by simple righteousness, as these are now set forth, may appear to some persons to stand in attractive contrast with what is supposed to be the complicated and confusing theism and soteriology of the Christian world. Buddhism (not the spurious "esoteric Buddhism," of course, but the Buddhism of Buddha as the earliest records represent it) appeals to many persons in Europe and America partly, on the philosophical side, by the stress it lays on the moral order of the world, a personal deity being ignored, partly by its doctrine of reincarnation and karma, which is believed to offer the best foundation for a belief in a sort of immortality, while it holds every man personally responsible for all his weaknesses and misfortunes. This ethical naturalism, notwithstanding its philosophical and social difficulties, has a charm for those who wish to avoid all extrahuman spiritual agencies in life. The attraction of Babism is of the opposite sort—here we have the bodily introduction of the divine into life, a literally present God. The natural desire for a perceptible presence of the divine has been met in the Western world in different ways: by a philosophical doctrine of immanence (passing into various forms of pantheism and mysticism), and by such Church doctrines as the real presence in the eucharistic elements and the infallibility of the Bible or the Church.

Babism, going still farther, provides a perpetual incarnation of God in the person of some man, who is thus an infallible and perennial source of truth. In this way it undertakes to satisfy the human demand for something immovable; the man it offers is independent of learned argument and cavil, in himself absolute and final.

It is thus possible that the attractions of these religions are not wholly unrelated to serious convictions and desires on the part of their American and European adherents. However this may be, the movement toward the modern Asiatic faiths is at present of slender proportions, and cannot be said to have affected visibly our creeds. Such a result can be produced only by much more powerful influences, and it is one of these that I wish to describe and examine in the remainder of this article.

II.

Recent ethnological discussions have made us familiar with the important historical fact of the mixture of races. It is doubtful, we are told, whether there is a pure race on the face of the earth; mingling of tribes and nations seems to have gone on from the beginning of human life. In some cases great nations, controllers of the course of civilization, have sprung from such processes of admixture. Similar processes of assimilation and union may be discovered in the history of the religions of the world. We are not in a position to discuss the question whether there is or ever has been a pure, unmixed religion on earth—for this we have not the requisite knowledge of the phenomena; back of the earliest known facts of savage life lies an immense period of time enshrouding a history whose character we can only vaguely surmise. It will be necessary, therefore, to confine ourselves to the more highly developed religions and to the periods which fall within the scope of certified history.

In this inquiry we are shut up within a narrow space. Unfortunately, the formative period of the great, ancient national religions is shrouded in almost complete darkness. There is just a hint that in Egypt the relatively advanced cult of the conquering Hamitic tribes was amalgamated with the animal worship of the earlier inhabitants; hence, perhaps, arose the bizarre combination of ethical theism with the worship of living bulls, cats, crocodiles, and apes. In Babylonia, there is reason to believe, the Semitic invaders adopted in part the pantheon, myths, and rites of their non-Semitic predecessors, the issue of the union being a cult of noteworthy breadth and dignity; but the details of the process escape us. Something like this may have happened in the genesis of the Aryan

religions—there is a dim suggestion that the Indo-Iranians appropriated some of the usages and conceptions of the barbarous peoples of India and Central Asia, though it is difficult to distinguish between what may have been original Aryan and what a loan from without. When we come to China and Japan we are in still greater degree at a loss in the attempt to understand the religious development, largely because of the absence of historical monuments. Of early Japanese history we know practically nothing beyond the probability that the Japanese people, when they entered their present territory, found it in possession of savages, whose religion was doubtless akin to that of the Ainos. Chinese annals describe a chaotic mass of tribal incursions in the second millennium B. C., and what mingling of religious ideas there may have been at an earlier time we cannot tell. Nor have we more definite information about the rise of the great Indo-European religions of Europe. Greece adopted and modified certain Semitic deities in the second millennium B. C., but it does not appear that this adoption of divine figures affected the general character of the Greek religion, and we have no knowledge of other early, intimate religious contact of the Greeks with foreign peoples. The same thing is true of the formative periods of the Italian and Germanic religions.

Possibly a full history of the birth of the national religions would reveal little of moment. These cults grew up within national bounds, were the embodiments of national ideals at a time when isolation was the essential condition of national growth and the rule of political life. International relations were external and superficial. The Hebrew nomads, hovering on the borders of Egypt, before their incursions into Canaan, learnt nothing from the great Egyptian civilization; and Egypt and Babylonia, keeping up a lively political intercourse in the fifteenth century B. C., appear to have been only slightly affected each by the other in religious customs and ideas. Apparently, it is only after the national religious development is completed, and the point is reached when reflection on the meaning of religious conceptions begins, that an effective exchange of ideas between great bodies of men is possible. This stage of progress coincides in general with the rise of those religions that have been called universal, that is, capable of transcending national limits and commending themselves to all men everywhere. It is, therefore, to such religions as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism that we must turn in search of a significant intellectual and moral union of diverse national systems of life.

Of these, however, it is doubtful whether we can include Buddhism, the origin of which does not seem to show non-Indian influence. Buddhism appears in history as the isolation and elaboration of certain con-

ceptions that had long been familiar to Brahmanism. It was the achievement of a religious genius who discarded much of what was local and external in the current of faith, and laid stress on that which appealed to the general needs and the better moral sense of his time and country. That it contained universal elements is probably shown by the wide acceptance it gained in Eastern Asia. It became, and it remains, the dominant faith of Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Cochin China, and Tibet, has many adherents in the middle part of the continent, and is followed in China and Japan by the mass of the people, though there an eclectic sentiment exists which permits a man to be at the same time Buddhist and Tauist or Confucian, or Buddhist and Shintoist,—everybody is of the state religion, and most persons are Buddhists. Christianity and Buddhism have one noteworthy fact in common: each was expelled from its native land (though Buddhism remained in India much longer than Christianity in Palestine) and achieved its triumphs among alien peoples. In the case of Christianity the reason of this migration is evident: it received so large an infusion of non-Jewish thought that it ceased to have attraction for the Jewish people. It has been suggested that a similar infusion of foreign elements may account for the transference of Buddhism. But this infusion could not have taken place at the rise of the new faith. The only non-Brahmanic influence possible would be that of the non-Aryan races of India, and of this there is no trace, nor has Buddhism gained adherents among these races. Further, such influence, while it might serve to account for the acceptance of Buddhism by Tataric peoples, and perhaps some others, would hardly explain its rapid conquests in China and Japan. It must be added, however, that in certain regions, as Tibet and China and elsewhere, its triumph has been in proportion to its deterioration. It has allied itself with popular superstitions to such an extent as almost to lose its original aspect. In the gorgeous hierarchical machinery and elaborate polytheism of Lamaism it is hard to recognize the figure of the Sakya sage, Gautama; the Buddhist priests of China are notorious beggars and hypocrites; and the middle and lower classes in Ceylon, China, and Japan appear to be ignorant of what we regard as the essential elements of the Buddhistic faith. It may be said, therefore, that in one sense Buddhism owes its success to a process of religious fusion, but a process of an inferior sort. Gautama created, apparently out of purely Indian material, a faith that was not wholly universal; his absolute ethical system was grafted on a local conception of life. Hence, perhaps, may be explained the career of Buddhism; its universal element procured it currency outside of its native land; its imperfect Indianism cut short its abode in India, where it gradually

yielded to the pressure of the traditional national cults; and in foreign lands, while it retained some of its original features, it was compelled in every region to adopt and assimilate local peculiarities. In this process, which appears to have gone on throughout the Buddhistic world, it is hard to say how far there has been an intimate mingling of different systems of thought. In India, Brahmanism and Buddhism stood side by side in not unfriendly association for some centuries, but, while there was some interchange of thought (which, considering the original identity of the two systems, was quite natural), of permanent mutual influence there are no clear proofs; and elsewhere there appears to be only a mechanical union of Buddhism with other faiths. It must be concluded, therefore, that Buddhism owes its triumphs to a fusion, mechanical, not intellectual or spiritual.

The best example of the genesis of a religion from the union of different faiths is furnished by Christianity, which combined in itself the conceptions of more than half of the ancient world. Large processes of assimilation that had been going on for a long period were completed by the conquests of Alexander the Great, whereby the Greek and Jewish worlds were converted into a unity. By a happy coincidence he came on the field at the moment when the controlling communities of the West were ripe for union. In the light of subsequent events we can see that had he been a century or two earlier or later the results would probably have been very different from those actually accomplished. This will be apparent from a glance at the histories of the two leading faiths of the Western world.

The Judaism of the end of the fourth century B. C. summed up the best thought of the old Semitic peoples. Ancient Israel, while the most original of the Semitic races, was also the most hospitable; isolated and self-centred, it was at the same time a constant borrower. When it first appears in history, its religion is not to be distinguished from that of the many other tribes which ranged over the pasture lands on the borders of Canaan and Egypt, from time to time conquering for themselves settled habitations. Great doubt hangs over its early years; the origin of its god Yahweh is unknown. But from the moment it secured a footing in the land of Canaan, it began to enrich itself with the ideas and customs of its neighbors. It adopted Canaanitish shrines, festivals, sacrifices, institutions, deities, legends, and myths, preserving, however, its own individuality and shaping the new material by its own genius. After a while it came into contact (especially in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C.) with the leaders of Semitic civilization, the Phœnicians, the Assyrians, and the Babylonians; and still later it became a member of the Persian Empire,

and found itself in a community that practically embraced the whole Western world as it was then known to the Jews. Through these influences, in conjunction with their own capacity of progress, the Jews had reached a high plane of religious life; they had pushed the old Semitic monolatry to the point of ethical monotheism; they had perfected an institution (the Sabbath) fitted to serve as the external framework of social religion for all the world; and they had composed and gathered together a body of sacred literature of singular elevation and freshness. So far as we can see, there was nothing of permanent value in Semitic religion that they did not possess, and they added certain conceptions (the theocratic constitution of society and the supremacy of divinely given law, national righteousness, national sin, national pardon, and the hope of a happy future for the nation), which existed either not at all or only in germinal form among their Semitic neighbors—in a word, they had developed in well-rounded shape the conception of social religion as an organization controlled by definite external law.

In like manner the Hellenic religion of Alexander's time was the culmination of a long development; it represented the finest product of Western Indo-European religious thought. In one respect its experience was simpler than that of its Semitic contemporary—it was less affected by foreign influences. Its earliest form known to us belongs about in the thirteenth century before the beginning of our era, the period commonly assigned also to Moses. At this time the Greek popular cult did not differ substantially from that of the other ancient peoples; there was the ordinary worship of local divinities, with festivals and sacrifices; some form of ancestor-worship probably existed; the conception of the other world was vague and non-moral. At an early period Semitic settlers on the Greek coasts left traces of themselves in the shape of a few divinities which were adopted and modified by the Greeks¹; but these did not sensibly affect the Greek theistic system, which remained Indo-European. In the time of Homer and Hesiod the pantheon had assumed the form that it retained, with some additions, to the end. The higher ethical construction of religion began about the seventh century B. C., its exponents being the poets and the philosophers. As among the Semites, a virtual monotheism became the faith of the great ethical thinkers (from Pindar on), but not of the people at large. Profound religious ideas were inculcated in the mysteries, which formed a select circle of seekers after truth, but never grew to the proportions of a national Church. Stress was laid on the individual and inward character of the religious life, and

(1) Aphrodite (Ashtart), Melicertes (Melkart), and perhaps others.

an enlightened conscience was regarded as the guide and judge of conduct. An ethical basis was given to the future life, and the hope of a free and active immortality was the stimulus to men to lead a pure life on earth. The Greeks had no divinely given code—they thought of God as being in man's reason, and, in general, of the world, including man, as being the dwelling-place of the divine.

Such, in brief, were the two great masses of religious thought that were brought together by the conquests of Alexander. There began immediately what may be called a process of coalescence; but, strictly speaking, the process was wholly, or almost wholly, one of borrowing on the part of the Jews. It does not appear that the Greeks, for the next four hundred years, adopted any of the ideas of their Semitic fellow citizens. The ethical pleasure-seeking of the Epicureans and the ethical self-control of the Stoics were both of them Greek in origin and in content; and the religious usages of the Jews were too distinctly national to be adopted at that time by the Hellenic communities. It was not strange that the stream of influence should flow in one direction only. The great governing world was Greek, and it seemed to be provided with everything man could desire; it had literature, art, science, philosophy, elegant social culture. The Jews were a subject people, hedged about by customs that doubtless appeared bizarre or barbarous to Hellenic refinement; and their literature, even when it was translated into Greek, dealt too largely with remote history and peculiar ideas to be easily intelligible to foreigners. It was rather Egypt that the Greeks of that time found attractive. Their imagination was impressed by its immense antiquity and its strange pantheon; and the doctrine of immortality that they had already worked out would be strengthened and supplemented by the elaborate Egyptian scheme of judgment in the under-world. The Ptolemies were warm friends of the civilization of Egypt; the two peoples mingled their religious lives; the Egyptians could not become Hellenized without leaving their impress on their conquerors.

The Jews in the Greek kingdoms were highly susceptible to the influences of their surroundings. They found themselves in the atmosphere of a new and splendid culture. If they had been intellectually inhospitable, they might have remained unaffected by what they saw; but, as is pointed out above, they were the reverse of inhospitable. Without, as a people, abandoning their peculiar point of view, they threw themselves eagerly into the new life. Some of them adopted Greek social customs; the more thoughtful accepted and assimilated certain lines of Greek philosophy. One writer (the author of the original book of Ecclesiastes) embraced a form of scepticism then current; another (the

author of the "Wisdom of Solomon") made the personified Wisdom the architect and inspirer of the cosmos; still another (Philo of Alexandria) expounded the Pentateuch in accordance with the ideas of Platonism, introducing the doctrine of the Logos that was destined to play so important a rôle in the history of Christianity. Jews wrote dramas and epic poems, things foreign to the Semitic genius. Incipient forms of gnosticism showed themselves in Jewish circles. In short, there was scarcely an intellectual current of the time into which Jews did not throw themselves. Thus, gradually and almost insensibly the Jewish people modified their older conceptions, took on the coloring of the new era, and interpreted their sacred books in the light of the new ideas. Even when they did not adopt Greek philosophy or Greek manners, their conception of moral and religious life was modified; they acquired a half-cosmopolitan tinge.

All over the Greek world the Jews were subjected to these influences—in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Babylonia, and the Mediterranean islands. Alexandria was their most important centre, and here, it would seem, probably in the second or the first century before the beginning of our era, they first reached the doctrine of ethical immortality. Doubtless the root of the doctrine was in their own national thought; but here, where Egyptians, Greeks, and Semites were moulded into a unity, it appears to have taken shape, each people contributing something to its full form; thence it would easily spread over the Jewish world. But, wherever it arose, it was a joint product of Greeks and Jews.

By the beginning of our era a partial amalgamation of the two systems of religious thought had taken place. For the permanence of any form of organized religion the most important thing is the nature of the organization; ideas are transmitted through individuals from age to age, but no body of men has ever perpetuated a religious system unless its members were held together by some simple and strong social bond. It was in the creation of such a bond that the Jews most showed their religious genius. Other nations reached a high plane of theistic and ethical thought; the Jews alone, in the Western world, popularized such thought by a series of admirably contrived institutions. Before the time of Alexander they had set apart one day in the week for the cultivation of religious feeling. Later they created the Sabbath assembly: the people met regularly to listen to the reading of the sacred books, which were expounded by learned men. Thus they constructed a social framework of the religious life that has commended itself to the world as effective and practicable. They maintained and diffused their great idea of a direct divine government of the world and of every man's direct personal respon-

sibility to God for every act of life. They glorified divine law, an external code, the absolute guide of life, set above all individual variations of feeling; they lived in a world in which, at every moment, they were conscious of an external, supreme restraining and directing power. To this scheme of life the Greek conception came in the way of modification—internalizing, refining, enlarging. The divine, the Greeks held, was in man's soul, and autocratic conscience or reason was the director of life; God, being bound to man in close sympathy, was to be loved as well as revered; the world was a cosmos, not alien and hostile to the higher life, but a revelation of divine truth. There was also the belief in immortality, in part a Greek contribution. The doctrine of bodily resurrection (adopted by the Jews partly under Persian influence) was relatively narrow (the book of Daniel held that only Jews were to be raised to life); the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was consoling, refining, inspiring, and broadening.

A discussion of the ethics of the time does not fall within the scope of the present inquiry. The subject is an interesting one, and deserves more attention than it has yet received. As far as the evidence goes, there seems to be no essential difference in the higher Jewish and Græco-Roman codes of the period that witnessed the rise of Christianity. The common practice, Jewish, Greek, and Roman, fell far below the standards of the best writers, but these last agreed among themselves. In the practical ethical element Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus are at one with Hillel and Paul; the Talmud is morally in accord with the New Testament. Much that has been recently written on the morality of the first century of our era is misleading; but it is impossible to examine the details here. In the Græco-Roman world the ethical feeling had everywhere reached about the same point, and it, of course, coalesced with the religious feeling. The religious organization of doctrine and usage, with which we are here concerned, went its own way, assimilating, as it found occasion, the ethical ideas of the time.

It was in the midst of the new Judaism that the founder of Christianity lived and taught. Unfortunately we have only very meagre reports of his life and words, and these often colored by tradition. But the impression left by the New Testament accounts is that he was not unacquainted with the intellectual currents of thought of the Palestine of his day. In the Fourth Gospel the doctors of divinity call him unlearned, but in the Synoptics they treat him with respect. Whatever his technical learning or ignorance may have been, he was evidently familiar with the modes of thought of the Jewish leaders of the day, and handled them in masterly fashion. The probability is that he was

acquainted with the Palestinian non-Jewish lines of religious thought of the day; that such thought was then not unknown to the Jewish doctors may be inferred from the fact that Hellenism had maintained itself in Palestine for a century before Jesus appeared on the scene. Herod had done his best to introduce Greek customs. Palestinian cities were seats of Greek philosophy; in the first century before the beginning of our era Ascalon and Gadara produced writers of note. Add to this that many cultivated Greeks and Romans lived in Jerusalem and in other Palestinian cities. It may not be going too far to suppose that the tone of universality in Jesus' teaching is due in part to the larger intellectual world in which he lived. It is impossible to explain completely the thought of so lofty a religious genius; yet we may say that, as he adopted the Jewish sacred books and institutions, so he accepted other large conceptions, such as the subordinate position of ritual in religion, the inwardness of the true life, and the ideas of filial union with God and the "enthusiasm of humanity." Some of his Jewish contemporaries may have grasped, at least to some extent, the same ideas; but they also would be nurtured in the new Judaism.

Jesus himself dealt only with fundamental religious and ethical principles; he neither founded a Church nor gave directions for founding one; he entered into no theological speculations and announced no ecclesiastical rules. In the work of organization undertaken by his immediate followers a certain number of Greek ideas were more or less explicitly expressed. Paul probably had no special acquaintance with Greek philosophy, but he was in sympathy with Greek thought, and his system is colored by it. His conception of the Christ (the Messiah) is not Jewish, though it is similar to one found in a late Jewish work (the "Parables" in the book of Enoch); the man Jesus he represents as having been exalted to be the divine Son of God, sitting, as head of the Church, at the right hand of God. This profound conception of humanity as deified in the person of the Saviour is out of accord with the Jewish idea of the transcendence of God, but is in harmony with the Greek idea of the immanence of God in the world. The Greek point of view is still more pronounced in the Logos of the Fourth Gospel (and substantially in Colossians and Hebrews). The world as cosmos, salvation by regeneration of the soul, the divine spirit as the inspirer of the higher life, the two worlds of light and darkness,—these, though they may have existed in Jewish thought in embryonic form, attained their New Testament shape under Greek influence. Thus the New Testament is largely a Greek book, and the Christianity of the New Testament is largely a Greek product. The Jewish framework of institutions is retained, but

the Jewish conceptions of God, man, and salvation are modified in various directions.

It is unnecessary to carry farther the description of the amalgamation or fusion of the two faiths, the Hebrew and the Hellenic. The process was continued in the following generations, when Christianity passed out of the hands of Jews, and was largely Hellenized and Romanized, retaining, however, its Jewish substratum. There can be little doubt that it owes much of its power to its dual nature, the present form of which Matthew Arnold describes so happily in his "Culture and Anarchy."

The origin of Islam is similar to that of Christianity. Mohammed grew up in an Arabian community that was tinged with foreign ideas, Persian, Christian, and Jewish. The conflict here was sharper than that begun by the founder of Christianity. The new conceptions had been adopted by a select circle only; the masses held to a more or less crude polytheism, which had to be extirpated by violence. The Northern Arabs had no religious institutions, only some simple and primitive customs. Mohammed was obliged to borrow bodily much of his spiritual framework,—a sacred day, devotional meetings, daily prayers; the sacred book he composed, an extraordinary achievement paralleled only by Confucius and Buddha (and, we may add, Joseph Smith). But he retained what he could of the old usages, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the processions and sacrifices. His monotheism may be regarded as a purification and elevation of the old Arabian monolatry, and the whole fabric of Islam as an ennobling of Arabism by the infusion of higher Semitic and non-Semitic (Christian) elements. Though the Christian element (faith, the apostleship, a final judgment, heaven, and hell) was important, the basis was substantially the severe, unbending Semitic theocracy, with no intermediary between God and man. Mohammed, by a fine stroke of genius, called his religion the "faith of Abraham," which he claimed to have restored in its pure form uncontaminated by the addition of Judaism and Christianity; so Paul, in the third chapter of Galatians, carries Christianity back to Abraham. Islam, by its combination of simple Semitic theocracy and certain later spiritual conceptions, appealed to the Semitic population of Western Asia and the related peoples of Africa and Central Asia, from which regions it speedily expelled Christianity; it has never been able to get a firm hold on any Indo-European people, except by a modification of its point of view. In cultivated circles it is now undergoing a transformation under the influence of modern scientific and ethical ideas.

Of the permanent results of the latest Asiatic religion, Babism, it is too soon to speak with certainty. It is one of many Persian attempts to cast off the Semitism of Islam and revert to the Indo-Iranian type of

religious thought. The designation "Indo-Iranian" may be justified by the fact that Babism is an Iranian construction of the Indian doctrine of divine incarnation. It is, however, almost if not wholly Buddhistic or Brahmanic in its fundamental conception; it is hard to find in it any trace of the Zoroastrianism of the Avesta or of the modern Parsees. It has adopted certain modern European ideas of education, of the position of woman, etc.; but its conception of God, righteousness, salvation, and the future life cannot be said to be taken from Islam or from Christianity. As yet, with the exception of European and American converts, it has not passed beyond the borders of Persia, and, though it has universal elements, it is impossible to say whether it will survive otherwise than as a Persian sect.

III.

From the facts above stated it appears that the only religions in which a union of different faiths is evident are Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This group is not identical with what are commonly called the "universal" religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam) or with those which were founded by a single man (the same three, Zoroastrianism being omitted as doubtful). The differentia of the group appears to be the fact that the religions composing it all sprang from a process of social fusion. In the case of Judaism and Christianity this process is evident, as is pointed out above. The Hebrews, from the moment they entered Canaan up to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, were in close contact with other peoples, Canaanites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, living in the midst of them, trading with them, and sometimes intermarrying with them. Since the destruction of their nationality, also, they have dwelt among alien peoples, and, in so far as their relations with these have been socially intimate, their religious ideas have been modified. At two points in their history they have had this sort of contact: first, with the Moslems in Spain (from the eighth century to the thirteenth), and then, with the Christians in Europe (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); in the first of these periods appeared the liberal theology of Maimonides, in the second the reform movement of Moses Mendelssohn. The reform has spread in Germany, France, England, and America; it has scarcely touched countries where, as in Russia, the Jews have been isolated. Christianity, beginning as a compound of Semitic and Greek elements, obtained a footing in the Roman Empire, and, under the pressure of the current thought, became more and more Hellenized and Romanized. In Arabia, for a century before Mohammed, the different sections of the population, Arabian polytheists,

Jews, and Christians, mingled freely in commerce and in social life. The relations between them were often hostile, but, in spite of this (or, partly, in consequence of this) there was a constant interchange of ideas, and a substantial unity of life.

If we omit Confucianism, which is a social code rather than a religion, the dominant faiths of the world are Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism, and all of these except the last have come into existence and gained their power through social mingling of races or nationalities. Buddhism is not altogether an exception to the rule, since, outside of India, it has commonly won success by effecting a union with local cults. It is, apparently, in this way that the great unifying religious movements of the world have been accomplished, not by philosophical discussions and not by violence, but by the union of thought that naturally follows union of life. Union of life creates and involves a number of broadening influences,—a point that cannot be discussed here. Whether there is to be any further coalescence of social masses in the world, and, if there should be such coalescence, what its nature and results will be,—these are questions that only the future can answer.

NAPOLEON
IN THE LIGHT OF POSTHUMOUS TESTIMONY AND
RECENT HISTORICAL WORKS

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IT would be interesting to study the genesis of historical legends. It is believed by most persons that these legends do not arise until long after the events,—at a remoter period when the main lines of the facts and the features of the characters are already so shrouded in the mist of time that they loom up larger, more sombre, or more brilliant than they were in reality. Numerous examples prove, on the contrary, that legends are apt to be formed shortly after the death of the hero they celebrate, and even during his lifetime. And without going back to the Trojan War, to the Nibelungen, or to the Round Table, we have witnessed in the course of the nineteenth century itself historical legends in process of formation under our very eyes; legends that, after having passed from mouth to mouth, have finally been embodied in works written by authors enjoying a certain authority, and have ended by becoming articles of faith.

One of the most recent instances is that of Garibaldi, who, during his lifetime, passed in the eyes of the people of Southern Italy for a sort of knight of the Holy Grail, at once invincible and invulnerable. Nor did his defeat at Mentana nor the fact that he was wounded at Aspromonte in the least diminish his superhuman virtues. "They fire at him," the Neapolitan lazzaroni were wont to say in 1859, "but he has only to shake his cloak and the bullets fall."

Neither documents nor testimony have any power over a legend, for it is the property of a legend to be all sufficient unto itself and to be superior to all proofs. Once the legend is formed, proof fails to affect it. In vain has it been demonstrated, by means of documentary evidence, that the Bastille was not taken by the people, but surrendered by its defenders, and that at the same time it held no political prisoners; it will not prevent this riot, witnessed by numerous spectators, and even by fine ladies, who had repaired thither for the sake of diversion, from passing for the people's first and glorious victory in its struggle against tyranny. That rascally Latude, also, whom legend, in order to render him more interesting, has presented with a tame spider that kept him company, will remain, no matter what may be urged in opposition, the martyr of a holy cause,—a social advantage he took care to turn to the best possible account.

Translated by Professor F. C. de Sumichrast of Harvard University.

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But the real hero of modern legend, the legend that towers above the whole century, is Napoleon. The Napoleonic legend did not arise at once, that is, while he was the all-powerful master of France, and while he was crushing Europe under his iron heel with an amount of free-and-easiness, and a contempt for the rights of others that has been equaled or surpassed only by the great Asiatic conquerors, Timurlane and Ghenghis Khan. At that time he was admired and feared, but he had not yet become, as he did become later, the ideal of grandeur and chivalric majesty.

His epic commenced after his fall only, and the date of that commencement may also be said to lie between the abdication of Fontainebleau and the Hundred Days. It was developed after Waterloo, especially when the vanquished despot appeared in fallen majesty on that rock of Saint Helena, which turned out, indeed, to be a magnificent pedestal for him. Then it was that all the officers on half-pay, who had grumbled against him of yore, and who now, dissatisfied with the king's government, which distrusted them and cut off their supplies, invented the Napoleonic cult. They turned their former commander into a sort of demi-god endowed with every virtue, at once the representative of the Revolution, which he had destroyed by completing it, and of the genius of France, which he had worn out for the benefit of his own ambition.

Every wrong he had been so often reproached with, his egotism, his nepotism, his contempt for men and women, his jealousy of those whose military glory offended his own, his harshness towards the vanquished, his lack of scruples, carried to the length of judicial murder, as was seen in the case of the Duke d'Enghien, his preference for servile mediocrity, even for rascals such as Talleyrand and Fouché, whom he made his habitual companions, although well aware that they were capable of anything, somewhat after the fashion of his masters, the sultans of the East, who turned eunuchs into ministers,—all these features of his character, well-known to his contemporaries, completely disappeared in this apotheosis behind the power of the personage and the incarnation of the glory of arms,—the latest in time of the great conquerors.

Those who have most contributed to endowing the world with this fictitious Bonaparte, are first Napoleon himself, who spent his leisure time on the rock in writing his own apologia and painting a portrait of himself for the use of posterity; next, the faithful Las Cases, the Dangeau of this new Louis XIV., who improved upon his master's account; then, Ségur, the lyrical romancer of the Grand Army; then, Émile-Marco Saint-Hilaire, the teller of Napoleonic anecdotes; and, finally, Béranger,

the singer of the man, who more than any one else made the little hat and gray coat popular :—

“Tell us of him, granny,
Tell us of him ;”

then, Victor Hugo himself, who later, from the top of his Guernsey rock, was to curse in his heaviest, most eloquent, and most inexhaustible style the imperial dynasty, but who was in 1830 singing, to the accompaniment of his lyre, the glories of 1811 ; and, finally, M. Thiers, who devoted endless volumes to glorifying the imperial system, and thus consecrating the legend as an historical monument that might be believed definitive.

Alongside of all this, popular cuts and cheap statuary scattered profusely around the features of the demi-god, who, his arms crossed on his breast, and his little hat on his head, seemed to be defying the universe, and imposing his will upon the future. Every cottage, every country tavern, possessed a copy of the idol offered for the worship of the faithful, and piously placed in the handsomest room or in the drinking room, in the same place where, seventy years later, was to figure his caricature in the shape of the portrait of General Boulanger. Is it surprising that the Napoleonism created by the half-pay officers under the Restoration ended by becoming a national cult that had even a king, Louis-Philippe, for almoner ?

Later on the Second Empire damaged it somewhat, first by copying its model rather too servilely, but especially after its fall, when Sedan recalled Waterloo. Since that day, and under the Third Republic, men dared to gaze straight at the sun without being particularly blinded by it.

The legend, however, still subsisted,—until the day when a celebrated historian, M. Taine, happened to examine it with his myopic vision and perceived that it did not quite come up to what it was believed to be. He studied the legend with the microscope, dissected it with his scalpel, and discovered that under the great general there was an astute politician and a fiercely ambitious man ; under the glorious Frenchman, a tricky and unscrupulous Corsican, the worthy descendant of the Italian condottieri, his ancestors. He devoted a couple of volumes to the support of this view, which he backed up with innumerable quotations and testimonies drawn from every quarter, a method that had already stood him in good stead in literature, in proving that all great men are first and foremost men of their time, that their grandeur does not reside in them, but in the society to which they belong, to which they do but restore what they have received from it, and the defects as well as the good qualities of which are incarnated in them.

This method, the usual result of which is to diminish the importance of the portrait by enlarging the frame, produces a Napoleon so different from that of the legend that he is almost its antithesis. It exhibits him to us as a hard worker, very industrious, very intelligent, knowing men thoroughly and possessing the art of making use of them, endowed with marvelous intuition, which he applied to everything that interested him,—and he was interested in many things, especially in himself. It shows him also, on the other hand, as a man who was vulgar, who lacked education and culture, who despised men and women because he was himself incapable of belief in honor and virtue; jealous of the fame of others, and mean in his thoughts and his judgments, which explains how it was that he could surround himself with nobodies and live on a footing of intimacy with rascals whom he knew to be such, and with whose treasonable practices he was acquainted.

What he loved in France, which was not his fatherland, was not France itself, but the club he made of it, and with which he smote the world with redoubled blows like the madman that he was, and also as a rash gambler, hypnotized by his star, never satisfied with what he had; breaking off alliances as soon as he thought it advantageous to himself; delighting in overthrowing the thrones of Europe, in order to set them up again and to place on them members of his wretched and hungry family,—always begging, never satisfied, and ungrateful into the bargain towards the man to whom they owed everything. History has never recorded such sickening nepotism, such a dividing of the spoils. The nations to whom he sent a Joseph, a Jerome, a Murat, a Louis, an Eliza, to be their kings or queens, were mortified to the very depths of their souls. Never were justice and right more outrageously violated, and he did not even bestow a thought upon that view of the matter, for the nations did not count so far as he was concerned. In the way of governments, he recognized but one, the despotism of the sword, and he understood no other system than that of absolute servitude.

What he was as a sovereign, he was also as a man,—irritable, haughty, contemning contradiction, going beyond all bounds in his wrath, insulting his most faithful servants, his best generals when they happened not to be of his way of thinking; absolutely without regard for women, whom he despised even more than he did men, and withal concealing often under brusque manners, and even under coarseness, what was lacking in his early education,—a lack he would not own to, though he suffered from it. This was why he liked to be surrounded by pomp, why also he cast with lavish hand princely alms to all who drew near to him or who formed part of his household or of his family; he thus hoped to

restore the prestige he fancied he did not have, though, in point of fact, his genius might well have stood him in stead of it. But he wanted something else. His dream was to enter into the great family of kings, that is, to be above them and to see them tremble before him.

* * *

Such, indeed, is the impression one has of the character of Napoleon when one has studied it in Taine's work and tries to sum it up in its chief aspects. No doubt it is a correct representation, but relatively correct only, and it may be that from the scientific point of view, a method which consists in enumerating testimonies laboriously collected so that they shall all tend in the same direction, is neither the safest nor the fairest.

The fault of this plan of sorting out is that by its means one can manage to prove anything. Other writers, M. Levy, for instance, have succeeded, by adopting the same plan and making use of the same methods, in presenting to us a Napoleon entirely different from that other; a bourgeois Napoleon, rather stupid, endowed with every domestic virtue, the constant dupe of those who surrounded him, robbed, deceived, betrayed by all and sundry, and never perceiving it or never daring to punish the traitors. In a word, a sort of George Dandin of genius, who, could he but see this portrait of himself, would probably make matters pretty warm for the kindly, but clumsy, author who painted it.

Nevertheless this book, such as it is, proves better than any long demonstration could do the weakness of Taine's method. And from this point of view, Prince Napoleon was right in saying to the celebrated writer that Napoleon was not an animal to be examined under a microscope, and that to dissect his fibres was the surest way of never coming across his genius. It was a sharp criticism, yet it cannot be said to be undeserved. What Taine's Napoleon lacks is the greatness that the Emperor possessed in the supremest degree, and without which neither Napoleon himself nor the part he played in the world can be understood. Such epic figures as his are not composed exclusively of second rate qualities, even if these be carried to an eminent degree. There stands in their favor a testimony more effective than endless tittle tattle,—the testimony of history, which is not to be gainsaid.

II.

There is, however, one point in the old legend that has probably been destroyed forever,—the portrait of the man. He appears to us at the present day vastly different from the man presented to us by Marco Saint-Hilaire, Norvins, Charlet, and all the Napoleonic embellishers. The

kindly individual celebrated by Béranger has vanished, and in place of it there remains a great man, but a terrible man, scarcely estimable and not in the least sympathetic.

By a singular chance the publication of Taine's work coincided more or less closely with the appearance of a multitude of memoirs concerning Napoleon, and written, some by military men, such as Marbot, Macdonald, Roussillon, Oudinot; others by enemies, Count d'Entraigues, Hyde de Neuville; and others, again, by persons who had lived with him and who knew him intimately, Mme. de Rémusat, Count Chaptal, Duke Pasquier, not to mention that consummate liar, Talleyrand, who fooled posterity even from beyond the grave by bequeathing to it "Memoirs" in which he goes on lying, not only in what he says, but especially in what he omits to say.

In particular he takes good care not to confess to the preponderating part he played in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien; but this omission has fortunately been made up for by Chaptal and Pasquier, and the part played by the ex-Bishop of Autun is so clearly stated that doubt on the point is henceforth impossible. Talleyrand it was who concocted the bloody plot, apparently for the sole purpose of increasing by that shameful complicity the influence he wielded over the master's mind, and which he felt was shaken. He it was who advised against clemency, and possibly hastened on the execution by transmitting secret orders to Savary. Indeed, Napoleon formally accused him of this, before witnesses, in the course of a terrible scene related by Pasquier, and which will remain famous. This is but one of the numerous infamous deeds of the man who was the minister of the Revolution, of Napoleon, of the Restoration, plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna, ambassador of Louis-Philippe, and who died, full of years, of contempt, and of honor. It is right that it should be set down against him, and that he should bear the responsibility of it in the face of history. But it is not with Talleyrand that we are concerned.

All these testimonies, appearing at one and the same time, like Rabelais' frozen words, have thrown upon Napoleon's character and private life a flood of light that was wanting in previous biographies; and since each of the witnesses looks at him from his own point of view, or, as the saying is, through his own glasses, the result cannot, even if not the truth itself, be very far from it.

* * *

To Mme. de Rémusat Bonaparte is a master, at once seductive and terrible; a single pleasant word of his makes one forget his frequent frowns.

A man who enjoys seeing others tremble before him, who grants his friendship to no one; profoundly egotistical, yet capable of gratitude; absolutely lacking in all that is called morality, ready to do anything to satisfy his desires, especially political ambition, but other passions also; and yet he remains, notwithstanding the additions and corrections made to these curious memoirs at a later date, interesting rather than hateful. One feels that they are written by a woman who fell under the spell of the mighty conqueror, and who has repented in her latter days, but in the way in which people repent of the sins of their youth, that is, with a certain tender complacency, marked especially by the pleasure of remembrance and the emotion of regret.

* * *

Marbot shows us the ever victorious general, who does not allow the army to remain idle, and under whom, if a man succeeds in pleasing him, and is not fool enough to go and get killed, he is pretty sure of rapid promotion, particularly in time of war. Napoleon has a good memory and forgets nothing, neither the good nor the evil. As he is suspicious and mistrustful, one must beware, above all things, of opposing or offending him; but when one knows him and serves him well, when one has the art of flattering his weaknesses and his conceits at the right time,—and great men are subject to such foibles like other, and even more than other, men,—one may obtain anything from him.

It must never be forgotten that he is an Italian, and that there is in him something of the actor, and even of the quack, as for instance when on the eve of Austerlitz, in order to dazzle the envoys of the King of Prussia, he caused flags that had already been received to be taken from the arsenal and the whole ceremony to be gone through with again. On such occasions a man must not contradict or appear astonished, but divine the intention, play his part well, and speak his lines convincingly. That is the kind of man whom Napoleon likes, and who may hope for everything from him.

Marbot had no reason to complain of Napoleon, although the latter did keep him waiting somewhat before he promoted him to the rank of general. The fact that this very brave and very entertaining eye-witness, who so cleverly brings out the picturesque setting of his tale, is not always truthful, or at least that his memory is rather too readily controlled by his prejudices, impairs the value of his account. He has been more than once convicted of distorting the truth,—in the matter of the behavior of the Swiss soldiers, for instance, who were at that very moment shedding their blood for a foreign country, and whom he has foully slandered.

But so far as Napoleon is concerned, his testimony may be accepted, for he was not interested in disguising the truth.

* * *

Macdonald is a very different sort of man; he is less imaginative than Marbot, but more to be relied on. He remained his whole life the same rough, rather unamiable but loyal character that he was known to be both before and after Napoleon's fall. He served him to the last, while others betrayed him; he was the first to tell him the truth when the doing so might be the salvation of France; finally, he was almost the only one who, holding a high command at the time of the Hundred Days, was faithful to the oath he had sworn, and succeeded in resisting the contagious mania that led his colleagues to desert their flag. They all deserted it, apparently unconscious that they were at the same time false to their honor, every one of them, even he who had promised, as he started on his way, to bring Napoleon back in an iron cage.

If ever a man's testimony has been made weighty by his life, it has been in Macdonald's case. It may be urged that he did not like Napoleon and that he had reason to feel sore towards him. He did not like him, it is true, and he is at no pains to conceal the fact, but the reason may well be that he felt no esteem for him, and if he had reason to complain of Napoleon, the reasons for his doing so are wholly to his credit. Napoleon was not fond of open spoken people; pride in others displeased him as if it were a semi-revolt, and he preferred the pliancy of a Fouché or a Savary. Further, he did not like generals who exhibited a readiness to take the initiative, and those who happened to be defeated in his absence found him fairly indulgent towards them, provided only that the defeat did not entail consequences such as the capitulation of Baylen. It is for this reason that he did not like Macdonald, and kept him waiting for his marshal's baton until the battle of Wagram. It is true that on that day he gave in gracefully, though he did almost repent of it; at least since his effusive words to Macdonald on the field of battle, he was not more amiable towards him than before.

The portrait of Napoleon drawn by this observer, who could not be fooled, is by no means attractive. His clear sightedness perceived the man's ferocious egotism, his mad ambition, which nothing could satisfy because it was limitless; the gambler who believed in his star and tempted fortune by staking what was not his own, the peace and happiness of nations, the grandeur and prosperity of his own country, sending the young to be butchered with the utmost coolness and without any remorse, caring naught for the tears of the mothers, and seeing in France but an

inexhaustible treasure house of gold and silver, and in its inhabitants nothing but food for powder. Not a single time did a humane thought stop him or suspend for an instant the decision he had come to.

When this gambler won, he became ferocious, that is, insatiable; when he lost, he was a wholly different man, losing his energy, his quick sightedness. Instead of stopping the rout, he outstripped it, leaving his generals to get out of the mess in the best way they could in the absence of orders. At certain times he became pusillanimous; he was afraid. This happened three times,—after Moscow, after Leipzig, after Waterloo; for it must not be forgotten that this man, who was a great captain, and whom his admirers place above all others, linked his name none the less with the names of three of the greatest routs known in history, and that on none of these occasions did he rise to the circumstances, failing even to do his duty as a general. He hastened on to prepare the return blow, he was in the habit of saying, but in truth he fled not from the foe, but from his responsibilities. He was a great conqueror, the greatest, possibly, with Hannibal, Alexander, and Cæsar, but he fails to attain the foremost place because he failed to be always equal to himself, whether in good or in evil fortune. Turenne was defeated occasionally, but he never bolted at full speed ahead of his routed army.

Macdonald does not waste time in drawing the portrait of Napoleon; he “snaps” him, as it were, on the march; but it is especially at the close of the campaign in France, and on the tragic day of Fontainebleau, that he shows him to us as he himself beheld him,—cast down, void of energy, almost indifferent, and yet still playing a part, seeking to persuade others, in order to convince himself that he still had friends and resources; reckoning now on the rising in mass of France, now on England, now on the Emperor Alexander, and ending by yielding to fate. And all this without any grandeur about it, in the most commonplace fashion, like an adventurer who resigns himself to becoming the nonentity he once was.

As for Colonel Vigo-Roussillon, who followed Napoleon to Egypt, he was particularly struck by his inhumanity, his disregard of the lives of men. At Jaffa, he saw him have soldiers poisoned because he did not know what to do with them. He has discredited the legend of the plague patients,—a legend already damaged, though Gros’ painting may perhaps cause it to survive in spite of all.

III.

So much for the soldier and commander. As for the chief of the state, Count Chaptal and Pasquier saw him more closely, and their testimony deserves also to be listened to. Both held daily intercourse with

the master, thanks to their important administrative functions; the one was a member of the Institute, minister of the interior, and, above all, a chemist who manufactured gunpowder and beet sugar; the other, a counsellor of state and prefect of police. Their memoirs are documents of the highest value. These men judge the man they served faithfully, dispassionately, but without favor.

Let us hear Chaptal first.

According to him, Napoleon was religious in his own way; he held to a certain fatalism, not exempt from superstition, for at times ridiculous prophecies sufficed to make him change his purpose, that is, what he most clung to. Nevertheless, his attachment to the Roman Catholic Church did not prevent him, in the course of his quarrel with the Pope, from threatening to reconstitute the Gallican Church, and at other times to turn Protestant himself and to make France do the same.

As regards his relations with his generals:—

“If they had distinguished themselves, he was satisfied with saying that they had done their duty; at times only did he mention them honorably in his bulletins. If, on the other hand, they had been unfortunate, the whole fault was theirs, and never that of the inferiority of the troops he had placed under their command, or of the bad positions due to such inferiority. * * * Accustomed to refer everything to himself, to think of himself only, to consider no one but himself, Napoleon paralyzed every one around him. He would have no one famous but himself, and believed that he alone was endowed with talent. * * * There was another cause that contributed to increase his successes and to diminish those won by his generals; he could dare everything, for he was not responsible to any one, and he could sacrifice men and materials of war without fear of blame, while his generals had to think of losses and feared to risk falling into disfavor, so that they became timid and less audacious.”

He loved to surround himself with servile tools who carried out his orders, no matter what their character, without discussing them, and apparently without even thinking of their nature. “These men were so much the more dangerous that the first impulses of the Emperor were terrible; his most violent decisions being the result of his first thought, and he plunged into the blackest excesses, finding always satellites ready to obey him.” When he was stayed in time, he occasionally revoked violent and unjust decisions rendered *ab irato*.

He made the administration of justice almost illusory, “for the judges were appointed by him, and when their decisions did not conform to his will, he referred the appeal to another commission wholly chosen by him.”

In matters of finance, he made use of methods that reached to the point of extortion. “He went on the principle of never allowing a creditor of the state more than two thirds of his claim, and the unfortunate

creditors who claimed payment for supplies or work done, were compelled to submit, for his decrees were unchangeable and without appeal."

He always despised trade, which he considered an inferior affair, and the operations of which he pretended to regulate by arbitrary orders; he himself named the goods that should be imported or exported, though he knew nothing whatever of the matter. In his view all merchants were idlers or robbers. His intervention in manufacturing industries was more fortunate, as he compelled their development, not because he felt any interest in them, but merely to fight his constant foes, the English, upon that point also.

"He feared the people and dreaded insurrections." It was in order to avoid these that he constantly interfered, often recklessly, with the corn market, causing prices to be raised or lowered in an arbitrary, and consequently, dangerous fashion. In this way he ruined the country people, who, nevertheless, remained faithful to him, because they believed him to be a sure protection against the return of the system of tithes and feudal rights.

"In war, Napoleon exhibited an insensibility that, in every phase of his stormy career, stood out as his chief trait. In Egypt, near Jaffa, he caused to be shot seven thousand Turks who had surrendered in terms of a capitulation. Five or six who managed to escape from the frightful carnage took refuge in Saint-Jean d'Acre, made known there this violation of good faith, and induced the garrison to listen to no proposals, but to defend themselves to the very last. This was the chief cause of the resistance Bonaparte met with at Saint-Jean d'Acre. * * * About the same time, he caused eighty-seven soldiers, sick with the plague in the hospital at Jaffa, to be poisoned. Opium was first tried, but as the desired effect was not produced, corrosive sublimate was administered."

* * *

The writer establishes a fundamental distinction between Napoleon as First Consul and Napoleon as Emperor, so far as ideas and character go. At first he was in the habit of listening, of seeking information, and he deigned to discuss. So soon as he became absolute and undisputed master, he separated himself from those around him by a rigid etiquette, and made his will the supreme law,—a sort of oracle that could neither be discussed nor appealed from:—

"Thus was formed and consolidated the most frightful despotism that ever weighed down upon men. Once he had succeeded in mastering the nation, his ambition knew no bounds; in his madness he sought to become the master of the world, and, in the course of six or seven years, he did manage to place under his rule almost the whole of Europe, so that he might have carried out his vast project, had not public opinion in France, which had turned against him, joined itself to the efforts the European coalition was making to overthrow him."

Is it not, alas! doing a great deal of honor to public opinion, which then existed only in a state of terror or hypnotism, to allow it a share in that great event? It is true that when Napoleon was beaten, it did turn against the god it had served on bended knee, and that later it knew to be no more than a fragile idol. "He suffered the pain of seeing," says our eye-witness, "in the course of the campaign of 1814, the French welcoming foreign domination in order to be rid of his." But it was indeed force alone that conquered him; he reckoned on force alone, and he lost the game by playing that trump card.

* * *

In private, Napoleon was not very sympathetic; he lacked kindness and a good early education. "His way of meeting people for the first time was cold, and his remarks were insignificant or ill-bred." In support of this Chaptal cites numerous examples which shocked him, of which he was the eye-witness, and which give an idea of Napoleon's freedom of manners, which, especially with women, may have been merely awkwardness.

"At an entertainment at the Hôtel de Ville, he replied to Mme. —, who had just told him her name, 'Good Heavens! Why, I was told that you were pretty!' And to another, 'What a good time you can have while your husband is campaigning.' To some old men he said, 'At your age, men have not long to live.' And to young girls, 'Have you any children?'"

"In general Napoleon's manners were those of an ill-bred subaltern, and at first, there was nothing in him to indicate cleverness or the least acquaintance with the usages of society. * * * No one felt at ease with him, for no one could expect him to be kind or indulgent. * * * His court was a regular galley, in which every one pulled at his oar in accordance with regulations."

His habits were regular, and he was extraordinarily sober; he ate little and quickly, often rising from table at the beginning of an official dinner, to the great disgust of his guests. He slept little, but he could sleep whenever he pleased; he had an iron constitution, and could work all day and all night, almost without a moment's rest, and without any apparent ill effects. His memory equaled his power for work; he forgot nothing and nobody; this faculty, which is not of the first order, but which brings out the full value of the other faculties, was a part of his genius. Every one who ever approached him was struck by the extraordinary rapidity with which he assimilated notions that were entirely new to him, thanks to the accuracy of his admirable mind, which enabled him to divine what he did not know, and to give points to experts on the very subjects with which they were most familiar.

On the other hand, Napoleon never in the least understood art or let-

ters. He saw nothing in the paintings he purchased, and made the most irrelevant remarks to painters. He broke everything he touched, either through awkwardness or fancy, and valuable objects came from his hands outrageously mutilated. When he had nothing to break, during deliberations of the council, he hacked the arms of his chair with a knife, or, under pretext of drawing, smashed his pen on the paper. He was violent and brutal in his gestures. He could not caress a child without making it cry, and being naturally destructive, he amused himself shooting Josephine's favorite birds in the park at La Malmaison. When he entered a hothouse, he never came out without having pulled up some of the most valuable plants.

Yet he was most careful in his expenditures. The strictest house-keeper does not take greater care to note down the smallest purchases than he did, and while he would bestow millions upon his brothers and his marshals in the most lavish way, he would get into a furious passion if he learned by chance, or on making inquiry rather, that he was paying too high a figure for his coffee.

It is true that his largess cost him nothing; every gift he made was taken from the foe, from confiscated domains, or from the reserved sums that formed the incidental fund. Thus it was the vanquished who bore the cost of the extravagant mode of life led at their expense by their enemies.

Even so, he did not know how to make a gift. "No sovereign," says Chaptal, "ever discontented so many people. He never learned how to grant a favor or to make a gift in a way to inspire gratitude; he always seemed to be distributing alms, and humiliated rather than encouraged." As for his generals, who did not consider him so greatly above them as he seems to us now to have been, they believed themselves entitled to share his good fortune, for they looked upon him as their work or one of themselves.

* * *

"Napoleon," says Chaptal again, "never experienced a feeling of generosity, hence the dryness of his company, and his never having a single friend. He looked upon men as vile cash or instruments to be made use of to satisfy his caprices or his ambition." He was not careful of the lives of his soldiers, although he took care they should be well fed, so that they might be in better condition; but he had not for them, as the legend would make us believe, a father's love. He did not know what pity was. "As he rode over the battlefield of Eylau, strewn with twenty-nine thousand bodies, he turned the dead over with his foot, and said to the generals around him, 'Mere rabble!'"

He had no love for his family, which had none for him. Of his brothers he spoke with contempt, though that did not prevent his upsetting Europe in order to provide them with thrones, which they invariably thought not fine enough for them. They looked upon the imperial throne as a piece of family spoils they had the right to share out among themselves, and no matter how much was given them, they were never satisfied.

And when one remembers that Europe had to bear the shame of being divided up between that horde of adventurers, and at the same time to be pillaged without mercy for the purpose of enriching the Paris museums and of increasing Napoleon's war fund, one is forced to confess that never was there a more dismal epoch or a more maleficent genius. He trampled upon the right of nations, although it is true that there are to be met with even now casuists who maintain that his conquests were blessings and his pillaging a work of mercy. But paper will stand anything. Nevertheless, to be delivered over as a prey to one of those satraps, who had no personal right to the favor, to cease to be an independent people and to become a flock kept by ravening wolves, was a shame greater than could be borne.

French writers are apt to call this glorious epoch "the glorious time, the great epopee." They forget too readily that France, at that time, was itself driven with the lash, crushed under the heel of the imperial boot, and desired only to be rid of it as swiftly as might be, no matter at what cost, and forever. Strange is the patriotism that regrets the days when men were the slaves of a despot who ruled over one tenth of the human race; such glory is uncommonly cheap. We can yet remember that horrible time, for our fathers told us of it, and we hope the echo of that remembrance, and the horror of despotism and of foreign dominion will long make itself heard in the hearts of our children.

The man never had the least idea of the rights of other people, that is, of right in its most sacred and most obligatory form. Chaptal says:—

"I remember that at the time of the annexation of Piedmont to the Empire, he went to the Senate and spoke for an hour and a half on the importance and necessity of the measure. He particularly applied himself to proving that it was advantageous for Piedmont, Italy, and the sovereigns, who could not but regret seeing one of themselves hemmed in between two republics, France and Italy; so that he appeared to be seizing upon Piedmont in accordance with the views of European policy and in the interest of the sovereigns rather than in his own. The annexation was carried out immediately after the treaty of Amiens, and the British then refused to evacuate Malta, though it was one of the conditions of peace. The Emperor complained loudly of perfidy, and thought he had blinded Europe to the real causes that brought on a new war."

I have quoted this passage in its entirety, because it contains in an abridged form the whole of the Napoleonic policy. I cannot, unfortunately, add that it died with him, and that conquerors are not to be seen nowadays, or will nevermore be seen, posing as representatives of right and as benefactors of their victims,—which, be it said by the way, is the most barbarous and the most painful of all proceedings, for if it be hard to be called upon to choose between giving up one's life or one's purse, it is harder still to have to thank the man who takes both.

IV.

Chaptal says:—

“Napoleon was naturally suspicious; he flooded France with spies, and he believed in their reports as an old priest believes in the Gospels. Fresh denunciations came in every day; every day saw the birth of supposed conspiracies, and he was seen to withdraw his confidence from some men and to cast others into prison, without the motives for these actions ever being known. * * * The great swarm of spies who every day filled their reports with the gossip of the cafés spread alarm everywhere. No man could be sure of not being arrested and finding himself compromised. * * * To this mass of police were added the aides de camp and the generals who formed Napoleon's guard, and this police was by far the most dangerous to the persons of the court and the chief administrative agents, because it was entrusted to devoted men who twisted everything, poisoned everything, and represented as criminals every one who did not slavishly adore their idol.”

I spoke a moment since of Napoleon's taste for literature, or rather of his perfect indifference to it. He looked at letters from a political point of view only. He paid three or four poets to sing his praises, but the republic of letters was unmistakably a republic so far as he was concerned, and he entertained the deepest mistrust of it. He struck “Mérope” and the “Death of Cæsar” from the repertory of the Théâtre Français, on account of the allusions that might be found in them and that might have been emphasized. He prohibited every “play which treated of the usurpation of a throne, the punishment of a tyrant, or in which there was any allusion to the House of Bourbon.” He could not tolerate the least praise of England and the English. “Phèdre” had to be suppressed, the pit having discovered in it an allusion to the trial of Moreau. He got angry in Lyons, because the public, thinking to please him, had applauded the line in “Mérope”:—

“The earliest of kings was a fortunate warrior.”

“What means,” said he, “this popular saying? The man who rises to a throne is the greatest man of his age; it is not a question of luck, but of merit on the one hand, and of gratitude on the other.”

Napoleon did not like the press, but he used it at need to war against his enemies, and particularly against the British. "He wrote out himself every communication inserted in the 'Moniteur' in reply to the diatribes and assertions published in the English gazettes. Once he had published a communication, he felt sure he had carried conviction. It may be remembered that most of these communications were neither models of decency nor patterns of good literature; but nowhere has he so strongly exhibited the stamp of his character and of his particular form of talent."

It would be interesting to know whether any one possesses the list, complete or not, of these imperial articles. A most interesting volume on Napoleon the Journalist might be made out of the collection. There can be little doubt that he would prove to be the greatest swashbuckler of the brotherhood.

I have dwelt at length upon the information drawn from Chaptal's memoirs, first because no one knew Napoleon better than he did, and next, because these memoirs are the work of a very attentive observer, skilled in rendering the result of his observations in a single word or two. It may be objected that they are the outcome of a rancor that was long nursed, and that he made up for adulation of the man in public by slandering him in secret, but there is nothing to warrant the belief that Chaptal was a flatterer of Napoleon or that he had any particular reason to be dissatisfied with the treatment he received at his hands. Besides, most of his criticisms happen to be confirmed, with less bitterness, it is true, by the testimony of Chancellor Pasquier, whose well-balanced mind is a guarantee of his sincerity. Although he admired Napoleon's genius even more than did Chaptal, he observed the same defects of character that the famous chemist noted down, and the two portraits, while completing each other, are alike.

I should state that nowhere in Pasquier's memoirs is there any evidence of a settled purpose to "snapshot" Napoleon, as is the phrase today. The portrait he traces of him is the direct result of the story in which the Emperor himself plays the leading part. In order to discover this portrait, I shall have to set it out, instead of quoting.

Two episodes in this book particularly attracted public attention; the one because it bears upon one of the most freely discussed actions of Napoleon's life; the other, which is directly connected with the former, because it clearly indicates the nature of his relations with his chief minister,—with the man who appears to have played, in connection with him, every part, from that of Mephistopheles to that of Judas.

It is the odious drama that began by the violation of the rights of nations on a foreign territory, and that ended in the moat of Vincennes.

For the first time this tragic story is related in full and *de visu* by a man whose office enabled him to be accurately informed on the subject. Chaptal, who had also been a witness of the affair, is satisfied with stating that "he saw everything," but he omits to say what it was he saw, no doubt because he thought it would be too compromising to do so under his own name, even after his death. This is to be regretted, for what Chaptal saw, he saw well. Fortunately Pasquier proved less discreet.

The outcome of his story is that Talleyrand was the instigator of the whole business, that the passive instrument was Savary, and Napoleon the dupe or else the willing accomplice; that the judges who were appointed to carry out this dark job, and who were not unanimous, never supposed they were sending the prince to death, or at least to immediate death; that they had reasons for counting on the sovereign's clemency, and that, besides, the dread words, so often quoted, "The execution shall take place at once," did not appear in the original document, to which they were subsequently added by an unknown hand. That Napoleon was aware the prince was to be executed immediately is plainly shown by the words he spoke before, during, and after the trial, particularly when he said to Josephine, quite coolly, "By this time the Duke of Enghien is no more."

So he did know it, and he did will it. Why did he will it? To avenge himself upon the Bourbons? to strike terror into the conspirators who were said to be in their pay? to give pledges to the partisans of the Revolution, and to intimidate the Royalists? These reasons are all plausible and are probably correct. And what is equally correct is that the tempter was Talleyrand, whom Napoleon himself charged with the fact in that famous scene of which I shall speak presently. And the purpose of that contemptible individual was certainly to bind to himself by the closest of bonds, complicity in crime, the man whom he had selected to be his pupil, but who turned out to be his master.

There runs through this bloody drama a comedy that has hitherto been unexplained. It is a sort of countermanding order or respite of which Réal took charge in good faith, so far as he himself was concerned, at least, but that unfortunately did not arrive in time. It has never been known by whom Réal was entrusted with his mission. If it was by the Emperor, the worthy man was simply made a fool of, since the sentence had already been carried out at the time he reached Vincennes to save the prisoner, and it was known at La Malmaison that it had been carried into effect.

The part played by Napoleon in this affair, which was to weigh so heavily upon his memory, and possibly upon his conscience, case-

hardened though it was, is thus cleared up, at least so far as the responsibility for it goes ; nothing was done but by his orders. As for Talleyrand's part, it was not revealed but illustrated in a scene of which Pasquier is the historian, and which recalls by the vigor of his description the narrations of Saint-Simon, though the man who plays the chief part preserved neither the dignity nor the self-respect of Louis XIV.

This public invective hurled by the crowned accomplice at the man who had once been Bishop of Autun might, for want of a Corneille, have inspired Victor Hugo. It is quite in his manner, and recalls the address of Ruy Blas. It produced upon those who heard it an impression of stupor and uneasiness which is transformed in the case of those who merely read it into a feeling of relief, for never were so many truths crowded into so few words. It begins thus : " You are a robber and a coward, a man without faith. You do not believe in God. Your whole life long you have been false to your every duty ; you have deceived and betrayed every one. There is nothing sacred in your eyes ; you would sell your own father. * * * " And it ends thus : " And by whom was I informed where that man, that unfortunate man, was to be found ? What are your projects ? What are you seeking ? What do you hope for ? Dare to say it ! You deserve that I should smash you like glass, but though I have the power to do it, I despise you too much to take that trouble ! "

This is undoubtedly a fine outburst of wrath, but unless a hopeless madman, one does not retain in one's service people so intensely despised. Pasquier wonders, and we wonder too, " how a man treated so insultingly could remain at court and keep his place in the hierarchy of the highest imperial dignities." For, having to avenge himself upon a master who had become his mortal enemy, Talleyrand must more than ever have proved false to Napoleon, and as a matter of fact that is just what he did do.

It is still more amazing that the subsequent governments, that of the Restoration and of the July Monarchy, should have also availed themselves of the services of this man, whose whole life had been one continuous piece of treachery, and who died with all the marks of public esteem. It is almost a satisfaction for me to remember that he detested Geneva, which, nevertheless, received him a good deal more warmly than he deserved ; a fact that did not prevent his playing us, before and during the Congress of Vienna, every possible trick. Our honest republicans, in whose breasts burned clear the flame of lost liberty, were the most repellent sight that had ever affronted the abject and elegant immorality of the regicide priest, who had turned courtier.

And as I am speaking of Geneva, I must be allowed, though the matter is not strictly germane to my subject, to quote a few lines that do honor to the man who wrote them, and that give me pleasure, were it only because it is so rare to meet with such appreciation at the hands of a French writer. The incident refers to the time of Napoleon's departure for Egypt, and to the attack on Switzerland. Pasquier says:—

“In Switzerland intervention was undertaken on the pretext of restoring tranquility, which was disturbed only by the insurrection of the Vaudois against the Bernese government; this insurrection having plainly been induced by the intrigues of the Directory. The French troops invaded the Vaud country on February 28, the day on which the annexation of the city of Mulhouse was proclaimed. Mulhouse was a free city confederated with Switzerland. An engagement took place on February 2, and the city of Freiburg was taken. On the 9th, after several very bloody engagements, the city of Berne was occupied and Switzerland's liberty and independence destroyed at one and the same time.

“It was on this occasion that Carnot, in a pamphlet which he published in the asylum he had found in Germany, wrote these vigorous words: ‘The Directory sought for a place where it could find the greatest number of free men to slaughter, and dashed at Switzerland.’ On April 26, the Republic of Geneva was annexed to France.

“General Bonaparte was not quite as much dissociated from these acts as might be believed, for, while he was content to allow the odium of them to rest upon the Directory, they entirely fitted in with his political views and his military combinations. When he traversed Switzerland on his way to Radstadt, certain expressions he had dropped, not unintentionally, had been noted. He had exhibited, with regard to the conduct of the Swiss government during his Italian campaign, a dissatisfaction that pointed to ulterior projects and that, at need, might serve as motive and excuse for them.”

To this page of history, which has an interest of its own, it is proper to add that Geneva and its people had the honor of always inspiring the almighty conqueror with especial aversion, no doubt because they failed to consider themselves happy enough under his paternal rule. One of his latest historians states that once, when Geneva was mentioned to him, he exclaimed, “The Genevese have done us harm enough as it is!” Now, the only harm they ever did him, so far as I can recollect, is that they remembered their history and could not submit to the humiliation of being a conquered people.

But enough of this digression; let us return to Napoleon.

V.

More indulgent towards his illustrious model than is Chaptal, Pasquier is nevertheless at one with him in refusing to allow the master of France a quality that marks the line of separation between the conqueror and the

despot. "Had he," says Pasquier, "possessed a mind capable of understanding everything, he lacked a heart to enlighten his mind on generous decisions." This he says with reference to the trial of Moreau and Pichegru, in which Napoleon gave proof of merciless rancor.

When he proceeded to crush Prussia after Jena, he carried contempt to the length of imprudence:—

"Scarcely had he reached Berlin when he not only spoke and acted as an angered conqueror, but assumed the language and attitude of a sovereign who gives commands to his subjects. Loyalty to the prince who was fleeing before him was treated as rebellion, and in his indignation against the resistance of a few nobles who kept up communications with their unfortunate king, he had exclaimed, in the very palace of the great Frederick, 'I shall so abase these court nobles that they will be reduced to beg for bread.' His proclamations, his bulletins, were always a combination of insults and threats. Misfortune, which is sacred, was not respected even in the person of the Queen of Prussia."

These are methods that leave their mark on the memory of nations and that suffice to explain much. Although he was so clear sighted, he was capable, when blinded by passion, of coming to the most amazing decisions. Hence his grandiose but empty dream of a continental blockade, which, under the pretext of isolating England, sacrificed the interests of the whole of Europe to those of France. The line was too extended to allow of its being guarded everywhere, and any disobedience to orders being looked upon as a *casus belli*, the war of 1812 was the inevitable consequence of this politico-economic error. It sufficed, with the unfortunate and unjust Spanish War, to bring about the fall of the colossus, who could never be high enough or great enough for his own satisfaction.

It is, however, in religious and ecclesiastical questions that Napoleon showed himself at once most violent, utopian, and incapable of grasping the fact that there are limits laid down by nature to the most absolute power. Pasquier was the saddened and indignant witness of the mad attempts of the Emperor to compel the Pope to submit to his fancies, and to constitute for him a Church such as he desired. The first step was to oust the Pope from his possessions. The unfortunate pontiff had refused to join an Italian league, and "this refusal," declares the French minister, Champagny, "is a sufficient justification for war; the first result of war is conquest, and the first result of conquest, the change of government." In accordance with these deductions, the French troops had entered the Papal States, the Pope himself being a prisoner in his own capital. He was kept there for some time; and then, in despair of ever convincing him, Napoleon, in spite of all the services the pontiff had done him,

caused or allowed him to be carried off and taken at full speed to Grenoble, whence he sent him back to Savona.

Never, in modern times, was a Pope so treated by a Roman Catholic sovereign; nor, on the other hand, did any Pope exhibit greater resignation and long-suffering. Compelled by his conscience to pronounce the sentence of excommunication against the spoiler of the Holy See, he did so in the gentlest and most inoffensive manner possible, even omitting the name of the spoiler. At bottom, Napoleon's object was that artlessly expressed to Pasquier by that not at all artless personage, Maury, who had just accepted the archbishopric of Paris, which had been refused by Cardinal Fesch: "With a good police and a good clergy the Emperor can always reckon on the public remaining quiet, for an archbishop is also a prefect of police." Never had any priest thus assimilated the two offices.

Maury's idea of the Church, however, was exactly that of Napoleon, and, on the other hand, it was the opposite of that entertained by Cardinal Fesch. It was with the complicity of Maury that Napoleon summoned at Paris the famous so-called national council that was to reëstablish the Gallican Church, under the nominal authority of the Pope,—transferred to Paris, the new Rome,—but really under the authority of the Emperor,—the new Constantine,—who was entirely prepared to draw up for that Church both a creed and a breviary, just as he had formerly drawn up a civil code. Mad though the attempt seemed, it nearly succeeded, so great was his prestige and so great also the terror he inspired. People had ceased to wonder at anything, and when once he had spoken no one dared to remonstrate; evil became good and absurdity turned into evidence.

At one time a sort of tacit consent to a civil constitution for the clergy had been obtained from the Pope, then still a prisoner at Savona, but then Napoleon, claiming that he had been tricked, cast away all discretion; he insisted upon the Pope submitting not only unconditionally, but without any reserves or reticence, and down came the whole fabric. Previous to this, the council had already been purged; recalcitrant bishops had been cast into prison and ordered to hand in their resignations. The country had been upon the very brink of schism.

This whole story, of which Pasquier, then prefect of police, was an eye-witness, is told at length in his memoirs, and forms one of the most striking and interesting chapters. The mere reading of it casts more light upon Napoleon's temperament, his manner of governing, and his way of looking at the relations between a sovereign and his subjects, than all that might be said *ex professo*. It exhibits his ideas, his passions, and his prejudices not only in their natural condition, but in action, which is the best way of learning to know them.

As for his legal relations towards conquered nations, they are easily studied, for they may be summed up in a single sentence,—he arrogated all the rights to himself and imposed all the duties upon the nations. Once they were annexed to the Empire, under the nominal sway of a brother of the Emperor or of a marshal of France, they ceased to exist as much as does a drop of water that has fallen into the ocean.

When his brother Louis was made King of Holland, it is just to say that he took his duties as sovereign seriously, and that he endeavored to make his new subjects forget the loss of their independence by defending, though still very timidly, their interests. In particular, he dared to ask that the French troops should be withdrawn from his capital, which they were closely besieging,—peacefully, of course,—while crowds of French revenue officers were helping to maintain on the coast line, to the great damage of the trade of the Low Countries, the continental blockade. And finally, he claimed the right as sovereign, to have an ambassador in Paris.

He was very much out of his reckoning. His claims infuriated Napoleon. The ambassador was displaced by a simple “chargé d'affaires,” and the King of Holland received from his redoubtable brother a letter containing the following remarks: “I will not have henceforth any Dutch ambassador in Paris. I will not permit you to send an ambassador to Austria. Nor will I allow you to send away the French troops in your service. Cease writing to me in your usual strain. You have been repeating these things to me for three years, and every instant proves their falseness. This is the last letter I shall write you.” So the unfortunate king made up his mind to abdicate, which is to his credit. Besides it was the best thing he could do.

When his son, Prince Louis Napoleon, was presented to his uncle, the Emperor, the latter spoke to him in the following words, which were published in the “Moniteur”: “Never forget, in whatever position you may be placed by my policy and the interests of my Empire, that your first duty is to me, and your second duty to France. Any other duty, even towards the nations I may entrust you with, can come only after these.”

That was plain and unmistakable. And such was the inward conviction of the man who has so often been represented as the missionary to Europe of the principles of the Revolution. I, first and foremost; France next; the other nations do not count. In other words, sovereigns are vassals and nations subjects. The Great Mogul spoke just in the same way.

Napoleon applied this dogma of his in every case, but especially to Sweden. After Bernadotte was elected Prince Royal,—an election that

did not commend itself to him, first, because it was not his work, and next, because he did not like the man,—he exhibited his ill temper towards him on every possible occasion. To begin with, he not only compelled him to break off all alliance with England, but also to declare himself her foe, which was contrary to the traditional policy, the sympathy, and the interests of the Swedes. He refused to allow him a subsidy, even by way of compensation; but, on the other hand, he required him to furnish seamen, and insisted on French revenue officers being installed at Gothenborg. Then, as Britain continued, in spite of all this, to treat the trade of its former ally with a certain amount of consideration, the Emperor, affirming that this meant guilty connivance on the part of Sweden, authorized his privateers to capture Swedish vessels,—now on pretence that these had no license, now on the ground that they held an English license to trade.

Soon he occupied Swedish Pomerania; and this it was that led Sweden, which had made every possible sacrifice to obtain peace, to throw in its lot with the coalition,—an act for which Napoleon and all French historians in his train, have violently blamed it. These historians have called the conduct of Sweden treason, which would lead one to suppose that Napoleon had acquired rights to the gratitude of the Swedes. But what were these rights? They were not even as just as those of the wolf in the fable to the gratitude of the stork, for if he had not devoured it whole, he had ruined and devoured it in detail. “Never,” says Pasquier, “did Napoleon use his power more wrongfully than he did towards Sweden. Possibly he desired to be avenged of an elevation that was not his work, and that may have appeared to him like a parody upon his own.”

* * *

Towards his enemies he was absolutely unscrupulous. On the eve of the war with Russia, Pasquier, as prefect of police, was put on the track of a gang of counterfeitters of bank-notes, not of the Bank of France, but of the Russian Bank and of the Bank of Vienna. I will let him relate the end of this edifying story:—

“The counterfeited notes, the plates, the gravers, everything was seized and carried to the prefecture of police, but scarcely was the work done when the Duke of Rovigo hurried to my house in a state of absolute consternation. The whole of this fine business was being carried on under his orders and under the direction of Desmarests, by a printer called Fain, whose brother was one of the Emperor’s private secretaries. It then came out that this was a plan devised for the purpose of paying for the supplies the French army would obtain in Russia. This happened at the outset of the campaign of 1805.”

And the author adds, "On the eve of making war with Russia, steps were taken to make use of the same means."

"Everything," continues this irrefutable witness, "that had been brought to the prefecture was transported to the Ministry of Police, where he did with it as he pleased. I have since learned to a certainty that these counterfeit notes were never of any real use. A very small number only were passed during the expedition to Russia, and when the retreat began, it was found necessary to burn large quantities of them, as they were no longer of any use."

That was the way in which the rights of nations were understood, or at least observed, in those days. The end justified the means, and there was but one inviolable right,—the Emperor's will. But violence bears in itself the germ of weakness, and here is the unimpeachable verdict rendered by history, by the mouth of that servant of the Empire, on the policy of excess and wilfulness that believed in violence and conquest only, and was constantly directed toward crushing some one,—now France, now the Pope, and now Europe into the bargain.

"He ended," says Pasquier, "by being unable to secure to France its former frontiers, and he handed us over almost defenceless to the spirit of ultramontanism and the encroachments of the papal power."

And this may well be called the moral of the story.

CONCLUSION.

I shall now endeavor to collect these varied traits, these diverse yet concordant testimonies, so as to make plain the changes effected by them in the figure of the legendary Emperor. It would be almost necessary, were it possible to do so, to adopt the methods of photographers, who, by superimposing the images of several persons in succession, manage to eliminate purely individual characteristics and to leave only those of the family, the race, or the profession.

In this case the things to be eliminated are the personal point of view taken by each of the witnesses,—their passions, interests, and grudges, in order to bring out the true image of the man they sought to paint, and whom they did paint, in point of fact, as they individually saw him. This is a work that calls for much patience and sagacity, and which is all the more difficult since the operator himself must first of all lay aside his own prejudices. Now, nothing is more difficult than to do this, and as I cannot claim such power for myself, I prefer to allow my readers to judge for themselves,—a course which has the further advantage of being very much easier. Let them compare the documents I have just placed before them with the portrait of the legendary Napoleon, and decide for them-

selves what changes it has suffered, and whether it has gained or lost in the process. Of course it must be clearly understood that I refer to the character of the man alone; of his genius as a sovereign and as a strategist that array of witnesses had nothing new to tell us.

He emerges intact from the test; at most we have learned to appreciate better the wonderful combination of faculties, such as other men possess,—memory, perseverance of purpose, ever wakeful curiosity, power of work and assimilation, imagination, in the mathematical sense of the word, inflexible and at times pitiless will, contempt for men and things,—that went to the making up of his genius, which, seen from afar, strikes one as almost superhuman, just as a pyramid rises grand and triumphant above the desert of sand, no matter of what coarse materials it may be built.

Seldom has there appeared on this earth an intelligence better armed, or, in other words, better adapted to the work it had to perform and to the time at which it was to manifest itself. He found society in a state of complete decomposition, and his instinct for organization enabled him to create out of it a new structure, made in his own image, moulded, as it were, on his own frame, and he built it so thoroughly that not only did the house survive his fall, but stands even now, after the lapse of several generations, in the course of which no one has appeared who could utilize it or who was big enough to dwell in it. So it is said to be uninhabitable, which is true, for it was built by him and for himself alone.

So much can I see with my own eyes,—I who have no reason to love him, since my country gained nothing through him save humiliation and tears. Nor do I need witnesses to tell me he was not a great man merely; the word does not seem to fit him, but one of the greatest and most extraordinary leaders of peoples the world ever knew.

There are some five or six men in history that may be compared to him, and it will always be difficult to decide which of them all was the greatest, that is, the strongest, the most despotic, and the most feared. If he did not experience the enjoyment of ordering vast executions of men such as those in which his predecessors loved to contemplate their own grandeur and the nothingness of mankind, it is because he lived in Paris in the nineteenth century of the Christian era, and not in Nineveh under the kings, the sons of Sargon. But he caused blood to flow in streams upon the battlefields for motives that were scarcely better, and he humbled more rulers and destroyed more states than any Sennacherib or Assurbani-pal. He also had his hecatombs, and in this respect he need envy no one.

In my opinion the thing which distinguishes Napoleon from all these other conquerors, is that behind the epic hero we clearly perceive the bour-

geois, a man such as nearly all those middle class men were then,—an ex-revolutionist turned strong conservative, and so utterly inseparable from the crowned Dromio that it is impossible to understand the one without reference to the other. But he was, it must be owned, a bourgeois such as there are not many, with a larger share of gifts that are rarely met with in combination, especially to such a degree; and a larger share of qualities and defects also.

He had a tenacious memory that never allowed anything to escape it, and that enabled him to have constantly in mind the numberless practical details of information he needed in his double business as general and sovereign. He knew by heart, day by day, the muster rolls of his army, the condition of his treasury, the state of the supplies, the names and the records of all the high functionaries of the Empire, and he could turn them up at any moment as if he had within himself a directory ever open at the desired page. He has been heard to state, several years after the event, and without hesitating, the place where a particular regiment was at a given time, and seldom was he wrong.

He possessed the practical curiosity of the trader who wishes to keep himself constantly informed on the state of business, and who questions every one who can give him useful information. Naturally, then, if the men to whom he addresses his inquiries are functionaries, they will do well to have at hand, like Pasquier, a note-book containing in the form of figures,—he cared for figures only,—every practical detail relating to their work which this jack-booted statistician may take it into his head to ask them. As for instance, “How many craft in Paris today? how many came in? how many went out? how many bags of sugar?” And so on. He wanted to know everything, and especially wanted men to be constantly ready to tell it him. Any one who did not know or who hesitated was forthwith entered in his black books.

He had a powerful imagination, not the kind of imagination that delights in the beauties of nature and goes into ecstasies before works of art, not the imagination of a poet or of a painter,—for he understood naught of such matters,—but the imagination of a mathematician or a chess player, who perceives in space, and in time even, the possible combinations of lines, facts, and movements. Applied to matters political, this precious gift enabled him to see at a glance all the consequences of a given situation. Applied to matters of warfare, it enabled him to take in, in the same way, the configuration of the country, the situation of the armies, and the topography of the battlefield.

To it he owes that he was a great strategist; but sometimes it carried him too far when it led him to look upon things as accomplished

which were not so, and could not be so, and thus it comes about that he committed mistakes in politics and lost battles that he was sure he would win.

Applied to men, his penetrating vision enabled him to read their secret thoughts and to divine the motives of their actions. In this respect, however, it was less reliable, for he had the bad habit of despising his adversaries too much, and of believing them either more basely inspired or more stupid than they were. This was one of the weak points of his armor.

He was a very close, rapid, and penetrating logician, so that he calculated very quickly all the possible consequences of any given cause, but in this case, also, he trusted too much to himself and followed out his own ideas.

He had extraordinary power of work, a faculty that has a physical side, and does not of itself make a man great, but if it be lacking, genius itself is subject to dangerous intermittence. He slept little, ate fast, was very sober, and could read or dictate for days and nights together without a break, and show up as fresh and fit the following day, after a few hours' rest, as though he had idled the livelong time.

His education was very limited, even in what concerned his profession, that is, mathematics, the study of which he had not carried very far; but he made up for this by the faculty of assimilation, which he possessed to a very high degree, and by the rapid intuition of the things he did not know, so that after having listened in silence to various opinions, he could, as he summed up the debate, give a lesson in law or political economy to the very men who had just been instructing him. It was on such occasions that he chiefly showed his superiority, though the share he took in the reform of public instruction and in the great works of jurisprudence that bear his name, has been somewhat exaggerated. But it may be said of him without flattery, that all the creations, whether good or bad, and almost always ingenious or grandiose, which have made his reign noteworthy, are due to his personal initiative or are stamped with his own mark.

He was all along a man of synthetical, classifying, organizing genius; and he showed it in everything, whether he had to do with the army, the great bodies of the state, the administration, the Church, or commerce. In this way he imposed upon France an organization that was, moreover, comformable to its instincts, and the bases of which are sunk so deep in the soil that they have survived the various régimes, whether monarchical or republican, that came after his own. It may even be said that today imperial France still stands with its essential forms and organs. Every

man who has striven to react against the excessively developed system of bureaucracy and to loosen the cuirass has wasted his time and has died in the effort.

If now there be added to all the above traits a powerful will, such as, fortunately, the world has seldom seen, I shall not conclude by saying naïvely, "That is how Napoleon was a great man," but I might say, "That was the union of faculties, seldom combined in one man, which enabled him to make his superiority felt by a whole generation which he overtopped like a giant." He exercised such fascination that even those who were the chief sufferers by his tyranny submitted to it with a certain fatalistic resignation, as if they were bowing to the decrees of fate.

* * *

The man's character was less exceptional, for egotists are to be met with everywhere, who consider everything in its relation to themselves, who are careless of the rights, the honor, and the suffering of others, intolerant of contradiction, always ready to hurt their best servants by sharp remarks, often unjust, and that, spoken in public, destroy gratitude and leave deep scars on the soul. He had no thought for any one, say those who knew him well, for age, sex, talent, virtue, or services rendered. This was well seen in the way he treated the unfortunate Pius VII. He had neither the tone nor the manners of a well-bred man; he disliked society, in which he had the awkward air of a proud and shy individual, and he offended the men or the women to whom he addressed compliments in doubtful taste. His pleasantries, as we have seen, were not always amiable.

It would be easy to make a volume of the court anecdotes in which he plays the part of a benevolent grumbler; for there is one trait which all his biographers agree in ascribing to him,—the complete absence of generosity. He lacked it in every way: when he punished innocent people for faults and did not permit them to defend themselves; when he deliberately allowed the drafts of his contractors to lie unpaid; when he illtreated his generals; when in his bulletins, or by his acts and words, he insulted the misfortunes of the sovereigns and the nations he had conquered, trampling on them as on dead bodies, taking away their children to send them to fight against his enemies and to die for a cause that was not their own, and never mentioning their names in the bulletins in which he sang the praises of his soldiery. He lacked it wholly when he caused Moreau and Pichegru to be condemned for crimes that could not be proved; when he caused to be murdered in the moat of Vincennes a

young prince whose glorious name ought to have rendered his person sacred to him. He lacked it wholly in his relations with the unfortunate Pope, who, as long as he lived, was his scapegoat, and whom he treated as no decent man would treat his valet. He lacked it all his life in his relations with his foes and his friends, and some of his biographers, as they summed up their remembrance of him, have been in a position to say that he did not know what pity was.

It may be urged that he gave freely; that was because apanages and millions cost him nothing, since they came out of the property of the vanquished. Then he found this giving profitable, for he thought it bound to him those whom he overwhelmed with his benefits while making them his accomplices, and also because his glory benefited by the splendor of this official lavishness. But beyond this he was, as the saying is, uncommonly close fisted with regard to the expenditures of the state and in his household, often allowing claims on the state to lie unpaid for a long time. Besides, if he did count on his largesses making him devoted friends, he was greatly mistaken, for he made ingrates only. The reason of this, it is said, is that though he gave freely, he did not give pleasantly, and often in a way to offend those he loaded with benefits.

* * *

Taine says of him that he was a Corsican, and therefore an Italian, and from these premises he has deduced all manner of consequences which he has sought to verify by means of documents. Whatever may be thought of this *a priori*, there is a certain amount of truth in the estimate, in so far, at least, that Napoleon, who never learned to speak French correctly, remained a Corsican all along, which is not quite the same as being an Italian. A Corsican is a Corsican; he had all the defects of the race: mad ambition, unscrupulousness as to the choice of means, and a spirit of rancor and vengeance. On the other hand, he had also its good qualities,—strength of will, sobriety, endurance at work, persistency in designs, gratitude towards those that had done him any service during his years of hardships. It was during his youth especially that he showed all he owed to his native land when he struggled in the shadow in order one day to reach the highest rank.

* * *

There has been much discussion on the subject of Napoleon's feelings for his family; while some show that he did everything for his ungrateful

and unattractive brothers, and went so far as to give up to them one fourth of Europe in the endeavor to satisfy their insatiable greed, others affirm that he thought but little of them; nor are these two versions incompatible. On the other hand, all are agreed that, like a true Corsican, he deeply venerated his mother, and that he entertained for his two wives, and for Josephine in particular, as much affection as he was capable of feeling for any one. It flattered him to have married, in the first place, a lady of the world of the ancient régime, and in the next, an imperial princess who made him the son-in-law of an emperor by divine right. Further, he was grateful to Josephine for the way in which she was able to direct the imperial drawing-room, which, but for her supreme grace, would have run the risk of resembling a guard-room. It was only after a prolonged struggle with himself that he made up his mind to separate from her,—in the interests of France, say his panegyrists; in the interests of his ambition, will say those who see things as they are. Besides, he very quickly consoled himself, and thought of Marie Louise only, from the moment he had hopes of espousing her. It is even said that he behaved towards her like a country beau in too great a hurry to conclude matters.

The man was not tender; he was hard, but he had his vulnerable points, and one of the most marked was his ostentatiousness, his theatrical taste for stage business, which proved him to be a *parvenu*, who was more flattered at being the equal of emperors and kings than proud of his genius. Hence, though himself always very simply dressed, he wanted plenty of gold lace on his liveries, that is, on the uniforms of his generals and his functionaries; the reason also which led him to load with honors his family, whom he held in contempt and who disliked him.

To be individual, egotistical, to sacrifice everything to one's fame and to one's policy, are indeed the defects of all great leaders of men, whether they be called Alexander, Cæsar, Louis XI., Julius II., Louis XIV., Ximenes, Richelieu, or Bismarck. Henry IV., himself, under his kindly, jovial air, was generous only when it was to his interest.

Every one of these great politicians had, like him, a store of clever sophisms with which they justified their worst exactions and their most unjust conquests. This is not what distinguishes Napoleon from each and all of them; on the contrary, in this respect he belongs to the same family. What constitutes his originality is that coming into the world at a time when the old civilization was fallen in ruins, and when there was nothing and no one to oppose him, he looked upon the world as his own personal property, and did with it as he pleased, in order to re-create it in his own image, and, as it were, to suit himself.

Such was the terrible bourgeois concerning whom we have made a few discoveries, and probably there are more to be made, for we have seen only the first in the procession of witnesses, most of whom are for the prosecution,—great ladies, high functionaries, officers of his court who confided to paper the daily secrets of their observations. And this is just what he neglected to think of, when he thought he had made eternal silence fall around him.

Had posthumous memoirs been the fashion in the days of Alexander, it may be that we should find that in the Greek hero the man was not as great as was the conqueror. We know so much about Augustus, because there was a time when he was called Octavius, and had others than flatterers only around him.

The conqueror of Austerlitz had the misfortune of having to do with many second and third rate people, whom he treated rather badly, and who avenged themselves upon him for all the sufferings he inflicted on them, in memoirs in which they entered, day by day, with a view to posthumous vengeance, every truth,—and, if you please,—every hard word they dared not speak to him.

The result is that it is demonstrated that he was a dreadful egotist; but this much had been suspected already. Egotism is not necessary to the making of a great man; it makes neither great citizens nor benefactors of humanity, such as Washington and Saint Vincent de Paul. But without egotism there can be no great conquerors, men whom history calls, according as it considers their life from the point of view of the victors or that of the vanquished, glorious rulers or scourges sent from heaven.

Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine*; Madame de Rémusat, *Mémoires*; Baron Wyde de Neuville, *Mémoires et Souvenirs*; Marshal Davout, *Correspondance*; *Mémoires* of Chaptal; *Mémoires* of the Chancellor Pasquier; *Mémoires* of Barras; *Mémoires* of the General Baron Thiébault; *Mémoires* of the Countess Potocka; *Mémoires* of the General Baron Duvernois; *Mémoires* of Norvins; *Mémoires* of Talleyrand; *Mémoires* of Fouché; Albert Sorel, *Bonaparte et Hoche*; Albert Vandal, *Napoléon et Alexandre Ier*; Pons de l'Hérault, *Souvenirs et Anecdotes de l'île d'Elbe*; Le Gras, *Napoléon à St. Hélène—Souvenirs de Betzy Balcombe*; Lord Rosebery, *Napoléon dans la dernière phase*; Baron de Comeau, *Souvenirs des guerres d'Allemagne pendant la Révolution et l'Empire*; *Correspondance de Napoléon*; *Lettres de Napoléon Ier*; Vassili Verestchagin, *Napoléon Ier en Russie*; Murat, Lieutenant of the Emperor in Spain, 1808, *D'après sa correspondance inédite et les documents originaux*; Marshal Oudinot, *Récits de guerre et de foyer—La captivité de Ste. Hélène*; *Rapports* of the Marquis de Montchenu, Commissioner of the King; Marshal Count de Reiset, *Souvenirs*; Arthur Lévy, *Napoléon intime*; L. Pingaud, Vijo Roussillon, etc., *Le Comte d'Entraigues*.

CICERO: AN INTERVIEW

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THE title of this article may provoke a smile. The interview is so distinctly the outcome of modern—the most modern—journalistic enterprise that to use it in connection with the century preceding the Christian era may seem an anachronism, as if one were to speak of a “curtain lecture” of Atossa as producing the Persian invasion, or of the “skeleton in the closet” of the Atreidæ as giving rise to the “Orestea” of Æschylus. Yet, though well aware of the prejudice which it may create, I have deliberately chosen a phrase which will at once bring into prominence the unique character of the evidence which we have for the life and times of Cicero. It stands alone. We have in English the letters of Horace Walpole and the Greville “Memoirs”; we have Madame de Sévigné’s portrayal of contemporary French life; we have Eckermann’s “Conversations of Goethe,” Boswell’s “Johnson,” Froude’s “Life and Letters of Carlyle,” and Carlyle’s “Letters of Cromwell.” These are all documents of profound interest and importance, but how incomparably inferior in interest and importance to the letters of Cicero! There may be admirers of Cicero who may regret that so fierce a light beats upon the every-day thoughts—the *vie intime*—of one whose public acts were certainly memorable, and whose private character was marked by traits so signally contrasting with the unblushing profligacy or self-conscious purism of the age in which he lived. Certainly the admirers (if there are still any) of the detestable Carlyle must regret the act of Froude, when, tempted by the opportunity of producing the book of the season, he laid bare the meanness, peevishness, and littleness of one who posed as a prophet and the bearer of a solemn message,—a great light to lighten a generation that sat in darkness. But no genuine admirer of Cicero will regret the accident which has preserved for us this most precious of historical documents. For accident it was. In the year before his death Cicero wrote to his friend Atticus:—

“My letters have never been collected for publication. Tiro has some seventy of them, besides which a selection might be made from my letters to you; but I must look over them and edit them; then and then only must they be given to the world.”¹

Happily Tiro—an excellent specimen of that interesting and often brilliant class, the Greek literary slave, to which modern society has nothing in any degree analogous—knew what a treasure these

(1) *Att.*, xvi., 5, 5.

letters were, and knew also how utterly their value would have been depreciated if their writer had been allowed to edit them. He seems to have kept his own counsel and to have preserved every letter from Cicero on which he could lay his hands. Hence he was able, seven years after the writer's death, to confer on the world the priceless gift of nearly nine hundred letters written by a master hand during a most momentous epoch of the world's history, most of them penned only for the eye of some intimate and trusted friend, and reflecting every light and shade of the writer's mind, every hope and fear, every surmise and suspicion. There may be some to think that Tiro did no great good to his friend and master by giving to the world so unsparing a self-disclosure, but no one can deny that he bestowed an inestimable boon on humanity.

If we had none of the letters of Cicero, or only the seventy, or perhaps a hundred, edited letters which Cicero would have published, we should have suffered as great a loss, perhaps, as we have had to endure in the disappearance of nearly all the poems of Sappho and the plays of Menander, or in the missing books of Livy and of Tacitus. We may form an estimate of what the loss would have been by reflecting for a moment on those periods in which there is a gap in the correspondence between Cicero and Atticus. From the end of the year 54 B. C., for about two years and a half Atticus was, unfortunately for us, constantly with Cicero in Rome. Hence no letters passed between them. At once the picture of the time becomes blurred and faded. We have no records of the opinions of Cicero on the dissolution of the coalition formed by Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, and generally known as the first triumvirate, and we do not even know how far he was admitted at that critical epoch into the counsels of Pompey and of the optimates. On the other hand, we can feel every fluctuation of the pulse of Rome and of Italy in the eventful months which followed the outbreak of the civil war (B. C., 49), preserved and registered in the seventh and eighth books of the letters to Atticus. At first there is the disgust of all moderate men at the news that Cæsar is in open rebellion. No terms should be made with him. But the Italians are slow to send in their levies. In a month or so feeling changes. In the latter end of February we read:—

“There is no public indignation against Cæsar now, and little private resentment: the loyal party have some such feeling, but it is far from acute: the rabble and lower orders are all on his side, and revolution is certainly in the air.”¹

By the first of March there is a strong feeling of admiration for the generosity shown by him after his success at Corfinium. By the

(1) *Att.*, viii., 3, 4.

fourth we read that "the country towns regard Cæsar as a god."¹ This is what constitutes the signal value and charm of the letters. They place us face to face with Cicero. They are a kind of kinematograph reproducing the last years of the republic, and clear as they make every subject which they touch, they portray nothing so clearly as the mind of their writer. Hence modern historians and essayists have no excuse when they make broad generalizations without regard for the testimony of the correspondence. The greatest sinner in this respect is the late James Anthony Froude. It will not, fortunately, be any considerable part of my task to defend Cicero from assaults intelligent or otherwise. The detractors are now silent. The unreasonable virulence of Mommsen and Drumann is generally recognized, and Cicero has found able and eloquent defenders both in England and abroad. Schmidt and Gurlitt, Strachan-Davidson, and quite recently Zielinski² have vindicated his fame and have shown that there is no character of antiquity which could not be torn to tatters if we used the methods of Mommsen and Drumann. But it is a bounden duty for an admirer of Cicero to refute the attack made on him by Froude in his "Cæsar: a Sketch," because, though it ostensibly deals with Cicero as a statesman, it really aims a wicked stab at his private character; and because the refutation will put in a strong light the preciousness of the letters, and the criminal folly of neglecting them as a source of historical knowledge.

Marcellus, who was consul in the year 51 B. C., was one of the most malignant of the enemies of Cæsar. This hostility he showed in every way. Cæsar was deeply interested in the enfranchisement of the Transpadane Gauls, and it was no doubt to spite Cæsar that Marcellus ordered the public scourging of a distinguished citizen of Novum Comum who was residing at Rome and who in the view of Cæsar ought to have enjoyed the same immunity from corporal punishment as the consul himself. After Pharsalia, Marcellus, feeling no doubt how well he had earned the resentment of Cæsar, went into voluntary exile in Mitylene. In the year 46 B. C., Cicero was living in Rome, in close intimacy with leading Cæsarians, Dolabella, Hirtius, and Pansa, whom he was teaching declamation while he was (as he tells us) learning from them the art of dining; and on very good terms with Cæsar himself. He was very anxious to procure the pardon and restoration of Marcellus and (though much discouraged by the latter) he at last sounded Cæsar on the question. Cæsar, to his astonishment, at once granted his

(1) *Att.*, viii., 16.

(2) *Cicero im Wandel des Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig, 1897.

request. Touched by this act of magnanimity Cicero in his speech, "Pro Marcello," which has come down to us, lauds Cæsar to the skies. "Such," writes Froude, "was the speech delivered by Cicero in the Senate in Cæsar's presence within a few weeks of his murder." He then goes on to imply that Cicero's eulogy was a base device to lull Cæsar into a false security, so that the crime of the ides of March (which he fancies took place a few weeks after) might be perpetrated with greater security and certainty of success. Now, the speech was delivered in the autumn of 46, more than a year and a half before the fatal ides. This misrepresentation, however, was probably the result of sheer ignorance on the part of the ill-advised panegyrist of brute force,—and Cæsar. But what are we to say about his complete suppression of Cicero's distinct statement in a letter written to a private friend just after the delivery of the speech? He writes to his friend, Servius Sulpicius (to whom he would certainly have owned the policy of his laudation if it had been a *ruse*), that he regarded Cæsar's language on that occasion as being virtually an undertaking to restore the republic:—

"I saw in my mind's eye the reviving republic. I had determined to hold my peace forever; not, God knows, through apathy, but because I felt that my former *status* in the House was lost irretrievably. But Cæsar's magnanimity and the Senate's kindness broke down the barriers of my reserve."¹

In a transport of gratitude and delight he poured out the riches of his unrivaled vocabulary in praise of the expected restorer of the republic, but he did not forget to add in a fine passage (studiously suppressed by Froude in his pretended résumé of the speech) what Rome expected of him:—

"You have not yet laid the foundation stone of the work which you are destined to achieve. * * * You have yet to reconstruct the republic. * * * Future generations will doubtless listen awe-struck as they hear or read the tale of all your conflicts and all your triumphs. But unless you have so designed and framed the constitution as to set this city on a sure foundation, your name, though it may go forth into all lands, will find no abiding resting place. * * * Posterity will pronounce undisturbed by favor or hope of advancement, undisturbed likewise by passion or by jealousy."²

Such was the frame of mind in which Cicero made this fine speech so travestied and garbled by Froude. He was as sincere when he panegyricized Cæsar as he was when he sent to Basilus the little note which was almost an inarticulate scream of joy (probably written on the evening

(1) *Fam.*, iv., 4.

(2) *Pro Marcello*, viii., abridged.

of the murder) on the news of the death of the tyrant (the shortest letter in the collection), "Congratulations! Delighted! My love and complete sympathy! Do send me (with your love) a full account of your plans and prospects" ("Fam.," vi., 15). But the interesting feature in this complete change of view, and that which makes it possible for us actually to "interview" Cicero by means of his letters is this: we are able through these to register every step in the progress of Cicero's mind, during more than a year and a half, from enthusiastic confidence in Cæsar as the champion of the republic to horror and hatred of him as its deliberate destroyer.¹ The evidence is on the face of the correspondence; it is unequivocal and it affords a subject for a very pretty piece of psychological analysis. The neglect of it by one who professed to portray the character of Cicero betrayed either a deliberate spirit of unfairness or a lack of intelligence of which one can hardly accuse Froude.

The great English poet, who was also a consummate letter writer, uttered many great truths, but none greater than when he called Cicero "Rome's least mortal mind." He might also have called him Rome's least Roman mind. His character shows few specifically Roman traits, and many which are surprisingly modern and un-Roman. He had none of the Roman pleasure in the bloody scenes of the arena, "What pleasure can a man of any culture feel in seeing a helpless human being mangled by a huge beast or a fine brute spitted on a lance?"² Not even his bitterest detractors have found anything to cavil at in his personal habits, which afforded a marked contrast to the coarse self-indulgence of the times. He mentions in a somewhat apologetic tone³ that he really enjoyed a dinner where the disreputable Cytheris was present, and we have a letter to Gallus⁴ in which he owns that he was the worse for a grand augural banquet in the house of Lentulus; but it was not rich meats or strong wines that hurt him, but a delicious salad of which he ate too freely, and for which he had to atone by two days' unbroken fast, "who could easily resist the Murenas (lampreys, with a play on the proper name) was entrapped by Messrs. Beet and Mallow (*a Beta et a Malva*)."⁴ Then, where was the old Roman implacability which ever

(1) The steps are too many to enumerate here. They are given in Tyrrell and Purser's *Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. 5, pp. xvii., foll.

(2) *Fam.*, vii., 1.

(3) *Fam.*, ix., 26. "I never was much attracted by women of that class even when I was a young man."

(4) *Fam.*, vii., 26.

sought an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth? Cicero is slow to enter into a quarrel and ever ready to make it up. Writing to Atticus in the year 57, he says, "there are other things that are worrying me, but one is *sub rosa*, and must not be mentioned: my brother and my daughter give me their love." He, no doubt, refers to some disagreement with his wife, whose name has not appeared in his letters for some years. Eleven years afterwards he divorced Terentia. We can gather from obscure hints (for the most part couched in enigmatic Greek) that she and her dishonest steward Philotimus had been causing him much annoyance and even pecuniary embarrassment, but he abstains from all hurtful criticisms, and shows a modern gentleman's distaste for the public washing of domestic linen. When his brother Quintus and his nephew the younger Quintus, after Pharsalia, sought to make their peace with Cæsar by maligning him, he does not seem to have pointed out their baseness to Cæsar, who would have welcomed any approach on his part, but was careful to write to the Dictator assuming all the responsibility of the flight from Italy in which he was accompanied by his brother.

Bacon, in his essay on "Revenge," quotes the "desperate saying of Cosmus, Duke of Florence, against perfidious or neglecting friends," that, though we are commanded to pardon our enemies we are nowhere admonished to forgive our friends. Cicero could pardon even his friends. Quintus, junior, had maintained for some years an attitude of hostility and malevolence towards his uncle which the latter describes more than once by one of the strongest epithets in the Latin language. He calls his nephew's conduct "blackguard" (*impurus*, the Greek *μιαρός*). But the moment the nephew has the grace to let him know that he feels the estrangement, the uncle writes with refined courtesy, "why then do you permit the estrangement to subsist?" His amenity towards dependents and social inferiors is also a trait uncommon in his time. His constant solicitude about the health of his cultivated slave, Tiro, is surprising in view of the fact that Tiro is said to have lived to be more than a hundred years of age. Cicero once wrote him a letter¹ headed *Tullius Tironi sal.* In omitting his own *prænomen* Cicero was treating Tiro as though on terms of absolute equality, for, contrary to modern practice, the use of the first name was a mark of respect. Tiro remonstrated. He thought such familiarity was hardly decorous between a consular and a manumitted slave. "What," says Cicero, "I should have liked even to have written *Tullius Tironi suo*" (which would have been still more familiar), "but be it as you please; we must afford no ground for cavil,"

(1) *Fam.*, xvi., 18.

which last words show that popular opinion would have condemned the condescension of Cicero. This urbanity towards inferiors is again strongly illustrated by a letter to Atticus¹ on the death of a favorite slave and the illness of other humble members of his household:—

“Poor Athamas! My dear Atticus, your grief is natural, but you must struggle to overcome it. Let philosophy anticipate the effect which time must produce at last. Now let us take care of your other patient, Alexis, in Rome. Is your house on the Quirinal insanitary? If so you must send him and Tisamenus, who is looking after him, to my house. The whole upper part of it is unoccupied, as you know. I think the change might have a wonderful effect.”

In what other Latin writer do we find, or should we expect to find, the tender little touches of domestic life which his early letters reveal? “My darling little Tullia,” he writes to Atticus,² “is calling for the present you promised her and is dunning me as your representative.” And again,³ little Marcus aged six, his hand probably guided by his father, shows how well he can write the Greek characters.

Even in his weaknesses Cicero was un-Roman. The Roman was no stay-at-home, and Cicero himself in urging his friend Trebatius⁴ to join the camp of Cæsar in Gaul gives him counsel which amounts to the Shakspearean admonition that “Home-keeping youth have ever homely wit.” But he is miserable when he acts on his own advice. For him the whole world lies between the Palatine and Vatican hills. He writes to Cælius from his province, Cilicia:—

“Cleave to the City, the City, and in that focus of light feel yourself alive: all foreign travel is but darkness and disgrace for those whose gifts can bear the light of Rome.”⁵

Even before he sets foot in his province he writes to Atticus⁶ “words cannot express how I am consumed with longing for the City, how intolerably insipid I find provincial life.” Now this was not a Roman trait. Cæsar was as eager for a new tenure of his period of government in Gaul as Cicero was anxious to prevent a prorogation of his rule over Cilicia. Marcellus, as we have seen, was quite willing to remain in the charming Mitylene, and was far from eager for the success of Cicero’s appeal to Cæsar to permit him to return to Rome. Milo, when shown the masterly speech which Cicero wrote in his defence, congratulated himself that it had never been deliv-

(1) *Att.*, xii., 10.

(2) *Att.*, i., 8.

(3) *Att.*, ii., 9 and 12.

(4) *Fam.*, vii., 6.

(5) *Fam.*, ii., 12.

(6) *Att.*, v., 11.

ered, since its effect would probably have been such that he would never have known how excellent were the fish to be procured in Marseilles. These typical Romans felt none of the homesickness which troubled Cicero so much, though probably they were quite as little interested in the affairs of the provinces. The bureaucracy and *beau monde* of the Roman world regarded provincial life as beneath their notice, and, indeed, it was a mark of good breeding to be absolutely indifferent to the provinces. Cicero tells us an amusing anecdote in illustration of this fact in his speech for Plancius,¹ which is worth quoting besides as showing how well he can tell a story:—

“Life in Rome hardly catches a whisper of provincial doings. I hope I shall not be accused of arrogance if I refer to my own quæstorship. Let me make a candid confession—I imagined Rome did nothing but talk of my official success. I had sent home a great supply of corn at a time of exceptional dearth. I was the idol of the provincial,—who devised unheard of honors for my glorification. When I retired, I felt sure that there was nothing which my grateful country would not bestow on me. Well, when I landed at Puteoli on my way to Rome, the season was in full blast, and the *beau monde* were there in force. Gentlemen of the jury, you could have knocked me down with a feather when an acquaintance meeting me asked for the news from Rome. ‘Why, I am on my way home from my province,’ replied I. ‘Ah yes, to be sure, Africa, I think,’ says he. ‘Sicily,’ said I with some *hauteur*, feeling by this time rather piqued. ‘What,’ says a bystander, one of those who pose as universal providers of information, ‘Is it possible you don’t know our friend has been quæstor of Syracuse?’”

Now Lilybæum (the modern Marsala), not Syracuse, was the division of Sicily over which Cicero had presided. So even the third guess had not hit the scene of his administration, which in his youthful inexperience he had expected to find on the lips of all the beaux and quidnuncs of gay Puteoli.

In his passion for the *salons* and the *boulevards* Cicero recalls the modern Parisian and his “on ne vit qu’ à Paris et l’on végète ailleurs.” In other features, too, of his character he reminds us of the modern Frenchman, in his passionate attachment to his daughter Tullia and comparative indifference to his wife, and in his attitude toward religion, which he assigns, as a matter of course, to the province of the woman. “Neither the gods,” he writes to Terentia from exile, “whom you have worshipped with such piety, nor men to whom I have ever been a slave, have returned our devotion.”² In a letter written some nine years afterwards (“Fam.,” xiv., 7.) he tells her how he was suddenly relieved of a bilious

(1) *Cc.*, 26, 27 abridged.

(2) *Fam.*, xiv., 4.

attack which had made him look on everything with a jaundiced eye, adding, "it was a providential interference, for which you must pay our dues, with your usual piety, to the gods who intervened, that is to Apollo and Æsculapius."

As we have touched on Cicero's attitude towards religion, it may be remarked that, if our evidence had been confined to the correspondence, we could hardly have credited him with a belief in a future state. In his reply to the beautiful letter of Sulpicius,¹ part of which has been finely paraphrased by Byron, he admits that his friend had touched on every possible topic of consolation for the death of his beloved Tullia, yet there is not a hint at the comfort which might have come from a belief in the happiness of his daughter in a future state. The only allusion to a possible life after death is the suggestion that the girl might be pained by the inconsolable anguish of her father "if the dead have any consciousness." In a letter written to Torquatus² some months later he speaks of death, if it should befall him in those troublous times, as a condition of insensibility. His tone is often that of one on whom religious beliefs sit lightly. "Let chance look to this or providence if there is such a thing" ("Att.," iv., 10), is hardly the language of faith. In his speech for Cluentius (§ 171) he speaks of the doctrine of future punishment as silly fables (*ineptiæ ac fabulæ*), and declares that death only removes our sense of pain. Yet in the defence of Rabirius (§ 29) from the instinctive belief of mankind he deduces an eternal existence for the souls of the good, and in the "De Haruspicum responsis" he endorses the argument for the existence of a providence drawn from the evidences of design in nature. Again in "De Nat. Deor." i., 37 and "De Rep.," vi., 16, he acknowledges an over-ruling providence. In "Tusc. Quæst.," i., 74, we read that the god who holds authority in our breast forbids us to desert our post without his leave; yet during his exile and in the last year of his life he often speaks of suicide without any apparent sense that it is contrary to the dictates of religion or conscience.

Though far in advance of his age in morality and refinement, it would be idle to claim for Cicero a sense of honor quite as keen as that of a gentleman of the present day, if that word so "soiled with use" be taken in its strictest sense. That would be to ignore the change of view which was the inevitable result of Christianity and chivalry. Cicero, under the influence of anger, had written a speech against Curio and Clodius which he feared might impair his chances of restoration from

(1) *Fam.*, iv., 5 and 6.

(2) *Fam.*, vi., 4.

exile if widely circulated. It was not a well-written speech; and Cicero allowed himself to write to Atticus,¹ "I think a good case could be made to show that it was not written by me." This is a suggestion which a modern gentleman could not make. A man may refrain from acknowledging a piece of work which he thinks unworthy of him and likely to injure him, but he must not suggest to a friend to deny it. The result might be much the same in both cases, but the wish must not be expressed even to an intimate or a kinsman. In another case Cicero stooped to a fabrication to oblige a friend. He was anxious to recommend Atticus to the influential Cælius, and, as the copyist of Atticus happened to be with him, he dictated to him a letter in praise of Cælius, purporting to come from Atticus and guaranteed as genuine by the handwriting of Atticus' copyist, who was known to Cælius. To give one more instance of a somewhat blunted sense of honor, as regarded from the modern point of view, one day a packet of letters from his brother Quintus fell accidentally into his hands. He had reason to believe that they contained injurious reflections on himself; he opened them and sent them to Atticus, adding² that if it seemed fit they might be resealed and sent to the addresses, "for I fancy your daughter Pomponia (the wife of Quintus), who is with you, has his seal ring." No gentleman now would stoop to such an act, but how few would have been capable of the generosity which dictated the letter to Cæsar (already mentioned) in vindication of the brother whose treachery he had so clearly ascertained!

Another charge which has been brought against his sincerity must be dismissed, since it rests on the untenable hypothesis that there is no such thing as official language, and that the opinions expressed in the public utterances of a public man must always tally precisely with the sentiments of his private correspondence. This is a hard saying, and what public man shall hear it? But of this anon. A little more than a month after the memorable ides of March, Marcus Antonius wrote to Cicero a letter craving his good offices in bringing about the restoration from exile of Sextus Clodius. The letter of Antony is wretchedly expressed and full of blunders in grammar and diction, such as *non contempseris* (this use of *non* for *ne* is mentioned by Quintilian as an error common amongst the illiterate) and *contumacia* for *contumelia*. Compare the slipshod use of *perspicuity* for *perspicacity* and *predicate* for *predict* among careless writers. The latter error was pointed out by John Stuart

(1) *Att.*, iii., 12.

(2) *Att.*, xi., 9.

Mill, and is made more than once in Thomas Hardy's "Jude the Obscure." These are errors which we are not surprised to find in the man from whom Cicero in the thirteenth Philippic quotes *odivit* and *piissimus*, and which we certainly ought not to correct (as the German editors do) into conformity with orthodox Latinity. However, we are not here concerned with this question, though it might well be discussed in an article on the correspondents of Cicero, which might prove interesting. The letter is quite friendly in tone, and so is Cicero's reply. At the same time Cicero writes to Atticus thus:—

"M. Antonius has written to me about the restoration of Sextus Clodius. You will see by his letter, of which I enclose a copy, how polite he is; nor will you fail to note its slipshod style, and how menacing is his attitude, which sometimes makes one wish Cæsar back again. What Cæsar would never have done nor permitted to be done is now carried out on the authority of forged minutes alleged to be his. However, I fell in with his humor perfectly in my reply, which also I enclose. Having discovered that he can do what he likes, he would have done it in this case whether I complied with his request or refused it."¹

The Mommsens, Drumanns, Beeslys, and Froudes find in the comparison of the letters to Antony and to Atticus food for charges of perfidy and double-facedness; but the man of the world will recognize the inevitableness of official language. Not long ago the biographer of Cardinal Manning by publishing a complete collection of that prelate's letters laid him open to a similar charge. But it was agreed among men of the world that every man in a public position must adjust the tone of his letters to the age and station of the person whom he addresses and the relationship or intimacy which subsists between them. Even an eminent dignitary of the Church, Cardinal Vaughan, wrote in reference to the calumny:—

"If all private and intimate correspondence were to be conducted with a view to its being presently cast upon the four winds, such a change in our customs would revolutionize the familiar intercourse of friendship, and would in the end, perhaps, dry us all up into prigs and pedants."

It is a singular coincidence that Cicero in the second Philippic (§ 7) rebukes the ill-breeding (*inhumanitas*) shown by Antony in reading to the Senate extracts from the letter under consideration, and in doing so utters the very sentiment of the archbishop, "Would not such a practice revolutionize social life and cut at the roots of intimate correspondence?" It is interesting to observe the respectful and friendly tone adopted by

(1) *Att.*, xiv., 13. The letter of Antony to Cicero is *Att.*, xiv., 13 *a* and Cicero's reply *Att.*, xiv., 13 *b*.

Brutus and Cassius towards Antony at that epoch, and to mark how the miraculous genius of Shakspeare divined that such would be their attitude:—

Brutus. “For your part,
 To you our swords have leaden points, Mark Antony;
 * * * and our hearts
 Of brothers’ temper do receive you in,
 With all kind love, good thoughts, and reverence.
Cassius. Your voice shall be as strong as any man’s
 In the disposing of new dignities.”¹

The letters of Cicero are for the most part the birth of the moment, and reflect feelings essentially volatile and evanescent. Suspicions which were immediately proved groundless are stereotyped there as if they had been realized. Petulant expressions the result of a momentary irritation are there irrevocable. But only the German *savant* will treat them as solemn utterances indicative of character and policy. They found charges of treason to his party on expressions which are simply peevish. One has heard many a good conservative exclaim, “I declare Disraeli is just as bad as Gladstone.” Similar utterances pilloried in the letters have supplied Drumann with the data for an elaborate indictment which proves nothing but the purblind pedantry of the prosecutor. Gaston-Boissier excellently observes in words which a translation would spoil:—

“Pour bien apprécier toutes ces nuances, pour rendre aux choses leur importance véritable, pour être bon juge de la portée de ces phrases qui se disent avec un demi-sourire et ne signifient pas toujours tout ce qu’elles semblent dire, il faut avoir plus d’habitude de la vie qu’on n’en prend d’ordinaire dans une université d’Allemagne. S’il faut dire ce que je pense, *dans cette appréciation délicate je me ferais peut-être encore plus à un homme du monde qu’à un savant.*”

And again of the Mommsenian Cæsar-worship, he writes:—

“Comme il est toujours préoccupé du présent dans ses études du passé, on dirait qu’il poursuit dans l’aristocratie romaine les hobereaux de la Prusse et qu’il salue d’avance dans César le despote populaire dont la main ferme peut seule donner à l’Allemagne son unité.”

In some points, of course, Cicero reflects the manners of his age. Though a letter to Pætus (“Fam.,” ix., 22) shows him as an opponent of foul and obscene speech, yet he allows himself to use language which would now be regarded as disgustingly coarse. Even the Irish Nationalists have not yet come to calling their political opponents swine, carrion, and ordure, terms which Cicero often applies to adverse politicians. An

(1) *Julius Cæsar*, iii., 1, 172.

excited French mob will shout *conspuez*, but Cicero writing to his brother¹ tells how Clodius and his supporters actually carried out such an exhortation in the Senate, and he does not relate it as a very remarkable incident of debate. He is never tired of referring to an occasion when Antony vomited in the Senate house, and of some of his repartees (especially *licet alterum tollas*²), the less said the better.

His life reflects, too, the strange looseness of the marriage tie which characterized Roman society in his time. This is excellently illustrated by the incidents which followed the invasion of the mysteries of the Bona Dea by Clodius in the December of 62 B. C. When Clodius intruded into the company of the vestals and matrons who were celebrating in the house of Cæsar rites which were desecrated by the presence of a male, he was believed to have done so in pursuit of an intrigue with Cæsar's wife, who was forthwith divorced. But Cæsar maintained friendly relations with the man who had dishonored him, and for a good reason,—he had an intrigue of his own with Pompey's wife Mucia, and so could hardly pose as a champion of the purity of married life, though he is said to have uttered the oft quoted *banalité*, "Cæsar's wife must be above suspicion." Pompey, however, divorced the frail Mucia and married the daughter of his wife's seducer. Verily those were days of which it might be said *vexat censura columbas*! Cicero seems to have no very definite reason for divorcing Terentia except her extravagance and lack of sympathy. In debating about his choice of a successor to her, he thinks chiefly of money, of which he was just then in sore need, and contemplates a union with a certain heiress whom he describes as being "the ugliest woman I ever saw." Finally he married the wealthy Publilia, who might have been his grand-daughter, and divorced her because she would not simulate a grief which she did not feel for the death of his darling daughter. Tullia's first husband, Piso, seems to have been a worthy person. He died during Cæsar's exile, and she was married in 56 B. C., to Furius Crassipes, who divorced her after about five years. The following year she married Dolabella, an agreeable rake who insulted her by his infidelities with Cæcilia Metella and squandered her dower, but to whom she gave a love which neither of her former husbands had inspired. She died in childbirth at the age of one-and-thirty in her father's villa in Tusculum, and (strange to say) we subsequently find Cicero living on terms of intimacy and cordiality with the cruel and faithless Dolabella. Cicero never recovered her loss, and it is to her that

(1) *Q. Fr.*, ii., 3, 2. Clodiani nostros consputare cæperunt.

(2) *Att.*, ii., 1.

we owe most of his exquisite works on philosophy. When he buried her there was nothing for it but to bury himself,—which he did in his books. Strachan-Davidson claims for these works of his old age and bereavement an influence on the modern world (mainly through the effect which his philosophy had on St. Ambrose) second only to that exerted by Plutarch's "Lives" on English literature through Shakspeare. They are, indeed, the Moon which sheds on us so beautifully the light borrowed from the Sun of Greek Philosophy. Mommsen bays at this benign luminary in the words, "anyone who seeks classical productions in works so written can only be advised to study in literary matters a becoming silence." We are not afraid that English or American readers will keep perfect silence to listen to the Prussian *latratus*.

Cicero's indifference to pecuniary troubles is a feature of the age, but it is the more graceful in one who refused to fill his coffers by illicit means, as did most of his contemporaries, even the austere Cato and the immaculate Brutus. Shortly after the Catilinarian conspiracy he says, "I am so plunged in debt that I think I must join the next conspiracy instead of putting it down." After Tullia's death he writes, "I am more vexed that I have no one to leave my money to than that I really have none to go on with." When he hears of certain serious mishaps to some house property of his, his reflection is "many call these things misfortunes; to me they are hardly an inconvenience," and he alludes in jesting phrase to the greed of Dolabella in refusing to repay Tullia's marriage portion, "Yes, Dolabella is acting well. A score for him. I wish he would think of the score he has got to settle with me."

A strong contrast to the meanness of Dolabella is afforded by his own scrupulous sense of honor in money transactions. He determines on his return from his province to devote to the repayment of a debt to Cæsar the money with which he had intended to defray the expenses of his triumph, on the ground that "it looks ugly to be in debt to a political opponent."¹ On leaving Rome after the assassination of Cæsar, he writes:—

"I am owed money enough to satisfy all claims on me, yet it often happens to be hard to collect. If this should be so, pray consult only my reputation. Borrow afresh to meet the demands of my creditors, or even raise money by the sale of my property."²

The vanity which is so often held up to ridicule in the character of Cicero was essentially a weakness of the age. Did not even the serene

(1) *Att.*, vii., 8.

(2) *Att.*, xvi., 2.

Cæsar send to the Senate the absurd piece of gasconade, *veni, vidi, vici*? If Lord Wolseley had been a Roman contemporary of Cæsar, King Koffee's umbrella would have figured in his triumph with Heaven knows what rodomontade inscribed on it. Indeed, moderation in despatches from the seat of war is a modern Anglo-Saxon virtue which we hope we may maintain. The Napoleonic *fanfaronnade* of "Forty centuries are looking down upon you" contrasts curiously with the homely words addressed by Lord Gough to his Irish regiments at Chillianwalla and Sobraon. But vain Cicero undoubtedly was. He was fond of glorifying his own exploits, and would have accepted the definition given of a bore as "one who talks about himself when *you* want to talk about *yourself*." In the end of the "Brutus" he prefaces with the words *nihil de me dicam* a description of his place in oratory which lasts till the treatise breaks off, occupying two or three long chapters, and we do not know how much more, as the conclusion of the treatise is lost. But his vanity was, in the words of Mr. Strachan-Davidson, "essentially of the innocuous and peacock-like kind." It was a childish trait, like his ready placability.

Dean Merivale, the eminent historian of the Romans under the Empire, gives his verdict in favor of Cicero, and maintains that after all due deductions are made there remains a residue of what is amiable in his character and noble in his teaching. We have already seen how, through St. Ambrose, his philosophy influenced the ancient world, more by its spirit than its content. Some of his treatises are not philosophy in the modern sense at all. The "De Officiis" partakes more of the character of Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son. The "De Senectute" has little in it beyond its incomparable style—"cet atticisme, les délices des gens de goût et le désespoir des traducteurs." St. Augustine recognized in the "Hortensius" of Cicero the first source of his conversion. Quintilian made the enjoyment of the style of Cicero a test of one's improvement in taste, and Merivale holds that "the same praise may justly be extended to the qualities of his heart, and even in our enlightened days it may be held no mean advance in virtue to venerate the master of Roman philosophy."

THE EGYPT OF TODAY

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WHEN Lord Milner returns from his wearisome task in South Africa, it is possible that he may consider that country pre-eminently the land of surprises and contradictions. When, however, he wrote his book on "England in Egypt," he was of the opinion that no other country in the world was so unique as was Egypt,—in its methods of cultivation, in the habits of its people, in the constant series of unexpected acts of its rulers, and in the no less surprising results which sprung from these acts. Most cheering, however, is the optimistic tone, not merely of Milner's work, but also of the writings of most recent observers of affairs in Egypt. The unexpected seems almost continually in these later years to be the surprisingly good, in sharp contrast with the unexpectedly bad of the days of Ismail, before the time of the British occupation.

It is quite possible that other states may have made as great progress as Egypt has during the last twenty years. It is, however, doubtful if in any other country the good results of constructive statesmanship can be so accurately measured in bushels of produce, in pounds and pence of revenue, in decreasing percentages of illiteracy, and in increasing numbers of righteous instead of corrupt court decisions. This possibility of apparent precision, as well as the surprising effects of governmental measures, makes the study of late history in Egypt of peculiar interest.

I have spoken of the work as one of constructive statesmanship. Many able men have aided in, but all agree that the master hand in bringing about, these beneficial results has been that of Lord Cromer. As representative of the guiding power, he has known what it was best to do; he has had the patience and wisdom not to attempt too much; it is his tact which has prevented interference with the Egyptian government in matters that were non-essential; and his has been the courage and decision to check with a steady, and possibly unpleasantly heavy, hand those who have opposed measures aiming at the welfare of the country. The contemplation of the decided progress of the last few years has surely been for him a fitting reward.

It is the purpose of this article to sum up as compactly as possible the progress of these last few years and to set out in brief the present situation in Egypt. The authorities used are the latest books and reports, together with the words of the men who are doing the work, and of those who are feeling the results,—both foreigners and native Egyptians. For

the conclusions reached, however, I alone am responsible. They have resulted from as careful a weighing as possible of direct evidence and of the opinions of those representing differing points of view.

EGYPT'S POLITICAL DOWNFALL.

It has often been said that the story of Egypt is the story of the Nile; its lean years are the years of a bad Nile; its years of plenty, those when the Nile is good. Its years of famine are not brought about by the failure of monsoons that sweep across the country, as are those in India, for whatever may be the circumstances surrounding the source of the Nile, Egypt proper has no climatic changes. There is the one unending succession of days of sunshine, sometimes a little warmer, sometimes a trifle cooler, but always sunshine from day to day, from year to year. The breadth of the long strip of green and fertile territory lying between the rocks and sands of the desert is due, not at all to the rainfall of Egypt, but to the flow of the Nile.

The way in which, in recent years, even the Nile itself is being brought more and more absolutely under the control of the Egyptian government will be told in a later paragraph. First we should speak of another side of Egypt's history. If Egypt's economic prosperity is due to the Nile, it is no less true that her modern history has been as profoundly affected by the ebb and flow of her debt and the methods taken to control that. But these two subjects, the Nile and the Debt, their inter-relations, and the way in which everything else depends upon them, do tell practically the entire story.

Egypt is of course technically a Turkish province; but early in the nineteenth century Mehemet Ali, the Sultan's ablest commander, wrested from his master a semi-independence, and attempted to place Egypt in the way to the acquirement of a European civilization. He, first of all Egypt's rulers in modern days, saw that the Nile could, to a considerable extent, be controlled by engineering works, and that it would pay his country to acquire some of the engineering skill of the West. His less able successors let the products of his advanced ideas fall into decay, and Egypt drifted, as in the earlier days, until Said Pasha, lured on by De Lesseps, joined in the project for building the Suez Canal, and borrowing money, began the story of the debt.

His successor, the Khedive Ismail, "the Arch-Borrower," in his delight in extravagant living and in his restless attempts to carry out his plans of making his capital a second Paris, and Egypt a centre of wealth and influence, created the debt which brought about Egypt's downfall, and ultimately, strange as it may appear, Egypt's regeneration. In twelve

years he had incurred a debt of over \$500,000,000, of which, according to the best authorities, probably not more than ten per cent was spent really for the good of Egypt. With the country bankrupt, he was compelled practically to place his financial administration into the hands of the great European Powers to manage for the creditors. Unwilling to be checked and guided, vigorously struggling for the retention of his reckless independence, he was at length removed, and at the time of his death, which occurred quite recently, was practically a state prisoner at Constantinople.

His more amenable but in many ways less attractive son, Tewfik, had his government left largely under the direction of the French and English as administrators for European creditors. The position was a galling one both for him and for the ambitious, proud spirited, and none too scrupulous Egyptians, whose Moslem pride was injured by the control of Christians and whose individual purses suffered by the rigid inspection which compelled, relatively speaking, an honest administration of the finances in the interests of the country and of the creditors.

At length the hostile Egyptians, under the leadership of Arabi Pasha, with the avowed intention of driving out the foreigners and securing Egypt for the Egyptians, broke into a revolt that threatened, not merely the authority of the Khedive, but also the security of the government as directed by the foreigners, and even the property and persons of those foreigners resident in Egypt. Prompt action was necessary. England called upon France to aid in putting down the revolt and in restoring the authority of the Khedive. France hesitated, and when open hostilities threatened, her fleet withdrew. England took the responsibility. Acting in the interests, as she claimed, of both Egypt and of the creditors, her fleet bombarded Alexandria, her soldiers routed Arabi's forces, captured their leader, and assumed control. Since then England has had an army of occupation in Egypt, and although she has always governed nominally through the authority of the Khedive, has never suggested annexation or mentioned even a protectorate, she has shut out the interference of France and other European nations as far as possible; and, whatever the form of action may have been, she has practically ruled Egypt as a dependency.

This is not the place to study in detail the political devices employed. Nominally the Khedive rules as a despot, like his master the Sultan of Turkey, so long as he pays to his master an annual tribute of about \$3,375,000. He has a cabinet of six ministers to advise him, each in charge of a department, and this cabinet is nominally in his name the law-making body. He has also a legislative council to which proposed

laws are submitted for advice. There is a general assembly, meeting every two years, which may also consider the welfare of the country and make suggestions. But, more important than all these, there is an English financial adviser who, without a vote, sits with the cabinet, who must be given full information, and must be allowed to give advice. In each department there is either an English adviser or an English permanent secretary, who also must be given full knowledge of the working of government, and must be permitted to make suggestions. These all act under the experienced, wise leadership of Lord Cromer, England's diplomatic agent and consul general. To support this English advice, an English army of some five thousand troops is in occupation, and they hold the citadel whose guns command the Khedive's capital. The Egyptian army is trained and commanded by English officers, and the principle has been formally enunciated in the English despatches to Lord Cromer as the British representative in Egypt, and on more than one critical occasion practically enforced,—that when England, on important matters, gives advice to the Egyptian government that advice must be accepted and acted upon.

Egypt's debt thus indirectly made Egypt an English dependency. How, before the English occupation, the burden of the debt was literally, through starvation in many cases, crushing the life out of the Egyptian peasant, and how, since that occupation, the burden has been lightened and the burden bearer strengthened, will be told later. It is necessary first to see how governmental decrees can make a country rich.

IRRIGATION.

While the prosperity of Egypt is absolutely dependent upon the Nile, this very dependency makes her independent as soon as the water of the Nile can be controlled in amount and distribution. Presumably in the most ancient days the irrigation of the cultivated land was simply that resulting from the annual overflow, which supplied both moisture and fertilizer sufficient for a single crop, the land then lying dry and fallow until the next high Nile. More than four thousand years B. C., Mena, the traditional first king of Egypt, is said to have introduced the basin system of irrigation, which is still prevalent over large parts of Upper Egypt. Low dams of earth are thrown in various directions across the plain between the Nile and the desert on either side, dividing the land into shallow basins. As the overflow from the Nile fills the basin, it is held there until the land is thoroughly soaked, and a sufficient amount of silt for fertilizing has been deposited, and is then drawn off into the basin, on the next lower level, to flood and fertilize that in the

same way, and so on as long as the supply of water lasts. This plan is simply that of building a series of low dams often only a few inches high, to extend the effectiveness of the Nile by holding back, and thus using for a longer time, some part of the annual overflow. This system can, of course, be extended over wider territories by the cutting of canals which shall lead the water of the Nile into some more remote districts. As far back as Joseph's time we find the cutting of a large canal, which to a great extent has been retained, and is employed even to the present day.

The basin system of irrigation secures one crop, the extent of the territory varying of course, more or less with the height of the Nile in different years. If now the supply of water, so large a proportion of which runs out unused into the sea at the times of high Nile, can be held back, to be supplied to the country during the heat of summer, instead of one crop being gathered and the land lying fallow for the rest of the year, it is readily seen that two or three harvests may be reaped easily enough in a land where the heat is always sufficient to favor the growing crop.

Thus it was the plan of Mehemet Ali, in his most successful and most ambitious days, to build the great barrage across the Nile, below Cairo, so as to hold back the waters and to furnish to the Delta, by means of subsidiary canals and weirs, a system of perennial irrigation. His engineers, however, were not backed by the necessary authority or given sufficient funds, so that, although a beginning was made, the dam was of little or no practical use until repaired by the Anglo-Indian engineers who came to Egypt in 1883 and 1884 to remodel the irrigation system. Since 1884 Lower Egypt has enjoyed successful perennial irrigation, and the land has produced, even in years of low Nile, over a good part of its cultivable territory from two to three successful crops. In ordinary years this barrage secures prosperity for Lower Egypt.

In order, however, to give like fertile crops even in seasons when the Nile is low, as well as to secure for Upper Egypt, also, the system of perennial irrigation, it was necessary that a great storage reservoir be constructed which could contain enough of the surplus from times of high Nile to supply the water needed throughout the rest of the year. The new great dam at Assouan has been constructed with this end in view. A dam two thousand meters in length, twenty meters in height at the centre, is nearly completed, which will dam back the water for a distance of more than one hundred and fifty miles and contain one billion, sixty-five million cubic meters of water. It is estimated that this will be sufficient to secure, even in the worst seasons, a plentiful supply for all Lower Egypt, so that the most valuable crop, cotton, will always be insured.

Large tracts also in Upper Egypt now cultivated only with the basin system will be given a sufficient supply for summer irrigation, while much land now entirely uncultivated will be reclaimed. The gain to the state will come, of course, through the sale of reclaimed lands and the increased annual revenue derived from them, as well as indirectly through the increased amount of agricultural produce, the rise in the value of land and the added stimulus to business from this increase of wealth.

According to the report of Sir William Garstin, the annual increase in the wealth of the country from these various sources will amount to £E. (Egyptian pounds) 2,608,000, while the benefit to the state in the form of added annual income will amount to £E.378,400. In addition to this annual benefit, an additional sum to be obtained from the sale of land is anticipated amounting to £E.1,020,000. These estimates are based on the most unfavorable conditions of season and supply, and it should be remembered that all of these benefits, it is thought, will be secured at a contract cost of only £E.2,000,000, though experience has shown that added excavations will increase the cost beyond the contract by a considerable sum. Probably £E.3,000,000 will cover all expenses, including the supplementary weirs and canals.

Aside, however, from these great works, which are practically revolutionary in their effects, the entire irrigation and drainage system has been thoroughly reorganized, and multitudes of small savings have been made in many places, the sum total of which has lessened very materially the burden of the Egyptian debt. Owing to the deposit of silt in the canals after the flood, it was once necessary to clear them out in the summer season by forced labor. Formerly the labor required in the Delta alone amounted to £E.630,000 per year. Now, with a much more extensive system and additional drains, owing to the better organization and the more careful distribution of the water, the annual cost is only £E.200,000. In one special case, by certain minor changes introduced to lessen the amount of silt deposited, with an expenditure of less than £E.2,000, an economy was made of between 700,000 and 800,000 days of work per year, or, in terms of money, this single expenditure of £E.2,000 made an annual saving of at least £E.16,000. Figures like these are eloquent.

To secure, however, the proper distribution of wealth from land irrigation, there is needed not merely the annual overflow of the Nile and the proper dams and canals for its distribution, but perhaps of equal consequence is the control of the population so that the water will be properly distributed and the best possible use made of the supply. In the days of Ismail's reckless extravagance and unjust favoritism, the wealthy landowner could always be sure of receiving a sufficient supply of water

to secure his crops, while his poor neighbors, who lacked political influence, frequently went without.

The cotton crop of Egypt is, by far, its most valuable crop. The production of maize, and especially the production of rice, requires far more water. In the earlier days, if the man of influence planted rice, he took what water he wanted, and, if the Nile were low, his less influential neighbor producing cotton or maize saw his crops fail. In the year 1900 the Nile supply was unusually low. The calculations of the irrigation officials, made from accurate measurements of the height of the Nile on the water-gauges at different points, showed that it would be impossible to save all the crops on even the Lower Nile. It was determined, therefore, to save the cotton entire, and what little might be secured of the others. A decree of the Khedive was issued forbidding the planting of corn until a certain fixed date, and the rice crop was practically abandoned. Somewhat later in the season, when the cotton crop was completely secured, permission was given to plant corn, and a certain amount of water was allowed for the growing of other crops. The result of the action was that the entire cotton crop was saved, and even an average one of maize, and this under possibly the worst conditions known in a century. Twenty years ago such conditions would inevitably have caused a serious famine. Without the absolutely despotic action of the irrigation officials, determining how much water should be given to each acre of land, on what days that water should be taken, and how it should be employed, there would doubtless have been a partial failure of the cotton crop, with probably a corn crop no better than that actually secured, and merely a relatively small rice crop, of little value, to offset the much greater losses.

With, however, the absolutely certain knowledge regarding the amount of water available, with the possibility of determining the wisest use to be made of it, and the rigid impartiality with which the available supply is distributed among the poor and rich alike, even the poorest Egyptian can be certain of receiving, under the present English administration, his just share; and when the plans now nearly completed shall have been carried out, practically all can be sure that every year, whatever the condition of the Nile, there will be sufficient water to secure an average crop. The risk of the agriculturalist will be limited to unusual plagues, like the plague of rats, which ruined the rice crop in parts of India a year ago, and to the risk coming from fluctuations of price dependent upon conditions in foreign countries, and to the damage that will possibly come, for still a few years, from the breakage of the dykes at times of abnormally high flood.

But the improvements of the irrigation system have brought about justice and freedom in ways perhaps even more important than the finan-

cial ones. Under the old system the working classes in Egypt were regularly called out by order of the government for forced labor (the "corvée"), not merely in watching the banks of the Nile in flood time, but also in clearing out the drains or in doing any other public work that the government thought advisable, even to the digging of the Suez Canal. Besides this public compulsory labor, many of the officials compelled the poor fellaheen to work for nothing on private estates. Even men of wealth and influence who were not government officials often commanded the poorer peasants to work for them, and the peasants, in their ignorance, submitted. This meant the forced labor, for months at a time, of thousands of the workingmen,—a practical slavery. Under the English administration, even the government "corvée" as a regular system has been abolished. The peasants are, some of them, still called out, but only for the watching of the banks of the Nile in times of flood; here only for a short period and in relatively small numbers (in 1899 only about 11,000 instead of 281,000), varying with the needs of the year. In many, perhaps in most, sections of the country, this remnant of the "corvée" has become a work not much more burdensome than the personal working out of the highway tax in the United States.

THE DEBT.

From the economic point of view the most striking change in Egypt's conditions, or at any rate the change that can be shown with greatest arithmetical accuracy, is that brought about in the public debt. Even Mr. Clinton Dawkins, the former undersecretary of state for finance in Egypt, whose work has surely given him a practical view of the question, calls the story of the Egyptian debt "preëminently romantic," for, as he explains, out of the evil of a debt that for years pressed with crushing severity on the Egyptian peasant came good. The necessity of paying the debt in full led to reforms which have not merely lightened his burden, but have also put into his way the possibility of attaining a higher, if not the highest, civilization.

I have already stated how the eloquence of De Lesseps tempted Said Pasha to begin the Egyptian debt. This loan was nominally £3,292,800, but the rate of interest was seven per cent, with a sinking fund of one per cent, and the net proceeds were only £2,640,000. In comparison with Ismail's terms, however, this loan was generous. Ismail's first loan, besides paying seven per cent, had a sinking fund of four per cent instead of one, and when, through his ambition to build magnificent palaces, to give entertainments worthy of an Oriental ruler, as well as to furnish funds for the Suez Canal, he continued borrowing, the terms rapidly

became stiffer. In 1865 a nominal loan of £3,000,000 was issued at ninety, with an interest of nine per cent, and with a sinking fund of 3.27 per cent. A year later the railways loan of £3,000,000 at seven, with a proviso for its repayment in six annual instalments, had an average charge of over twenty-six per cent on the amount actually received. As the borrowing went on the terms became even harder still. In 1868 a seven per cent loan, with a sinking fund of one per cent, was issued at seventy-five. With the commission the rate paid on the amount realized was 13.25 per cent. In 1870 another loan paid substantially the same amount. His final loan, in 1874, cost him fourteen per cent; and then, as his last financial exploit, he sold to the British government for £4,000,000 the 177,642 shares in the Suez Canal, subscribed for by Said Pasha. He had already detached the coupons up to 1894, and he received £450,000 more than he paid for the shares; but the same shares for which the British government paid £4,000,000 are now worth roundly £24,000,000, and the annual revenue received is estimated at £850,000.

Such recklessness in borrowing and expenditure could not fail to be extremely burdensome to the tax-payer. Tax after tax was levied until, in many cases, the cultivator found it impossible to pay.

A not uncommon procedure, according to Mr. Dawkins, was for the tax-collector to take with him a money lender, with chests of money, as he went about to collect his taxes. "Called upon to pay their taxes before the crops were ripe, the villagers, under the stimulus of the koorbash, were then and there obliged to borrow from the attendant Shylock, and to assign their coming crops to him in payment." Besides being thus compelled to mortgage their crops to pay the annual tax, land-owners were, in 1870, compelled to pay six years' land tax in advance, though they were promised thereafter, as compensation, that their taxes should be reduced by fifty per cent. The money tax thus collected under the lash had impoverished the people; the forced labor exacted by the government and by influential favorites had practically enslaved them.

The story of the recovery from the ill effects of the debt, though perhaps not so ludicrously extravagant in its details, is after all almost as marvelous. Lord Cromer himself has summed the matter up in a late report. He speaks of three distinct phases through which the finances of Egypt have passed since 1883. From 1883 to 1887 the efforts of the government had to be directed toward the maintenance of financial equilibrium. It was impossible to effect either fiscal relief or to incur additional expenditure. The second period from 1887 to 1894 might be considered that of fiscal relief. The danger of insolvency was over. There was an opportunity of relieving the country in part from the burden of the taxes.

Since 1894 the tax burdens have become, on the whole, so reasonable that the period of expenditure directly for the improvement of the people has arrived. When statistics tell so remarkable a story as those of Egyptian finances, a few figures even may not prove wearisome.

Between 1881 and 1897 the average land tax per acre was reduced from about \$5.50 to \$4.56. Since 1891 the total annual tax on land has been reduced by over half a million pounds; other direct taxes have been reduced by about a quarter of a million pounds, and indirect taxes amounting to £E.186,000 have been abolished. Between 1881 and 1897 the tax per head of population was reduced some twenty per cent, although there had been over 200 miles of new railway opened; the expenditure on public instruction had been increased by over thirty-seven per cent, large sums of money had been spent on irrigation, and on agricultural roads, and the number of men called out on "corvée," that is, for unpaid labor, had been reduced, as we have seen, from 281,000 to 11,000 men per year.

In 1881 the amount of bonds outstanding was £98,376,660 sterling, in 1897 it had been reduced to £98,035,780, in spite of the fact that £13,219,000 of fresh debt had been raised to cover extraordinary expenditures, and that there had been £3,400,000 increase of capital due to conversion. In 1881 the interest charge was £4,235,921. With all the improvements mentioned before, the charge in 1899 was only £3,872,239. In 1881 the market price of the five per cent privileged debt was 96¼. In 1897 the same debt, converted into three and one half per cent, was 102. The four per cent unified debt in 1881 stood at 71¾; in 1897 at 106½. The amount of debt per head of population in 1881 was £14, 8s. 9d.; in 1897 it was £10, 0s. 2d. Although the per capita burden of the debt has been thus enormously reduced, the ability to carry the burden, through the various works mentioned, as well as through various other helpful measures, educative and otherwise, has also been very greatly strengthened.

If one goes back a little further the story becomes even more striking. This is not the place, however, to tell it in detail. The following brief table, printed lately by Mr. Dawkins, summarizes the whole in briefest shape:—

	Capital of debt in hands of public.	Total debt charge.
1877	89,208,046	6,565,023
1880	98,559,790	4,308,603
1899 ¹	95,550,000	3,862,000

(1) Note that between 1880 and 1899 it had been necessary to raise the guaranteed loan of £9,000,000.

Although the principal of the debt has been comparatively little lessened, there have been greatly added expenditures in works of public improvement, and the poor peasant, the tax-payer, has had his burden cut in half, while his strength to carry the same has been doubled.

SOCIAL REFORMS.

Most of the later day writers have laid special emphasis upon the lessening of the debt and the improved financial situation through irrigation.¹ It was, of course, absolutely essential while Egypt was tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, that attention be first paid to the matter of finances. Since 1894, however, the surplus revenues have enabled the government to take measures of reform which quite possibly future writers will dwell upon with even more emphasis than they do on questions of finance.

Lord Cromer and Lord Milner have insisted on behalf of the English that their government of Egypt is for the benefit of the Egyptians, and that their intention is to teach the Egyptians as rapidly as possible how to govern themselves. Their French rivals have naturally looked upon these professions with somewhat sceptical eyes, and even some of the English administrators themselves have apparently questioned the wisdom of putting the Egyptians into a position to manage their own work efficiently; but whatever may be the wisdom of the course, there can be no doubt that the English are most effectively, and apparently as rapidly as possible, training the Egyptians towards self-government.

Such training, if it is to be thorough, must begin with the schools. Until after the English occupation, for centuries the training of the Egyptians, so far as they were trained at all, in the schools and even in the great university, consisted practically in learning verses of the Koran by rote without understanding their meaning. The far-sighted Mehemet Ali, to be sure, had begun to introduce somewhat the European system of training, but he had no thought of educating the masses of the people. His idea was to secure some capable officers for his troops, and to provide a sufficient number of trained men for his administration. Certain teachers were sent to Europe in order to secure the necessary learning, and the children of the rich were in a good many instances sent there for their education. The great masses of the people, however, remained ignorant. Over ninety-one per cent of the males and almost ninety-nine and one half per cent of the females could neither read nor write.

Aside from those who were preparing for official work, almost the entire education, until of late years, has been that furnished by the missionaries, whose schools for some decades have, in many individual cases,

reached the children of the poorest classes and given them an opportunity to make something more of themselves than their fathers had been. In earlier days, while Mehemet Ali's views were being carried out, the pupils who were selected for training were practically forced into the schools. Later on, under his successors, pupils desired for similar purposes were in reality bribed to attend by scholarships of various kinds. Since the English have been directing affairs, part of this system still remains, inasmuch as certain school certificates are required in order to secure special positions in the civil service; but in connection with this hoped for reward there has also been inculcated something of a desire for education for its own sake and for the sake of the public welfare. While the fees are placed very low, the parents are encouraged to defray at least a part of the cost of education. In 1879 not more than about five per cent of the pupils paid educational fees. At present between eighty-five and ninety per cent are paying pupils.

Until within the last five years public primary education for the poorer classes, aside from the mere learning of the Koran, was almost unknown. At the present time public schools are being established everywhere, and certain grants in aid for these schools are paid in proportion to the attendance and to the records made by the pupils. Likewise, as has been already intimated, certain positions in the civil service can be filled only by those who hold certificates from schools of certain grades. As a consequence, there has been a great awakening of interest. The opposition which came largely from Mohammedan teachers or religious leaders has been largely checked by the very great care taken to have the schools entirely non-Christian in their instruction. The teachers are mostly Mohammedan, and under-officials, such as inspectors, are almost entirely Mohammedan. The highest officials are, of course, English and Christian; but the Koran is still used as a text-book for many purposes; and, in order to avoid any possible charge of influencing the people contrary to the Mohammedan religion, one Christian chief inspector said that he never visited the public schools of certain grades except in the company of a Mohammedan inspector. With this care on the subject of religion, the education is decidedly practical in its general nature. The children are taught, besides reading and writing, the elements of the sciences, and they choose either French or English as the foreign language which they will learn, and that in which they will receive instruction in the more advanced studies where Arabic text-books cannot readily be provided. While, in the earlier days, French was the language more frequently chosen, now, and especially since the Fashoda incident seemed to make it perfectly clear to all Egyptians that the English and

not the French were to exert the dominant influence in the country, nearly all of the pupils are selecting English.

There are also provisions for training in law, medicine, agriculture, engineering, etc. The young Egyptians, on the whole, prefer the law school, which is the most popular, whereas the agricultural college, although the basis of Egyptian wealth and prosperity is, and must practically always be, agriculture, suffers from lack of pupils. The technical schools seem to be growing, although somewhat slowly, in popularity. So far, every graduate of any fair standing has been able to secure at once profitable employment, either directly in the government service in connection with the irrigation works or otherwise, or on the railways.

The educational system is apparently directed in a very sensible, practical way, with no effort at mere show, but with the necessity continually in mind of fitting the grade and type of instruction to the needs of the pupils and of developing the work as rapidly as possible. The English, in this respect, are certainly educating the Egyptians toward self-rule.

Besides the system of common and technical schools for boys, of which the tendency is to fit directly for public service and for carrying on the ordinary business of life, female education is receiving much attention. We may expect in the near future that instead of ninety-nine and one half per cent of the women being unable to read and write, a very large percentage of the mothers of the country will be able to give their children the rudiments of education at home, and with the added intelligence and wider outlook on the world's affairs that will come from their own reading, they will be able to start their children in the direction of the higher civilization.

JUSTICE.

Of perhaps even greater importance is the schooling of the population in the ways of justice and fair dealing. Formerly when the poor cultivator had paid his tax he was never certain that there might not be further exactions during the same year. As a rule he had no tax-receipt which was a quit-claim for any specific time; and with his ignorance and lack of support from the government officials, he simply paid what he could when the tax-gatherer appeared, and paid again when the proper official made a second demand. All this has been changed. The taxes, while being reduced, have been fixed; the amount is absolutely determined from year to year, and the time of payment is known. When a peasant has paid the tax, he is given a receipt which secures him from further demands until the next regular period. This feeling of security against unexpected exactions of the tax-gatherers has perhaps done more than anything else to make the fellaheen satisfied with the English occupation.

Similar results are found in connection with the courts. Formerly when the poor man had a dispute with his richer neighbor, he in many cases did not know that he could receive any relief from the courts; and even if he attempted to appeal to them he was by no means certain of receiving justice. The judges very often had their own private rooms where they received the suitors bearing gifts before the case was tried. The larger present usually decided the case in its favor. Some of the more conscientious judges received equal amounts from both sides, and then paid back the bribe to the suitor losing the case, thus insuring impartiality, as they thought. But this qualified system of bribing was rare; ordinarily the larger purse won. Among the native judges in the lower courts naturally enough there still remain many traces of this system. On the whole, however, corruption is rapidly dying out and to a considerable extent has already vanished. There is never any accusation brought against the fair dealing of the European judges in the higher courts, save that it is thought that they are at times slightly swayed by prejudice in favor of Europeans or in favor of Christians. This is, however, admitted by the Egyptians themselves to be not corruption but only a natural prejudice, and even this is not charged except in the rarest cases. So far as the Egyptian judges are concerned there is a rigid system of inspection of cases in the lower courts by English officials; and unjust judgments are now very likely to be discovered. If discovered they are certain to be upset, and the unjust judge, if there is evidence of corruption, is punished. "This even handed justice" between rich and poor is another one of the boons of liberty for which Egypt thanks the Englishman.

OTHER REFORMS.

It would take too long to go through the list of reforms which the English have set themselves to bring about. Until within the last five or six years the lack of funds has been such that Lord Cromer and his supporters could only counsel patience, but at present, with the improved financial situation, reforms are coming.

Whereas formerly the prisoners of all grades, first offenders and hardened criminals, were placed together and worked together, now new prisons have been built, and the prisoners are properly classified with the idea of protecting the younger from the evil influence of the hardened criminal. Acts have been passed providing for lighter sentences for first offenders, and for other suitable gradations of punishment. As yet the indeterminate sentence by which the reformed criminal may work his way out has not been introduced; but a reform school for child offenders has been established, which, although still sadly hampered by the lack of funds,

is doing an admirable educational work in teaching the children trades and in giving them discipline of a more liberal type than before. The boys are even granted certain privileges in the way of half holidays, of temporary leaves of absence, and of other favors, quite after the fashion of the best managed reform schools in the most highly civilized countries.

While much more is to be expected, as improved financial resources permit, in the way of improved water supply and drainage, the work already done by the health department in the way of improved sanitation is noteworthy. When one reflects upon the way in which the plague, year after year, has steadily extended in Mysore, Bombay, and other cities of India, checked apparently, if at all, almost solely by weather changes, one cannot admire too much the vigor by which the plague, which had even secured a foothold in Port Said and Alexandria, was stamped out by the vigorous measures of the sanitary officials under the efficient leadership of Pinching Pasha, the British adviser.

In Egypt, as in practically all Oriental countries, the usurer has been a curse to the poor agriculturalist. Not gifted with foresight, scarcely able to reckon the amount of an annual burden, bound by traditions which compel him to make relatively large expenditures in connection with marriages, funerals, and other social duties, the poor fellah very frequently fell into the clutches of the money lender, who, usually asking rates of from two to five per cent per month, soon acquired control of the cultivator's land and brought him into practically lifelong subjection. Through a system of loans by the national bank, organized with the aid of the government and with governmental aid employed in the collection of interest and principal, the cultivators, in many localities, have been encouraged to pay off the usurers' debts, and to secure, for ten per cent, capital which would enable them to cultivate their lands to good advantage, and thus to acquire substantial independence. Among people so poor and ignorant as the Egyptians, such efforts cannot be successful unless personal attention can be given to persuading the cultivator into adopting measures leading toward thrift, and unless the official undertaking the work has both uprightness, so as not to cheat the cultivator, and sympathy, so as to persuade him in the ways best suited for him. As yet this system of practically state loans has only begun, but the results so far seem promising, and it is likely that in the near future capital will be found to extend the system much more widely.

ENGLAND'S ADVANTAGE.

Perhaps enough has been said to show, in the main, the methods and results of the English occupation and control. It remains for us to state

briefly the pay which England gets from all this work, to say a word regarding the probable length of her occupation of Egypt, and one in connection with her management of the great upper country, the Soudan, and the region controlling the sources of the Nile.

The French are never weary of accusing England of a practical seizure of Egypt. The English emphatically assert that they are governing the country for the good of the Egyptians. So far as observation may go, we may perhaps say that, judging by historical experience, the English are in the habit of securing pay for services rendered; and, generally speaking, they, like other nations, are not usually entirely disinterested in their international policy. In the beginning, doubtless, England, like France and Germany and Austria, was looking carefully after the interests of her citizens, bondholders of Egypt, when she in unison with the other nations joined in the demand for international control. So far as can be seen, before the time of the rebellion of Arabi Pasha, England had acted throughout in good faith with France and the other powers in the control of Egypt. But it can hardly be expected that far-sighted English statesmen grieved when France refused to join in an active effort to put down the Arabi revolt; for England's interests in Egypt were far greater than those of any other country, and the English people have always preferred to attend to their own business alone rather than to join with others in so delicate a duty.

England is the great sea power of the world; and she had become the great sea power because her own confines were too small and she had in consequence become an ocean empire with colonies situated in all the seas. These colonies could not be secured nor can they be protected without her control of the seas. Her merchant marine is, compared with that of other nations, of corresponding moment, and to a nation with such a merchant marine and with so great a necessity of controlling the seas by her naval power, the Suez Canal is of prime importance. It is true that the Suez Canal has been declared neutral and that all nations are to have the use of it on equal terms; but, as the first thought of Arabi in his conflict with England was to block the canal, so we may be sure that any other European nation in control of Egypt might easily manage, in the event of war with England, to check her fleets and possibly in that way to cause her measureless loss in connection with the Indian Empire or other far-lying colonial possessions. With England in control of Egypt this risk is gone.

Aside from that, English domination in Egypt, although Egyptian markets are open to all the world on equal terms, is likely to result in the expansion of English commerce and English trade.

And further yet, waiving more direct advantages, no one can question that in the contest among great world powers for supremacy, much depends upon international prestige, and the nation which wins so close a contest as that for the upper hand in Egypt has acquired a power which cannot be measured, to be sure, but which no one questions is very great, both to aid her in still further conquests in the world of trade, and to increase her influence in the settlement of international questions.

THE CONTROL OF THE NILE.

The question of the Soudan and of the sources of the Nile is somewhat different. When England, through her hesitation, whether justified or not, sacrificed Gordon and lost the Soudan, she had met with a reverse worse for her prestige than any other which she has suffered in modern times, until she took upon herself the burden of the South African War. One need not question the motives of English statesmen or the wisdom of the policy which seemed to be forced upon England and Egypt of the abandonment of the Soudan. But whatever the needs of that time may have been, one need not look far to see the absolute necessity under the circumstances of the ultimate reconquest of the Soudan and of the absolute control in English hands of the sources of the Nile. Enough has been said of the irrigation system of Egypt to show that a hostile nation at any place above Egypt on the Nile would be in a position to dictate terms, however severe. It might be almost in its power to make of Egypt a desert; and it could certainly prevent the accomplishment of far-reaching plans for future improvement. This explains fully enough the action of England regarding Fashoda. No one need question the gallantry of Marchand in crossing Africa and in reaching this important position on the Upper Nile. Could France have held that position she doubtless would have been placed at a great advantage in diplomatic negotiation with England. But France was playing for an advantage; England was practically fighting for the life of Egypt. The feelings between France and England have not been so cordial, and the interests of the two countries have not run so closely together, that England could afford to permit thus to be placed into her rival's hands the key to the prosperity of Egypt and of the Soudan for which she was holding herself responsible.

The same principle holds with reference to the future development of irrigation works upon the Nile. For the proper development of the resources of parts of Upper Egypt, and for the suitable development of the Soudan, it is necessary that huge irrigation works be created still nearer the source, either at the great lakes, the source of the White Nile,

or at the head of the Blue Nile in Abyssinia. Engineers say that the simplest, cheapest, and most efficient control can be secured by irrigation works at the head of the Blue Nile. One may possibly predict, however, without fear of mistake, that as long as Lord Cromer is in control of Egypt, his cautious policy, although he is bold enough when necessary, would never lead him to consent to any entanglement with Abyssinia which would either lead to war with that country or with some other European power anxious to interfere in African policy. At double the cost Egypt might much better afford to construct her works on the White Nile or to find some place on the Blue Nile clearly within Egyptian territory.

Even as regards the new government of the Soudan, in which Egypt and England have taken substantially an equal share, the possibility of foreign interference is shut out. In Egypt proper international courts, established as the result of the international control, still remain; and, as in the war with the Soudan England and Egypt learned to their cost, this international control proved most embarrassing, upsetting some of their most cherished plans. This court acts without fear of England. Since the Soudan was reconquered solely by Egyptian and English money and troops, no other nation being asked to take any part, the government of the Soudan is now absolutely free from any international control. So we may well predict it will remain.

When one considers that England is, and intends to remain, the great sea power of the world, and when one sees how greatly she has added to her prestige by her administration of Egypt, one may, I think, not look forward to any immediate withdrawal. After the Fashoda incident, when the French yielded beyond question the control of the Upper Nile to England, and when England showed her readiness to fight if need be for that control, the Egyptians felt that the question for the immediate future, at any rate, was settled. What the English policy definitely is, England has not announced, and there is perhaps no reason why she should announce any policy. Ever since the bombardment of Alexandria, she has been content to do in Egypt the tasks that lie near at hand and to make no promises for the far distant future. As England has done, we may expect that she will do; but unless conditions in Europe and in the Orient assume an aspect widely different from that of the present, we may expect that, while Egypt may be governed in the interests of the Egyptians, the government will, directly or indirectly, be under the control of England, and that English interests in Suez, in Egypt, and in the upper regions of the Nile will be secured.

NATIONAL ART IN A NATIONAL METROPOLIS

WILL H. LOW

NEW YORK

IN my callow youth, when I was an art student in Paris, there came to me, bearing a letter of introduction, a man typical of a large class of our population. Of foreign birth and parentage, he had been brought to the United States as a child; in his life had so prospered that at the age of fifty-five he had amassed a competency, and at the time of our meeting was making a tour of Europe. A visit to his birth-place in Germany, and intercourse with the surviving relatives of his own and his parents' generation, had apparently stimulated his patriotism for what it would hardly have been advisable to call his adopted land, to a degree of fervor which in his mind almost excluded the right of existence to any European country.

Youth is not only tenacious of its own beliefs, but is generously enthusiastic in sharing them with others; the four or five years of my sojourn in Europe had taught me much, and my visitor offered a field of missionary labor to be embraced with a vigor which now chiefly appeals to my sense of humor, and speaks volumes for the patient tolerance of the elder man of business for the enthusiastic young artist.

Though I agreed in part that in material prosperity for the great mass of its inhabitants, our country outclassed, as he put it, the rest of the world, it still appeared to me that on the æsthetic and spiritual side of life the balance was in favor of the older civilization. A frank acknowledgment on the part of my visitor that that side of the question had "never bothered him much" excited my proselyting ardor, and for a fortnight, intent on demonstrating to him the benefits which humanity owed to art, I led him from school to museum and from museum to gallery until, footsore, dazed, and weary in spirit, he must have cursed the day which brought him to my door. I showed to him and explained the working of the manufactory of porcelains at Sèvres and of tapestries at the Gobelins, led him through the Louvre and the Luxembourg, took him to the then newly decorated Opera and the Pantheon, described the competition for the Prix de Rome and the classes of the École des Beaux-Arts in painting, sculpture, and architecture, as well as the smaller schools adapted to the teaching of art applied to industry,—in a word, all that Paris contained of the manifestation of the art principle, which is the mainstay of the city's prosperity, I caused to pass before his eyes.

I found that in certain directions my victim was acute and intelligent, and results which I knew or theretofore had taken for granted, I was

obliged to prove; which as a rule I was fortunately able to do. My main contention that art in its best sense was not a luxury for the fortunate few; that in such work as the decoration of the Pantheon it spoke a language common to all; that in the varied service of the applied arts it was a considerable factor in the prosperity of the country, then so recently able after a devastating war to pay its indemnity to the victor, and cover its loan twice over without recourse to foreign aid; that the proverbial contentment of the French people and their disinclination to emigrate was largely the effect of art which had made the country beautiful,—all this urged with vehemence seemed to force conviction.

Alas, this semblance of conviction was soon to be rudely shattered, for one evening, at the end of a dinner which had been an example of refined and savory cooking, a form of art for which my visitor showed some appreciation at least, he thus resumed the effect of my teaching, "When people get a little money they go in for various things. Some go in for yachts, some for pictures, and some for horses. As for me I think I prefer horses!"

This memory of long ago comes back to me as I reflect that the opening of an art exhibition, the Salon, is still the event of the year in a social and fashionable sense in the good city of Paris; the one day above all others when all Paris, intellectual and notable, meets to lend the prestige of its presence to a typical manifestation of the city's life. In New York, and after a lapse of twenty years, in which the city has made giant strides towards the eminence of a metropolis, the words of my Western visitor return to me and beget the fear that they may yet be true.

The nearest approach to a great gathering of people met together in a typical social function is to be found in the annual horse show held in the Madison Square Garden. Here, if our smaller roll of names eminent in literature, science, and art is not much in evidence, the men and women whose names are known throughout the world as representative of our huge, new civilization are to be found, and the conclusion is suggested that perhaps we still "prefer horses." Naturally, the horse show, in itself, and the interest in the noble animal which it represents, is in every way laudable; but as a typical episode of a great city's life it undoubtedly places New York in a rank of intellectual inferiority to those other great centres of civilization which it emulates, London and Paris.

For, though the world is agreed that in Paris and France the people are more deeply interested in art than elsewhere in the world, it must not be forgotten, if we take attendance at art exhibitions as an indication of such interest, that the Royal Academy in London, open from April to August, is visited by vast numbers of people, and the ceremony of its

opening reception, and the presence, at the academy dinner, following, of all that England boasts of men of distinction make it almost as much as in Paris the notable event of the year. Late in July when the exhibition had been open for three months, and was consequently not a new attraction, I have seen the galleries more than once uncomfortably crowded; a contrast to the sparse attendance of our exhibitions at home ill-calculated to foster patriotic pride in the breast of an American.

Indeed, when we turn to cities in the United States other than New York, the contrast does not cease to be humiliating.

Chicago, in 1893, showed what civic pride can do in the way of an art exhibition, and while it is true that the Columbian Exposition was national and not local, we all know that it was the money of Chicago, earned in the stock-yards and elevators, freely given to the service of art, that alone made the White City, the most notable manifestation of art of modern times in any country, possible. Local pride, or possibly greater interest in art, continues to make the annual exhibitions of the Chicago Art Institute more notable in one sense than any exhibition held in New York, for it is the custom there to employ an agent in Europe to procure work of Americans residing abroad and to pay for the transport of these works of art to Chicago; an admirable thing which no New York exhibition does. The international exhibition annually held in Pittsburg by the Carnegie Institute goes farther and invites and transports free of charge the works of eminent foreigners as well as of Americans abroad and at home, and exhibitions are held in this smoky city which New York can rarely equal. That this is due to the liberal endowment of the Institute by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, rather than to a living art interest on the part of the city, does not weaken the case against New York, for in this our chief city private initiative should do as much as in Pittsburg, unless it be held, as well it may be, that a metropolis can best vindicate its right to the proud title, by municipal action so that it may not be outdone by smaller cities.

Finally, in Philadelphia,—the butt of countless witticisms emanating from New York,—at the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, exhibitions are held which numbers of New York artists are glad to visit, knowing that they will there see many works never shown in their own city.

Yet, in the face of these facts, and despite the neglect to which they are subjected, the greater number of American artists of repute are to be found in New York City, thus tending to make it, though so far apparently against its will, the metropolis of art in the United States in the same sense as are Paris and London in France and England.

Here is the seat of the National Academy of Design, our oldest art

institution, founded in 1826; the Society of American Artists, the product of a revolt against the elder academy, already in the twenty-fifth year of its existence; the New York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, by numbers and prominence of its members the most important of its numerous chapters; the Architectural League of New York, which counts not only architects, but practitioners of the allied arts on its roll of membership; the National Sculpture Society enrolling the majority of our sculptors together with a large lay membership of persons interested in sculpture; the Municipal Art Society, whose function is aptly described by its motto, "To love our city, we must make our city lovely"; the American Water Color Society and its revolutionary offshoot, the New York Water Color Club; the Society of Beaux-Arts Architects, composed of men reared in the *École des Beaux-Arts* in Paris and exponents of its principles; the National Society of Mural Painters, to whose members is due much of our latest expression of art in decoration, and the American Fine Arts Society, which erected and controls the only public exhibition building in New York, a model of architectural fitness, though now become too small for its purposes. All of these societies are under the direct control of practicing artists with the exception of the Municipal Art Society, which is not, of course, a creative body, though one or two have a lay membership recruited from amateurs of the arts. It is to be noted that every branch of the fine arts is represented in these various societies, and in this sense New York is richer than the elder capitals of the old world. Paris, for instance, has no separate organization of its sculptors, nor has London, and it is within the last year that in the former city a society has been organized analogous to that of our mural painters.

Some years ago, in 1896, to be precise, it was felt that while the separate and independent existence of these various societies was in a sense a safeguard for their special and various interests, there were, nevertheless, questions that made it advisable that at certain times all the societies should be united and speak as with one voice; and the Fine Arts Federation of New York was founded.

This idea was first expressed, if I remember rightly, by Mr. George L. Heins, architect, to whom honor is due, as the subsequent federation of interests has proved to be of great value, and promises to be in the near future of even more importance. Nor should the name of Mr. Russell Sturgis, the first president of the Fine Arts Federation of New York, be passed by here, for, without prejudice to his able successors, his work at the inception and during the early years of the Federation was most valuable.

In the constitution of the Federation it is stated that "the object of the Association is to ensure united action by the Art Societies of New York in all matters affecting their common interests; and to foster and protect the artistic interests of the community."

The membership of the council of the Fine Arts Federation is made up by the naming, by each of the constituent societies, of three delegates who represent and vote in the name of their respective societies. There are also named three alternates in each case to ensure a quorum in the deliberations of the Federation in the event of the enforced absence of the delegates at a meeting. It is unnecessary here to describe in detail the various actions taken by the Fine Arts Federation upon the questions which have come up since its formation,—questions that in every instance have a general, public, rather than a special and professional, interest. Reference may be made, however, to the fact that early in its existence the Federation received, for the first time in our history, official recognition by the municipal government of the city. In the charter of Greater New York it is set forth that all works of art purchased by or presented to the city, all monuments erected therein, must be first judged and accepted by the Municipal Art Commission. The members of this body are named by the mayor of New York from a list of nominations submitted by the Fine Arts Federation for the purpose of selection therefrom by the mayor. The enactment of this law constitutes, as was said before, the first official recognition of art as a factor in our social fabric in any city or, to the best of my knowledge, any State of the Union.

The existence of the Fine Arts Federation and the large membership of its component societies centred in the city of New York go far to stamp the city with the hall-mark of a metropolis of art; and there are other indications of a different order which tend to confirm this, despite the apparent contradiction of indifference which the notorious lack of local pride in our cosmopolitan city evinces, with peculiar severity, towards the artists resident within its walls.

The tide of fortune for a number of years has brought to our seaboard city men of wealth from all parts of the country, who have lined Fifth Avenue with a succession of palaces, most of them containing works of art which, though temporarily inaccessible to the general public, must inevitably in the course of time obey the unwritten law which makes the masterpiece find its permanent home within the public museum. The builders of these palaces with their vast wealth have become the principal purchasers of works of art in the marts of Europe, and it was only the other day that an English critic, Mr. Claude Phillips, bewailed

the fact that their appearance and competition as buyers tended to strip Europe of some of its choicest treasures and to prevent the completion of the collections in the museums of the old world.

Though all these collectors are not residents of New York, the great majority reside here; notably he who is known as the purchaser, for five hundred thousand dollars, of the most important picture of Raphael recently purchasable, and who, on the other hand, lately prevented the dispersion of the Garland collection of porcelains, now deposited in the Metropolitan Museum in New York, by the expenditure of six hundred thousand dollars. New York is also the only city of the United States which vies with London and Paris in the number and importance of sales of works of art; many collections being brought here from Europe to seek a better market than the old world affords.

The statistically minded can follow in the daily papers the great sums thus expended, as the various collections of works of art are brought to the hammer, and the aggregate of these moneys shows beyond question that whatever may be the underlying motive, since we must admit that pure love and appreciation of art may not alone account for it, New York proves, by the homely adage that "money talks," in private and sporadic instances at least, a generous and sincere recognition of art.

A nobler instance is to be found, in the formation and maintenance of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, begun a generation ago by a few public minded citizens and maintained at first in the face of public indifference by its founders. By private munificence its collection grew until at last the city was obliged to yield a tardy recognition, and the efforts of its founders and their successors, men whose names are identified with the enterprises which make our country commercially great, were crowned with success. As it stands, its stately edifice erected and maintained by the city, its collections are already remarkably rich and are constantly growing. Every picture, statue, or object of art in the museum represents a gift; no public money has ever been appropriated for the purpose of adding to the collection, and a recent bequest of five millions of dollars, which will make it one of the most richly endowed museums of the world, was a fitting tribute by a citizen to the unselfish service and generosity of those other citizens who have endowed their city with this splendid monument.

With all this evidence that New York is becoming, if it is not already, a metropolis in fact as well as in name, the assertion that there is a notable lack of interest in the living art which should characterize a great city filled with civic pride, is unfortunately true. The millions acquired by the unique opportunities of our great new world are spent with pro-

fusion in the collection of works of art, but a beggarly proportion of these sums is expended to encourage and establish our nascent art,—our art which is more than nascent, for with the shrinkage of distance and bridging over of space, characteristic of our age, our artists have mingled with their elder brothers of the old world, and have there received recognition which is denied them at home.

For more than a generation the most important modern school of art in the old world has found its chief encouragement upon these shores, and men whose efforts have been made possible only by the dollars of cis-Atlantic origin,—with the result that today in the picture mart of New York their works are stamped with a market value to be expressed in four figures,—have worked side by side in Parisian ateliers with their American comrades. Of these two classes of men, at the outset equal in talent, the foreigner has found at the beginning and throughout his independent career a generous patron in our collectors; directed it is true by a cleverly organized and efficient class of picture dealers, so that today we learn of so and so whom we have known in the school who has been taken in hand by the dealers, and, as the phrase goes, is now “working for a syndicate,” and, to continue in commercial terms, it may be added “for purposes of exportation.”

The American, on the other hand, returns to what his French comrade calls the “pays des dollars” to find these very necessary adjuncts to a professional career difficult to obtain, and is forced to turn to other forms of art than those which express his individual temperament and the results of his study abroad. He is, if a painter, almost debarred from the production of pictures, and is forced to employ his accomplishment in teaching or illustration. The sculptor, thanks to the abundant store of heroes of the Civil War, all of whom are not yet memorialized, is in somewhat better case, since for some occult reason the foreign sculptor has not found favor with us. The architect is the happiest of the artistic trio, and has not lacked for abundant opportunity and ample recognition in the land of his birth.

For this land of beginnings it is much that, unaided by encouragement, we have been able to achieve at the two great exhibitions of 1889 and 1900 in the city of modern art the success accorded to our painters and sculptors. For the conditions under which the paintings especially were produced were such that in many cases these works were by men whose bread and shelter were earned in the subsidiary channels of art, and only their enthusiasm and self-sacrifice enabled them to produce the pictures which so far are esteemed the chief end and aim of the painter. So far, I say, for later on I would question whether the near future may not

relegate the unrelated easel picture to a less exclusive place in the scale of artistic production.

Before that, and much else which is pertinent to the title of this paper, I desire to say that what I have just written concerning the lack of appreciation of our home art must be taken as a simple statement of fact, and not a futile and deprecatory complaint against existing conditions.

We are in a state of transition, and it is quite natural that our new-born collector, nurtured in our new world yearning for that civilization which has preceded our own, should pay the tribute of his new fortune to the highly organized and comprehensive purveyors of works of art in the old world. That in a majority of cases they are enabled under the tutelage of the foreign art dealer to acquire good work is an unmixed blessing, for there is probably no commercial agency more thoroughly organized than are the foreign art dealers, and to their commercial honor, be it said, the cases of deception (easy to practice on many of our collectors, who, wary enough in most transactions of barter and sale, are like lambs unshorn in the hands of these experienced shepherds of the collecting flock) are comparatively rare.

The homage paid to their millions by men who have explored every corner of Europe to find great and authenticated works of art, aided by every artifice known to men grown old in such traffic, naturally affects our collectors eager for the distinction of possessing world-known works, and yet distrustful of their own judgment. Small wonder, then, that in the eastward passage our compatriots ignore the fact that here at home there is a small band of men, capable and deserving of discriminating encouragement, who are keeping alight a steady, albeit small, flame of art.

To those who watch this flickering spark with jealous care there are already signs that it will be fed and grow stronger. Within the past ten years there is a notable decrease in the importation of the less worthy forms of art, and our collector who then demanded only that the article purchased should be "made in France or Germany," as the case might be, now gives his chief attention to the works of the old masters, thereby giving to his country that which its newness would otherwise lack. Hence when the stock of available and authentic old masters is exhausted there is hope that some of these men may discover American art. In fact the condition which here prevails is not unlike that of France in the time of Francis I. It will be recalled that when he was building, decorating, and filling with works of art the palaces which he erected, he passed by the nascent art of his own country, and called to him Italian artists of renown. The French artists undoubtedly complained,—methinks that here in New York I have heard complaint,—but they

persevered, and we look back to that time through the effulgence of great names which light the pathway along which French art has come down to us. Hence, though it may not be in the generation now living, American art need not fear for its future, and accidental conditions of time and place cannot avail against the evolution of a great nation's expression in art.

We may, therefore, leave these general considerations confident of our future, and turn to those more specific of present time and place, which, if carried out, may well be first steps, in the evolutionary order, to that definite recognition which our home art deserves,—and perhaps has nearly won.

Specific conditions of time and place must be considered in any work undertaken if we are to hope for success, and this axiomatic truth applies to a work of art, a federation of art societies, or the establishment of a shipping trust, with equal force. The federation described in the foregoing pages, although applied to a number of art societies, is not unlike in nature to the pooling of interests involved in a trust. The objects are, in truth, somewhat more altruistic than those of a commercial trust, but the force gained by a community of interests is acquired, and as we have seen by the inclusion of the Fine Arts Federation in the city's charter, to the union is made possible that which would be denied to any one of its component societies.

Nothing is more characteristic of our time and place than this combination of interests, unless indeed it be our desire to do everything on the largest scale possible.

There are those who deride, and who insist that this admiration for bigness is a weakness; but as the unlimited is always fraught with possibilities it is perhaps well that there should be a corner of the world sufficiently young, sufficiently hopeful—and sufficiently big—to undertake vast schemes, while the rest of the world holds its breath and looks on.

I have spoken of the horse show, and the time is not long gone by when in some corner of the city those most interested in the equine race undoubtedly met together, had their little show, and the great city moved unconcernedly on its course, all but unaware of the fact. The Madison Square Garden was built, a vast enclosure suggestive in its spaciousness of the horse show as we see it year by year. Nothing more was needed; and, as has been already said, no more typical gathering of New Yorkers can be seen than that which fills the benches and the promenade in the Garden in successive years. Nor is it the city alone which contributes to the ceaseless crowding of the great amphitheatre. From other cities,

from all parts of the country, people come. Last year one hotel in the city—in itself a tribute to our love of quantity—was not only filled from cellar to roof, but in rooms outside had six hundred guests during what we have grown to know as “Horse Show Week”; and it would be difficult to calculate the number of people attracted, not alone because, like my Western friend, they “prefer” horses, but because the show is the event of the year, and the crowd attracts the crowd.

These are conditions which exist in New York; and when a number of years ago the artists and those interested in art began to feel that their city was lacking a great structure where the many and oftentimes unavailing exhibitions of separate societies could be centralized, their thoughts naturally turned to the Madison Square Garden. Efforts were made and plans were devised whereby an art exhibition could be held there, but the building is unsuited for such a purpose, and the changes necessary, which could only be of a temporary character, were so difficult and expensive to arrange that the project was abandoned.

Nevertheless, it has been constantly felt by the artists that the public desired a centralization of the year’s production in art, instead of the constantly recurring exhibitions of the various societies, supplemented by the special exhibitions of the art dealers, which through the winter and spring succeed each other at such short intervals that if New York’s initial interest in art was a dominating passion, it would tire itself to extinction before the rounds of exhibitions could be made. This idea, never lost to mind, finally resulted last autumn in the formation of a committee for a united fine arts exhibition building. After many meetings and much consultation, not only within the committee, but with many men of rank in the business world, a report was formulated which can best explain itself by transcription here:—

“FINE ARTS FEDERATION OF NEW YORK.

“REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR A UNITED FINE ARTS EXHIBITION BUILDING.

“From time to time it has been suggested to the artists of New York, both by individuals and the press, that it would be advantageous not only to themselves, but more particularly to the public, were their interests centred in a permanent home of a monumental character, where exhibitions of contemporaneous art should be held and where such facilities should be offered to the various societies as would most inure to the public good. Acting on these suggestions, each of the eleven art societies forming the Fine Arts Federation appointed delegates to a general committee to consider the feasibility of the project. This committee, after several meetings, has passed the resolutions that follow. To the members of the committee it has seemed that any attempt to build other than a dignified monumental building, free from all commer-

cialism, and so constituted as to be easily and frequently visited by the public, would be positively futile. Many of the constituent societies of the Federation are fairly well housed at present,—though not impressively,—and while such a building as is proposed would undoubtedly be to their advantage, it is nevertheless true that this building—this home of contemporaneous art—would be of greater benefit to the public than to themselves. Otherwise they would scarcely have ventured to suggest the expenditure of so large a sum as that named in the resolutions. They would also call the attention of the public to the fact that in this the largest city of the United States, and the second city of the world in wealth and population, there is no municipal building devoted exclusively to contemporaneous art. Compared with very much smaller and poorer communities in other lands (who deem that by aggrandizing art, and housing it properly, they aggrandize themselves), this city makes but a sorry showing.

“If the substance of the following resolutions seems somewhat vague and inadequate, the committee wishes to state in extenuation that it is advisedly so. As it is impossible for a committee to foretell how, or when, or whence the benefaction may come, it has seemed wiser to leave many important details untouched. It is not inconceivable that some day in the near or far future—and there is absolutely no haste in this matter—some scheme may be evolved for municipal improvement that may carry with it, either by purchase or by right of eminent domain, some large space for the aggregation of its monumental buildings—some noble square, for instance, or avenue lined with equally noble buildings that would rival, if not surpass, those of foreign cities. Such being the case, the committee has confined itself merely to generalities, which may be modified according to the exigencies of the moment. On the other hand, it has wished to declare on behalf of the federated art societies their willingness to accept, and to the best of their abilities to further, any such scheme as is herein proposed for the unification and development of the art interests in New York City.

“The resolutions are as follows :—

“*First.*—That the Committee be called ‘The Committee for a United Fine Arts Exhibition Building.’

“*Second.*—That this building should be a home for contemporaneous art in New York City, and that it should be so planned and administered as to attract and instruct all classes whether professional or non-professional.

“*Third.*—That this building should be of a monumental character, and that no commercial considerations—such as the renting of portions thereof for business purposes—should be entertained.

“*Fourth.*—That it should contain adequate galleries for exhibitions of contemporaneous art, of a character more important than can be held in any building at present available ; and that it should include every facility for the centralization of the interests and activities of the Art Societies of this city.

“*Fifth.*—That it is the sense of this Committee that, to be suitable for its purposes, the site of this building should be in the Borough of Manhattan, above Fourteenth Street, and as near to the centre of the city as possible ; and that it should face upon some great thoroughfare, or upon an open square.

“*Sixth.*—That the site required for this building should contain about forty thousand square feet.

“*Seventh.*—That it is the sense of the Committee that the cost of such a building as is required, exclusive of site, would be at least one million five hundred thousand dollars.

"Eighth.—That the administration of the building should be vested in an incorporated Society with a board of trustees, to be formed as soon as occasion may require.

"Ninth.—That proper legislation should be obtained to secure exemption from taxation; and that some reasonable guarantee should be provided toward the maintenance of the property, either by endowment or by municipal appropriation."

This document is signed by Frederic Crowninshield, chairman, and the thirty-three members of the committee representing the eleven constituent societies of the Fine Arts Federation of New York.

This report, emanating from a body of men representative of the various art societies, and consequently cognizant of the fact that in the majority of cases those societies which seek the support of the public by holding exhibitions for which an entrance fee is charged, have comparatively scant attendance, and only continue to exist by the practice of a rigid economy, popularly supposed to be foreign to the nature of the artist, shows no lack of confidence. This is but just, for in full knowledge of existing conditions these societies have been established and have grown; accepting these conditions in the assurance that when the time comes, that which they have built will at least serve as the foundation stone for the stronger, more enduring fabric. They have waited until now the time seems ripe; but it is to be noted that they deprecate haste, for though art be long, it is also enduring, and sooner or later this great metropolis will realize that the city needs such a building even more than the artists need it.

One has only to know how much the collections of our Metropolitan Museum are visited by workmen in the arts applied to industry,—by the artisans who have little credit even amongst those who consider themselves interested in art,—or to know what it has meant to industries like that of wall-paper, tiles, ceramics, and the printing of tissues in England and France to have the South Kensington Museum or the Musée des Arts Décoratifs for consultation and instruction,—to realize that art is not a negligible quantity in economics.

A vast centralized exhibition could and should take cognizance of all the arts, and herein lies an opportunity which we may trust our national acuteness to see and seize.

Here we would not be trammelled by tradition,—the tradition which has grown within the last two hundred years, and consequently since the greatest of all epochs, the time of the Renaissance, but which still holds France and England firmly. It is, in fact, within a century that what was known as historical painting in England and "*la grande peinture*" in France were with sculpture the only arts admitted to the highest plane. Within that time even the landscape painter has been obliged to scale the walls of the citadel within which the figure painter, who sometimes con-

descended to paint a wall or decorate a ceiling, but who looked down on the professional decorator, was entrenched. The Royal Academy in London still holds to these conservative ideas, but with the establishment of the seceding body of French artists in what is known as the Champ de Mars Salon, objects of art were admitted to the exhibition; an example shortly after followed by the older, so-called Champs Elysées Salon. Nevertheless, even in modern France the old prejudice dies hard, and nothing so comprehensive as could easily be done here has had, as yet, an adequate opportunity in Europe.

There are many questions of interior policy to be decided if the great edifice foreshadowed in this report should be built. One of these naturally is the separate identity and existence of the various exhibiting societies. In so far as the great comprehensive exhibition is concerned, there should certainly be adequate provision made for complete separation of the various kinds of exhibits. Easel pictures could not be seen to advantage in close proximity to or in the same kind of galleries necessary to show stained glass executed, or the cartoons for stained glass. Separate exhibitions should be given to sculpture. Bookbindings, enamels, medals, and ceramics, though they might, if any but an ideal exhibition were desired, be exhibited together or near each other, should have distinct rooms or alcoves so that the student or visitor should not have attention distracted by one from the other form of art. Designs for wall-papers, posters, woven and printed stuffs, street and shop signs, locks, keyplates, door knobs, embroideries, illustrative designs for books, magazines, and advertisements, the work of the silversmith and jeweler, iron artistically wrought, mural paintings to cover great wall spaces, and decorative paintings to cover the panels of furniture,—all these and many industrial and useful articles which receive or should receive the vivifying touch of art could be exhibited. Such an exhibition would indeed “attract and instruct all classes whether professional or non-professional.”

Not less salutary in the eyes of the public would be the spectacle of this great body of artists of many kinds exhibiting their productions upon an equal footing. Many of these exhibitors, the public would learn for the first time, were artists; for the title, even here where our formulæ are still inchoate, has been exclusively claimed by the man who paints a picture or models a statue. On the other hand, many of the exhibitors would learn for the first time that they also were artists, and the stimulus thus given to many an anonymous worker might well have an influence on our industrial arts worthy of the attention of the economist.

It would be well in time to come if we could thus call within the fold all the wandering sheep of art, for the lesson of the near future will

be that only the chosen few can hope to win recognition or a livelihood by painting pictures. It is an assumption of great power to boldly challenge the world by the production of an object which exists without relation to aught save itself; to say, in a word, here is a beautiful object brought into the world by my inspiration, so precious and beautiful that though it serves no purpose other than to excite emotion in the beholder, yet it has a right to exist, and I, its producer, must be enabled to exist. The poet has this pretension, and there have been poets who have earned their living by writing poetry. But how few! Yet our art schools in the main teach nothing but the art of picture making, and myriads of students issue forth each year with no thought other than to pursue this charming vocation by charming others.

To show that art touches on life and utility in a thousand places would not be the least lesson that a great exhibition could teach, and he who is doomed to fail in this perilous task of charming would there learn that he would be none the less an artist if his sense of form, of color, or of invention served purposes of ordinary utility.

One question of interior policy relates so intimately to the individual societies that it need only be lightly touched on here. Various reasons have called into existence the separate societies, and in the course of time differences as to internal government or the difficulty encountered by men outside their ranks in securing justice according to their deserts, have resulted in the formation of other societies. Thus we have the National Academy of Design and the Society of American Artists and the American Water Color Society and the New York Water Color Club; the former and the latter identical in purpose, and the reasons which led to their separate existence all but forgotten.

In a great union such as is desired the separate existence of bodies with common aims seems unnecessary. For a movement of this importance can be made successful only by the most complete union of the artists before the public. In all essentials this union exists today in New York, and the whilom lion of the Society lies down by the lamb of the Academy in perfect peace, though references to issues long since dead are occasionally resurrected by writers in the public prints, and the public, which has neither the time nor the inclination to weigh old grievances, would demand as a right that when the time comes to build the artists their palace, no echo of differences should resound within its walls. These details can, however, be safely left to the sound common sense and that public spirit which acts for the greatest good to the greatest number, and is to be found in no body of men of differing mind and aim more than among the artists.

There still remains to be considered the means by which a great monument of this character involving so large an expenditure could be achieved. In these days when our men of wealth appear to have as one of the chief aims of their existence, a noble desire to share with their less fortunate fellow men a large proportion of their fortunes, with no other limitation than that their benefactions should aid humanity in its higher aims, when every newspaper prints almost daily great sums given for the establishment of libraries, the endowment of educational institutions, or donations to aid special research,—the means should not be far to seek. It is true that, with the exception of the large bequest already referred to in favor of the Metropolitan Museum, and occasional smaller sums given to other museums of art throughout the country, these benefactions have been almost entirely devoted to educational institutions of a scholastic character or to hospitals.

To care for the mind and the body has been the first consideration, doubly noble it is true, which has untied the purse strings of the very rich.

The arts of design have as yet not been appreciated at their full educational value; one of the misfortunes due in my belief to the almost total surrender on the part of the modern artist to the desire to charm. If there were full appreciation of the fact that, in common with literature and science, art has such myriad form that there is no limit to the service which it is capable of rendering humanity, the artist would gain in stature, and there would no longer exist in the public mind doubt of his usefulness.

It is, therefore, on this ground of the common service which a great art building could render, no less than a great university, that the subject should be considered. If I read aright the report of the committee for a united fine arts exhibition building, the edifice therein suggested is unlike the fine arts section of the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburg. The work there has been limited to bring to the life of that toiling city the illuminating ray of the æsthetic influence of Painting, side by side, in another portion of the same building, with that of Music. To each city in the measure of its needs; without the Carnegie Institute Pittsburg would be barren of the civilizing effect of art publicly accessible. But New York, as has been pointed out, has this form of art in profusion, and what is needed here is the huge garner into which annually every form of art, from the lowest to the highest, from the humblest utensil, by proportion, form, and decoration made a work of art, to the noblest soul-inspiring work of the imagination, may be gathered.

Can there be any doubt that such a display would not be trivial or

would not appeal to the many? And if this be true could a better object be devised for a gift of one million five hundred thousand dollars?

No city, no nation, has ever arrived at greatness unaided by the arts of design, and the rich collections, spoils of by-gone greatness, do not suffice the needs of a great city. It is necessary that current production should be followed, and through its living activity the breath of art should be animate; and a great museum by its very nature as a permanent repository of work done cannot encourage or follow current production. The wise provision which makes the condition that no work of an artist can be placed in the Louvre until ten years after his death, is a model which might be safely followed by all museums, provided that there coëxisted another gallery like that of the Luxembourg, where works by artists, living or recently dead, could pass the period of probation. But as admission to the Luxembourg is in itself an honor of selection to which few of the works annually exhibited in the Salons are admitted, it will be seen that in our provision for the growing necessities of New York, there lacks even the primary provision of these requirements of a living art.

Our municipal government, year by year in the progression of the great city, has realized growing necessities for which wise expenditure of public moneys has been made. Notable instances of this are the multiplication of small parks within the old city limits and larger parks upon its extended area, the recreation piers and public baths,—all provided for the public good, but all entailing an expenditure which would not have been thought compatible with our political system in a past generation. A later instance is the provision of sites paid for by the city to make effective Mr. Andrew Carnegie's gift of five millions for the establishment of auxiliary libraries.

It will be noted that in the report of the committee for a united fine arts building the estimate of cost for the proposed building is exclusive of site; and undoubtedly there was in the minds of the framers of this report the precedent established, not only in the instances cited above, but, as bearing more directly on this project, that of the erection and maintenance of the Metropolitan Museum of Art by the city.

When the directors of the museum had shown by the accumulation of its collections a generous public spirit, there could be no question of the manifest duty of the city to make these collections accessible to the citizens of New York, by the erection of a building for their exhibition and preservation. In like manner, it can hardly be doubted that if the requisite amount for the erection of a great art building were forthcoming as a gift by an individual, or by an association of public spirited citizens recognizing the city's needs, there could be no hesitation on the part of the

municipal authorities, and a site adequate in space and location would be provided.

But, it may be asked, granting that such a united fine arts building were an established fact, is the current production of New York or the United States in the arts of design sufficient to provide an adequate and dignified display? To this I would say that it must be borne in mind that for lack of space and of importance no New York exhibition has as yet been fully representative of the entire artistic activity of our country. No exhibition, for instance, has been willing or able to transport works of art from a distance. There is no building here or elsewhere in the United States, outside of museums which do not exhibit current productions, suited to the exhibition of sculpture. Yet there is very great activity of sculptural production in the United States, as was seen in Chicago in 1893, and in Buffalo last year. But, as I have already outlined, the proposed exhibition would be more comprehensive than what we have generally known as an art exhibition, and would recruit from the workshops almost as much as from the studios. This would have to be done at the solicitation of committees of selection carefully composed of painters, sculptors, architects, and designers, whose task would be no sinecure, for the very future of the exhibition, and, most intimately connected, the future of our art in general, would depend in a great degree on their wise selection of exhibits that were worthy, and the elimination of those poor in design. In the first exhibition this might exercise a limitation in the number of exhibits, but once let the word get abroad that there was in our great city an exhibition, the stamp of whose approval would lift a given work from the ranks of the commonplace and futile, and the second and succeeding years would bring to the committee of selection an embarrassment of riches from which to choose.

For the inventive quality which is so strongly characteristic of our country is in itself akin to the artistic temperament, and the general merit of design in our silverware, pottery, wall-papers, bookbindings, and furniture has been more appreciated abroad at the various universal expositions than at home. Our stained glass, one of the most beautiful, and in the higher sense, most useful of arts, is with us a living art in comparison with all other countries of the world, where it is fettered by tradition to a point where many of its possibilities are undeveloped.

To the general public it may not be known that the furniture trade, in which millions of capital are invested, holds frequently, perhaps annually, an exhibition in New York. This is held for the trade and is not supposed to interest the general, much less what is now known as the exclusive art, public. The design of much of the furniture, however,

is surprisingly good, though, of course, there is evident a lack of standard and of definite direction of design. But again let it be generally known that there was an exhibition of art, where knowledge and appreciation of a piece of furniture that should be equally useful and beautiful, would crown the effort of designer and maker as a title for its admission to the exhibition, and it is not vain imagining to believe that much of the capacity, energy, and capital already employed would receive a new impetus. In provoking new channels for the current of art production, in seeking to present our pictures and sculpture to a larger and deserved appreciation, there can be little doubt as to the quality and quantity of the exhibits that would be forthcoming.

But—I again imagine the doubter among my readers—how is it, after what has been already said about the lack of interest shown in already existing exhibitions, that there may be expected an accretion of art interest sufficient to fill the vast building projected with numbers of interested visitors, “to attract and instruct all classes whether professional or non-professional”?

The example of the Madison Square Garden, and the attraction of the crowd for the crowd, I am willing to leave aside, though it is far from a negligible quantity.

The comprehensive character of the exhibition in itself would interest vast numbers of people of a class who seldom visit an art exhibition; the householders and the housebuilders, the men and women intent on making for themselves a home, would find many of their problems solved, problems which they have never perhaps thought of as questions of art. The artisans who now never cross the threshold of the Academy or the Society exhibitions, but who know the Metropolitan Museum as helping them in their work, would throng thither.

The numbers of our vast foreign population which in the countries of their origin go as a matter of course to the Glas Palast in Berlin, the Salon in Paris, or the Royal Academy in London, to see the exhibitions there would surely attend, while now it never occurs to them to enter a dealer's gallery on Fifth Avenue or the Fine Arts Building on Fifty-seventh Street.

But, above all, the very considerable number of good Americans who in the very heyday of our newly realized greatness as a world power, are beginning to feel that their country is no longer in a state of dependence on the old world for the rewards of life, made full and beautiful by the gentler arts, would throng from factory and counting house to enter in and enjoy the world of beauty made visible by men of their own race and temperament. And, lastly, the smaller in number, though greater in

influence, of those who for the last generation have watched our art develop, to whose interest and encouragement is due its growth, would find there the first realization of their steadfast belief. And these, for I would not limit them to those faithful few whose purse strings have been loosed and to whose active encouragement our art owes much, but would rather speak of those who now go to our art exhibitions, and who follow at much pain of travel and of distraction the various and scattered shows of the different exhibiting societies,—these would appreciate the centralization of our art production.

For it is the belief of all those interested in this movement that there is vastly more art interest on the part of the good citizens of New York than is made apparent. Each one of our exhibitions, and, as has been said before, their name is legion, has a certain attendance, perhaps it might be called its own clientele, and a certain proportion of these visitors at one exhibition may possibly attend two or three others. But even the professional artist misses by half attendance at *all* the exhibitions, and the result is that few or none realize just how much art and art interest exists to be drawn upon for a centralized exhibition, even if such a show were limited to paintings alone.

But perhaps the most convincing reason that such a building is a necessity for our city lies in the fact that with the dissemination of intelligence in our country, no good citizen of New York would own to an inferiority to the inhabitants of old world cities, which have proven beyond dispute that a great art exhibition is as vital a factor in a city's life as a great library. We hear much of the art instinct of the people of the old world, but like every other development of the finer senses it is a cultivated sense, which, when it exists among uneducated people, does so only in a limited degree as a passive acceptance of the beliefs of their intellectual superiors. This instinct, though possibly more dormant, with us is by no means absent, and has been awakened largely through our exhibitions in Chicago and Buffalo, if only by the echo which has reached those who were unable to go.

Give to these people a great art building filled with worthy exhibits and they will throng its halls.

It must be given, for to be sufficiently dignified and splendid it is a work beyond the power of any class of men like the artists to provide; theirs the duty to see that the soul shall animate the body.

This donation has been necessary in other countries. France, though the state takes on itself as a duty the encouragement of the fine arts, has no voice in the composition or direction of the two great exhibiting bodies of artists which now constitute the two rival salons. When

the division in the old Salon occurred in 1890, the succeeding body left the Palais de l'Industrie in the Champs Elysées to the Société des Artistes Français. The old palace of industry was built for the first universal exhibition and was the property of the city of Paris, which, with this seceding body of artists on its hands, was forced to lodge them under the name of the Société Nationale des Beaux-Arts in one of the buildings of the Universal Exposition of 1889 on the Champ de Mars. When in provision of the Exposition of 1900 the old building of the Palais de l'Industrie was destroyed, and the new Palace of Fine Arts was built on the Champs Elysées, the exposition was no sooner over than this new building was divided into two parts and given over to the two salons, each of which pays one franc per annum as rental to the city of Paris.

Here the artists ask for less from the city, and are in fact willing to wait until the necessity of a dignified monument devoted to the Fine Arts—the arts of peace, be it remembered by our peaceful people, who have been prodigal in their memorials to military valor—shall become such a necessity that some good citizen of our Greater New York will feel that *noblesse oblige*—when it will be built. It is in strict consonance with precedent that the project is suggested in the report of the committee for a united fine arts building, and it is safe to say that in the “near or far future” the confidence expressed therein will be justified. Some citizen or group of citizens will give their city a noble monument, and the responsive city will place it like a fair jewel on her breast. In this the artists are only as much, and not more interested, than all good citizens, until the moment comes “to accept, and to the best of their abilities to further, any such scheme as is herein proposed for the unification and development of the art interests of New York City.”

ZIONISM

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AMONG the persons of the educated classes who follow with any attention all the more important movements of the times, it would now be difficult to find one to whom the word "Zionism" is quite unknown. People are generally aware that it describes an idea and a movement that in the last years has found numerous adherents among the Jews of all countries, but especially among those of the East. Comparatively few, however, both among the Gentiles and the Jews themselves, have a perfectly clear notion of the aims and ways of Zionism; the Gentiles, because they do not care sufficiently for Jewish affairs to take the trouble to inform themselves at first hand as to the particulars; the Jews, because they are intentionally lead astray by the enemies of Zionism, by lies and calumnies, or because even among the fervent Zionists there are not many who have probed the whole Zionist idea to the bottom, and are willing or able to present it in a clear and comprehensible fashion, without exaggeration and polemical heat.

I will endeavor to furnish readers of good faith, who are not biased, and have no other interest than that of gaining authentic information about a phenomenon in contemporary history, as concisely and soberly as possible with all the facts, as they really are, not as they are reflected in muddled brains, or distorted and falsified by calumniators.

I.

Zionism is a new word for a very old object, in so far as it merely expresses the yearning of the Jewish people for Zion. Since the destruction of the second temple by Titus, since the dispersion of the Jewish nation in all countries, this people has not ceased to long intensely, and hope fervently, for the return to the lost land of their fathers. This yearning for, and hope in, Zion on the part of the Jews was the concrete, I might say, the geographical, aspect of their Messianic faith, which in its turn forms an essential part of their religion.

Messianism and Zionism were really, for nearly two thousand years, identical conceptions, and without caviling and hair-splitting interpretation, it would not be easy to make a distinction between the prayers for the appearance of the promised Messiah, and those for the not less promised return to the historical home,—both of which stand side by side on every page of the Jewish liturgy. These prayers were, until a few generations ago, meant literally by every Jew, as they still are by the

simple believing Jews. The Jews had no other idea than that they were a people which as a punishment for its sins had lost the land of its forefathers, which was condemned to live as strangers in strange lands, and whose great sufferings would first cease when it was again assembled on the consecrated soil of the Holy Land.

This gradually changed about the middle of the eighteenth century, when enlightenment first began to find its way into Jewdom, in the person of its first herald, Moses Mendelssohn, the popular philosopher. The faith of the Jews became more lukewarm; the educated classes, where they did not simply convert themselves to Christianity, began to regard the doctrines of their religion in a rationalist manner; for them the dispersion of the Jewish people was a final and unalterable fact; they emptied the conception of the Messiah and of Zion of every concrete meaning, and arranged for themselves a singular doctrine, according to which the Zion promised to the Jews was to be understood only in a spiritual sense, as the setting up of the Jewish monotheism in the whole world, as the future triumph of Jewish ethics over the less sublime and less noble moral teaching of the other nations. An American rabbi reduced this conception to the striking formula, "Our Zion is in Washington." The Mendelssohn teaching logically developed in the first half of the nineteenth century into the "Reform," which deliberately broke with Zionism. For the Reform Jew, the word Zion had just as little meaning as the word dispersion. He does not feel himself in any diaspora. He denies that there is a Jewish people and that he is a member of it. He desires only to belong to the people in whose midst he lives. For him Judaism is a purely religious conception which has nothing whatever to do with nationality. The land of his birth is his fatherland, and he will know of no other. The idea of a return to Palestine excites him either to indignation or to laughter. He answers it with the well-known, silly, would-be witticism, "If the Jewish state is again set up in Palestine, I will ask to be its ambassador in Paris."

The thinking Jew did not fail, however, to perceive, in the course of time, that Reform Judaism is a half measure, a compromise, which like every compromise, contains the germ of destruction, as it cannot for one instant resist logical criticism. Whom shall the Reform Judaism satisfy? The believing Jew? He rejects it with the greatest abhorrence. The unbelieving Jew? He despises it as hypocrisy and phrase-mongering. The Jew who really desires to break with his national past and to be absorbed by his Christian surroundings? For that Jew, Reform Judaism does not suffice; he goes a step farther, the step that leads to the baptismal font. Still less does it satisfy the Jew who desires to guard

Jewdom against destruction and to preserve it as an ethnical individuality. For to him an openly expressed abandonment of all national aspirations is synonymous with a self-condemnation of the Jewish people to a perhaps slow, but sure, death. Reform Judaism without Zionism, that is to say, without the wish and the hope for a reassembling of the Jewish people, has no future. At the best, it can only be regarded as a somewhat crooked path that leads to Christianity. He who desires to reach that goal can find straighter and shorter routes.

II.

And so it has come about that the generations which had been under the influence of the Mendelssohnian rhetoric and enlightenment, of reform and assimilation, have, in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, been followed by a new generation which seeks to take up another than the traditional standpoint towards the question of Zion. These new Jews shrug their shoulders at that twaddle which has been the fashion among rabbis and literati for the last hundred years, and which boasts of a "Mission of Jewdom," said to consist in this, that the Jews must live forever in dispersion among the peoples in order to act as their teachers and models of morality, and to educate them gradually to pure rationalism, to a general brotherhood of mankind, and to an ideal cosmopolitanism. They declare the mission swagger to be either presumption or foolishness. They, more modest and more practical, demand only the right for the Jewish people to live and to develop itself, according to its abilities, up to the natural limits of its type. They have become convinced that this is not possible in dispersion, as, under that condition, prejudice, hatred, and contempt continually follow and oppress them, and either stint their development, or force them to an ethnical mimicry which necessarily makes of them, instead of original types with a right to existence, mediocre or bad copies of foreign models. They therefore work methodically with a view to rendering the Jewish people once more a normal one, which lives on its own soil, and accomplishes all economical, intellectual, moral, and political functions of a civilized nation.

The goal cannot be reached at once. It lies in a future more or less near. It is an ideal, a desire, a hope, as the Messianic Zionism was and is. The new Zionism, which has been called the political one, differs, however, from the old, the religious, the Messianic one, in this,—that it disavows all mysticism, no longer identifies itself with Messianism, and does not expect the return to Palestine to be brought about by a miracle, but desires to prepare the way by its own efforts.

The new Zionism has grown in part only out of the internal impulses of Judaism itself, out of the enthusiasm of modern educated Jews for their history and martyrology, out of the awakened consciousness of their racial qualities, out of their ambition to save the ancient blood, in view of the farthest possible future, and to add to the achievements of their forefathers the achievements of their posterity.

On the other hand, Zionism is the effect of two impulses which came from without,—first, the principle of nationality, which for half a century ruled thought and feeling in Europe, and governed the politics of the world; secondly, Anti-Semitism, from which the Jews of all countries have more or less to suffer.

The principle of nationality has awakened self-consciousness in all the peoples; it teaches them to regard their peculiarities as qualities, and gives them a passionate desire for independence. It could not, therefore, pass over the educated Jews without leaving a trace. It induced them to remember who and what they are; to feel themselves, which they had unlearned, a people apart; and to demand for themselves a normal national destiny. This slow and painful work of the recovery of their national individuality was rendered easier by the attitude of the peoples, who eliminated them from themselves as a foreign element, and put stress, without consideration or courtesy, on the real and imaginary contrasts, or at least differences, between themselves and the Jews.

The principle of nationality has, in its exaggerations, led to excesses. It has been led astray into Chauvinism, abased to idiotic hatred of the foreigner, degraded to grotesque self-worship. From this caricature of itself the Jewish nationalism is safe. The Jewish nationalist does not suffer from self-inflation; he feels, on the contrary, that he must make tireless efforts to render the name of Jew a title of honor. He modestly recognizes the good qualities of other nations, and seeks diligently to acquire them in so far as they harmonize with his natural capacities. He knows what terrible harm centuries of slavery or disability have done to his originally proud and upright character, and seeks to cure it by means of intense self-training. If, however, nationalism is on its guard against all illusions as to itself, this is a natural phase in the process of development from barbaric selfish individualism to free humanism and altruism,—a phase whose justification and necessity can only be denied by him who has no comprehension whatever of the laws of organic evolution, and is totally lacking in the historical sense.

Anti-Semitism has also taught many educated Jews the way back to their people. It has had the effect of a sharp trial which the weak cannot stand, but from which the strong emerge stronger or more confi-

dent in themselves. It is not correct to say that Zionism is but a "gesture of truculence" or act of desperation against Anti-Semitism. It is true that more than one educated Jew has been moved only by Anti-Semitism, to throw in his lot again with Jewdom, and he would again fall away if his Christian fellow-countrymen would receive him anew in a friendly spirit. But, in the case of most Zionists, Anti-Semitism only forced them to reflect upon their relation to the nations, and their reflection has led them to conclusions which would remain a lasting acquirement of their mind and heart, even if Anti-Semitism were to disappear completely from the world.

Be it well understood; the Zionism analyzed above is that of the educated and free Jews,—the Jewish élite. The uneducated mass, clinging to the old traditions, is Zionist without much reflection, from feeling, from instinct, from distress, and yearning. They suffer too much from the hardships of life, from the hatred of the peoples, from legal disabilities, and social outlawry; they feel that they cannot hope for any lasting amelioration of their situation so long as they must live as a powerless minority among a hostile majority. They desire to become a nation, to rejuvenate themselves by close contact with mother earth, and to become once more the masters of their destiny. This Zionist mass is still in part not quite free from mystical tendencies. It allows its Zionism to be pervaded, to a certain extent, by Messianic reminiscences, and blends it with religious emotions. They have certainly a clear idea of the aim, the reassembling of the Jewish nation, but not of the means. Still, even they have realized already the necessity of themselves making efforts, and there is a vast difference between their active readiness for organization and their spirit of sacrifice, and the pious, prayer-indulging passiveness of the purely religious Messianist.

III.

The new or political Zionism has had here and there forerunners, whose first appearance dates back to the early half of the nineteenth century.

In the beginning of the eighties terrible persecutions broke out in Russia without any apparent reason, persecutions which cost hundreds of Jews their lives, destroyed the prosperity of thousands more, and induced tens of thousands to turn their backs on the land of their birth. This calamity brutally aroused the Jews from their hundred-year-old illusions and brought them again to a sense of reality. A Russian Jew, Dr. Pinsker, at that time wrote a small pamphlet entitled, "Auto-Emancipation," which was already a prelude to the modern political Zionism,

and sketched all its motives without however developing them symphonically. He, at any rate, it was who gave its watchword to the whole movement: "The Jews are no mere religious community, they are a nation. They desire again to live in their own country as a united people. Their rejuvenation must be at the same time economical, physical, intellectual, and moral."

The Jewish youth of the middle schools and universities of Russia were profoundly affected by Pinsker's arguments. They began to found national Jewish societies. A number of students who studied at foreign universities became in their new surroundings apostles of Dr. Pinsker's idea, and found adherents here and there, for the most part among the young Jews of Vienna. Others preferred action to word, example to sermon, abandoned their studies, and emigrated to Palestine in order to become peasants there,—Jewish peasants on historically Jewish soil. Deeply moved by this idealism of a peculiarly enthusiastic élite, cooler headed Jews in Russia and Germany began also to form societies in order to support from a distance the Palestine settlements of the Jewish pioneers. This took place without any combined plan and with no clear notion of the aim and the means. The societies were not conscious of the fact that they felt and acted as Zionists. They did not perceive the connection between the Jewish colonization of Palestine and the future of the whole Jewish nation. It was in their case rather an instinctive movement in which all kinds of obscure feelings are dimly discernible,—piety, archæological-historical sentimentality, charity, and pride of pedigree. At any rate, the minds of the Jews were prepared, the feeling was in the air, Jewdom was ripe for a change.

As is always the case in such historical moments, the man also appeared whose mission it was to express clearly the ideas obscurely felt by many, and to proclaim loudly the word they were waiting to hear. This man was Dr. Theodor Herzl. He published in the autumn of 1896 a concisely written booklet, "Der Judenstaat" (The Jewish State), which proclaimed with a determination that till then had no precedent, the fact that the Jews are a people who demand for themselves all the rights of a people, and who desire to settle in a country where they can lead a free and complete political existence.

"Der Judenstaat" has become the real starting point of political Zionism,—the starting point, not the programme. Herzl's book is still the subjective work of a solitary thinker who speaks in his own name. Many details in it are literature. It is not easy to draw a sharp boundary line between the sober earnest of the social politician and the imagination of the prophetic poet. The real programme had to be a collective

work which was certainly based on Herzl's book, and inspired by Herzl's visions of the future, but which rid itself of all fantastic details, and was built up solely from the elements of reality.

Herzl's book was at once greeted by tens of thousands of Jews, chiefly the young, as an act of redemption. It was not to remain merely printed paper, but should be transformed into a practical creation. New societies were founded everywhere, no longer with a view of the slow, petty settlement of Palestine by means of groups of Jews creeping surreptitiously as it were into the country, but by the preparation for an emigration "en masse" into the Holy Land, based on a formal treaty with the Turkish Government, guaranteed by the Great Powers, by which the former should accord the new settlers the right of self-government.

The premises of political Zionism are that there is a Jewish nation. This is just the point denied by the assimilation Jews, and the spiritless, unctuous, prating rabbis in their pay. Dr. Herzl saw that the first task he had to fulfil was the organizing of a manifestation which should bring before the world, and the Jewish people itself, in modern, comprehensible form the fact of its national existence. He convoked a Zionist congress, which in spite of the most furious attacks and most unscrupulous acts of violence,—the Jewish community of Munich where the congress was originally intended to be held protested against its meeting in that town!—assembled for the first time in Basel, the end of August, 1897, and consisted of two hundred and four selected representatives of the Zionist Jews of both hemispheres.

The first Zionist congress solemnly proclaimed in the face of the attentive world that the Jews are a nation, and that they do not desire to be absorbed by other nations. It vowed to work for the emancipation of that part of the Jewish race which is deprived of all rights, and which is dragging out its existence in undeserved misery, and to prepare for it a brighter future. It put its aims on record in a programme unanimously adopted with the greatest enthusiasm. This ran as follows:—

"Zionism works to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine guaranteed by public law.

"For the reaching of this goal the congress proposes to adopt the following means:—

"(1.) The well-regulated promotion of the settlement of Palestine by Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and manufacturers.

"(2.) The organization and knitting together of the whole Jewish community by means of proper local and general institutions, in accordance with the law of the different countries.

“(3.) The strengthening of the Jewish self-respect and national consciousness.

“(4.) Preparatory steps for obtaining the consent of the governments, which is necessary for the achievement of the aims of Zionism.”

IV.

The first congress did not separate without having created a lasting organization. It elected a “Great Committee of Action,” in which all countries with a somewhat considerable Jewish population are represented, and which in its turn selected a smaller “permanent committee” with its headquarters in Vienna, under the presidency of Dr. Herzl. It was followed in the three ensuing years by three further congresses, in 1898 and 1899, again in Basel, and in 1900 in London. The number of the delegates rose in 1898 to two hundred and eighty, in 1899 to three hundred and seventy, and in 1900 to four hundred and twenty. At every succeeding congress the regulations for election were more strictly enforced, the mandates more closely examined, and at the present moment the congress, which has become a permanent institution of the Zionist Jewdom, and which met for the fifth time in December, 1901, again in Basel, can with justice claim to be the real representative of one hundred and eighty thousand electors.

He who desires to know what the Jews who have been represented at the congress have done up to the present time to realize the programme of Zionism drawn up by the first congress, has only to compare the various points of this programme with the facts we are going to record.

“(1.) The well-regulated promotion of the settlement of Palestine by Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and manufacturers.”

Zionism rejects on principle all colonization on a small scale, and the idea of “sneaking” into Palestine. The Zionists have therefore devoted themselves preëminently to a zealous and tireless advocacy of the already existing Jewish colonies in Palestine, with those who until now have given them their aid, and who of late have inclined towards the withdrawal of their support from them. The Zionists have also prepared the way for founding factories in the Holy Land, which will give employment to the Jewish workmen there, and have assured, by according a yearly subvention, the future existence of the model Hebraic school in Jaffa, which was about to close its doors for want of funds. They take care that the existing and promising beginnings of a Jewish colonization shall be looked after and maintained till the movement will be possible on a large scale.

“(2.) The organization and knitting together of the whole Jewish

community by the means of proper local and general institutions in accordance with the law of the different countries."

The Zionist Jewish community is at present organized in both hemispheres in about nine hundred societies, which display great activity. In the matter of organization covering the whole of Jewdom, Zionism possesses national federations of its societies,—the "great" and the "smaller committee of action," and the congress which maintains a permanent secretarial office in Vienna. The cost of this apparatus is covered by the voluntary yearly offerings of the Zionists, to which offerings the name of the old Jewish coinage is applied, and which accordingly are known as "shekels,"—their amount being in America forty cents, and in Western lands a unit of the coinage (one mark, one franc, one shilling, etc.). The payment of the shekel gives the right of vote for the congress. Zionism possesses its official organ, "Die Welt," published in German in Vienna. Its ideas are further set forth in about forty other periodicals in the Hebrew, German, Russian, Polish, Italian, English, French, and Roumanian languages, and in the Jewish-German and Judeo-Spanish jargons. Its American organ is the periodical, "The Macca-bæan." It has founded numerous schools, Toynbee Halls, and educational institutes, and has recently begun to acquire a share in the administration of the Jewish communities, in order to devote their resources, more than has heretofore been the case with the anti-national or unthinking leaders, to the promoting of national Jewish instruction, education, and culture.

"(3.) Strengthening of the Jewish self-respect and national consciousness."

The Zionist societies use every effort that the members and the Jewish masses in general may know the history of their nation, and become acquainted with the sacred and profane literature in the Hebrew tongue. They teach the Jews to hold their heads high, to be proud of their descent, and to despise the Anti-Semitic lies, calumnies, and insults. They care, in the measure of their strength, for the amelioration of the hygiene of the Jewish proletariat, for its economic improvement by means of association and solidarity, for well-directed education of children, and for the instruction of the women. They give the young students a goal for their efforts and an ideal in life. They preach the duty of leading a faultless, spiritual life, the rejection of a crude materialism, into which the assimilation Jews, on account of the want of a worthy ideal, are only too apt to sink, and strict self-control in word and deed. They found athletic societies in order to promote the long neglected physical development of the rising generation. They give a new impulse to the

celebration of Jewish historical feasts and memorial days. In many instances they even make themselves outwardly conspicuous by wearing insignia. The Zionist regards it as contemptible to conceal his nationality. He wishes to be recognized as a Jew, and as he always behaves himself in a natural, unaffected way, plays no comedy of imitation, wishes to deceive nobody about his extraction and identity, intrudes upon no one under a false flag, his relations to his Christian neighbors and fellow-countrymen are sounder, truer, more frank and dignified than those of the assimilation Jew, who makes painful and useless efforts, which disgust every Christian possessing a modicum of good taste, to hide the fact that he is a Jew.

“(4.) Preparatory steps to obtain the consent of the governments necessary to achieve the aims of Zionism.”

Several of the governments whose opinion will eventually be decisive in the matter have been, by means of memorials, reliably informed of the aims of Zionism; and there has been no want of very important encouragements and promising expressions of sympathy with its tendencies.

For the moment the committee of action is trying to obtain from Turkey a charter for the colonization of such land in Palestine as can be disposed of, and which at present is lying waste, and for the opening of its neglected resources. The exploiting of such a charter is not possible without considerable sums of money. In order to be armed financially for the time that Turkey will accord such a charter, the second Zionist congress (1898) decided to found a national Jewish bank institute, the “Jewish Colonial Trust,” with its headquarters in London. This resolution was carried out the following year (1899). The bank has been brought into being. Its capital in shares is two million pounds sterling. It can, by the statutes, start business when one eighth of this capital, two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, has been actually paid up. This has already been done.

Another financial instrument of Zionism is the “National Fund,” created by the fifth congress (1901), which is raised by voluntary subscription and which is to amount to two hundred thousand pounds sterling. The half of this sum is to be devoted to the purchase of land in Palestine, the other half to remain an intangible common property of the Jewish people, which will by means of compound interest and gifts continually increase, so that at important junctures the interest may be used for great national purposes.

V.

I have taken pains to show, in as brief and as objective a manner as possible, what Zionism is, what it desires to do, how it came into being,

and how it has developed up to the present. I have also repeatedly mentioned that its most violent opponents have arisen from the Jewish community.

Many of them content themselves with libeling and insulting the leaders of the Zionist movement. This kind of hostility they who are vilified can afford to despise. Men who, without expecting the slightest advantage to themselves, out of the purest, most unselfish love for the unhappy ones of their race, out of reverence for their forefathers, out of a general spirit of philanthropy, have made the greatest sacrifices in money, time, strength, and health, in order to elevate their people and to free millions of innocent, persecuted men from the bitterest misery, have the right smilingly to shrug their shoulders when irresponsible fanatics or pitiable paid scribes reproach them with self-interest or vanity.

Beside these opponents of a lower type, there are others who do not merely lie and slander, but also seek to argue. They delight in comparing the apostles of Zionism with the false Messiahs like the notorious Sabbathai Levi, who have appeared only too often in Jewish history, and who have always done the greatest mischief to the Jewish people they have deceived. To compare Zionism with the vagaries or impostures of false Messiahs of the Sabbathai Levi kind, presupposes great foolishness or great bad faith. Zionism is precisely characterized by the complete absence of any mystical element. It promises its adherents no miracles; on the contrary, it continually impresses on them that their emancipation from a situation they find intolerable, can only be the result of their own work, the fruit of their long, strenuous, and combined efforts.

People declare Zionism to be a dream, and deny that its practical realization is possible. To objections of this category the Zionists have a hundred times given a sufficient answer. This simple negative criticism can be passed over. Its only real refutation is in deeds, such as the Zionists have already performed, and as they intend further to perform.

The one point which probably forever excludes the possibility of an understanding between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, is the question of the Jewish nationality. Whoever maintains and believes that the Jews are not a nation can indeed be no Zionist, he cannot join a movement which is only justified when it is admitted that it desires to create normal conditions of existence for a people living and suffering under abnormal conditions. He who, on the contrary, is convinced that the Jews are a people, must necessarily become Zionist, as only the return to their own country can save the everywhere hated, persecuted, and oppressed Jewish nation from physical and intellectual destruction.

Many Jews, especially those of the West, have, in their heart of hearts, completely broken with Judaism, and they will probably soon do so openly, and if they do not break away, their children or grand-children will. These desire to be entirely absorbed by their Christian fellow-countrymen. They resent it as a great annoyance when other Jews proclaim that they are a people apart, and desire to bring about an unequivocal separation between themselves and the other nations. Their great and constant fear is to be denounced as strangers in the land of their birth, of which they are free citizens. They fear that this will be more than ever the case, if a large section of the Jewish people openly claim for themselves rights as an autonomous nation, and still worse, if anywhere in the world a political and intellectual centre of Judaism should really be created, in which millions of Jews would be grouped together, united as a nation.

All these feelings on the part of the assimilation Jews are comprehensible. From their standpoint they are justified. These Jews, however, have no right to expect that Zionism should for their sake commit suicide. The Jews who are happy and contented in the land of their birth, and who indignantly reject the suggestion of abandoning it, are about a sixth of the Jewish nation, say two millions out of twelve. The other five sixths, or ten millions, feel themselves profoundly unhappy in the countries where they reside, and they have every reason for doing so. These ten millions cannot be called upon to submit forever unresistingly to their thralldom, and to renounce every effort for redemption from their misery, merely in order that the comfort of two million happy and contented Jews may not be disturbed.

The Zionists are, moreover, firmly convinced that the misgivings of the assimilation Jews are unfounded. The reassembling of the Jewish people in Palestine will not have the consequences which they fear. When there is again a Jewish country, the Jews will have the choice of emigrating thither, or of remaining in their present home. Many will doubtless remain, and will prove by their choice that they prefer the land of their birth to their kindred and to their national soil. It is barely possible that the Anti-Semites will still throw the scornful and perfidious "stranger!" in their face. But the real Christians among their fellow-countrymen, those who think and feel according to the teaching and examples of the Holy Writ, will be convinced that they do not regard themselves as strangers in the land of their birth, and will then rightly comprehend the real meaning of their voluntary renunciation of a return to a land of the Jews, and of their fidelity to their homes and to their Christian neighbors.

The Zionists know that they have undertaken a work of unexampled difficulty. Never before has the effort been made to transplant, peacefully, in a short space of time, to another soil, several million people from various countries; never has it been attempted to transform millions of physically degenerate proletarians, without trade or profession, into agriculturists and cattle breeders, to bring townbred hucksters and trades people, agents, and men of sedentary occupation again into contact with the plough and the mother earth. It will be necessary to accustom Jews of different origins to one another, to train them practically to national unity, and at the same time to overcome the superhuman obstacles of difference of language, unequal civilization, and of the manners of thought, prejudices, likes, and dislikes of foreign nations, brought severally from the lands of their birth.

What gives the Zionists the courage to begin this labor of Hercules is the conviction that they are doing a necessary and useful work, a work of love and civilization, a work of justice and wisdom. They desire to save eight to ten millions of their kindred from intolerable suffering. They desire to free the nations among whom they now vegetate from a presence which is considered disagreeable. They wish to deprive Anti-Semitism—which everywhere lowers public morals and develops the very worst instincts—of its victim. They wish to make unquestionable producers out of the Jews at present reproached with being parasites. They desire to fertilize with their sweat and till with their hands a country that is today a desert, until it is again the flowering garden it has once been. Thus will Zionism in an equal degree serve the unhappy Jew and the Christian peoples, civilization and the economy of the world; and the services which it can render, and wishes to render, are great enough to justify its hope that the Christian world, too, will appreciate them, and support the movement with its active sympathy.

HERMANN SUDERMANN

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HERMANN SUDERMANN is, at the present time, undoubtedly the most widely known of all the living authors of Germany. His dramas have borne his name into regions where the most celebrated of our novelists have not yet penetrated, and even his novels have attained a circulation that none of his German contemporaries can hope to rival. Abroad Sudermann stands as the representative par excellence of modern German literature, and even at home voices are not wanting that ascribe to him a like significance, although our critics and our poets, especially of the younger generation, accord with almost unbroken unanimity, not to him, but to Gerhart Hauptmann, the palm of literary supremacy.

Yet there are with us not a few critics who deny to Sudermann the slightest vestige of a claim to importance, or who look upon him as merely a "seeker after effects," and as a "panderer to the baser instincts of the public." A closer scrutiny of his life and performances will perhaps make clear the reasons for this difference of opinion regarding the most widely read and most widely heard of modern German authors.

The story of Sudermann's life is easily told. The son of an innkeeper not over endowed with this world's goods, he was born on September 30, 1857, on an estate in East Prussia, far removed from the culture and the excessive refinements of culture that belong to a great metropolis. In the province of his nativity not even the German language held unrestricted sway. The men of toil, the rustics of this place, still largely speak the rich, mellifluous tongue of Lithuania,—a Slavic vernacular that Sudermann skilfully employed to lend local coloring to the dialogue of his drama, "Johannisfeuer."

His parents were compelled to battle sorely for their existence, and many a trait from this period of privation has found expression in his novel, "Frau Sorge." Yet the means were not wanting to send Hermann to the gymnasium of the provincial capital of Elbing,—to the "kind old aunt" who has left her indubitable traces in the "Katzensteg" and other of the poet's productions. Even at this period, the passion for the drama had taken possession of him. Gustav Freytag's now forgotten work, "Die Valentine," incited him to his first immature histrionic effort, in which he nevertheless evinced the potentiality of what was afterwards to be distinctly his own. He then became, like Henrik Ibsen and Theo-

dor Fontane, an apothecary; afterwards returned to his academic studies; and on April 28, 1877, made his way to Berlin, as he himself describes it, "with the same exalted rapture of pride which filled the heroes of Zola as they set forth from their ancestral heathers to conquer Paris."

But the conquest of the capital was not so easy. Ten years of sorest travail followed, in which Sudermann studied in the rôle of the private tutor the elegant "bourgeoisie" of Berlin, and drank to the dregs the bitter cup of the futile struggle for literary fame. It was then, finally, that his first two, and his best two, novels brought him a slight measure of celebrity. These were,—*"Frau Sorge"* (1887), full, as are so many of the first fruits of authorship, of autobiographic detail, and *"Der Katzensteg"* (1889), replete with the memories of home and childhood. Then followed collections of novelettes,—*"Die Geschwister"* (1888) and *"Im Zwielficht"* (1890). Between these two last mentioned volumes took place a development of extraordinary significance,—a development from trivial sentimentality to realism of the most ironic sort, from empty verbosity to epigrammatic terseness. Maupassant exercised here an unmistakable influence.

Then, like a flash, unexpected doubtless by all save the poet himself, borne up by his hope and his ambition, came that memorable evening in December, 1889, when Sudermann's drama, *"Die Ehre,"*¹ was produced,—an evening that records the greatest theatrical triumph of recent times, with which even that of Rostand's *"Cyrano"* cannot be compared. At a single bound the scarcely known novelist reached the pinnacle of dramatic renown; like Byron, he awoke to find himself famous. The bitter opposition his work evoked served only to increase its reputation. None of its successors, it is true, approached its fame. By the side of downright failures, *"Sodoms Ende"* (1891), *"Die drei Reiherfedern"* (1893), and partial successes, *"Schmetterlingsschlacht"* (1895), *"Das Glück im Winkel"* (1896), *"Morituri"* (1896), *"Johannes"* (1897), *"Johannisfeuer"* (1901), *"Es lebe das Leben"* (1902),—stands but a single genuine triumph, *"Die Heimath"* (1893); and this last production owes its good fortune unquestionably as much to the sensational rôle of Magda, and to her impersonation by actresses of the type of Duse and Réjane, as it does to its literary form and contents. Yet even in his discomfitures Sudermann asserted his claim to primacy,—in the realm of the drama at least; for a third novel, *"Es war"* (1898), did not meet with the same reception or the same measure of popularity as did its predecessors.

Recently a fresh laurel, and that of another sort, has been added to

(1) Published in 1890.

the wreath of literary fame achieved by Sudermann. Both by his personal character and his professional renown Sudermann, who lives for the most part in Berlin, in more than easy circumstances, appeared of all our contemporaries the best qualified to assume the leadership of the movement that was organized to protect the interests of modern German tendencies in literature, which had been seriously endangered by a virulent reaction. In the combat with the notorious "Lex Heinze," the aim of which, though ostensibly that of suppressing immorality, was really to stifle the slightest outburst of untrammelled genius, Sudermann, as the president of the newly founded "Goethe-Bund," was destined, both by act and speech, to achieve success for the cause. Here, too, his performances as the author of the renowned "Drei Reden" (1901) gave increasing emphasis to his position as the chief representative of German literature.

But is he from sheer merit entitled to that exalted rank? One cannot, in my estimation, accord to him without serious reserves so lofty a position. There are others to my mind that represent in a far higher degree the mighty and promising tendencies in our modern German literature. There is Nietzsche with his marvelous art in prose; Gerhart Hauptmann with his incisive dramatic realism; nay, even the time-honored Fontane with his buoyant, life-fraught zest for truth. Years are not alone decisive. Fontane, who would now be eighty were he yet alive, has in many respects the vantage of genuine literary youth over Sudermann, who is still in the prime of manhood. For, strange though it be, there still cleaves to the poet of our generation a goodly modicum of the cobwebs of antiquity,—cobwebs that many a lesser contemporary has ruthlessly brushed aside with so few compunctions. Yet this very reverence for the past has not been the least element in his greatness and success. The classical representative of modern German literature Hermann Sudermann can scarcely be called. But the typical representative he has been of the struggle for modern literary art, of the struggle now waging between the ideals of the literary present and the literary past.

In a rapid review of his complete literary achievement, two salient, nay, over-salient, features engage our attention. First, his almost pitiless tendency to repudiate the traditional ethics; his even militant and exultant construction of characters that antagonize it at every point in their ruthless and over-abundant consecration to the self; and, secondly, his predilection for moralizing. In this contradiction resides the latent disharmony of Sudermann's character. For his is in the supremest sense of the word a "divided soul." He is a man of power, of passionate yearning, of conscious, forceful volition. The poor innkeeper's son and private tutor did actually "conquer" Berlin, and that in no little

measure because he possessed in his own person a portion of the strength that he so inordinately admires. "Never yet saw I miracle other than force," he says in his "Johannes." And again in "Reiherfedern":—

"Denn bei jedem grossen Werke,
Das auf Erden wird vollbracht,
Herrschen soll allein die Stärke,
Herrschen soll allein, der lacht."

It is true that in the period to which these confessions belong, namely, 1896–1898, Sudermann was more strongly than ever under the spell of Nietzsche, whose words sometimes fairly reverberate in his "Johannes," and that subsequently in his "Drei Reden" Sudermann deliberately forsook these paths, nay, even went so far as to assail the Nietzschean "worship of the ego" and to glorify the doctrine of general service to humanity. But that is his other soul. Quite uninfluenced by Nietzsche's pæan to the "Master Nature," the author of the "Katzensteg" had already extolled his intrepid heroine Regine as "one of those expansive beings of the type born when every youthful creature could grow unchecked to its fullest measure of power, and be one with Nature in both bad and good." And, last of all, in the "Es lebe das Leben," he has again portrayed with deep sympathy the "Master Nature" in the whole of its proud passion for life,—a pride steeled by the very consciousness of its readiness for death. His heroine cries, "Sin! I know no sin. I have done the best I could with the character that is in me. I have no mind to be crushed by your moral laws."

This, then, is the one side, a potent nature reveling in the contemplation of victory-wonted power. Not without purpose in nearly every one of his works looms this figure of a Titanic, power-craving yet power-meriting man, whose ruthless will "crushes" all that surround him, and who especially hovers, like a nightmare of destiny, over wife and child. Sudermann, like the admirers of Bismarck, Wagner, and Nietzsche, gloats over the spectacle of gigantic strength. Yet he is not totally consumed by this admiration. His other soul also asserts itself. By the side of the ingenuous admirer of downright brute force, stands the scion of the East Prussian homestead, where the arrogant, domineering yoke of the Junker aristocracy slightly mollified his love for the "Master Nature." By the side of the son of an individualistic epoch, with its unconditional "worship of the ego," stands the child of East Prussian liberalism born of the strife with this reactionary aristocracy. The apostle of Nietzsche in the "Johannes" is likewise in "Die Ehre" the faithful disciple of Gustav Freytag, the same who also learned in the school of Friedrich Spiel-

hagen the art of imparting a trait of resolute political subjectivity to his characters. And so he feels constantly obliged to curb his unsophisticated delight in brute force, by the restraining bit of altruistic morals.

And as toward his characters, so is his attitude toward "collective individuals." For Freytag and Spielhagen the German "bourgeoisie" is the vehicle of our natural development, and the town the focus of all sound thought and successful labor. In Sudermann there is mingled with something of this acquired sentiment the inborn hatred of the child of the quiet, unworldly country home for the noisy, seething, grinding city. "Sodoms Ende" has its whole source in this bipartite sentiment: the disillusioned lover of the metropolis writes a bitter, venomous satire on his beloved city, which had rendered victory all but too easy, but which still, as Ibsen says, again and again "lures and tempts" him.

In his artless enravishment with what is great and strong lies Sudermann's strength,—his modernity. In his deeply rooted dread of the consequences of blind, individual indulgence lies his weakness,—his unmodernity. In the mingling of these two traits lies his artistic idiosyncrasy, which has made him the typical representative of the struggle now waging for modern art. He is not himself one of those "expansive creatures," of whom he says in "Reiherfedern":—

"Zwischen Schuld und Rache, zwischen Unrecht und Recht,
Zwischen Hass und Liebe und gut und schlecht,
Zwischen Lust und Gesetz, zwischen Acker und Furch',
Da geht ein ganzer Mann—quer durch."

But he is one "of those other natures that are tossed around between the good and the bad their whole life long. * * * What nature demands of us, becomes our blemish and our sin, and what the laws of men demand, appears to us stale and insipid. Between dread and defiance we oscillate to and fro" ("Katzensteg"). And so he became uncertain in sentiment as in portraiture; these inward battles ever and anon agitated him, and ever and anon he speaks "of renunciation and of dignity, of lassitude and of defiance" ("Es lebe das Leben").

He can thoroughly appreciate them,—these full, expansive, unbroken natures,—whether they be such as pursue ingenuously their inward impulses, like Leo in "Es war" and Regine in "Katzensteg," or such as repudiate resolutely their natural bent and "sacrifice all they love" ("Frau Sorge"). Here, too, belongs Paul in "Frau Sorge," or Pastor Heffterdingk in "Heimath"; and here, too, above all others, the numerous tender hearted mothers and wives, absolutely absorbed in their loving kindness and devotion,—from that poetically transfigured type in his first

novel to the realistic and fully illuminated conception in the "Schmetterlingsschlacht." Yet it was in his initial production only that he dared to give first place and final victory to an "expansive nature" of this sort. Elsewhere they are invariably subordinate figures, while the principal characters are always "problematic natures," tainted to the core with that characteristic rift between egoism and altruism, between naturalness and nervousness, between pride and humility. And worst of all, these characters are painted with a hand that also shakes and with an eye that also swims and trembles.

Sudermann is never positive regarding his own characters. His subordinate figures alone assume full and finished shapes,—and that frequently with astonishing lifelikeness, as with Alma in the "Ehre," Kessler in the "Schmetterlingsschlacht," and Pastor Haffke in the "Johannisfeuer." All his main characters have a psychological fracture; they are not coherent. Their illusive reality never wanes for an instant; yet when their utterances are grouped, they are seen at once to be irreconcilable, the result of the whole impossible, the character unreal, because composed mosaic-like of contradictions that have never found consistent incarnation in any human soul.

True, we all know that the days of the characters, all of one piece, of the old stage are past; we know that no being exists that is miser and miser only, like Molière's Harpagon, or always an immaculate hero, like Schiller's Max Piccolomini; contradictions inhere in every human breast. Yet there are some traits that are absolutely and unequivocally incompatible with one another,—traits of which the impression produced by the one inevitably nullifies that produced by the other. In the "Johannisfeuer" the entire household is supposed to quake before old Vogelreuter. And what do we see? A good-natured elderly gentleman engaged in affectionate conversation, whose ire is at most comparable to a passing thunderclap. And, again, his John the Baptist is announced as a portentous preacher of wrath, and there stands before us a muddled dreamer. All this is impossible. The result the poet desired to produce is not forthcoming, and yet we have to suppose that the character is fully sustaining the rôle that the author intended for it.

In his earliest novels there is no trace of this idiosyncrasy, for the sufficient reason that Sudermann is here still imitating artistic models that are not his own. On the other hand, even here some of his favorite types are met with; for example, the courageous son who tirelessly struggles to expiate the sins of his parents, and to whom these very parents become an ever imminent fatality. Married couples also form the frequent subject of Sudermann's types: the wife

that simulates affection but is cold at heart, and her imbecile consort. To the passionate soul of our poet a desire signifies more than to other men; a demoniac force abides in it; a desire, even an unfulfilled desire, is a curse, and he alone that has stifled his desires is free. In his symbolic mask, "Die drei Reiherfedern," Sudermann has freely developed this idea, to which Hebbel had already given literary expression in his farce, "Der Diamant."

A more personal coloring tinges his great novel, "Frau Sorge." Here the central figure is a desire personified, incarnate in human flesh: the yearning of a poor, oppressed woman for light and happiness. And yet the book has taken too abstract a shape: dull, homely virtue, unmitigated self-denial, verging in its overwrought, idealistic fastidiousness almost on stupidity and cowardice. But our approval we may not, after all, withhold from the book, for the poet has thrown into it his whole passionate being, and saturated it with the glowing inspiration of his own rapturous yearning. Yet this personal sympathy, here as elsewhere in Sudermann's productions, has lent to the poet's work a pronounced tinge of partisanship. Pure as driven snow has the character of Paul been portrayed, and ebony black that of his brothers and sisters, while a pair of ideal figures on his side and a brace of miscreants on the other complete the sad disparity. But however defective the psychology,—including even the masterly drawn figure of the father, a visionary and irrational prater of unspeakable incapacity,—so vigorous is the movement of the plot that the book never ceases to ravish and fascinate. At the conclusion only is the action marred by a discordant effect; our paragon of virtue, in order to save his benefactor, is forced to become an incendiary and to glory in his performance; the first achievement of which he boasts is an act of crime!

Delicate touches are not wanting,—as in that symbolic episode where Paul's child of sorrow, his locomobile, which he had been repairing, crushed, on its first movement, the gift of his beloved,—a flute, on which he had never been permitted to play. A symbolic turn that may extend beyond the import of the moment, and possibly signify the crushing of the idyllic muse by the colossus of the metropolis, or the crushing of the quiet dreams of the poet by the applause of the public.

Yet a still more powerful trend does his fiction take in the "Katzensteg." During the German wars of independence against Napoleon, a nobleman partially of Polish extraction treacherously revealed to the French a path by which they could lead into ambush a squad of Prussian soldiers. This impious deed it is his son's duty to atone. But the curse has greater power than his courage. To overcome the detesta-

tion of his neighbors, to restore his ruined estate,—that was possible; but there, like an heirloom of the flesh and blood, was the last mistress of the impious father, an almost animal nature, but of adamantine power and fidelity, whose strength and steadfastness and sensuous charms held spellbound the shattered soul of the wretched son, making him feel but too acutely his surpassing impotence. It is a work of power, full of realistic scenes and of lifelike figures,—but its villains are again too villainous. Were the conclusion not the product, once more, of Sudermann's second soul, it would be a masterpiece. But when the end comes, the strongly passionate soul of Sudermann is again forcibly transformed into its contrary,—into the soul that vacillates between dread and defiance. And now comes the savage unraveling of the plot; the father is forced to shoot his daughter Regine and to go insane over the act, while at the close of all we are treated to a series of inconceivable ethical considerations.

For, meanwhile, a problem had crept into Sudermann's horizon that has never since ceased to employ him,—“the rift of the emotions.” The phrase first meets us in his collection, “Im Zwiellicht.” It then dominates Sudermann's most famous work, “Die Ehre.” The philosopher of the drama speaks of the castes of India,—and of the remaining world besides. “The impassable gulf that divides all the castes is the sundering rift in the emotions. Each caste has its own gospel of honor, its own sense of delicacy, its own ideals, nay, even its own language.”

It is a strange production. Viewed outwardly, it is weak,—so weak that its success today appears incomprehensible. Sudermann, who now writes an unusually vigorous and realistic dialogue,—at its best in “Johannisfeuer,”—here still dawdles with the insufferably stilted fustian of the old-fashioned German stage rhetoric, at least in the case of his most pretentious characters. The most naïve prattle about themselves is the medium by which his heroes are introduced to the public; while the ideas of the author himself are trumpeted through the mouth of an insufferable old oracle and philanthropist, Count Trast, scion of a noble race, coffee king, wiseacre, and absurdly bosom friend of the scatter-brained Robert Heineke. In this character is embodied all that Sudermann learned from Gustav Freytag's weak youthful dramas, and everything that in every poet is the bane of his poetic work,—the tendency to moralize, to split hairs, to produce vivid effects, to cater to the public.

And here, in fact, lay precisely one of the reasons of the success of the piece. Opinions are set forth that never fail to appeal to the public heart. That they were those of Sudermann one need not doubt, for there spoke here the political and social liberalism of his country home.

"Young Lithuanians" was, indeed, the name of the leading spirits of the Prussian progressive party that fought, to the admiration of Europe, its long battle of freedom against Bismarck. The scene of the play is a peculiar one. As the mediæval mysteries showed in three stories their hell, heaven, and earth, here we have, as it were, a two-storied social mystery. On a great industrial estate stands in the foreground the "manor," in which with his family lives the wealthy proprietor; behind lie the "tenements" inhabited by the suffering proletariat in his employ. The rich proprietor has taken the son of one of these families under his special protection, and educated him. The latter, on extensive commercial journeys, has splendidly fulfilled in his development what was expected of him, and returns home, accompanied by his immensely wealthy and extraordinarily sagacious friend, the count and coffee king. But the globe-girdler has become transformed abroad, while he finds the people at home precisely as he left them—the eternal contrast! Does not Goethe say in his "Faust":—

"Ich find 'euch noch wie ich euch sah;
Ein Anderer bin *ich* wieder da?"

Now this is a theme that lies very near to the hearts of modern Germany, where rapid national development has sharply separated the generations; and it has played the leading rôle in many novels like those of W. Raabe, and in the dramas of Gerhart Hauptmann. But Sudermann conceives this contrast not as a contrast of generations, but as a contrast of the moral "over-man" and the "man of the rabble." In the "manor" as in the "tenement" obsolete and antiquated conceptions of honor prevail. Alike deserving of denunciation appear to the poet the "swashbuckler" conceptions of honor of the young German reserve officers, reposing on pure externalities, and the commercial notions of "respectability," always capable of being expressed in dollars and cents, that dominate the rest of society; and so he contrasts the wealthy merchant that cancels his obligations of crime with gold, and the poor working men that congratulate the daughter seduced by his son on the hush money she has received. Every conception of honor, thinks Sudermann, is conventional, and above them all stands the unfettered man with his consciousness of duty. One notes, though, that Robert and his friend do not take this conception of duty too rigorously; and one is sorely inclined to ask whether "duty" is not also as much a matter of relativity as honor. But the public was entranced. Social contact, with something like an equal distribution of light, and especially of shadow, over "manor"

and "tenement," was always the delight of the German "folk plays"; and Nestroy, the Vienna comedy writer, and Gustav Freytag, and more recently the Berlin playwright, L'Arronge, have all successfully exploited this theme.

But with Sudermann the note took a far deeper strain; for with him personal experiences had made far more deeply a question of the heart than was the case with them, this gaping antithesis between the poor and the rich, the educated and the uneducated. And in antagonizing the arrogant conceptions of honor of the "higher classes," the editor of the liberal "Deutsches Reichsblatt" and the public of the metropolis found themselves at heart one. And thus a technically weak, and poetically flaccid, drama was made a "record-breaker" of unparalleled rank.

Merit it decidedly had. The atmosphere of the "tenement" was portrayed with rarest art, the language and the characters with consummate realism,—before possibly dreamt of, but never before attained. Yet in all other respects, the play can at present subserve but one purpose,—that of illustrating the remarkable progress the poet has made in technique as in subject matter.

"To be successful," says Sudermann, "is to be nailed, nailed fast,—sometimes even to a cross" ("Es lebe das Leben"). And this utterance has a twofold import. It holds, first, for the public, which grows more and more exacting and demands the same sop that it has before received; and it holds too for the poet, whom the temptation ever lures to duplicate his original success, even at the cost of the better artistic self.

Like "Die Ehre," so also "Sodoms Ende" sought to offer a moralizing picture of the times, to set off against the dilettantism of unserious cleverness, the ideal of serious, arduous labor; against the boisterous enjoyment of the pleasures of life, the beatific happiness of the cosy, retired home. But unfortunately here too the hand of the poet shook. As in the "Ehre" the portraiture of the "manor" assumed entirely too conventional a form, with its *parvenu* of a father, its fop of a son, and its divinely beautiful daughter, so here instead of observation we have a glaring picture of impossible conditions, once more relieved only by the several felicitous subordinate figures. And the good old Berlinese, by a gross literary distortion, have been transformed into Romans of the Decadence. And again the main characters have all their psychological fracture,—their rift. The painter whose energy success and indulgence have shattered must have been a decadent before he ever painted the picture of Sodom's End, which brought him that success and indulgence. The characteristic "intrigante," "with the allurements of passion, but cold, cold as a dog's nose," is a vague replica of the same

type that Ibsen has so masterfully and unerringly portrayed in "Hedda Gabler." But there is one sentiment uttered here that might have furnished the leading theme for a great, modern realistic drama, "There is no love; there is no destiny; there are no duties; there are only nerves." It had been Sudermann's intention to portray this neurasthenic society as marionettes controlled by nervous shocks. But it was not in him likewise to depict these pitiable victims of their nerves as morally contaminated by the virtuous Philistines of the "tenement." He had not the courage of his logic. But, on the other hand, his technique shows great improvement, though most so in the coarser effects, which remind us of the "raspberry-colored evening glow" of the drama of his boarding school days. Even the admirable schoolmaster that commits to heart an address in honor of the great painter, who in the next apartment seduces "with terrific velocity" his eulogist's sweetheart,—even he could not restrain the public from a downright repudiation of this but too outspoken piece of dramatic "bidding for a purpose."

Correspondingly greater was the success of "Die Heimath." And here again Sudermann owed his laurels to a bit of purpose writing. Nietzsche had just begun to augment and intensify by his writings the direction of thought that Ibsen had initiated with his dramas. Again the question of "the rift of the feelings," sentiments, or emotions (however we may call it), stood in the forefront of literary endeavor. But now it was not "honor" or "nervosity," but the conception of individuality and of unfettered personal freedom that became the touchstone of sentiment. This, too, was a problem which belonged to the living experience of the author. One has scarcely any conception abroad, and particularly in America, of the oppressiveness with which "the law and customary morals and, worse still, 'sound sentiment'" ("Sodoms Ende") weigh down in Germany upon the free development of personality. Unfortunately Sudermann again treated with too glaring colors the timely problem that Gerhart Hauptmann had attacked with so much psychological objectivity in his "Einsame Menschen." The old traditional ethics must needs be represented by a narrow minded and paralyzed greybeard, and the modern yearning for unfettered development by a presumably great female artist who is given to loud, barbaric effects and who makes a show in her sentiments of the most obtrusive magnanimity. Psychologically, the subordinate characters, too, have been more than usually slurred, and for the most part dragged forth from the ancient corrugated stock-in-trade of the German stage. Note, for example, the unprincipled place-hunter, and the heroic self-renouncing pastor. Far-fetched, also, is the form of the conflict between the old colonel of the provincial town and

his famous, much traveled daughter, which could easily have been arranged without intrigue.

Then followed several dramas of minor importance. A moment of repose, of inactivity had entered in Sudermann's development,—caused more by his successes than by his failures. The "*Schmetterlingsschlacht*," in certain of its features, bears reminiscences of the "*Ehre*," save only that its dialogue is incomparably more lifelike and its diction more realistic. Yet here, too, at the conclusion, in an otherwise admirable peroration by the harassed mother, "the rift of the feelings" must pay the ethical piper, and opulence and poverty are juxtaposed in slightly too trenchant contrast. As for the rest, the piece contains, in the subordinate character of the successful "*commis voyageur*," one of Sudermann's most brilliant creations,—strongly reminding us of Balzac's "*illustre Gaudissart*." "*Das Glück im Winkel*" transforms an arrogant, aristocratic blusterer,—one of the master natures that dominate in Sudermann's novels,—into a love-sick, amorous swain, who is vanquished, hands down (mark the contrast with "*Sodoms Ende*"!) by a doughty pedagogue.

Profounder problems engage us in the three one-act plays that Sudermann has brought together under the single title of "*Morituri*." "Our most vehement impulse for existence," so his utterance runs in "*Es lebe das Leben*,"—"all our boasted energy of life, is naught but our readiness to meet death!" Our attitude toward the great problem of death is made here, as it is again in Sudermann's latest drama, the touchstone of the sentiments. Only when we can look death calmly in the face, do we feel the full richness of life, do we possess, compressed in the span of a single moment, all the possibilities of our existence. Proximity to death is thus made the test of the neglected happiness in both life and love of the Ostrogothic hero-king, the Prussian officer, and the French marshal. These three little dramas are of varying merit. In the historical drama, "*Teja*," its ultra-modern style strikes a discordant note. In the rhymed intrigante comedy, "*Das ewig Menschliche*," the frivolous tone is quite overdone. But "*Fritzchen*" is the compactest work of art that Sudermann ever wrote. The wretched young officer comes to his ruin from his father's persistent refusal to respect his personality. But this conflict here takes an original turn,—a good-natured and ethically tradition-bound soul perishes for the reason that the representative of the older generation strangely persists in treating him as an "expansive nature." The conflict has been portrayed with irresistible power, and nowhere has Sudermann so finely scorned as here over-charged dramatic effects or produced so emphatically the impression of unity.

He had become more serious, more wary of loud successes. Nietzsche

and Ibsen were influencing him more profoundly than ever. He labored upon himself. Hitherto he had given finished characters, now he gave characters in the process of psychological development.

From two sides he approached one of the capital problems of these two masters, namely, the destiny of the solitary idealist. His "Johannes" was intended to portray in an historical drama John the Baptist as the unsuccessful forerunner of Christ, as a man that had taken too heavy a burden upon his shoulders. John possesses only one half of the qualifications that his mission demands; he possesses the power of wrath, but the wretched times have destroyed in him the power of love. And so he becomes for his followers a curse instead of a blessing, and instead of awakening, he dulls, their spiritual sense. In this profound and nobly conceived tragedy, the brilliant delineation of the environment is heightened rather than impaired by the resonant echoes of Nietzsche's phraseology. But, like so many other psychological dramas, the "Johannes" suffers from a genuine plethora of problems and motives, and its philosophical truth has impaired its historic verity, in that the forerunner of Christ did not perish from his own impotence, but because of a chance meeting with Herod and his profligate court,—*"Sodoms Ende"* with Old Testament illumination!

While the "Johannes" depicts the idealistic educator of the people, the "Drei Reiherfedern" is concerned with the idealistic education of self. It is a dark, allegorical production, full of musical and graphic effects. The problematic character, the hero and his Sancho Panza, the stalwart man of the people, are a familiar pair, and Sudermann has illustrated in their figures the dangerous extremes to which his leading types are ever exposed,—the idealist verging close on the weakling (like Paul in "Frau Sorge"), and the realist on the outlaw.

"Kinder, was wärt Ihr für prächtige Kerle,
Wärt Ihr nicht so greuliche Lumpen."

As in the "Morituri," so here the hero does not discover that he is in possession of happiness until he loses it forever. Personal experience doubtless engendered this melancholy turn in Sudermann, as it did with Goethe in "Tasso":—

"Es reisst sich los was erst sich uns ergab,
Wir lassen los was wir begierig fassten,
Es gibt ein Glück, allein wir kennen's nicht;
Wir kennen's wohl und wissen's nicht zu schätzen."

After these great and serious endeavors a break once more occurs in Sudermann's productive activity. He made another effort to escape from the

exciting titillations of his first night dramatic successes, and to anchor in the calmer roadsteads of epic poetry; but the theatre had absorbed his entire being. The novel, "Es war," proved to be a mere debasement of his dramatic characters, conflicts, and effects. The almost Homeric delight he took in his inventorial descriptions of property—a trait he shares with Anzengruber, Gottfried Keller, and Zola—is the only feature that still betrays the pronounced epic strain of "Frau Sorge" and "Katzensteg." We have here (as in the "Heimath"), grouped together, all of Sudermann's faults and but few of his excellencies. It was necessary for him to rest.

Later, two more dramas appeared. Both strive to give dramatic body to metaphysical reflections on life. But in the meanwhile, a fundamental change has taken place in the poet's method: while at the outset Sudermann's endeavor was to embellish his dramatic conflict with moral reflections, now it is the story that he seeks for his thoughts, almost after the manner of Ibsen.

The second of his two latest tragedies is the more important. From a purely technical point of view, "Johannisfeuer" is, after "Fritzchen," Sudermann's capital achievement. The exposition is brilliant, and the illuminative effects, here also not wanting, are lifted up into the symbolical. Nearly all the subordinate figures are superb; notably the pastor and the Lithuanian beggar woman. But the main characters again exhibit incompatible traits. The heroine is half the daughter of her mother,—passionately covetous, unreal, and even perjured,—and half the exemplary German maiden, clever, self-sacrificing, enchanting. Love encompasses her, yet she maintains that she has been maltreated only; and the poet believes her. Her lover is partly the proud, strong, and self-reliant master nature, and partly the impotent, problematic character, who bows to every strong will he encounters. And, to cap the climax, he is forced, as unfortunately so many of Sudermann's characters are, to fall in love with a mediocre, nay, almost a simpleton of a girl.

"Es lebe das Leben" enters the political field. The antithesis between precept and practice in our conservative society forms the background. A rather tortuous intrigue forces the exultant conqueror, after heart and zest for life are broken, still to live on, when he fain would die. Lifelike figures, witty conversations replete with cleverest sallies, a banquet alarmingly animated by the proximity of death,—here is the vigorous poet of "Fritzchen" and "Johannisfeuer"; an artificial plot, far-fetched analyses of guilt and sin, of life and death, of morals and law,—here is the feeble author of "Sodoms Ende" and the "Heimath." The

problematic element of his characters is surpassed by the hesitancy of the poet himself, and we witness the trying spectacle of an author who is able to compete with Hauptmann and Ibsen for the laurels of dramatic fame, resting content with the mere stage artifices of a Sardou and a Dumas.

But we have no reason to be alarmed for the author because his latest work has approached so closely to the beginning. So much honest endeavor, so much intensity of passion, so much felicitous progress does Sudermann's career show, that a loftier plane of achievement is quite imaginable,—one on which there will be produced some great and complete tragedy that will have all the power of the one-act play, "Fritzchen,"—a drama that will exhibit, combined, such leading characters as those of the "Katzensteg," such subordinate ones as those of the "Schmetterlingsschlacht" and "Johannisfeuer," and an environment portrayed with the same consummate skill as that of the "Johannes." Perhaps a work will still be granted him that shall combine with lifelike portraiture of character and purposeful technique some lucid, guiding idea, such as the dramas of Ibsen exhibit. We are justified in hoping so. For by the side of the moralizing journalist with his counterfeit pathos, there dwells also in Sudermann a genuine poet, and by the side of the professional writer, yielding only too willingly to coarse impressionism, an idealist of sincerest ambitions. All of this Hermann Sudermann is. But he is also something more: he possesses in addition an inestimably precious gift, which is almost totally wanting to his fellow contestants for the wreath of realistic art,—the gift of genuine, keenest humor. He shares this felicitous endowment only with Ibsen and Böcklin; Zola, Hauptmann, and Tolstoi have not a vestige of it. And perhaps this talismanic grace will succeed sometime in eliminating all inward contradiction, and in welding them into a single, harmonious poetical personality, such as Sudermann would fain be, and such as we, both for his and for our sake, would gladly have him.

HÉLOÏSE

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OUTSIDE of imaginative literature, in the rude regions of fact, there has never been a passion between a man and woman more famous than that which brought happiness and sorrow to the lives of Abelard and Héloïse. Here fame is just. It was a great love, and its course was a perfect soul's tragedy. Abelard was a celebrity, the intellectual glory of an active minded epoch. His love story has done as much for his posthumous fame as all his intellectual activities. Héloïse became known in her time through her relations with Abelard; in his songs her name was wafted far. She has come down to us as one of the world's love heroines. Yet her fame has not made known to all who have been touched by her story,—the fact that Héloïse was a great woman, possessed of an admirable mind, a character which proved its strength through years, and, above all, a capacity for loving,—for loving out to the full conclusions of love's convictions, and for feeling in their full range and power whatever moods and emotions could arise from an unhappy situation and a passion as deeply felt as it was deeply thought upon.

Abelard was not a great character,—aside from his intellect. He was vain and inconsiderate, a man who delighted in confounding and supplanting his teachers, and in being a thorn in the flesh of all opponents. But he became chastened through his misfortunes and through Héloïse's high and self-sacrificing love. In the end, perhaps, his love was worthy of the love of Héloïse. Yet her love from the beginning was nobler and deeper than his love of her. Love was for him an incident in his experience, then an element in his life. Love made the life of Héloïse; it remained her all. Moreover, in the records of their passion, Héloïse's love is unveiled as Abelard's is not. For all these reasons the heart of Héloïse, rather than the heart of Abelard, discloses the greatness of a love that wept itself out in the twelfth century; and it is her love rather than his that can teach us much regarding the mediæval capacity for loving. Hers is a story of mediæval womanhood, and sin and repentance perhaps, with peace at last, or at least the lips shut close and further protest foregone.

Abelard's stormy intellectual career and the story of the love between him and the canon's daughter are well known. Let us follow him in those parts of his narrative which disclose the depth and power of

Héloïse's love for him. We draw from his "*Historia Calamitatum*," written "to a friend," apparently an open letter intended for circulation.

"There was," writes Abelard, referring to the time of his sojourn in Paris when he was about thirty-six years old, and at the height of his fame as a lecturer in the schools,—“there was in Paris a young girl named Héloïse, the niece of a canon Fulbert. It was his affectionate wish that she should have the best education in letters that could be procured. Her face was not unfair, and her knowledge was unequaled. This attainment, so rare in women, had given her great reputation.

“I had hitherto lived continently, but now was casting my eyes about, * * * and I saw that she possessed every attraction that lovers seek; nor did I regard my success as doubtful, when I considered my fame and my goodly person, and also her love of letters. Inflamed with love, I thought how I could best become intimate with her. It occurred to me to obtain lodgings with her uncle, on the plea that household cares distracted me from study. Friends quickly brought this about, the old man being miserly and yet desirous of instruction for his niece. He eagerly entrusted her to my tutorship, and begged me to give her all the time I could take from my lectures, authorizing me to see her at any hour of the day or night, and to punish her when necessary. I marveled with what simplicity he confided a tender lamb to a hungry wolf. As he had given me authority to punish her, I saw that if caresses would not win my object, I could bend her by threats and blows. Doubtless he was misled by love of his niece and my own good reputation. Well, what need to say more? we were united first by the one roof above us, and then by our hearts. Our hours of study were given to love. The books lay open, but our words were of love rather than philosophy, there were more kisses than aphorisms; and love was oftener reflected in our eyes than the lettered page. To avert suspicion, I struck her occasionally—very gentle blows of love. The joy of love, new to us both, brought no satiety. The more I was taken up with this pleasure, the less time I gave to philosophy and the schools—how tiresome had all that become! I became unproductive, merely repeating my old lectures, and if I composed any verses, love was their subject, and not the secrets of philosophy; you know how popular and widely sung these have become. But the students! what groans and laments arose from them at my distraction! A passion so plain was not to be concealed; every one knew of it except Fulbert. A man is often the last to know of his own shame. Yet what everybody knows cannot be hid forever, and so after some months he learned all. O how bitter was that uncle's grief! and what was the grief of the separated lovers! How ashamed I was, and afflicted at the affliction

of the girl! And what a storm of sorrow came over her at my disgrace! Neither complained for himself, but each grieved at what the other must endure."

Although Abelard was moved at the plight of Héloïse, he felt bitterly his own discomfiture in the eyes of the once admiring world. But the sentence touching Héloïse is a first true note of her devoted love: "what a storm of sorrow—*moeroris aestus*—came over her at my disgrace!" Through this trouble and woe, Héloïse never thought of her own pain save as it pained her to be the source of grief to Abelard.

Abelard continues: "The separation of our bodies joined our souls more closely and inflamed our love. Shame spent itself and made us unashamed, so small a thing it seemed compared with satisfying love. Not long afterwards the girl knew that she was to be a mother, and in the greatest exultation wrote and asked me to advise what she should do. One night, as we agreed on, when Fulbert was away I bore her off secretly and sent her to my own country, Brittany, where she stayed with my sister till she gave birth to a son, whom she named Astralabius.

"The uncle, on his return to his empty house, was frantic. He did not know what to do to me. If he should kill or do me some bodily injury, he feared lest his niece, whom he loved, would suffer for it among my people in Brittany. He could not seize me, as I was prepared against all attempts. At length, pitying his anguish, and feeling remorse at having caused it, I went to him as a suppliant and promised whatever satisfaction he should demand. I assured him that nothing in my conduct would seem remarkable to one who had felt the strength of love or would take the pains to recall how many of the greatest men had been thrown down by women, ever since the world began. Whereupon I offered him a satisfaction greater than he could have hoped, to wit, that I would marry her whom I had corrupted, if only the marriage might be kept secret so that it should not injure me in the minds of men. He agreed and pledged his faith, and the faith of his friends, and sealed with kisses the reconciliation which I had sought,—so that he might more easily betray me!"

It will be remembered here that Abelard was a clerk, a *clericus*, in virtue of his profession of letters and theology. Never having taken orders, he could marry; but while a clerk's slip could be forgotten, marriage might lead people to think he had slighted his vocation, and would certainly bar the ecclesiastical preferment which such a famous *clericus* might naturally look forward to. The situation—so frankly mediæval—is not without modern parallels within the Catholic Church.

Abelard at once set out to fetch Héloïse from Brittany to make

her his wife. The stand which she now took shows both her mind and heart: "She strongly disapproved, and urged two reasons against the marriage, to wit, the danger and the disgrace in which it would involve me. She swore—and so it proved—that no satisfaction would ever appease her uncle. She asked how she was to have any glory through me when she should have made me inglorious, and should have humiliated both herself and me. What penalties would the world exact from her if she deprived it of such a luminary; what curses, what damages to the Church, what lamentations of philosophers, would follow on this marriage! How indecent, how lamentable would it be for a man whom nature had made for all, to declare that he belonged to one woman, and subject himself to such shame! From her soul, she detested this marriage which would be so utterly ignominious for me, and a burden to me. She expatiated on the disgrace and inconvenience of matrimony for me and quoted the Apostle Paul exhorting men to shun it. If I would not take the Apostle's advice or listen to what the saints had said regarding the matrimonial yoke, I should at least pay attention to the philosophers,—to Theophrastus' words upon the intolerable evils of marriage, and to the refusal of Cicero to take a wife after he had divorced Terentia, when he said that he could not devote himself to a wife and philosophy at the same time. 'Or,' she continued, laying aside the disaccord between study and a wife, 'consider what a married man's establishment would be to you. What sweet accord there would be between the schools and domestics, between copyists and cradles, between books and distaffs, between pen and spindle! Who, engaged in religious or philosophical meditations, could endure a baby's crying and the nurse's ditties stilling it, and all the noise of servants? Could you put up with the dirty ways of children? The rich can, you say, with their palaces and apartments of all kinds; their wealth does not feel the expense or the daily care and annoyance. But I say, the state of the rich is not that of philosophers; nor have men entangled in riches and affairs any time for the study of Scripture or philosophy. The renowned philosophers of old, despising the world, fleeing rather than relinquishing it, forbade themselves all pleasures, and reposed in the embraces of philosophy.'" Speaking thus, Héloïse fortified her argument with quotations from Seneca, and the examples of Jewish and Gentile worthies and Christian saints, and continued:—

"It is not for me to point out—for I would not be thought to instruct Minerva—how soberly and continently all these men lived, who, according to Augustine and others, were called philosophers as much for their way of life as for their knowledge. If laymen and Gentiles, bound by no profession of religion, lived thus, surely you, a clerk and canon, should

not prefer low pleasures to sacred duties, nor let yourself be sucked down by this Charybdis and smothered in filth inextricably. If you do not value the privilege of a clerk, at least defend the dignity of a philosopher. If reverence for God be despised, still let love of decency temper immodesty. Remember, Socrates was tied to a wife, and through a nasty accident wiped out this blot upon philosophy, that others afterwards might be more cautious; which Jerome relates in his book against Jovinianus, how once when enduring a storm of Xanthippe's clamors from the floor above, he was ducked with slops, and simply said, 'I knew such thunder would bring rain.'"

"Finally she said that it would be dangerous for me to take her back to Paris; it was more becoming to me and sweeter to her, to be called my mistress, so that affection alone might keep me hers and not the binding power of any matrimonial chain; and if we should be separated for a time, our joys at meeting would be the dearer for their rarity. When at last with all her persuasions and dissuasions she could not turn me from my folly, and could not bear to offend me, with a burst of tears she ended in these words: 'One thing is left,—in the ruin of us both the grief which follows shall not be less than the love which went before.' Nor did she here lack the spirit of prophecy."

Héloïse's reasonings show love great and true, and her absolute devotion to Abelard's interests. None the less striking is their clear intelligence. She reasoned correctly; she was right; the marriage would do great harm to Abelard and little good to her. We see this, too, if we lay aside our sense of the ennobling purity of marriage,—a sentiment not commonly felt in the twelfth century. Marriage was holy in the mind of Christ. But it did not preserve its holiness through the centuries which saw the rise of monasticism and priestly celibacy. A way of life is not pure and holy when another way is holier and purer; this is peculiarly true in Christianity, which demands the ideal best with such intensity as to cast reflection on whatever falls below the highest standard. From the time of the barbarian inroads, on through the Carolingian periods, and into the later Middle Ages, there was enough barbarism and brutality to prevent the preservation, or impede the development, of a high standard of marriage. Not monasticism, but his own half barbarian, lustful heart led Charlemagne to marry and remarry at will, and have many mistresses besides. It was the same with the countless barons and mediæval kings, rude and half civilized. This was barbarous lust, not due to the influence of monasticism. But, on the other hand, it was always the virgin or celibate state that the Church held before the eyes of all this semi-barbarous laity as the ideal for a Christian man or woman. The Church

sanctioned marriage, but hardly lauded it or held it up as a condition in which lives of holiness and purity could be led. Such were the sentiments in which Héloïse was born and bred. They were subconscious factors in her thoughts regarding herself and her lover. Devoted and unselfish was her love; undoubtedly Héloïse would have sacrificed herself for Abelard under any social conditions. Nevertheless with her, marriage added little to love; it was a mere formal and binding authorization; love was no purer for it. If unsanctioned love was evil in the Church's eyes, neither was marriage quite the best; continency was much better, said the Church. To her mind, for a man in Abelard's situation to be entangled in a temporary "amour" was better than to be chained to his passion, with his career irrevocably ruined, in marriage. In so far as her thoughts or Abelard's were influenced by the environment of priestly thinking, marriage would seem a rendering permanent of a passionate and sinful state, which it were *best* to cast off altogether. For herself, as she said truly, the marriage would bring obloquy rather than reinstatement. She had been mistress to a clerk; marriage would make her the partner of his abandonment of his vocation, the accomplice of broken purposes if not of broken vows. And finally, as there was then no line of disgrace as now between bastard and lawful issue, Héloïse has no thought that the interests of her son demanded that his mother should become his father's wife.

"Leaving our son in my sister's care, we stole back to Paris, and shortly after, having in the night celebrated our vigils in a certain church, we were married at dawn in the presence of her uncle and some of his and our friends. We left at once separately and with secrecy, and afterwards saw each other only in privacy, so as to conceal what we had done. But her uncle and his household began at once to announce the marriage and violate his word; while she, on the contrary, protested vehemently and swore that it was false. At that he became enraged and treated her vilely. When I discovered this I sent her to the Convent of Argenteuil, near Paris, where she had been educated. There I had her take the garb of a nun, except the veil. Hearing this, the uncle and his relations thought that I had duped them, ridding myself of Héloïse by making her a nun. So, having bribed my servant, they came upon me by night when I was sleeping, and took on me a vengeance as cruel and irretrievable as it was vile and shameful. Two of the perpetrators were pursued and vengeance taken.

"In the morning the whole town was assembled, crying and lamenting my plight, especially the clerks and students, at which I was afflicted with more shame than I suffered physical pain. I thought of my ruined hopes and glory, and then saw that by God's just judgment I was pun-

ished where I had most sinned, and that Fulbert had justly avenged treachery with treachery. But what a figure I should cut in public! how the world would point its finger at me! I was also confounded at the thought of the Levitical law, according to which I had become an abomination to the Church.¹ In this misery the confusion of shame—I confess it—rather than the ardor of conversion drove me to the cover of the cloister, after she had willingly obeyed my command to take the veil. I became a monk in the Abbey of St. Denis, and she a nun in the Convent of Argenteuil. Many begged her not to set that yoke upon her youth; at which, amid her tears, she broke out in Cornelia's lament: 'O great husband! undeserving of my couch! Has fortune rights over a head so high! Why did I, impious, marry thee to make thee wretched? Accept these penalties, which I gladly pay.'² With these words, she went straight to the altar, received the veil blessed by the bishop, and took the vows before them all."

Abelard's "*Historia Calamitatum*" now turns to troubles having no connection with Héloïse; his difficulties with the monks of St. Denis, with other monks, with every one in fact, except his scholars; his arraignment before the council of Soissons, the public burning of his book, "*De Unitate et Trinitate divina*," and various other troubles, till, seeking a retreat, he constructed an oratory on the bank of the Ardisson. He named it the Paraclete, and there he taught and lectured. He was afterwards elected abbot at a monastery in Brittany, where he discovered that those under him were savage beasts rather than monks. Here the "*Historia Calamitatum*" was written.

The monks of St. Denis had never ceased to hate Abelard for his assertion that their great saint was not really Dionysius the Areopagite who heard Paul preach. Their abbot now brought forward and proved an ancient title to the land where stood the Convent of Argenteuil, "in which," to resume Abelard's account, "she, once my wife, now my sister in Christ, had taken the veil, and was at this time prioress. The nuns were rudely driven out. News of this came to me as a suggestion from the Lord to bethink me of the deserted Paraclete. Going thither, I invited Héloïse and her nuns to come and take possession. They accepted and I gave it to them. Afterward Pope Innocent II. confirmed this grant to them and their successors in perpetuity. There for a time they lived in want; but soon the divine pity showed itself the true Paraclete, and moved the people of the neighborhood to take compassion on

(1) *Lev.*, xxii, 24; *Deut.*, xxiii, 1.

(2) Lucan, *Pharsalia*, viii, 94.

them, and they soon knew no lack. Indeed as women are the weaker sex, their need moves men more readily to pity, and their virtues are the more grateful to both God and man. And on our sister the Lord bestowed such favor in the eyes of all, that the bishops loved her as a daughter, the abbots as a sister, the laity as a mother; and all wondered at her piety, her wisdom, and her gentle patience in everything. She rarely let herself be seen, that she might devote herself more wholly to prayers and meditations in her cell; but all the more persistently people sought her spiritual counsel."

What were those meditations and those prayers uttered or unuttered in that cell? They did not always refer to the Kingdom of Heaven, judging from the abbess's first letter to her former lover. After the installation of Héloïse and her nuns, Abelard rarely visited the Paraclete, although his advice and instruction were desired there. His visits gave rise to too much scandal. In the course of time, however, the "*Historia Calamitatum*" came into the hands of Héloïse, and occasioned this letter, which seems to issue forth out of a long silence; ten years had passed since she became a nun. The superscription is as follows:—

"To her master, rather to a father, to her husband, rather to a brother, his maid or rather daughter, his wife or rather sister, to Abelard, Héloïse.

"Your letter, beloved, written to comfort a friend, chanced recently to reach me. Seeing by its first lines from whom it was, I burned to read it for the love I bear the writer, hoping also from its words to recreate an image of him whose life I have ruined. Those words dropped gall and absinthe as they brought back the unhappy story of our intercourse and thy ceaseless crosses, O my only one. Truly the letter must have convinced the friend that his troubles were light compared with yours, as you showed the treachery and persecutions which had followed you, the calumnies of enemies and the burning of your glorious book, the machinations of false brothers and the vile acts of those worthless monks whom you call your sons. No one could read it with dry eyes. Your perils have renewed my griefs; here we all despair of your life and each day with trembling hearts expect news of your death. In the name of Christ, who so far has somehow preserved thee for Himself, deign with frequent letters to let these weak servants of Him and thee know of the storms overwhelming the swimmer, so that we who alone remain to thee may be participators of thy pain or joy. One who grieves may gain consolation from those grieving with him; a burden borne by many is more lightly borne. And if this tempest abates, how happy shall we be to know it! Whatever the letters may contain they will show at least that we are not forgotten. Has not Seneca said in his letter to Lucilius, that the

letters of an absent friend are sweet?¹ When no malice can stop your giving us this much of you, do not let neglect prove a bar.

“You have written that long letter to console a friend with the story of your own misfortunes, and have thereby roused our grief and added to our desolation. Heal these new wounds. You owe to us a deeper debt of friendship than to him for we are not only friends, but friends the dearest, and your daughters. After God, you alone are the founder of this place, the builder of this oratory and of this congregation. This new plantation for a holy purpose is your own; the delicate plants need frequent watering. He who gives so much to his enemies, should consider his daughters. Or, leaving out the others here, think how this is owing me from thee: what thou owest to all women under vows, thou shalt pay more devotedly to thine only one. How many books have the holy fathers written for holy women, for their exhortation and instruction! I marvel at thy forgetfulness of these frail beginnings of our conversion. Neither respect of God or love of us nor the example of the blessed fathers, has led thee by speech or letter to console me, cast about and consumed with grief. This obligation was the stronger, because the sacrament of marriage joined thee to me, and I—every one sees it—cling to thee with unmeasured love.

“Dearest, thou knowest—who knows not?—how much I lost in thee, and that an infamous act of treachery robbed me of thee and of myself at once. The greater my grief, the greater need of consolation, not from another but from thee, that thou who art alone my cause of grief may be alone my consolation. It is thou alone that canst sadden me or gladden me or comfort me. And thou alone owest this to me, especially since I have done thy will so utterly that, unable to offend thee, I endured to wreck myself at thy command. Nay more than this, love turned to madness and cut itself off from hope of that which alone it sought, when I obediently changed my garb and my heart, too, in order that I might prove thee sole owner of my body as well as of my spirit. God knows, I have ever sought in thee only thyself, desiring simply thee and not what was thine. I asked no matrimonial contract, I looked for no dowry; not my pleasure, not my will, but thine have I striven to fulfill. And if the name of wife seemed holier or more potent, the word mistress (*amica*) was always sweeter to me, or even—be not angry!—concubine or harlot; for the more I lowered myself before thee, the more I hoped

(1) There follows a quotation from Seneca. It was after the manner of the Middle Ages naively to cite an ancient author as authority for what any one might know, and quote a passage showing his approval of views held by the writer. In her epistolary manner Héloïse is of her time.

to gain thy favor, and the less I should hurt the glory of thy renown. This thou didst graciously remember, when condescending to point out in that letter to a friend some of the reasons (but not all!) why I preferred love to wedlock and liberty to a chain. I call God to witness that if Augustus, the master of the world, would honor me with marriage and invest me with equal rule, it would still seem to me dearer and more honorable to be called thy strumpet than his empress. He who is rich and powerful is not the better man: that is a matter of fortune, this of merit. And she is venal who marries a rich man sooner than a poor man, and yearns for a husband's riches rather than for himself. Such a woman deserves pay and not affection. She is not seeking the man but his goods, and would wish, if possible, to prostitute herself to one still richer. Aspasia put this clearly when she was trying to effect a reconciliation between Xenophon and his wife: 'Until you come to think that there is nowhere else a better man or a woman more desirable, you will be continually looking for what you think to be the best, and will wish to be married to a man or woman who is the very best.' This is indeed a holy, rather than a philosophical sentiment, and wisdom, not philosophy, speaks. This is the holy error and blessed deception between man and wife, when affection perfect and unimpaired keeps marriage inviolate, not so much by continency of body as by chastity of mind. But what with other women is an error, is, in my case, the manifest truth: since what they suppose in their husbands, I—and the whole world agrees—know to be in thee. My love for thee is truth, being free from all error. Who among kings or philosophers can vie with your fame? What country, what city does not thirst to see you? Who, I ask, did not hurry to see you appearing in public and crane his neck to catch a last glimpse as you departed? What wife, what maid did not yearn for you absent, and burn when you were present? What queen did not envy me my joys and couch? There were in you two qualities by which you could draw the soul of any woman, the gift of poetry and the gift of singing,—gifts which other philosophers have lacked. As a distraction from labor, you composed love songs both in metre and in rhyme, which for their sweet sentiment and music have been sung and resung and have kept your name in every mouth. Your sweet melodies do not permit even the illiterate to forget you. Because of these gifts women sighed for your love. And, as these songs sung of our loves, they quickly spread my name in many lands, and made me the envy of my sex. What excellence of mind or body did not adorn your youth? No woman, then envious, but would now pity me bereft of such delights. What enemy, even, would not now be softened by the compassion due me?

“I have brought thee evil, thou knowest how innocently. Not the result of the act, but the disposition of the doer makes the crime; justice does not consider what happens, but through what intent it happens. My intent towards thee thou only hast proved and alone canst judge. I commit everything to thy weighing and submit to thy decree.

“Tell me one thing: why, after our conversion, commanded by thee, did I drop into oblivion, to be no more refreshed by speech of thine or letter? Tell me, I say, if you can, or I will say what I feel and what every one suspects: desire rather than friendship drew you to me, lust rather than love. So when desire ceased, whatever you were manifesting for its sake likewise vanished. This, beloved, is not so much my opinion as the opinion of all. Would it were only mine and that thy love might find defenders to argue away my pain. Would that I could invent some reason to excuse you and also cover my cheapness. Listen, I beg, to what I ask, and it will seem small and very easy to you. Since I am cheated of your presence, at least put vows in words, of which you have a store, and so keep before me the sweetness of thine image. I shall vainly expect you to be bountiful in acts if I find you a miser in words. Truly I thought that I merited much from you, when I had done all for your sake and still continue in obedience. When little more than a girl I took the hard vows of a nun, not from piety, but at your command. If I merit nothing from thee, how vain I deem my labor! I can expect no reward from God, as I have done nothing from love of Him. Thee hurrying to God I followed, or rather went before. For, as you remembered how Lot's wife turned back, you first delivered me to God bound with the vow, and then yourself. That single act of distrust, I confess, grieved me and made me blush. God knows, at your command I would have followed or preceded you to fiery places. For my heart is not with me, but with thee; and now more than ever, if not with thee it is nowhere, for it cannot exist without thee. That my heart may be well with thee, see to it, I beg; and it will be well if it finds thee kind, rendering grace for grace,—a little for much. Beloved, would that thy love were less sure of me so that it might be more solicitous; I have made you so secure that you are negligent. Remember all I have done and think what you owe. While I enjoyed carnal joy with you, many people were uncertain whether I acted from love or lust. Now the end makes clear the beginning; I have cut myself off from pleasure to obey thy will. I have kept nothing, save to be more than ever thine. Think how wicked it were in thee where all the more is due to render less, nothing almost; especially when little is asked, and that so easy for you. In the name of God to whom you have vowed yourself, give me that of thee which is

possible, the consolation of a letter. I promise, thus refreshed, to serve God more readily. When of old you would call me to pleasures, you sought me with frequent letters, and never failed with thy songs to keep thy Héloïse on every tongue; the streets, the houses reëchoed me. How much fitter that you should now incite me to God than then to lust? Bethink thee what thou owest; heed what I ask; and a long letter I will conclude with a brief ending; farewell only one!"

Remarks upon this letter would seem to profane a shrine—had the man profaned that shrine? He had not always worshiped there. Héloïse knew this, for all her love. She said it, too, writing in phraseology which had been brutalized through the morbid, denouncing spirit of Latin monasticism. How truly she puts the situation and how clearly she thinks withal, discerning as it were the beautiful and true in love and marriage. The whole letter is well arranged and written in a style showing the writer's training in Latin mediæval rhetoric. It was not the less deeply felt because composed with care and skill. Evidently the writer is of the Middle Ages; her occasional prolixity was not of her sex but of her time; and she quotes the ancients so naturally; what they say should be convincing. How the letter bares the motives of her own conduct; not for God's sake, or the Kingdom of Heaven's sake, but for Abelard's sake she became a nun. She had no inclination thereto; her letters do not indicate that she ever became really and spontaneously devoted to her calling. Abelard was her God, and as her God she held him to the end, though she applied herself to the consideration of religious topics, as we shall see. Moreover, her position as nun and abbess could not fail to force such topics on her consideration.

Is there another such love letter, setting forth a situation so triple-barred and hopeless? And the love which fills the letter, which throbs and burns in it, which speaks and argues in it, how absolute is this love! It is love carried out to its full conclusions; it includes the whole woman and the whole of her life; whatever lies beyond its ken and care is scorned and rejected. This love is extreme in its humility, and yet realizes its own purity and worth; it is grieved at the thought of rousing a feeling baser than itself. Héloïse had been and was still Héloïse, devoted and self-sacrificing in her love. But the situation had become torture; her heart is filled with all manner of pain old and new, till it is driven to assert its right at least to consolation. Thus Héloïse's love becomes insistent and requiring. Was it possibly burdensome to the man who now might wish to think no more of passion? who might wish no longer to be loved in that way? In his reply Abelard does not unveil himself; he seems to take an attitude which may have been

the most faithful expression that he could devise of his changed self.

“To Héloïse, his beloved sister in Christ, Abelard her brother in the Same.” This superscription was a gentle reminder of their present relationship,—in Christ. The writer begins: his not having written since their conversion was to be ascribed not to his negligence, but to his confidence in her wisdom; he did not think that she, who, so full of grace, had consoled her sister nuns when prioress, could as abbess need teaching or exhortation for the guidance of her daughters; but if, in her humility, she felt the need of his instruction in matters pertaining to God, she might write, and he would answer, as the Lord should grant. Thanks be to God who had filled their hearts—hers and her nuns—with solicitude for his perils, and had made them participators in his afflictions; through their prayers the divine pity had protected him. He had hastened to send the Psalter requested by his sister, formerly dear to him in the world and now most dear in Christ, to assist their prayers. The potency of prayer, with God and the saints, and especially the prayer of women for those dear to them, is frequently declared in Scripture: he cites a number of passages to prove it. May these move her to pray for him. He refers with affectionate gratitude to the prayers which the nuns had been offering for him, and encloses a short prayer for his safety which he begs and implores may be used in their daily canonical hours. If the Lord, however, delivers him into the hands of his enemies to kill him, or if he meet his death in any way, he begs that his body may be brought to the Paraclete for burial, so that the sight of his sepulchre may move his daughters and sisters in Christ to pray for him: no place could be so safe and salutary for the soul of one bitterly repenting of his sins as that consecrated to the true Paraclete,—the Comforter; nor could fitter Christian burial be found than among women devoted by their vows to Christ. He begs that the great solicitude which they now have for his bodily safety, they will then have for the salvation of his soul, and by the suffrage of their prayers for the dead man show how they had loved him when alive. The letter closes, not with a personal word to Héloïse, but with this distich:—

*Vive, vale, vivantque tuae valeantque sorores,
Vivite, sed Christo, quaeso, mei memores.*

Thus as against Héloïse's beseeching love, Abelard lifted his hands, palms out, repelling it. His letter ignored all that filled the soul and the letter of Héloïse. His reply did not lack words of spiritual affection, and its tone was not as formal then as it now seems. When Abelard asked

for the prayers of Héloïse and her nuns, he meant it; he desired the efficacy of their prayers. Then he wished to be buried among them. We are touched by this; but, again, Abelard meant it as he said, for his soul's welfare; it was no love sentiment. The letter stirred the heart of Héloïse to a rebellious outcry against the cruelty of God, if not of Abelard,—a soul's cry against life and the calm attitude of one who no longer was—or at least meant to be no longer—what he had been to her.

“To her only one, next to Christ, his only one in Christ.

“I wonder, my only one, that, contrary to epistolary custom and the natural order of things, in the salutation of your letter you have placed me before you, a woman before a man, a wife before a husband, a servant before her lord, a nun before a monk and priest, a deaconess before an abbot. The proper order is for one writing to a superior to put his own name last, but when writing to an inferior, the writer's name should precede. We also marveled, that where you should have afforded us consolation, you added to our desolation, and excited the tears you should have quieted. How could we restrain our tears when reading what you wrote towards the end: ‘If the Lord shall deliver me into the hand of my enemies to slay me!’ Dearest, how couldst thou think or say that? May God never forget his handmaids, to leave them living when you are no more! May He never allot to us that life which would be harder than any death! It is for you to perform our obsequies and commend our souls to God, and send before to God those whom you have gathered for Him—that you may have no further anxiety, and follow us the more gladly because assured of our safety. Refrain, my lord, I beg, from making the miserable most miserable with such words; destroy not our life before we die. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof,—and that day will come to all with bitterness enough. ‘What need,’ says Seneca, ‘to add to evil, and destroy life before death?’

“Thou askest, only one, that, in the event of thy death when absent from us, we should have thy body brought to our cemetery, in order that, being always in our memory, thou shouldst obtain greater benefit from our prayers. Did you think that your memory could slip from us? How could we pray with distracted minds? What use of tongue or reason would be left to us? When the mind is crazed against God it will not placate Him with prayer so much as irritate Him with complaints. We could only weep, pressing to follow rather than bury you. How could we live after we had lost our life in you? The thought of your death is death to us; what would be the actuality? God grant we shall not have to pay those rites to one from whom we look for them; may we go before and not follow! A heart crushed with grief is not calm, nor is a

mind tossed by troubles open to God. Do not, I beg, hinder the divine service to which we are dedicated.

“What remains of hope for me when thou art gone? Or what reason to continue in this pilgrimage, where I have no solace save thee? And of thee I have but the bare knowledge that thou dost live, since thy restoring presence is not granted me. Oh!—if it is right to say it—how cruel has God been to me! Inclement clemency! Fortune has emptied his quiver against me, so that others have nothing to fear! If indeed a single dart were left, no place could be found in me for a new wound. Fortune fears only lest I escape her tortures by death. Wretched and unhappy! in thee I was lifted above all women; in thee am I the more fatally thrown down. What glory did I have in thee! what ruin have I now! Fortune made me the happiest of women that she might make me the most miserable. The injury was the more outrageous in that all ways of right were broken. While we were abandoned to love’s delights, the divine severity spared us. When we made the forbidden lawful and by marriage wiped out fornication’s stains, the Lord’s wrath broke on us, impatient of an unsullied bed when it long had borne with one defiled. A man taken in adultery would have been amply punished by what came to you. What others deserved for adultery, that you got from the marriage which you thought had made amends for everything. Adulteresses bring their paramours what your own wife brought you. Not when we lived for pleasure, but when, separated, we lived in chastity; you presiding at the Paris schools, I at thy command dwelling with the nuns at Argenteuil; you devoted to study, I to prayer and holy reading; it was then that you alone paid the penalty for what we had done together. Alone you bore the punishment, which you deserved less than I. When you had humiliated yourself and elevated me and all my kin, you little merited that punishment either from God or from those traitors. Miserable me, begotten to cause such a crime! O womankind ever the ruin of the noblest men!¹

“Well the Tempter knows how easy is man’s overthrow through a wife. He cast his malice over us, and the man whom he could not throw down through fornication, he tried with marriage, using a good to bring about an evil, where evil means had failed. I thank God at least for this, that the Tempter did not draw me to assent to that which became the cause of the evil deed. Yet, although in this my mind absolves me, too many sins had gone before to leave me guiltless of that crime. For

(1) Héloïse here in mediæval fashion cites a number of examples from Scripture showing the ills and troubles brought by women to men.

long a servant of forbidden joys, I earned the punishment which I now suffer of passed sins. Let the evil end be attributed to ill beginnings! May my penitence be meet for what I have done, and may long remorse in some way compensate for the penalty you suffered! What once you suffered in the body, may I through contrition bear to the end of life, that so I may make satisfaction to thee if not to God. To confess the infirmities of my most wretched soul, I can find no penitence to offer God, whom I never cease to accuse of utter cruelty towards you. Rebellious to His rule, I offend Him with indignation more than I placate Him with penitence. For that cannot be called the sinner's penitence where, whatever be the body's suffering, the mind retains the will to sin and still burns with the same desires. It is easy in confession to accuse one's self of sins, and also to do penance with the body; but hard indeed to turn the heart from the desire of its greatest joys! Love's pleasures, which we knew together, cannot be made displeasing to me nor driven from my memory. Wherever I turn, they press upon me, nor do they spare my dreams. Even in the solemn moments of the mass, when prayer should be the purest, their phantasms catch my soul. When I should groan for what I have done, I sigh for what I have lost. Not only our acts, but times and places stick fast in my mind, and my body quivers. O truly wretched me, fit only to utter this cry of the soul, Wretched that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Would I could add with truth what follows, I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Such thanksgiving, dearest, may be thine, by one bodily ill cured of many tortures of the soul, and God may have been merciful where He seemed against you, like a good physician who does not spare the pain needed to save life. But I am tortured with passion and the fires of memory. They call me chaste, who do not know me a hypocrite. They look upon purity of the flesh as virtue,—which is of the soul, not of the body. Having some praise from men, I merit none from God, who knows the heart. I am called religious at a time when most religion is hypocrisy, and when whoever keeps from offense against human law is praised. Perhaps it seems praiseworthy and acceptable to God, through decent conduct,—whatever the intent,—to avoid scandalizing the Church or causing the Lord's name to be blasphemed or the religious orders discredited. Perhaps it may be of grace just to abstain from evil. But the Scripture says, refrain from evil and do good; and vainly he attempts either who does not act from love of God. God knows that I have always feared to offend thee more than I feared to offend Him; and have

(1) Again she quoted, to prove this, from Job and St. Gregory and Ambrose.

desired to please thee rather than Him. Thy command, not the divine love, put on me this garb of religion. What a wretched life I lead if I vainly endure all this here and am to have no reward hereafter! My hypocrisy has long deceived you, as it has others, and therefore you desire my prayers. Have no such confidence; I need your prayers; do not withdraw their aid. Do not take away the medicine, thinking me whole. Do not cease to think me needy; do not think me strong; do not delay your help. Cease from praising me, I beg. No one versed in medicine will judge of inner disease from outward view. Thy praise is the more perilous because I love it, and desire to please thee always. Be fearful rather than confident regarding me, so that I may have the help of your care. Do not seek to spur me on, by quoting, 'for strength is made perfect in weakness,' or 'he is not crowned unless he have contended lawfully.' I am not looking for the crown of victory; enough for me to escape peril;—safer to shun peril than to wage war! In whatever little corner of Heaven God puts me, that will satisfy me. Hear what Saint Jerome says: 'I confess my weakness; I do not wish to fight for the hope of victory, lest I lose.' Why give up certainties to follow the uncertain?"

This letter gives a view of Héloïse's mind, its strong grasp and its capacity for reasoning, though its reasoning is here distraught with passion. Scathingly, half blinded by her pain, she declares the perversities of Providence, as they glared upon her. Such a disclosure of the woman's mind suggests how broadly based in thought and largely reared was that great love into which her whole soul had been poured, the mind as well as heart. Her love was great, unique, not only from its force of feeling, but from the power and scope of thought by which passion and feeling were carried out so far and fully to the last conclusions of devotion. The letter also shows a woman driven by stress of misery to utter cries and clutch at remedies that her calmer self would have put by. It is not hypocrisy to conceal the desires or imaginings which one would never act upon. To tell these is not true disclosure of one's self, but slander. Torn by pain, Héloïse makes herself more vile and needy than in other moments she knew herself to be. Yet the letter also uncovers her, and in nakedness there is some truth. Doubtless her nun's garb did clothe a hypocrite. Whatever she felt,—and here we see the worst she felt,—before the world she had to act the nun. We shall soon see how she forced herself to act, or be, the nun toward Abelard.

Abelard replied in a letter filled with religious argument and consolation. It was self-controlled, firm, authoritative, and strong in those arguments regarding God's mercy which have stood the test of time. If

they sometimes fail to satisfy the embittered soul, at least they are the best that man has known. And withal, the letter is calmly and nobly affectionate—what place was there for love's protestations? They would have increased the evil, adding fuel to Héloïse's passionate misery.

The master note is struck in the address, "To the spouse of Christ, his servant." The letter seeks to turn Héloïse's thoughts to her nun's calling and her soul's salvation. It divides her expressions of complaint under four heads. First, he had put her name first, because she had become his superior from the moment of her bridal with his Master, Christ. Jerome writing to Eustochium called her Lady, when she had become the spouse of Jerome's Lord. Abelard shows, with citations from the Song of Songs, the glory of the spouse, and how her prayers should be sought by one who was the servant of her Husband. Second, as to the terrors roused in her by his mention of his peril and possible death, he points out that in her first letter she had bidden him write of those perils; if they brought him death, she should deem that a kind release. She should not wish to see his miseries drawn out, even for her sake. Third, he shows that his praise of her was justified even by her disclaimer of merit,—as it is written, who humbles himself shall be exalted. He warns her against false modesty, which may be vanity.

He turns at last to the old and ceaseless plaint which she makes against God for cruelty, when she should rather glorify Him; he had thought that that bitterness had departed, so dangerous for her, so painful to him. If she wished to please him, let her lay it aside; retaining it, she could not please him or advance with him to blessedness; let her have this much religion, not to separate herself from him hastening to God; let her take comfort in their journeying to the same goal. He then shows her that his punishment was just as well as merciful; he had deserved it from God and also from Fulbert. If she will consider, she will see in it God's justice and His mercy; God had saved them from shipwreck; had raised a barrier against shame and lust. For himself the punishment was purification, not privation; will not she, as his inseparable comrade, participate in the working of this grace, even as she shared the guilt and its pardon? Once he had thought of binding her to him in wedlock; but God found a means to turn them both to Him; and the Lord was continuing His mercy towards her, causing her to bring forth spiritual daughters, when otherwise she would only have borne children in the flesh; in her the curse of Eve is turned to the blessing of Mary. God had purified them both; whom God loveth He correcteth. Oh! let her thoughts dwell with the Son of God, seized, dragged, beaten, spit upon, crowned with thorns, hung on a vile cross. Let her think of Him as her spouse, and

for Him let her make lament; He bought her with Himself, He loved her. In comparison with His love, his own (Abelard's) was lust, seeking the pleasure it could get from her. If he, Abelard, had suffered for her, it was not willingly nor for her sake, as Christ had suffered, and for her salvation. Let her weep for Him who made her whole, not for her corrupter; for her Redeemer, not for her defiler; for the Lord who died for her, not for the living servant, himself just freed from the death. Let his sister accept with patience what came to her in mercy from Him who wounded the body to save the soul.

“We are one in Christ, as through marriage we were one flesh. Whatever is thine is not alien to me. Christ is thine, because thou art His spouse. And now thou hast me for a servant, who formerly was thy master,—a servant united to thee by spiritual love. I trust in thy pleading with Him for such defense as my own prayers may not obtain. That nothing may hinder this petition I have composed this prayer, which I send thee: O God, who formed woman from the side of man and didst sanction the sacrament of marriage; who didst bestow upon my frailty a cure for its incontinence; do not despise the prayers of thy handmaid, and the prayers which I pour out for my sins and those of my dear one. Pardon our great crimes, and may the enormity of our faults find the greatness of thy ineffable mercy. Punish the culprits in the present; spare, in the future. Thou hast joined us, Lord, and hast divided us, as it pleased Thee. Now complete most mercifully what Thou hast begun in mercy; and those whom Thou hast divided in this world, join eternally in Heaven, Thou who art our hope, our portion, our expectation, our consolation, Lord blessed forever. Amen.

“Farewell in Christ, spouse of Christ; in Christ farewell and in Christ live. Amen.”

In her next letter Héloïse obeys, and turns her pen if not her thoughts to the topics suggested by Abelard's admonitions. The short, scholastically phrased address cannot be rendered in any modern fashion: *Domino specialiter sua singulariter*.

“That you may have no further reason to call me disobedient, your command shall bridle the words of unrestrained grief; in writing I will moderate my language, which I might be unable to do in speech. Nothing is less in our power than our heart; which compels us to obey more often than it obeys us. When our affections goad us, we cannot keep the sudden impulse from breaking out in words; as it is written, from the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh. So I will withhold my hand from writing whenever I am unable to control my words. Would that the sorrowing heart were as ready to obey as the hand that writes!

"You can afford some remedy to grief, even when unable to dispel it quite. As one nail driven in drives out another, a new thought pushes away its predecessor, and the mind is freed for a time. A thought, moreover, takes the mind up and leads it from others more effectually, if the subject of the thought is excellent and of great importance."

The rest of this long letter shows Héloïse putting her principles in practice. She is forcing her mind to consider and her pen to discourse upon topics which might properly occupy an abbess's thoughts,—topics, moreover, which would satisfy Abelard and call forth long letters in reply. Whether she cared really for these matters or ever came to care for them; or whether she turned to them to distract her mind and keep up some poor makeshift of intercourse with one who would and could no longer be her lover, or whether all these motives mingled, and in what proportion, perhaps may best be left to Him who tries the heart.

The abbess writes: "All of us here, servants of Christ and thy daughters, make two requests of thy fathership which we deem most needful. The one is, that you would instruct us concerning the origins of the order of nuns and the authority for our calling. The other is, that you would draw up a written *regula*, suitable for women, which shall prescribe and set the order and usages of our convent. We do not find any adequate *regula* for women among the works of the holy fathers. It is a manifest defect in monastic institutions that the same rules should be imposed upon both monks and nuns, and that the weaker sex should bear the same monastic yoke as the stronger."

Héloïse, having set this task for Abelard, proceeds to show how the various monastic *regulæ*, from Benedict's downward, fail to make suitable provision for the habits and requirements and weaknesses of women, the *regulæ* hitherto having been concerned with the weaknesses of men. She enters upon matters of clothing and diet, and everything concerning the lives of nuns. She writes as one learned in Scripture and the writings of the fathers and sets the whole matter forth in its details, with admirable understanding of its intricacies. She concludes, reminding Abelard that it is for him in his lifetime to set a *regula* for them to follow forever; after God, he is their founder. They might thereafter have some teacher who would build in alien fashion; such a one might have less care and understanding, and might not be as readily obeyed as himself; it is for him to speak, and they will listen. *Vale*.

The first of Héloïse's letters is a great expression of a great love; in the second, anguish drives the writer's hand; in the third, she has gained self-control; she suppresses her heart, and writes a letter which is discursive and impersonal from the beginning to the little *Vale* at the end.

Abelard returned a long epistle upon the Scriptural origin of the order of nuns, and soon followed it with another, still longer, containing instruction, advice, and rules for the nuns of the Paraclete. He also wrote them a letter upon the study of Scripture. From this time forth he proved his devotion to Héloïse and her nuns by the large body of writings which he composed for their edification. Héloïse sent him a long list of questions upon obscure phrases and knotty points of Scripture, which he answered diligently in detail.¹ He then sent her a collection of hymns written or "rearranged" by himself for the use of the nuns, accompanied by a prefatory letter, "At thy prayers, my sister Héloïse, once dear to me in the world, now most dear in Christ, I have composed what in Greek are called hymns, and in Hebrew *tillim*." He then explains why, yielding to the requests of the nuns, he had written hymns, of which the Church had such a store.

Next he composed for them a large volume of sermons, which he also sent with a letter to Héloïse: "Having completed the book of hymns and sequences, revered in Christ and loved sister Héloïse, I have hastened to compose some sermons for your congregation; I have paid more attention to the meaning than the language. But perhaps an unstudied style is well suited to simple auditors. In composing and arranging these sermons I have followed the order of Church festivals. Farewell in the Lord, servant of His, once dear to me in the world, now most dear in Christ: in the flesh then my wife, now my sister in the spirit and partner in our sacred calling."

At a subsequent period when his opinions were condemned by the Council of Sens, he sent to Héloïse a confession of faith. Shortly afterward his stormy life found a last refuge in the Monastery of Cluny. His closing years (of peace?) are described in a letter to Héloïse from the good and revered abbot, Peter the Venerable. He writes that he had received with joy the letter which her affection had dictated,² and now took the first opportunity to express his recognition of her affection, and his reverence for herself. He refers to her keenly prosecuted studies (so rare for women) before taking the veil, and then to the glorious example of her sage and holy life in the nun's sacred calling,—her victory over the proud Prince of this World. His admiration for her was deep; his expression of it was extreme. A learned, wise, and holy woman could

(1) Héloïse's last *problema* did not relate to Scripture, and may have been suggested by her own life. "We ask whether one can sin in doing what is permitted or commanded by the Lord?" Abelard answers with a discussion of what is permissible between man and wife.

(2) This letter of Héloïse is not extant.

not be praised more ardently than Héloïse is praised by this good man. He had spoken of the advantages his monastery would have derived from her presence, and then continued :—

“ But although God’s providence denied us this, it was granted us to enjoy the presence of him—who was yours—Master Peter Abelard, a man always to be spoken of with honor as a true servant of Christ and a philosopher. The divine dispensation placed him in Cluny for his last years, and through him enriched our monastery with treasure richer than gold. No brief writing could do justice to his holy, humble, and devoted life among us. I have not seen his equal in humility of garb and manner. When in the crowd of our brethren I forced him to take a first place, in meanness of clothing he appeared as the last of all. Often I marveled, as the monks walked past me, to see a man so great and famous thus despise and abase himself. He was abstemious in food and drink, refusing and condemning everything beyond the bare necessities. He was assiduous in study, frequent in prayer, always silent unless compelled to answer the question of some brother or expound sacred themes before us. He partook of the sacrament as often as possible. Truly his mind, his tongue, his act, taught and exemplified religion, philosophy, and learning. So he dwelt with us, a man simple and righteous, fearing God, turning from evil, consecrating to God the latter days of his life. At last, because of his bodily infirmities I sent him to a quiet and salubrious retreat on the banks of the Saône. There he bent over his books, as long as his strength lasted, always praying, reading, writing, or dictating. In these sacred exercises, not sleeping but watching, he was found by the heavenly Visitor, who summoned him to the eternal wedding feast, not as a foolish, but as a wise virgin, bearing his lamp filled with oil,—the consciousness of a holy life. When he came to pay humanity’s last debt, his illness was brief. With holy devotion he made confession of the Catholic faith, then of his sins. The brothers who were with him can testify how devoutly he received the viaticum of that last journey, and with what fervent faith he commended his body and soul to his Redeemer. Thus this Master Peter completed his days. He who was known throughout the world by the fame of his teaching, entered the school of Him who said, ‘ Learn of me for I am meek and lowly in heart ’; and continuing meek and lowly he passed to Him, as we may believe.

“ Venerable and dearest sister in the Lord, the man who was once joined to thee in the flesh, and then by the stronger chain of divine love, him in thy stead, or as another thee, the Lord holds in His bosom ; and at the day of His coming, His grace will restore him to thee.”

The abbot afterwards visited the Paraclete, and on returning to Cluny received this letter from the abbess: "God's mercy visiting us, we have been visited by the favor of your graciousness. We are glad, kindest father, and we glory that your greatness condescended to our insignificance. A visit from you is an honor even to the great. The others may know the great benefit they received from the presence of your highness. I cannot tell in words or even comprehend in thought, how beneficial and how sweet your coming was to me. You, our abbot and our lord, celebrated mass with us the sixteenth of the Calends of last December; you commended us to the Holy Spirit; you nourished us with the Divine Word;—you gave us the body of the Master, and confirmed that gift from Cluny. To me also, unworthy to be your servant, though by word and letter you have called me sister, you gave as a pledge of sincere love the privilege of a Tricenarium, to be performed by the brethren of Cluny, after my death, for the benefit of my soul. You have promised to confirm this under your seal. May you fulfil this, my lord. Might it please you also to send to me that other sealed roll, containing the absolution of the master, that I may hang it on his tomb. Remember also, for the love of God, our—and your—Astralabius, to obtain for him a prebend from the bishop of Paris or another. Farewell. May God preserve you, and grant to us sometime your presence."

The good abbot replied with a kind and affectionate letter, confirming his gift of the Tricenarium, promising to do all he could for Astralabius, and sending with his letter the record of Abelard's absolution, as follows: "I, Peter, Abbot of Cluny, who received Peter Abelard to be a monk in Cluny, and granted his body, secretly transported, to the Abbess Héloïse and the nuns of the Paraclete, absolve him, in the performance of my office (*pro officio*), by the authority of the omnipotent God and all the saints, from all his sins."

Abelard died in the year 1142, aged sixty-three. Twenty-one years afterward Héloïse died at the same age, and was buried in the same tomb with him at the Paraclete:—

Hoc tumulo abbatissa jacet prudens Heloissa.

THE NATIVE STATES OF INDIA

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THE military successes and the deeds of heroism by which British dominion has been won and held in India, have attracted popular attention at the expense of greater achievements in the field of policy or administration, and yet the peaceful and progressive government of an empire is a more difficult task than its acquisition by force of arms. To the statesman, as well as to the student of history, the victories of peace are more instructive than the shock and destruction of armies on the battlefield. A Western nation directly governs two hundred and thirty millions of Indians, not because its arms triumphed on the plains of India, but because its rule is acceptable to the mass of its Eastern subjects. The abiding strength of British dominion is shown in organizing victory over famines, in teaching fanatical races to respect law and value public tranquility, in adapting European civilization to Asiatic customs, and above all in demonstrating that a foreign ruler is as willing to respect the rights of others as he is capable of maintaining his own. The power of self-restraint and the ability to preserve are of more value than the extension of empire and the overthrow of rivals. And so it happens that the British protectorate over native states and sixty-four millions of their subjects is viewed as a triumph of British administration. It was regarded at one time as an impossible feat. The obstacles to success seemed overwhelming, and one policy after another was tried and discarded. The accepted text-books of international or of constitutional law threw no light on the problem. But somehow the difficulties have been met, and a *modus vivendi* between a paramount power and seven hundred semi-sovereign princes has been established. How this result has been accomplished we shall now attempt to explain.

It is easy to think lightly of an accomplished fact. A century ago a general impression prevailed that the East India Company's sovereignty was incompatible with the existence of the "country principalities." Parliament moved by the splendid eloquence of Burke had in vain declared, in 1793, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honor, and the policy of this nation." The irresistible tide of annexation and conquest submerged one state after another in the nineteenth century. The Carnatic

and the Delhi territory were the first to sink beneath the flood. The Bombay presidency passed from the Peshwa, and other Maratha potentates, to the Company between 1817 and 1819. The great province of Burma was acquired by instalments in 1826, 1852, and 1885 after contests which the government of India had tried to avoid. Lord Hardinge and Lord Dalhousie reluctantly put in their sickles after the Sikh Wars, and reaped the Panjab. Sind was conquered in 1843, and Satara, Nagpur, and Oudh were annexed either under the doctrine of lapse or by forfeiture between 1849 and 1856. Many smaller states and districts have been drawn into the vortex; and yet the fact remains that, in the twentieth century, more than one third of the whole area of India remains under native rule, to contradict the fears of an earlier generation and to show that the British government equally desires to live and to let live.

The wonder is not that so many native principalities have ceased to exist, but that so many have survived the provocations which they have given, and the temptations which they have offered to their stronger neighbor. The annexation of the Panjab would have been justified by the events of the first Sikh War. After the rebellion of 1848, the murder of British officers at Multan, and the four great battles of the second Sikh War, in which Sher Sing and the whole Sikh nation, with their allies, the Afghans, defied the British in the country between the Jhelam and the Chenab, the restoration of a native state on the northwestern frontier would have been an act of political insanity. Annexation was forced upon the British government. So, too, with Burma, the arrogance of its native ruler and the risk of foreign intervention left no other alternative. The geographical position of Sind made it necessary to secure the defence of India by taking its administration into imperial hands; and although different considerations led to the acquisition of the other states mentioned, exceptional causes, bound up with the safety of British rule, produced similar results which were thought to be inevitable. But in many other cases the East India Company and its successors have been true to their policy of maintaining the rights of others. The rich state of Mysore, with its healthy climate, its rich gold mines, its valuable forests, and its annual revenue of one million and a quarter sterling was under British administration for nearly half a century. Its annexation had been decided upon, when at the last moment wiser counsels prevailed, and it was restored to its Hindu dynasty and an adopted heir was recognized. Gwalior in Central India provoked retaliation when in 1843 its rebellious armies were routed at Panniar and Maharajpur, and again in 1857 when its contingent joined the forces of rebellion in the Mutiny. But in the first case its Maharaja's infancy, and in the Mutiny his per-

sonal loyalty, weighed in the balance against the offences of his armed forces. The Gaekwar who ruled the wealthy state of Baroda, a veritable Naboth's vineyard, committed the gravest offences against the British government, and he was found guilty of an attempt to poison its representative. By right his disloyalty and breach of engagements might have been punished by the annexation of his state in 1875. But a distant relative was searched for, and discovered in humble circumstances, from which he was raised to the dignity of a sovereign. By these and other instances the British government has proved the sincerity of its professed desire to perpetuate the families of those chiefs whom it found established, notwithstanding flaws in their titles, as rulers of principalities when the decay of the Mahomedan Empire of Delhi left Indian provinces at the mercy of the strongest sword.

The risks to which native rule in India must be exposed are numerous. Mere greed, or territorial hunger, is the least of them. Yet a glance at the resources and position of the leading states shows that an unscrupulous paramount power would have derived considerable advantage from their annexation. Kashmir, for instance, offered peculiar temptations from its climate so suitable for European colonization, and its attractive scenery and capacities. The Berars blocked the direct line of communication between Bombay and Bengal, and their fertility was notorious. It is true that by treaty they are administered for their sovereign by British agents, but this arrangement entails expense, and it does not alter the fact that the Berars are not part of British India. When the opium revenue was a sheet anchor of Indian finance, the chiefs of Central India grew the poppy and encouraged smuggling, but the loss was endured in order to maintain the rights of the states. The whole presidency of Bombay is sprinkled with patches and outlying villages of native territory, causing difficulties of extradition and of break of jurisdictional gauge to the British districts that surround them. The cost and friction of this foreign element are tolerated in order that annexation may be avoided. The currencies of neighboring states, the passage through several jurisdictions of imperial lines of railway and postal communications, and the facilities afforded to smugglers, robbers, and fugitive offenders by different systems of law, and by the inefficient police arrangements of native rulers, are some of the annoyances which the British government endures in order to preserve the country principalities. If the map of British India had been drawn with the most elementary regard for the interests of British administration, the present patchwork of native states, and their retention of many positions of high strategic and commercial importance would have been condemned.

The engineers who construct canals upon which the food supplies of millions of British subjects depend have to content themselves with inferior catchment areas or an indifferent alignment, in order to avoid encroachment upon the territories of a neighboring chief. The rainfall of a British district is injuriously affected by the wholesale denudation of the hillsides whose forests happen to lie in a native state. A law is introduced into British India forbidding some inhuman rite such as infanticide or suttee or the marriage of immature infants. The old order of things continues on the other side of a mere political line which marks the frontier of British India, and straightway the law is rendered inoperative, or at least it is frequently evaded. The evil does not end there. A persistent irritation is kept up in the public mind by the maintenance in a native state of practices consonant with Asiatic traditions and feelings which are forbidden by the laws of a Western power in the adjoining tracts of country. The antithesis between the East and the West, and between a Hindu and a British code of laws is thus emphasized, and the political agitator finds a convenient text for his disloyal purposes. If all the native states were massed together in one quarter of India, these and similar inconveniences might prove of less practical importance. But there are nearly seven hundred separate states, or jurisdictions, scattered broadcast over the Empire, and the problem of preserving harmonious intercourse with them, and yet of avoiding undue interference in their internal administration, is one of grave difficulty. No native government that preceded the British left them an example to follow. By the King of Lahore, Ranjit Singh, or by the Emperors of Delhi the simple plan of annexation was adopted. If the British government has discovered a more excellent way, it has not done so without changes of policy and many experiments. Its attempts have not always been successful, and the future may bring modifications of its policy. At this stage we may examine its general attitude towards the native principalities, and look back upon the three different lines of action which it adopted in the last century.

The point of view from which the suzerain British power regards the country principalities is a matter of more than academic importance. By what tie are the states held in their place in the political system of India? Strictly speaking they have no international life. They cannot make wars, they may not negotiate with foreign nations nor even with each other, they can receive no foreign consuls, and their armed forces are limited in numbers and equipment by the superior commands of a powerful neighbor. On the other hand, they are not parts of the constitution of British India in the sense that the sovereign United States of America are parts

of a confederacy. There is no Indian congress in which their general interests are represented by the delegates of the whole body politic. There is no legislative power that can enact laws to bind them all. There is no supreme court in which the judicial power of all the states and of the British government is vested for any common purposes. Nor would the states themselves, with their sharp-cut differences of religion and social habits, tolerate the intervention of a single executive or of one judicial authority in their internal affairs.

If, then, the tie is neither international nor constitutional, how is it to be regarded? The position is one more akin to international than to constitutional semi-sovereignty. The contempt which Austin poured on the phrase "semi-sovereignty," as being an unknown political mongrel, was too strong for practical purposes. The phrase represents facts which exist, and is not repugnant to common sense or reason. No doubt, to international law a state is sovereign which demeans itself as independent, and the native states in their foreign relations are wholly dependent upon the British government. But, on the other hand, sovereignty indicates a set of separate powers and privileges. The rights which form part of the aggregate are specifically named by writers who distinguish them as the right to make war or peace, the right to negotiate, the right to legislate, the right to administer justice, the right to issue coinage, and so forth. A sovereign who possesses the whole of these rights is independent. But there is nothing in international law, or there is nothing in constitutional law, to prevent some of these rights being lodged with one possessor and some with another. Sovereignty is, in fact, despite the dictum of Austin, divisible. In India the aggregate of rights which make up a complete sovereignty, or independence, are divided between the British government and the states. Some states enjoy a very large measure of sovereignty, while others are under more or less of subjection according to their engagements, or according to usage and the hard logic of facts. It is here that the value to the states of an international conception of their rights comes into view. If international ideas are applied by the suzerain power to its intercourse with the country princes, then a limit is at once placed upon its encroachments. The states must be approached gently by agreement or consent, if they are to be required to part with the rights that fall within their recognized share of sovereignty. If they will not give way, and the suzerain is compelled by self-preservation to force upon them his own will, he feels all the responsibility of committing an act of war, although his superior power may make an actual recourse to arms unnecessary. But at least the suzerain is bound to justify his aggression at the bar of civilized opinion, by those appeals to

reason and to his own national rights which he would have to employ in the field of international politics. The interference demands on the aggressor's part a public vindication; and thus it is that on the rare occasions when the government of India forces a native state to give way within the sphere of its semi-sovereign powers, it appeals to the public conscience by proclaiming the reasons for its exceptional action. Constitutional action needs no such enlistment of moral support. Its ever constant pressure resembles that of the movement of a glacier. Its progress in this or that direction is no affair of its neighbors. In removing this or that privilege, the constitution acts under domestic laws or regulations which it can pass without any breach of international law or comity. So long, however, as the British government regards even the smallest of native states as foreign territory, and as entitled to some of the attributes of sovereignty, it imposes upon itself and upon those who press for reforms a large measure of restraint. No doubt some strain is put upon the use commonly attached to the phrases "international" and "sovereignty." The native states are sovereignties in a specialized sense. They are limited sovereignties. But the mental associations which cling to these terms of international law offer a substantial defence to the country princes against the pressure of external influences, and against undue encroachments of the suzerain power. It is, therefore, an advantage to the native states that they should be regarded as semi-sovereignties rather than as constitutional units of the Indian Empire, entitled to appeal to those principles of justice which usually regulate the mutual relations of nations, so far at least as such principles can apply to protected and dependent states.

The tendency of British policy has been to drag at the international moorings of the Indian states, but the drag has been felt and it has saved them from shipwreck. There was a time when the relations of the Indian princes with the Company were entirely regulated by those rules of conduct which were generally regarded as consistent with the just dealings of one independent nation with another. The Company approached the country princes as its equals. The very phrases used by the contracting parties were identical. Saraj-ad-daula ratified his treaty of 1757 "in the presence of God and the prophet," while Clive gave a solemn declaration "in the presence of God and our Saviour." Treaties were described as "treaties of alliance," and the native princes were called "Kings" and even monarchs, and their families were honored with royal titles. War was declared with all the formalities of international law, and peace was concluded in equally approved fashion. Even when a conquered country was practically annexed, the Nabob, or the Peshwa,

as the case might be, signed an agreement for the transfer of his "full sovereignty." Until the close of Lord Minto's rule the term "independence" constantly recurred in the transactions of the Company with its independent allies.

This period of international equality lasted until 1813, but by that date the Company had realized that the Indian princes had no conception of the principles of good faith, without which mutual relations could not be conducted according to natural justice or to international or any other law. Engagements were no more binding upon the native chiefs than ropes of sand. The Company had tried its best to live within a ring fence, and to avoid any entangling alliances or contracts with powers which treated their agreements as holding only one party to the bargain. The Pindari Wars and the contests of the native princes with each other at last compelled the Company to undertake a general settlement of the political map of India. Accordingly, new phrases were introduced by the Marquis of Hastings and his successors, to mark a change in the relations between the native sovereigns and their neighbor. The alliances were qualified by the word "subordinate," and even "alliance" soon gave place to "coöperation." The British power became paramount or suzerain. In most cases it expressly guaranteed the states from "any sort of interference in their internal affairs," but it took from them the entire conduct of their external relations, and restricted their armaments. Left to themselves, and freed from all fear of foreign attack, the rulers of some states insisted upon the divine right of governing their subjects just as they pleased. Misrule became so scandalous that at times the Company interfered to bind the chief by a specific engagement to rule with justice and mercy. But while he accepted the treaty obligation, he did nothing to redeem his pledge. The Company on its part took no steps to reform the internal administration. Thus the King of Oudh undertook to reform abuses, and his attention was repeatedly and without effect called to his engagement. At last patience was exhausted, and his territory was annexed, because he had failed by his own efforts to perform his contract. It was this recurring experience of the hopeless task of securing good government from the Indian princes which induced the Company to profit by the doctrine of lapse or escheat, and to annex certain states such as Satara, Nagpur, and Mandavi on the failure of heirs to the ruling chief. The interests of the subjects of the native states demanded reform. The British government, which suppressed rebellion, had bound itself by treaty not to interfere in the internal administration of its protected neighbors. If it called upon the native sovereign, in return for the protection given to him, to rule with moderation and justice, he ignored the

advice and continued in the well-trodden path of Asiatic oppression. To meet the difficulty, two courses were open to the suzerain power. It could try the effect of imposing a new obligation on the chief, binding him to improve his methods. If he failed, then it was in the spirit of international law to punish his breach of engagement by withdrawing support, and by suppressing the state. Or the paramount power might bide its time, and take the opportunity of a failure of heirs to claim its reversionary rights, and by annexing the state as its lawful heritage, to confer upon its subjects the benefits of a better administration. But either of these processes put an end to native rule, whereas the declared object of British policy was to preserve and to improve that rule. Yet improvement was impossible, unless the paramount power interfered to do the work by its own agents, and it could not take that step without a breach of its undertaking "not to interfere in the internal affairs" of its allies.

From this dilemma the Mutiny and the transfer of the Indian Empire to the crown set all parties free. After 1857 there was no question as to the suzerainty of the crown of England, and the chiefs of native states came under the protection of the Queen of the United Kingdom. The title which she adopted of "Empress of India" tardily recognized a change, which had already followed the grant of the right of adoption bestowed by Lord Canning. The days of lapse and escheat had passed by, thenceforth the representation of the houses of ruling chiefs would be continued, "so long as your house is loyal to the Crown, and faithful to the conditions of the treaties, grants, and engagements which record its obligations to the British government." The chiefs should be protected even from their own misdeeds, and the suzerain power became the sole judge of the means it would adopt. It would depose a hopelessly bad ruler in order to perpetuate his house, giving his state to another member of the ruling family; or it would send its own officers into the state to rule it in the nominal sovereign's name and by virtue of his tacit authority. The states should be preserved whether they willed it or no, and they should be made worthy of preservation. Such a policy entailed dangers of its own, for it might easily lead to veiled annexation, and to such constant interference in the internal administrations as to deprive the chiefs of India of all real control. That it has not produced these results is due to the restraining influence of the international aspect of the position of the states, and to the care taken in removing dangers of collision, and in differentiating the obligations of the protected princes. While certain duties are imposed upon them, there are many matters in which their sovereign powers are respected, and their coöperation only secured by their voluntary agreement.

The duties imposed upon the native chiefs are for the most part such as free nations would willingly accept. Obviously it is to their interests that their foreign affairs should be undertaken by the suzerain power. The British government secures for them the benefit of commercial treaties, it protects their subjects abroad, it undertakes the management of all their external relations both with foreign governments and with the neighboring native states in India. The same government provides for their common defence, and preserves the public tranquility of the whole empire of which they are a part. It has, therefore, the right to expect aid from them in time of war, to occupy in times of peace any positions needed for defence, to canton its troops in their territories and purchase there the necessary supplies for them, and to exercise an imperial control over imperial means of communication by railroad or by telegraph. It may impose reasonable restrictions on the strength and armaments of the military forces of the states, because overgrown local armies are a danger, not merely to their neighbors, but also to the chiefs themselves. Since its object is to preserve the integrity of the states, the suzerain must settle disputed successions, prevent the dismemberment or partition of their territories, and interfere to suppress disturbances if their rulers are unable to do so. But in the latter case the British government will not intervene without a free hand. Inquiry then follows repression, and the removal of substantial causes of complaint is insisted upon. If gross misrule has provoked rebellion, the suzerain power, which upholds the native principality, cannot divest itself of the responsibility for further action. It cannot consent to be the indirect instrument of oppression. At the same time it is careful to introduce the necessary changes of system in the name of the chief and by his authority.

The intrusion of British jurisdiction into a sovereign state is not unknown to international law. Under *capitulations* European powers exercise authority over their own subjects, and in matters concerning them, in the territories of foreign nations. Consular jurisdiction is thus recognized in the Turkish, Persian, and various African states. In Indian native states also the British government provides a just trial for its own subjects, and for those of foreign nations. By doing so it avoids the necessity for a larger interference in the imperfect systems of criminal justice which still exist in many of the protected principalities. If an American should by chance be charged with a crime committed in Hyderabad, the United States would rightly insist upon his trial according to the same principles of law that a British subject could claim. The Nizam is therefore expected to hand over the accused to a court presided

over by a British judge. By doing so his highness avoids all risk of foreign complications.

The instances just given illustrate the class of obligations imposed generally upon all native states. But there are many petty chiefships in India consisting merely of a number of villages, which are not included in British India, but are ruled by impoverished and illiterate chieftains. In them the British government exercises occasionally full jurisdiction, and always some degree of appellate jurisdiction, not merely over British subjects, but also over the subjects of the chieftains. That these patches of foreign territory have not been brought under British laws is a strong proof of the desire of the paramount power to preserve the rights of others. The usual method adopted is to group such estates together, and to appoint a magistrate or other official to administer them for the chieftains to whom they belong. The authority for the exercise of such powers rests upon the foreign jurisdiction vested in the executive government of India. The legislature of British India has no power to make laws for people who are not British Indian subjects. The governor-general in council accordingly declares that certain laws and a certain procedure will be followed, and annexation is avoided. If at any future date the chieftain of these small estates should be fit to exercise authority therein, the transfer to him of the necessary powers would be easily affected. Meanwhile, the suzerain steps in, and secures justice for the subjects of its protected and subordinate ally.

At times an abnormal act of interference is forced upon the suzerain power. When the Manipur officials murdered a British commissioner, when the King of Delhi instigated mutiny, or when native chiefs have from time to time tortured one of their subjects, or committed murder either on British soil or within their states, the British government has not hesitated to try and punish the offenders. Such occurrences are acts of state, and lie outside the rules or usages of Indian interstate practice. They are not justified by any appeal to legal or international phrases. For these extraordinary cases the British government usually provides a special tribunal, and after considering its finding it proceeds to pass sentence. It is, however, noteworthy that even in the Manipur trial, when the native state authorities murdered the representative of the Indian government in 1891 and attacked his escort, the paramount power justified its action by a public announcement to the people of Manipur of its reasons and its proceedings. It derived no territorial or pecuniary advantage from its interference, and the state still exists. But the occasion was taken to assert the undoubted right of the government of India to recognize any succession to a native state, to suppress rebellion, and to remove

by its administrative orders any person whose presence in a protected state might be found to be dangerous to the public peace. For waging war against the British imperial crown of India and for abetting the murder of British agents sent to carry out its orders, the parties who had committed or abetted those offences were sentenced to death or transportation.

Outside the sphere of the interstatal duties which have been described, there are numerous directions in which British interests or the general welfare of India can be promoted by the friendly coöperation of the protected states. But here the paramount power proceeds by consent and voluntary agreement with its allies. It claims no right to abolish long established mints working under the control of the chiefs in their capital cities, although it desires to see a uniform currency in India. It does not authoritatively insist on the abolition of transit duties or attempt to regulate commerce among the several states. It demands no uniformity in the law of bankruptcy, in the standard of weights and measures, in copyright, or in the credit to be given to its own judicial proceedings. Anxious as it is for religious toleration, and for the extension of personal freedom and justice, it relies upon example and advice, in order to obtain the willing assent of the chiefs to the adoption of those measures of general welfare and of the blessings of peace for which the constitution of the United States provides by its articles. The dividing line between obligations and matters of consent may vary between one state and another, but it is clearly understood by the protecting and the protected state.

When we come to a calculation of the relative advantages of the connection to the British government and the native states, it is no easy task to decide on which side the larger profit lies. The chiefs obtain protection by land and sea, the benefits of British commerce, railways, and canals, and the assurance of a peaceful succession on their deaths. Their subjects are admitted into British schools and colleges, into hospitals, famine relief camps, and even into the public services of British India. British enterprise and capital overflow into the gold mines of Mysore, the cotton fields of Kathiawar, and the silk industry of Kashmir. The native princes contribute nothing in return for these solid advantages, for such tributes as they pay are small and are generally due in return for some special service rendered to them. On the other hand, the very existence of the native states is a striking object lesson of British good faith and of its desire to maintain the rights of others. A comparison between their moral and material progress and the condition of the British provinces is the best answer to disparaging remarks on foreign rule. By common consent the states which are the most prosperous and the best governed are those which, like Mysore, have enjoyed the benefit of British admin

istration during a long minority or for other reasons. Those which have remained continuously under native administration exhibit neither in growth of population nor in wealth nor in the standard of living that material advance which is conspicuous in the British districts adjoining them. Above all there is not a sign that their rulers are ready to adopt in native territory those organic changes in administration which platform orators advocate for introduction into British India. It is true that the state of Mysore has a "representative assembly," which sounds like representative government. But this assembly has no power to vote supplies, to spend money, or even to make a single law. It cannot meet to act or to pass a resolution. Once a year it is invited to spend a week at the capital of the state where it hears a report on the administration, and its members ask questions within a limited range and receive even more limited replies. Its energy is exhausted in the selection of its members, and in listening once a year to the minister's report of his administration. Shrewd observers are not misled by appearances, and the autocratic rule of the Indian princes, who for the most part make their laws by a stroke of the pen and frequently interfere in the exercise of justice, is the best measure of the liberality with which rights and free privileges have been conferred upon British subjects. In the same way the loyalty of the ruling chiefs and their public testimony to the just treatment which they have received are assets of great value to the paramount power. The parrot cries of the disloyal section of the native press find no echo in the palaces of the chiefs, or in the printing houses within their territories. There is hardly one state in which a free press is tolerated, and if any excitement is raised in British India when a disloyal or seditious writer is prosecuted, the chiefs of the states and their people smile at it. Thus, public opinion in the country principalities, as well as the feelings of their rulers, are usually found on the side of the British government.

No doubt progress is slow in the native states, and in many of them justice is uncertain, and the system of taxation is somewhat oppressive. But there is a marked improvement, and a growing sense of the responsibilities of power and of the duties which a sovereign owes to his subjects. Improved communications and the employment of officials trained in the service of the government of India have greatly modified the old order and customs of native rule. The chiefs are partners in empire, royal instruments of imperial power, and feeling confidence in the good faith of their protectors, they are becoming more and more willing to join hands in common schemes of advancement. It is to their interest that the chain which connects them with the paramount power should be tight

enough to give them strength and vitality, while leaving them scope to develop their own systems of government in their own ways. Upon those conditions the anticipations of Lord Canning, recorded in 1860, will be fully justified,—“the safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of native chiefs well affected to us.”

THE ELECTIVE SYSTEM

HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED

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AS we look back over the intellectual history of our era, we can hardly fail to reach the conclusion that we are in the midst of the third of the great and fundamental revolutions which have overtaken higher education during the past two thousand years. If this be true, it will not prove a waste of time to consider the changes which are going on about us, from a purely historical standpoint, without regard to their expediency, in the same disengaged spirit with which we might view the educational programme of Abelard, Petrarch, or Luther. Only in this way can we hope to discover the exact nature of the present crisis. We are quite naturally disposed to look upon all educational changes as voluntary and to discuss their expediency as the sole reason for their adoption or rejection. Yet a careful scrutiny of the tendencies in the great world outside of our educational institutions may convince us that in some cases we are advancing subtle pedagogical reasons for accepting, or refusing to accept, proposed changes which are in reality being forced upon us by circumstances over which we have no control. We may, in short, be engaged in painfully justifying our submission to the inevitable.

This paper is an attempt to discover if possible the line of demarcation between the inevitable in educational reform, which it is vain to oppose, and the optional, upon which we should centre our attention and our criticism. In order to make quite plain the spirit in which I suggest that we deal with present exigencies, I venture to recall two earlier revolutions and compare them with that through which we are now passing.

The first of those was that which took place at the end of the twelfth century when the earliest of the European universities were being organized. We can discover at that time little or no tendency to revive the educational system which prevailed under the later Roman Empire. To Abelard, the most popular and influential teacher of his time, the sophist appeared quite as complete an anachronism as he does to us. Dialectic, not rhetoric,—sound deductive reasoning, not fair speech, he declared to lie at the foundation of education. “The chief key to wisdom,” he held to be “an industrious, persistent questioning.” In accordance with this idea, he prepared his famous text-book, “Yea and Nay,” a convenient manual of the apparent contradictions which may be found in the

writings of the Fathers, with some general rules to be observed in seeking to reconcile them. This educational ideal was destined to prevail for several centuries.

We are so ill-instructed in regard to the twelfth century that it is impossible to determine just what opposition the developing system met from those with different views on the subject of education. Certainly John of Salisbury cordially denounced it, and there are various indications that for a time a more humanistic tendency prevailed here and there, but not for long. In the thirteenth century Roger Bacon and others deprecated the exclusive attention to Aristotle, and attacked the prevalent methods in the universities on the ground that they could lead to no real scientific truth.

As we read the protests of John of Salisbury and of Roger Bacon against the current educational methods, we feel their force and are amazed at the insight of those who could free themselves from the prejudices of their age, and so clearly perceive its deficiencies; but at the same time we realize perfectly that their arguments must, under the existing conditions, have fallen upon deaf ears. Few would listen to them, if for no other reason, because mankind was still too intent upon collating the theological, philosophical, and scientific heritage of Greece and Rome to realize that there was anything else worth attending to. This heritage had reached them in scattered and broken bits which it required the utmost skill to patch together, and the sharpened wits of the logician could alone cope with the problem. The inheritance was, moreover, so great that there appeared to be no need for new knowledge; it only seemed necessary to prove and sort what was already known.

Two centuries after Abelard's death we find the beginnings of a successful protest against the system of education which he had made popular in the twelfth century. To Petrarch, and the large class of educated men who recognized him as their guide, logic no longer appeared to be the secret of progress, but only one of the useful disciplines of the schoolboy. "There is no more unseemly spectacle," he testily declares, "than a person of mature years devoting himself to dialectics." Aristotle's encyclopædic knowledge failed to fascinate him as it had fascinated the leading spirits of the previous century. The poets and the Latin moralists and men of letters absorbed his attention. He believed that death could not find him more worthily occupied than in the study of the literature of the ancients, and in the attempt to preserve it for the benefit of coming generations. Before the end of Petrarch's century a Greek professorship had been established by the city of Florence, and soon Chrysoloras published his Greek grammar for Western students.

We have no time to trace the manner in which the older plan of Abelard was gradually supplanted in the universities by a new plan which gave to the languages and literatures of Greece and Rome the place of honor. One thing, however, is clear. As we consider the period during which the change took place, it is evident that the revolution was due to general causes which made it appropriate, natural, and inevitable. It was not the result of any abstract theory of the superior educational value of the classics, and no single man or institution can claim the credit of forcing the new plan upon the world. The unrivalled influence of even such highly endowed and influential men as Petrarch and Erasmus sinks into utter insignificance, as we watch the majestic course of the *Zeitgeist* moulding men's minds and altering their tastes, so that what once they esteemed as essential they came to regard as futile and absurd.

Let us now review the changes which have taken place in our own colleges during the past generation, and which are quite as fundamental as those recorded in any previous revolution. Our present business is not to consider their propriety or theoretical expediency, but simply their nature and causes, from which we may, I think, make certain useful deductions.

Thirty-five years ago all of our colleges, so far as I am aware, with the notable exception of the University of Virginia and of Harvard, adhered to a fixed curriculum, in which Latin, Greek, and mathematics were far more carefully studied than any other subjects. In the senior year classics were generally dropped and most of the known sciences were flashed before the bewildered eyes of the student for at least a term. To take a single example, we find that in Princeton, in 1850, the second term of the junior year included, in addition to Latin, Greek, and mathematics, mechanics, natural theology, civil architecture, and botany. In the senior year we find logic, philosophy of mind, natural philosophy, astronomy, chemistry, Aristotle's "Art of Poetry," moral philosophy, constitutional law, mineralogy, geology, and zoölogy. To the most of these subjects but a half year was given. This is a characteristic programme, although the subjects selected varied somewhat in the different institutions.

Perhaps the actual trend of affairs which resulted in the decay of this system is best illustrated by Harvard, for the revolution there was more gradual than elsewhere. In the first catalogue which I have been able to examine, that of 1825, a humble, tract-like brochure offering a striking contrast to the stout octavo volume of about eight hundred pages which the University now issues yearly, the scheme of study was the conventional one. We find the juniors studying, in addition to their classics, Paley's "Moral

Philosophy," Hebrew, chemistry, logic, electricity, and magnetism. The seniors were required to take intellectual philosophy, optics, astronomy, natural philosophy, Paley's "Evidences," Butler's "Analogy," Say's "Political Economy," chemistry, mineralogy, geology, philosophy, and natural history. It is noteworthy, however, that a few options were given to juniors and seniors. The junior might substitute mathematics or an ancient or modern language for a term of Hebrew; he could also substitute a modern language for differential calculus. A senior might choose an ancient or modern language instead of chemistry, mineralogy, or geology.

In 1833 we find that a modern language was required in the sophomore, junior, and senior years. Ten years after, a portion of the work above the freshman year becomes elective, including Greek and Latin. It was not yet, however, the student, but his parent or guardian, or in the last resort, the faculty, who were to assign to the student "the elective studies they deemed it best for him to pursue." Four or five years later there is a return to the prescribed sophomore year with Latin and Greek. In 1850 the students themselves, instead of their parents or guardians, were first permitted to make the selection among the elective subjects. In 1856 we again find compulsory Greek and Latin in the junior year. In 1867 Greek and Latin definitely ceased to be required beyond the freshman year, and a tolerably free elective system was introduced for the last three years of the course. The catalogue now begins to present, on a small scale, the characteristics which it still retains.

What Harvard, under the pressure of the ever-widening demands of modern life, reached by a gradual, historical change which affords abundant evidence of hesitation, uncertainty, and excusable bewilderment on the part of those in authority, Cornell attained at a bound. When the institution was opened, in 1868, one year after the latest great extension of the elective system at Harvard, it proclaimed two signal departures from the accepted habits of our colleges. In the first place, the students were to enjoy "complete university liberty in the choice of studies," and secondly, there was to be no special prominence given to the ancient languages. On the other hand, special attention was devoted to "studies which shall be practically useful." The catalogue of 1870 says, "The idea of doing the student's mind some vague, general good by studies which do not interest him, does not prevail. The variety of instruction offered enables him to acquire such knowledge as is likely to agree with his best development, encourage his aspirations, and promote his work in life. The ancient languages, whose beauty and worth are fully acknowl-

edged, are provided for; particular attention is paid to modern classics, especially those of our own language.”¹

One year after the opening of Cornell, and two years after the definitive extension of the elective system of Harvard, President Eliot became the head of that institution. In view of what his name connotes it is needless to dwell on the significance of his appearance upon the stage.

Parallel to the changes which we have been following in the academic department, there were important developments in technical education. In addition to the establishment of more or less separate schools of theology, medicine, and law, which are, of course, familiar enough to the student of the mediæval universities, new departments of science appeared, the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale and the Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard in 1847; the School of Mines at Columbia, 1863. The colleges themselves undertook, moreover, to furnish educational advantages beyond the senior year, for which the college course was a prerequisite. Yale established a graduate course in 1847,—Columbia made an abortive attempt as early as 1857,—to introduce “a university course” comprising three schools of letters, science, and jurisprudence, leading, after two years of study, to the degree of A. M. The founding of Johns Hopkins, in 1876, for exclusively graduate work, gave great impetus to the extension of non-technical education beyond the close of the academic course.

Had the movement stopped at this point these innovations, as represented in the University of Virginia, Harvard, Cornell, Yale, and Johns Hopkins, might have been regarded as mere educational experiments which trustees, dominated by doctrinaire presidents and faculties, had been induced to encourage. The decisive test of the fundamental character of the change is to be found in the policy of the majority of the colleges, great and small, throughout the country. Almost all our institutions have shown a marked tendency to follow the lead of Harvard and Cornell. Yale, which enjoys the reputation of being a conservative institution, affords a fair example of the general progress of the elective system. It maintained the old curriculum until 1876, when students were first permitted to take four hours of optional ‘studies in both the junior and

(1) These innovations appeared to justify, in the eyes of those who, in 1871, edited the catalogue of the University of Virginia, where the elective system had prevailed from its foundation in 1819, the following reflections: “In this institution there is no curriculum or prescribed course of study to be pursued by every student, whatever his previous preparation or special objects. * * * The wisdom of this plan has been amply vindicated by time and experience, and within the last few years many institutions of higher culture in the United States have, to a greater or less extent, revised their method of study in accordance with the example here set.”

senior year. Eight years later the prescribed work in the junior year was reduced to seven hours and that for the seniors to three. Now the student at Yale is permitted a practically free choice of studies during the last two years of his course. While I have examined by no means all the catalogues of even the Eastern colleges, I think that I am quite near enough the truth for our immediate purposes in assuming that the majority of our colleges in their academic department maintain the old curriculum, but little modified during the first two years of the course, and then permit the student a wide range of choice either among single subjects or groups of subjects arranged to meet the tastes of the faculty.

In this cursory review, we have noted the general disappearance of required studies during the last two years, at least, of the college course, and the establishment, parallel to the classical courses, of English and scientific courses which include no Greek, and often no Latin. Everywhere the student is permitted to give toward half his time during four years to studies of his own choosing. The question naturally suggests itself, Will the system of partially prescribed studies, the "group system," and all the varying combinations of prescription and election now in use, give way finally to the system of free choice which prevails in a number of our universities; or may we expect a general reaction such as occurred on a small scale at Harvard after the earliest attempt to introduce the elective system there? In short, will the forces which have burst the bounds of the older rigid curriculum continue to operate until the disruption becomes general, or are these forces of a nature to weaken and leave us with the seemingly arbitrary compromises which are at present to be observed upon every hand?

Obviously it is impossible to answer this important question until we have determined what are the main factors which have led to the introduction of the elective system. These fall into two groups which may be called the academic and the extra-academic reasons. In the first group we may include all educational theories which would justify the freedom of choice on the ground that it benefits the student by increasing his self-reliance or stimulating his interest, or that it improves the character of the instruction by permitting specialization and placing before the instructor only those who have voluntarily chosen his particular branch of work. It may be added that there is also a category of academic objections which make against the further extension of the elective system, such as the added financial burdens which it brings with it and the alleged inability of the youth to choose his studies wisely. All this class of considerations both for and against the system I propose to leave to one side. I

do not question their importance, but they have already been the subject of interminable discussion. I hope to show, moreover, that these academic reasonings have really had far less influence in fostering the elective system than is generally assumed. As in the earlier revolutions, so in the present one, it is to changes outside the college campus that we must turn for the chief explanation of the situation in which we find ourselves, and for light upon the probable future of the college course.

The nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable transformation in the tastes and the intellectual ambitions and aspirations of the more cultivated class throughout Western Europe and our own country. A complete analysis of this transformation would demand much space and a philosophic insight to which the writer can make no claim. I venture, however, to select a few phases of the great changes which appear to be almost sufficient in themselves to account for the modifications of our educational plan.

In the first place, we must take into account the disappearance of Latin as the universal language of erudition. For many centuries after the Teutonic conquest of the Roman Empire no one was deemed "literate" who did not know Latin. Not until about the year 1700 did the number of books annually published in Germany, in the mother tongue, exceed those in Latin, and it is only in the nineteenth century that Latin became unnecessary for the professional work of the lawyer, the physician, and even the Protestant theologian. Not until the nineteenth century did the various vernacular languages, which had originally been tributary to the highly developed speech of Greece and Rome, finally become fully independent and conscious of their supremacy. They are now the medium of the best literary, scientific, and philosophic thought, and have reached a degree of excellence of form which rivals, even in the minds of the most discriminating, the ancient tongues to which alone Petrarch and Chaucer could turn, in the fourteenth century, for solace, wisdom, and the highest literary art. To give but one of innumerable examples of the recent but apparently conclusive character of the victory gained by the modern languages, the "Song of Roland" was not considered of sufficient importance to be printed at all until the year 1837, and now M. Gautier is devoutly thankful that every French youth of education knows the opening lines of that famous national epic quite as well as those of the *Iliad* or the *Æneid*. So general and remarkable a change as this exaltation of the vernacular languages has naturally reacted upon the college curriculum, and altered the estimate formerly put upon the ancient languages.

The second great change which strikes even the most superficial

observer is the fact that the scientific discoveries of the eighteenth and earlier centuries have become teachable in the nineteenth; the several branches of natural science have severed themselves permanently from theology and have become ever more and more specialized and exacting. Even to those who drew up the curricula in the early part of the nineteenth century, physics, botany, chemistry, zoölogy, mineralogy, etc., appeared worthy, as we have seen, of a place beside Latin and Greek, although their importance did not appear to justify more than a very subordinate place in the plan of study.

To modern scientific specialization and thoroughness must be attributed the final recognition of the superficiality and insufficiency of the older curriculum of the senior year, which was certainly comprehensive enough, as we have seen, to suit the most ambitious advocate of modern studies. The trouble lay not in the scope but in the character of the instruction, which appears to have been lacking in just those qualities which recommend scientific studies to us today. The text-books,—Paley, Butler, Wayland,—a few weeks devoted ordinarily to each subject; the many subjects taught by one instructor (for example, the Rev. John McVickar was for many years professor at Columbia of “Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, of Political Economy, of Rhetoric, and of the Belle Letters”); the absence of laboratories and of adequate libraries; all these justify the inference that the studies enumerated in the old catalogues had little in common with those of today. We find, for example, at Amherst, in 1842, a course extending through one third of the year devoted to “Natural Theology, embracing Mineralogy, Conchology, and Zoölogy,” and in Columbia all seniors, in 1852, were required to devote a small part of their attention during a term to “Civil and Military Architecture and Civil Engineering.” The perfunctory and superficial character of such instruction as measured by the standards which prevail today in our colleges, even the poorer and less fully equipped, is too patent to need further illustration.

The introduction of more adequate instruction in the natural sciences was doubtless greatly stimulated by the discovery that natural science might prove practically useful. This has no doubt considerably modified the popular estimate of the relative value of the newer and older subjects. The fact that scientific study has become a prerequisite for most professions cannot have failed to influence the preferences, even of those who were studying with no definite practical aim in view.

Lastly, the appearance of new social and political sciences has profoundly affected the scope of intellectual achievement. Some of these, especially political economy, constitutional law, and sociology, have devel-

oped only recently into disciplines of great interest and much practical importance. History, moreover, has been vastly broadened in scope and has become critical and exacting. Indeed the historical attitude of mind has done much to discredit the older conceptions of many of the subjects of academic instruction, not excluding the ancient languages themselves.

To read the discussions which appear from time to time one would infer that the question whether the elective system should be perpetuated and extended is still an open one, and that we might at any time reëstablish the old curriculum should we become convinced that our students do not and cannot advantageously select their own studies. In view, however, of the facts we have been considering, the debate over the right of the elective system to be, appears quite vain and unprofitable. We may, of course, undertake at any time to vindicate the ways of God to man, but we may well be on our guard against arrogating to ourselves a control over the course of affairs which we really do not enjoy. In gradually adopting the elective system, our colleges are only yielding, often most unwillingly and ungraciously, to an irresistible pressure from without, quite as inexorable as that which is forcing ever new concessions to democracy, or opening new occupations to women from which they have been hitherto debarred. The world has simply outgrown the limits of the ancient curriculum, and it is no longer possible for a student to give what is now considered a reasonable amount of attention to all the studies which appeared in the course fifty years ago. To permit the student to make his choice among these studies, or certain of them, was the easiest if not the inevitable solution of the difficulty.

I wished in this paper to confine myself, in the main, to the influences outside of the universities which serve to explain the changes within them. There is, however, one academic consideration which may be explained historically, and which might have an important influence upon the extension of the elective system. An undoubted tendency toward extreme specialization has often shown itself in our colleges of late years which has prejudiced many against the new ideals of education, and which, were it not offset by an increasing breadth of view in dealing with the various sciences, might easily have produced a temporary reaction in favor of the older disciplines. As men trained in a single field of work were gradually given a place in our faculties, and each was permitted to solicit the student's attention for a year at least to his particular study, it was not unnatural that there should have been an abrupt change from the old, easy going ways. A new narrowness invaded the classroom. The persistent attention to small incidents in the economy of the universe had produced such astonishing scientific results, that it was almost inevitable

that the first generation of scientifically trained scholars who became teachers, should have brought their subjects into a certain discredit by a failure to remember that they were conducting college courses, and not furnishing the technical preparation for scientific research. It must, however, be remembered that their critics, the defenders of the older classical studies, often forget how technical their own work was. From the standpoint of general experience, the ability to define trochaic dimeter with anacrusis is a more technical and special attainment than the ability to tell a canescent from a glabrous leaf.

Alongside of this youthful confidence in specialization, we find a tendency to encourage the student to carry on what was grandly called "original research." Historically considered, this was a reaction from the older habit of memorizing a text-book. There may be only a difference in degree between the original research of a sophomore and the problems dealt with by Röntgen and Edison, but it is decidedly worth while to make a distinction nevertheless. The use of the same expression for the activity of the sophomore who is solving a well-known problem in analytic geometry and the strictly scientific researches of the laboratory or study is sure to cause confusion and to place our college instruction in a false light.

In the reaction from the desultory and adventitious instruction in the natural and social sciences, and in the modern languages, which prevailed before the elective system was introduced, and in the distrust of the routine of the text-book, there was inevitably a temporary tendency to exaggerate the advantages of specialization and technical achievement, and an anxiety to force the student prematurely into independent research. This is exactly what might have been expected, and there are signs already that the exigencies of general education are being more carefully considered. There is a tendency everywhere to note the interdependence of the various sciences, an interdependence which is attested by the appearance of a variety of intermediary, and so to speak, conciliatory sciences, such as biology, physical chemistry, sociology. Moreover, even the study of political economy, as now understood, demands the same sort of insight as that which aids in the understanding of psychology, mathematics, and logic.

We have to consider, lastly, how far the prevailing idea of the requisites of a liberal education has changed; for a modification of the standards for judging an educated man will, of course, react in the long run on education itself. There is no doubt that the revolution in our college curricula has already profoundly affected the range of knowledge which may be expected from the members of a graduating class. One may know something of King Lear or Faust and yet admit without a blush

that he has never heard of Chloe or Tityrus; another may know the length of a parasang and not of a centimeter; a third may have dissected a cat but never have scanned elegiac verse; a fourth may be able to give an account of the life history of the amoeba and yet know nothing of so elementary a matter as Cartesian coördinates; John Stuart Mill may have a significance for a fifth that Aristotle has not; to a sixth the development of the English constitution may be clearer than that of Athens.

It is not strange that we give up with reluctance the old, ready indications of a college bred man, but bits of literary information play, at best, a small rôle in life; it would not, indeed, be difficult to arrange a course in elegant allusions, required of all seniors before they went out into the world, which would enable them to smile intelligently when *O tempora! O mores!* was uttered, or reference was made to Persian apparatus, or to Greeks bearing gifts. Indeed, such a course would meet one of the chief objections to the elective system. We have probably drifted farther from the conventional external signs of a college education than we realize. I believe that the historic forces have so far modified our notions, that few would esteem the equipment for polite intercourse, with which a graduate of fifty years ago entered the world, as equal to that with which he enters it today. Few, indeed, would understand his Horatian innuendoes, however pertinent, few would respect his ability to construct a faultless Latin distich if he had never heard of a dynamo or the union of Austria-Hungary. Already the external indications which might be looked for as a proof that one had spent four years in college have lost their definiteness, and those of the earlier half of the nineteenth century appear almost as complete anachronisms as the florid eloquence of the fourth or the dialectic precision of the thirteenth.

The real advantage of the college course must lie hereafter, as it has always really lain in the past, not in mere knowledge, but in the cultivation of those faculties which promise to be the greatest source of satisfaction to ourselves and our friends as the years go on. We cannot afford to exclude a single science that has found a place in our colleges; we are, in fact, far more likely to increase than to decrease the number. We cannot revert to a fixed course, because there is no dictator so powerful that he can, by force or persuasion, induce all to accept his particular selection of subjects, for such a selection cannot but appear arbitrary, whatever canons of educational expediency he may formulate. The mere scientific ambition which has taken possession of our colleges would in itself prevent the reduction of the number of scientific and literary studies represented in their announcements.

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OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER

JOSEPH B. BISHOP

NEW YORK

I REMEMBER hearing an astute observer, who had made a lifelong study of American politics and character, say after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, "Well, that starts us as a nation on a new and disastrous career. We are to go into the business of colonization, and no people were ever more utterly unfit for such work than we are. Our colonial administration will be saturated with spoils politics and be directed by spoils politicians. We shall make a dreadful mess of it, disgracing ourselves in the eyes of the civilized world." Never did prediction fail more completely of fulfillment than this has failed. Precisely the opposite has happened. We have shown that we are exceptionally fit for the work of colonization, we have kept spoils politics and spoils politicians out of the work entirely, and we have honored ourselves in the eyes of the world by the way in which we have performed it. For this highly creditable achievement the nation is indebted primarily to President McKinley. He made it not only possible but certain when he selected as pioneers in this new field of American endeavor such men as Generals Ludlow and Wood for Cuba, Judge Taft for the Philippines, and Mr. Allen for Porto Rico. Of each of these men it can be said, as President Roosevelt said so finely of General Wood in his Harvard commencement address, "Credit to him! Yes, in a way. In another no particular credit, because he was built so that he could do nothing else." If President McKinley had done his country no other service than to select these men for this new task he would have earned the lasting gratitude of the American people, for it was a service that not only brought honor to his country, but advanced the cause of civilization throughout the world. This is not panegyric, but the simple language of fact, as a plain statement of what these men have done within three years will demonstrate.

THE NEW REPUBLIC OF CUBA.

The story of what was done in Cuba, before it was turned over to its people for self-government, reads like a romance. General Wood, in his admirable account of his work in the island, which he gave before the

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Williams College alumni during the last commencement season, said that the only instructions which President McKinley gave him when he asked him to go to Cuba were: "I want you to go down there to get the people ready for a republican form of government. I leave the details of procedure to you. Give them a good school system; try to straighten out their courts and put them on their feet as best you can. We want to do all we can for them, and we want to get ready to get out of the island as soon as we can safely do so." Could the work of helping a people, just relieved from centuries of oppression, to start forward in the path of civilization have been outlined more simply or more wisely or more magnanimously than that? General Wood carried out his instructions in the spirit in which they were given, and the bare account of what he succeeded in doing reads like a tale from the "Arabian Nights," like a summary of results achieved through the use of an Aladdin's lamp or of a magic wand. He found the island without a government, without either a school or a court system worthy of the name, and in a condition of filth which made the cities of Havana and Santiago the most unhealthy in the world. Within less than four years later, he left the island with an established form of republican government, under a constitution modeled closely upon that of the United States, with a comprehensive, intelligent, and upright court system, with a public school system that extended through all the provinces, and with a system of sanitation that had made the cities as healthy as any in the world, and had freed the island from contagious diseases, including yellow fever, for the first time in its history. When Santiago surrendered, its condition from a sanitary point of view was beyond description. Its death-rate was 300 a day in a population of 40,000. In one province there were 3,000 cases of small-pox, and in one hospital 1,200 victims. When General Wood left Cuba, less than four years later, the death-rate was on a line with that of New England, and the cities of Havana and Santiago had a cleaner bill of health than the city of Washington. Millions of dollars had been spent in the work of sanitation, and the incalculably valuable discovery had been made of the variety of mosquito that transmitted the germs of yellow fever. As far back as 1881 an old Cuban physician, Dr. Finlay, advanced the theory that yellow fever is transmitted by mosquitoes, but never found the particular variety of mosquito that produced the infection. After the American government began the reconstruction of Cuba, different methods were tried for the extermination of yellow fever. First came the experiments with corrosive sublimate, then the successful campaigns against the mosquito. The yellow fever commission was formed, which made heroes of its three members and a martyr of one.

The discovery that yellow fever cannot be transmitted by contact, but by the sting of a mosquito, General Wood says, was worth the whole cost of the war, and is the most important discovery in medical science since that of vaccination.

In his work of establishing a school system General Wood proceeded with equal energy and good judgment. He found almost enough prisons, military hospitals, and barracks in Cuba to make schoolhouses for the people. He found only one university on the island, and in each province a single institute or high school having many professors and few students. The public school was unknown. When he left Cuba there were 3,786 schools, with 4,000 teachers, and the yearly enrolment of pupils was 252,000, with a daily attendance of 140,000. Of the total revenue \$4,200,000 or twenty-five per cent was spent for educational purposes. General Wood believes in the large school, and what he says of the one which he established in the old and indescribably filthy military barracks in Havana, shows what a genuine missionary spirit animated him in this field of his colonizing work: "We spent a great deal of money on this building in the plumbing and in all kinds of up-to-date sanitary arrangements. We spent it because I believe that a big school like that, in the centre of a city of 300,000 people, most of whom are ignorant of the very principles of sanitation, with every sanitary improvement put into the building, will be much more valuable than any books we can give to the children. For this is an object lesson, and in going back to their homes the children will make demands for improved sanitary conditions." The Ohio school law was put into Spanish and adopted, and has been very successful, and today there is a uniform school system throughout the island of Cuba.

When, on May 20 last, General Wood turned the island over to President Palma and the new government, Cuba was free from debt and had a more promising political future than was enjoyed by any other Latin-American community. The people had received during these few years of American control an object lesson in government that was of the highest value. They had seen the transformation made from mediæval barbarism to modern civilization, and had acquired an elementary knowledge at least of the fundamental principles and methods of civilized government. They had seen that government established first in the municipalities, then extended to the provinces, then embodied and formulated in a constitution for a republic. Many of them as members of municipal bodies, or as municipal officials, had acquired practical knowledge of the operation of government. We had, in short, done our full duty in starting them on the road that President McKinley marked out in his instructions to General Wood. Had Congress been as faithful to obligations of national duty as was General Wood,

the new republic would be in far better condition today, would be advancing more surely and more happily upon the road to stability and established success than is the case. We had as a nation only to supplement the work which General Wood had done with generous treatment in our trade relations with the new republic, and all would have been well. This had been promised to her by President McKinley and by the American people. The country went to war to free Cuba from Spain, went to great expense after the war in starting her as a free and independent republic, and it was not only willing but desirous of giving the new republic such liberal trade concessions as would make her success certain in the near future. Without such concessions, she is without the financial resources which are absolutely essential to success, and is pushed by the Senate's refusal to grant them to the very verge of bankruptcy and failure. All that a president could do to avert this act of perfidy and injustice, President Roosevelt did. The country understands that and applauds him for it. The responsibility rests nominally upon the nineteen Republican senators who composed what is known as the "Beet Sugar Combine," but really upon the fifty-four Republicans who constitute the majority of the Senate. Had the twenty-five Republican senators who professed to favor Cuban reciprocity been in earnest in their professions, the other nineteen could not have carried the day against the strong special appeal of President Roosevelt and against the overwhelming opinion of the country at large. There is no question about popular opinion on this subject. This has revealed itself so clearly since Congress adjourned that the leading culprits in the beet sugar opposition have hastened to declare that they favor Cuban reciprocity, and will vote for it at the next session of Congress. There is little doubt that a measure of reciprocity of some kind will be passed, but it will come too late to help Cuba in her time of greatest need. She may tide over that in one way or another, but the fact will remain that a nation which had been her best friend did her a cruel injury at a critical moment in her new career.

PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

What has been accomplished in the Philippines is, when the immensely greater obstacles encountered are considered, fully as notable as the result achieved in Cuba. There was no insurrection in Cuba, no opposition to American control, and the work of amelioration began immediately upon American possession. In the Philippines an organized insurrection began with the first moment of American possession and continued with varying degrees of activity for more than three years. During most of that time the islands were under military rule, and whatever civil government there was was merely a branch of the military.

The military government called into requisition the services of military officers by detailing them to civil duties. Till July, 1901, the commanding general of the army in the islands was civil executive as well. Under his direction, and working in harmony with him, the Taft Commission began to lay the foundations of civil rule, seeking to place them firm and enduring in the principles of popular government. Slow but sure progress was made in this work, one province after another passing under control of civil rule, with a government in which their own leading men took a greater or less part according to varying local conditions, until in July of the present year the entire archipelago passed under civil rule, with Judge Taft as governor, and military rule was withdrawn. The islands were then at peace with the United States throughout their entire extent, and have remained so since. In a communication which he sent to the Senate at that time, Secretary Root gave the total amount expended by the American government in the islands as about \$170,000,000, and said of the military forces: "In the middle of the fiscal year ending June 20, 1901, there were about 70,000 American soldiers in the islands. That number is now reduced to about 23,000. Orders have now been issued for the return of the Eighth, Fifteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry and a squadron of the Tenth Cavalry, and when these orders have been executed the number of American troops in the Philippines will have been reduced to 18,000."

The bare recital of the results achieved by the Taft Commission up to the time of the establishment of supreme civil government is a really marvelous story. Provincial governments had been established in nearly all the provinces and municipal governments in nearly all the larger towns. A civil service law had been enacted and for several years had been working admirably, which is a stricter application of the merit system than any similar law in the United States. Four million dollars had been appropriated for harbor and road improvements. A public school system, with 1,000 American teachers and 2,500 Filipino teachers, had been established and schools had been opened in 500 of the 900 towns in the islands. In addition normal and manual training schools had been organized. There had been established a judiciary system, with a supreme court made up of three American and four Filipino judges, with appellate jurisdiction, and fifteen judicial district courts with general, civil, and criminal jurisdiction. A local police and insular constabulary force had been organized with 5,000 men, about 150 in each province, under inspectors partly American and partly Filipino, of which Governor Taft said in May last: "I am glad to say that thus far the operation of the constabulary system has been most satisfactory, and ladronism (brigandage) is rapidly disappearing. The selection of men for its ranks has been very

carefully made. The system of selecting only residents of the province for service in the province avoids the danger of abuse and looting by the members of the constabulary themselves. In a force of some 5,000 men there have been reported but three desertions. The constabulary costs the Philippine government \$250 a man yearly, on the average." There had also been established a Health Department, coöperating with local health officials in all parts of the island, an Agricultural Bureau, a Bureau of Forestry, and a Postal System. Thus far the government had been self-supporting, its income being mostly from customs receipts. Surely this is a record of progress in less than two years which is a striking tribute to Governor Taft's ability as an administrator and to American capacity in the work of civilization and colonization. When it is added that on July 4 last a proclamation was issued granting amnesty to all Filipino prisoners, including Aguinaldo, and that no outbreak of any kind has followed to disturb the peace of the islands, the record of pacification is seen to be complete, thus opening the way to a rapid continuance of the civilizing work already so well begun.

In this genuine service to civilization Governor Taft has been the leading force, the dominating influence, as distinctly as was General Wood in Cuba. President Roosevelt's estimate of his character and work, in his speech at Harvard, was as just as it was eloquent and generous. It has been my inestimable privilege to enjoy intimate personal friendship with Governor Taft since his appointment to the Philippines by President McKinley in the spring of 1900. I had many long talks with him on the eve of his departure to the islands, and there was perceptible in him then the awakening of that genuine missionary spirit which has since taken complete possession of him. He told me then that he had been against the war with Spain, had believed it to be an unnecessary war, and regretted that it had left us with the Philippines on our hands. But the Treaty of Paris closed that part of the case. All there was for every American to do after that was to help his country to solve the new problems which the war had left on its hands. When President McKinley asked him to aid in this task, he felt that he had no right to refuse. He resigned his seat on the bench of the United States Circuit Court, although his tastes and ambition impelled him to a judicial career, and accepted the call of his country. I talked with him freely about his plans, and as I look back over his work in the islands I can see few or no really important particulars in which he has departed from them. His intellectual grasp of the problem had been so strong, his foresight so clear, that he was able to map out his work in all its largest details before he had started for the scene. This was especially the case in regard to the lands held by the friars, for the solution which he had in mind then is the one which he has brought to

assured success now, and which he presented with such ability and tact at Rome as to command both the confidence and win the approval of the Pope and the authorities of the Catholic Church.

What the President said of him was based on personal knowledge of all this and of much more of the same character. He said he had, during Governor Taft's recent visit to this country, said to him that he was aware of his ambition to become a justice of the Supreme Court, but that if a vacancy were to occur now he did not see how he could possibly give it to him because the country needed him where he was; and that to this Governor Taft replied: "Mr. President, it has always been my dream to be in the Supreme Court; but if you should offer me a justiceship now and at the same time Congress should take off entirely my salary as governor, I should go straight back to the Philippines nevertheless; for these people need me and expect me back and believe I won't desert them." Every one who met Governor Taft during this visit found him imbued with this spirit and concurred heartily with the estimate which the President made of him after his return: "He has gone back, gone as a strong friend among weaker friends to help them upward along the stony and difficult path of self-government; to do his part, and a great part, in making the American name a symbol of honor and of good faith in the Philippine Islands; to govern with justice and with that firmness, that absence of weakness, which is only another side of justice. He has gone back to do all that because it is his duty as he sees it. We are to be congratulated, we Americans, that we have a fellow American like Taft."

It is surely worthy of record that when as a nation we had need of men for the new work of colonization, we were able to find them and to command their services. The men came with the hour, and they were equal to the task.

In no part of his great task in the Philippines has Governor Taft displayed higher ability than in that relating to the disposition of the lands held by the friars. He realized at the start that this was the crucial element in the problem, for unless the friars could be banished permanently from the islands there could be little real progress made in the direction of pacification and improvement. The one subject upon which all the Filipino people are united is that of hostility to the friars. This is based upon the political power which the friars exercised for fifty years previous to the battle of Manila Bay. As Governor Taft puts it: "The friars were the policemen of Spain. They exercised absolute power in every municipality within their respective parishes, and they were made responsible by the people for every act of oppression, individual or general, which might be charged to the Spanish government." While the Filipinos of these parishes are Catholics and devoted to their Church, they

will not tolerate these representatives of the Church any longer among them. The last insurrection against Spain, shortly before the battle of Manila, was caused largely by hatred of the friars, fifty of whom were killed in it, and 300 of whom were prisoners when the Americans took possession of Manila and released them. They own in various provinces about 420,000 acres of land, some of which they have greatly improved by irrigation and other processes. Since the insurrection, or for four years or more, the friars have been unable to collect any rents from the people occupying the lands, but under the Treaty of Paris, they are lawful owners of the lands, are entitled to the use of them and the fruits of them, and if they are allowed to return and seek to enforce the rights of ownership the certain result will be riot and insurrection. What Governor Taft proposes is the purchase of the lands from them by the United States government and their sale in small holdings to the present tenants, on long and easy payments, the government to issue bonds in an amount sufficient for the purchase and the proceeds of sales to go into a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds. Congress has authorized this proceeding, and there is little doubt that it will be carried into execution. The friars are willing to sell at a reasonable price, and the Church authorities make no objection. The only point about which there has been difficulty in the negotiation is the withdrawal of the friars from the islands. Many Catholics in this country as well as abroad objected to this on the ground that it was designed to injure the influence of their Church in the islands, to cut down its field of work among the Filipinos. This was a total misapprehension. Governor Taft has stated his attitude in this matter with entire frankness and unmistakable clearness from the outset. He said in his testimony before a Committee of Congress in March last: "We hope that with the purchase of the property interests of the friars, the way will be made smooth and easy for the introduction of other Catholic priests, who do not by their history arouse the hostility of the natives and will not lead to a disorder, which is certain to follow a return of the friars themselves to their parishes." The question, in other words, is not religious, but political; simply one of law and order.

It may be well, in order to complete the record, to cite what President McKinley said to Judge Taft, when he selected him to go to the Philippines. It is very like in tone and temper to what he said to General Wood. In his speech at a banquet which was given in his honor by his fellow citizens of Cincinnati, after his appointment, Judge Taft said: "The high and patriotic purpose of the President in the present juncture is to give to the people of the Philippine Islands the best civil government which he can provide, with the largest measure of self-government consistent with stability. He seeks only the welfare of the Filipino and the

betterment of his condition." Speaking for himself at the same time, Judge Taft said: "The problems seem certainly formidable enough. It will take patience, persistence, and tact to work them out. Doubtless we shall make mistakes which will deserve criticism, but if we maintain our purpose steadfast, to do nothing save for the good of the Filipino people, we hope, in spite of their formidable character, to surmount the obstacles and win success. If we can thus relieve a hitherto unfortunate and oppressed people from the evil of three centuries of misgovernment the end will be worth the struggle." In his formal instructions to the Taft Commission, President McKinley said: "A high and sacred obligation rests upon the government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country."

A few months later, in his letter accepting a renomination, President McKinley said: "It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as rapidly as they are ready for it." It is because these instructions have been carried forward in letter and in spirit that the work which we are doing in the Philippines is a great service to the civilization of the world. The new system of government provided by Congress is directly in line with President McKinley's promise to give the Filipinos self-government as soon as they are ready for it. It stipulates that when it shall have been certified to the President by the Philippine Commission that a condition of general and complete peace exists in the islands, the President shall order a census to be taken as to the numbers, age, sex, race, or tribe, whether native or foreign born, literacy in Spanish, native dialect or language, or in English, school attendance, ownership of homes, and industrial and social statistics. Two years after the completion of the census, if complete peace has meantime been maintained throughout the islands, exclusive of the territory inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, the President is authorized to direct the Philippine Commission to call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people in the islands, which is to be known as the Philippine Assembly, and this body with the Philippine Commission as an upper house, is to be the legislative authority of the islands. This assembly is to consist of not less than fifty nor more than one hundred members, to be apportioned among the provinces as nearly as possible according to the population. Each province must

at least have one member, and each member is to serve for two years. The first meeting of the legislature is to take place on the call of the governor within ninety days after the election, and at this first meeting there are to be chosen two resident commissioners to the United States.

“ALMOST FORGOTTEN” PORTO RICO.

In his first speech on his recent New England tour, President Roosevelt summed up the account of what has been accomplished in Porto Rico, in a single sentence, “So excellent have been the effects of our administration and legislation concerning this island that their very excellence has resulted in their being almost forgotten by those at home.” So far as that member of our insular possessions is concerned, the problem has presented thus far few serious difficulties. Porto Rico has been under civil government for two years, and the record has been one of steady progress during that period, as it had been during the two years which immediately followed American possession. When Spain evacuated the island four years ago, she left a treasury that was wholly empty, nothing that could properly be called a school system, for she had never built a school-house, and a general condition of unsanitation like that which distinguished all Spanish-American possessions. Four years later, there was in operation an established government in which the people shared, a treasury with a cash balance of nearly \$2,000,000, and not a dollar of indebtedness; more than thirty schoolhouses had been built, nearly 50,000 children were receiving instruction, and two industrial schools had been established,—all under an annual outlay of \$600,000 for education; and sanitary regulations had been put in force with such effect that the death-rate had been steadily diminished, so that in the year just ended there were 13,000 fewer deaths than there had been in the previous year.

The government is modified territorial in form. Legislative authority is vested in an executive council of six Americans, who are also executive heads of the departments, and five native born islanders, all appointed by the President. There is a house of delegates, consisting of thirty-five members, all of whom are elected by the people. Two legislative sessions have been held; the island is now controlled by American statutes and the people have shown not only a willingness to accept them, but a wonderful adaptability to the changed conditions which they have brought about. An excellent corporation law has been adopted, capital is scrupulously guarded, and property rights are as safe as in an American State.

Governor Hunt, who went to the island with Governor Allen in May, 1900, when the civil government was inaugurated, holding the position of secretary, and who succeeded to the governorship when Mr. Allen resigned last year, says of the people of the island: “Porto Ricans

are ambitious for closer relations with the United States, and deserve all encouragement. In my residence of over two years in the island I found them generous, warm-hearted, good people. They are impressionable, but gentle and kind. The result of the liberal government given them is a steadily growing mutual respect and liking between them and the citizens of the mainland. I regard this in itself as a most desirable achievement of our occupancy."

What has been accomplished in Porto Rico, like similar results in Cuba and in the Philippines, is due primarily to the quality of the men who have been selected for the task. The high standard set by President McKinley has been adhered to rigidly by President Roosevelt for reasons which he stated with convincing force in one of his recent speeches. "First and foremost," he said, "in Porto Rico, we have striven to get the very best men to administer the affairs of the island." He went on to say that while a high standard of efficiency and integrity was desirable throughout the public service, it was an imperative necessity in a far-off island because public opinion is a less efficient check for wrong doing there and the victims of wrong doing are more helpless. His words on this point may be taken as ample pledge that the standard will be maintained inflexibly in the future so long as he is President: "In consequence, the administration of these islands is, beyond all other kinds of administration in our country, the one in which the highest standard must be demanded. In making appointments to the insular service, it is necessary to disregard any question of mere party expediency and to look at the matter solely from the standpoint of the honor of our own nation and of the welfare of the island itself."

NATIONAL VALUE OF AN ISTHMIAN CANAL.

Nothing that the late Congress did could be compared in importance for a moment with its passage of a bill vesting in the hands of the President full power to decide upon the route for an isthmiian canal and to select a commission to have charge of its construction. If a clear title can be obtained for the Panama route, he is authorized to select that, but if such a title cannot be secured, then the canal is to be constructed at Nicaragua. There is really no doubt that the Panama route will be the one selected, for the authorities at Washington are confident of obtaining a perfectly clear title. The bill appropriates \$10,000,000 for preliminary work, and limits the total expenditure for construction, in case of Panama, to \$135,000,000, and in case of Nicaragua, to \$180,000,000. The commission which is to have charge of the work is to be composed of seven members, chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate, who are to serve until the completion of the canal. At least four of them

must be engineers, at least one an officer of the regular army, at least one an officer of the navy, either upon the active or retired lists. The compensation of the commissioners is to be fixed by the President until otherwise prescribed by Congress. In addition to the members of the commission the President is authorized through the commission to employ in the service any of the engineers of the regular army at his discretion, or any engineers in civil life, and any other persons necessary for the proper and expeditious prosecution of the work.

It is known to be the President's intention to push the matter forward as rapidly as possible, and it is likely that he will be sufficiently assured of a clear title for Panama to send the names of the commission to the Senate soon after Congress meets in December. But this does not mean that the work of construction can be begun at once. In the estimation of the best engineers, at least two years will be required in simply preparing to begin, that is, in making detail surveys, drawing up complete plans and specifications, and forming the complete organization necessary for carrying on the work. A vitally necessary preliminary is the sanitation of the Isthmus. Mr. George S. Morison, of the commission which reported to Congress on the relative merits of the two routes, takes this view, saying: "The filth of 400 years must be taken from under the houses and dumped somewhere in the Pacific or Atlantic. The Isthmus, which has been occupied for 400 years, practically has not a water pipe on it. There is plenty of excellent water, but it must be brought to the towns and to every place there, and people must be compelled to use it instead of drinking from the swamps. This kind of work must be done throughout and everything should be in shape before the actual laboring force is brought there." Mr. Morison thinks that one of the beneficent results of the Spanish War is that it has taught us how to occupy a tropical country, how to handle it so as to get good results. He points to what we did in Cuba, cited by me already in these pages, and adds: "The city of Panama is a pest-hole, but it has never been as bad as Santiago formerly was, and there is no reason why Panama should not be as healthy as Santiago is now. The first condition is, that there must be an absolute military occupation of the Isthmus, with the same control for police sanitation, and everything else, that we had in Cuba. The military occupation must extend to everything which influences health, to police and other regulations, and it must be continued during the whole construction of the canal. I do not believe there are any men in the world as capable of making that military occupation efficient and good in its results as the men who have been trained in our own army in the Cuban occupation." It is the opinion of Mr. Morison and his associates that after two years of preliminary preparation the work of construction can be completed

within eight years, that is, within ten years from the time when the commission shall take charge. That would place the opening of the canal to commerce about January, 1913.

When it shall have been opened, what will be our position in relation to the trade and commerce of the world, and what will be the effect upon our political and national life? In the first place, so far as trade and commerce are concerned, we shall have a virtually continuous coast-line from the northeastern extremity of Maine to the western extremity of Alaska, open alike to the ships of the Atlantic and the Pacific, enabling ports on both sides the continent to trade directly with each other. San Francisco will be within fifteen days of New York by steamer instead of three months, and within twenty-three days of any English port. The west coast of South America will be placed 3,000 miles nearer to our ports than to those of Europe, opening to us an entirely new field of commerce, which has in it enormous possibilities. These are the large facts in the case and they are of incalculable value. They open to this country new markets for its products, new opportunities for that extension of foreign trades which our rapidly growing production is demanding year by year.

The political effects are certain to be of inestimable advantage in the direction of national unification. With the canal open there will be virtually no Atlantic and no Pacific fleet, but an American fleet. This will be as true of warships as of merchant vessels. As an object lesson, that wonderful trip of the battleship "Oregon," in the spring of 1898, from San Francisco to Florida, was a more convincing argument in favor of a canal than all others combined. With her powerful machinery working to its utmost limit and with everything in her favor she was eighty days on the passage. With a canal she could have made the journey in so short a time as to require no special haste. Instead of two navies as at present we shall have a double navy ready for all emergencies. This ability to assemble our warships quickly would be a powerful influence in the direction of peace, for it would operate constantly as a preventive of war. The new trade relations will unite the Pacific coast with the Atlantic seaboard more closely than has been possible even with the Trans-Atlantic railways, for the canal will establish complete unity of interest. Is it not reasonable to anticipate, as enthusiastic advocates of the canal do, that this unity of interest will lead to the development of a stronger national sentiment than the country has ever known, that it will put an end to sectional jealousies of all kinds, and bring the whole American people into more cordial relations with one another, and into heartier support of their national government than has existed heretofore?

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HOW SOLDIERS HAVE RULED IN THE PHILIPPINES

D. H. BOUGHTON, CAPT., THIRD U. S. CAVALRY

EXCEPT in the southern part, where a few Moro dattos still reject the sovereignty of the United States, the return to civil control of the province of Batangas,—so long the home and theatre of operations of the insurgent chief, Malvar,—marks the close of military government in the Philippine Islands. It is true the government is still called military inasmuch as it is administered by the President through the Secretary of War, but it has been shorn of its martial aspect and its agents are civilians, natives, and Americans, or army officers acting in a purely civil capacity.

The islands have now a legislative body—the Civil Commission, an executive—the civil governor, and a system of courts, whereby is effected that division of the powers of sovereignty into legislative, executive, and judicial, so essential under our theory of government to the maintenance of individual rights. The object of this change, from military to civil government, is unquestionably to prepare the natives so that ultimately they will be able to manage their own local affairs. How long a time will be necessary for this development is uncertain, but already the natives have a greater measure of individual liberty, a greater measure of self-government than they could reasonably have hoped for in so short a time, and if the opportunity thus presented them is not misused or abused, the future of the Filipino people, compared with its past, is roseate with good promise.

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But in watching this structure in the process of building we are apt to forget how the foundation was laid, and who it was that first cleared the ground and made possible what has been subsequently done. The work of the army in these islands is unquestionably little understood by the mass of the American people. Their attention, unfortunately, has been diverted by political and other issues. To be sure something is known of the hardships incident to a war in a tropical climate with burning suns and rainy seasons. Something is known of the battles and skirmishes, and lists of the wounded and dead have been published. But little, almost nothing, is known of the army in its contact with the people, or of its work of pacification and reconstruction, once active resistance had ceased. The Philippine Islands were a *terra incognita* to the American people and, of course, to the army of occupation. Nevertheless in a comparatively short time, despite the tropical heat and rains, and despite the opposition of ten millions of people who could regard the Americans in no other light than as invaders, for they were foreigners with objects and motives unknown, the islands were conquered and pacified, the forms of civil government set up, and conditions established that made the subsequent work of the Civil Commission possible. And made possible also that benevolent assimilation contemplated by President McKinley, of a people differing in race, language, customs, and laws from our own.

It is now a little over four years since the boom of Dewey's cannon signaled the dissolution of Spanish sovereignty in the Orient. On August 13, 1898, the army entered the city of Manila, the Stars and Stripes replacing the banner of Castile over the palace of the governor-general. The terms of the capitulation contained a clause providing for the surrender of the entire Philippine Archipelago, but, unfortunately, as appeared from subsequent events, the army was at this point prevented from extending its occupation of the islands by the peace protocol, which had been signed in Washington the day before. This agreement contained the following provision:—

“The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.”

Thus while the acting captain-general¹ had surrendered the whole archipelago to the American forces, the protocol limited the theatre of operations of the army to the city of Manila, and it was necessary to

(1) His chief, General Augusti, had shortly before fled on board a German man-of-war and left the islands.

wait for the treaty of peace before undertaking operations beyond the city limits. It will appear how this period was improved by the Filipino leaders to propagate their ideas of independence, and entailed upon the army weary years of tropical campaign and fighting.

The Peace Commissioners met in Paris and after much discussion finally signed the treaty December 10, 1898. It was ratified in Washington on February 10, following. This treaty contains the following stipulation:—

“Article 3. Spain cedes to the United States the Archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, which contains,” etc.

Thus by this treaty sovereignty in the Philippine Islands was transferred from Spain to the United States, though at the time the treaty was signed we had actual possession of Manila and the neighboring town of Cavite only. In the meantime,¹ however, the military authorities had established a government in the city, order had been brought out of chaos, trade had been resumed, and Manila opened to the commerce of the world.

By the treaty of peace Spain relinquished sovereignty over the islands. She could not, however, confer actual possession, and between the destruction of the Spanish fleet, May 1, and the signing of the treaty, December 10, events had so shaped themselves that it became necessary for the Americans to reckon with the natives and to ultimately engage in a war that has but just now terminated, happily, let us hope, for all concerned.

To thoroughly understand subsequent events and to appreciate the work of the army in these islands it will be necessary, as well as interesting, to take a cursory view of the political conditions in the Philippines at the time of the advent of the Americans, and to follow the chain of events that led to the final rupture between them and the adherents of Aguinaldo.

The insurrection against Spain was due in part to Spanish misrule, governmental neglect, and official venality, but in the main to abuses growing out of monastic usurpation and oppression. Active opposition on the part of the natives was initiated by the formation of a secret society known as the Katipunan,² whose numbers were bound together

(1) General Merritt, who had commanded the army at the surrender, left Manila August 30, and had been succeeded by General Otis, who so long and ably held the reins of government in the Philippines.

(2) A word in the Tagalog language meaning liberty or independence.

by an oath sealed with their blood, wherein they pledged themselves to blindly obey the mandates of their leaders. A plot to massacre all Spaniards was formed, but it was discovered on the eve of execution. Wholesale arrests, deportations, and executions followed, and the Tagal insurrection of 1896 was on. Aguinaldo issued a pronunciamiento and soon became a recognized leader. Rizal, the hero and idol of the Philippine people, had been sent to Spain, but the priesthood demanded his death. He was brought back to Manila, tried, sentenced, and on December 30, 1896, executed on the Luneta.¹ Of taking any part in the insurrection Rizal was innocent, but he had been guilty of opposing clerical abuses and of attempting to lift his people to a higher civilization. His death widened the breach and as time wore on there appeared little hope of successfully quelling the revolution by force. The governor-general finally recognized this and, though opposed by the friars, opened negotiations with the insurgents that ultimately resulted, December 14, 1897, in an understanding or treaty between the contending parties. This treaty, known among the Filipinos as the Pacto de Biac-na-bato, from the place where it was signed, was negotiated on behalf of the Spaniards by Pedro A. Paterno, a native who had visions of Spanish titles and of Spanish gold, and on behalf of the insurgents by Aguinaldo, now their recognized chief. No full text of this treaty is known to exist, and the Spanish government denies that any such treaty was ever made, claiming that the overtures came from the insurgent leaders themselves, who, on condition of their lives being spared and the receipt of a certain sum of money, agreed to leave the islands at the pleasure of the Spaniards. This has led to the oft repeated charge that Aguinaldo and other leaders sold their country for a bribe. The Filipinos, on the other hand, claim that the treaty was bona-fide and that it provided, among other stipulations, for an amnesty of three years, during which time Spain was to introduce certain reforms specified in the treaty. The money was to be used to reimburse those who had suffered loss during the insurrection. Be this as it may, Aguinaldo and thirty-four other leaders went to Hong-kong where they were paid the first instalment of money, and the insurrection was for a time at an end.

But Spain, with its accustomed short-sightedness in dealing with colonial affairs, failed to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered. No more instalments were paid and no reforms introduced. Monastic persecution continued, no amnesty was declared, and neither the life nor

(1) For an account of Rizal's life and works see Foreman, *The Philippine Islands*, second edition, page 530.

liberty of any individual was safe. Nor does it appear that Spain even rewarded the ambitious Paterno for securing the surrender of his countrymen, though he set his services at a million and demanded a place among the Spanish nobility. The people believed that they had been deceived and ere long the signs of insurrection again became rife. The leaders in Hong-kong formed a junta and opened correspondence with their countrymen in the islands. Insurrection broke out in Cebu and in a short time became general throughout the archipelago. Then came Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, shortly after which Aguinaldo came over from Hong-kong on an American dispatch boat and landed in Cavite. He placed himself at the head of the Filipino army, such as it was, declared himself dictator, and took steps to organize a revolutionary government.

At this time there were about twenty thousand insurgents around Manila, but at the surrender they were not permitted to enter the city on account of the excesses which they were liable to commit. Elsewhere throughout the islands, however, they were generally successful against the Spaniards, capturing many arms and many prisoners. On June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo summoned a congress to meet September 15, and on June 23, issued a pronunciamiento, the first article of which declared his purpose. It was, "To struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country for a real republic." The dictator was thereafter to be styled the president of the revolutionary government. There were also provisions relating to the revolutionary congress, already summoned, and others relating to the administration of military justice. A declaration of independence, subsequently ratified by the congress, was issued August 1. Aguinaldo moved his headquarters from Cavite to Malolos and there established his capital. Here the congress previously summoned met on September 15, elected the versatile Paterno its president, and voted supplies and other measures for carrying on the insurrection.

On January 22, 1899, this congress promulgated the constitution of the Filipino Republic, a document defining the powers of the government, providing for the separation of the Church and State, and for the protection of individual rights;¹ but as it was issued after the signing of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States it was in direct opposition to American sovereignty and, in fact, was a declaration of war against the latter. Aguinaldo was, of course, the soul of this movement. He possessed a wonderful influence with the Filipino people, and the

(1) For a translation of this document see *Report of the Philippine Commission*, 1900, 1., page 189.

government thus set up was generally acknowledged throughout the islands, the Moros always excepted.¹

Built on Spanish models it was only necessary to change the agents and turn the revenues into new channels. The people, glad to be rid of their old masters, naturally preferred a government of their own which could not possibly be any more onerous or burdensome than the one they had rejected. But the power behind the throne, the force that aided the propagation of revolutionary ideas, was the great Katipunan society, which every native was compelled to join whether he would or no, and which eventually extended to all parts of Luzon and the neighboring islands.

This, in brief, is an outline of the political conditions existing in these islands at the time when the American army was waiting in Manila, and when no one knew what the policy of the American government was or would be. Of course, when it became apparent that the United States would probably annex the islands, it was only necessary to change the word Spanish to American and all the machinery of the revolutionary government would be directed against the latter nation. Americans were foreigners, and by persistent misrepresentations on the part of their leaders the natives were led to believe that their condition under them would be even worse than under the Spaniards. It was, therefore, an easy matter to turn all the forces of the revolutionary government against the newcomers.

In the meantime the relations between the two armies were becoming more and more strained. The Americans held Manila and the suburbs while the Filipino army extended entirely around them on the land side, and there were frequent clashes between the outposts. The Filipinos, believing that they had been unjustly kept out of Manila, became more and more arrogant, and more and more insulting toward our soldiers, whose forbearance they construed as an evidence of weakness or fear.

In December, 1898, after the treaty of peace had been signed, the Spaniards evacuated Iloilo and the insurgents entered the city. Upon receipt of this information the President ordered General Otis to notify the Filipino people that by virtue of the treaty of Paris the sovereignty of the United States had been extended over them, and directed him to

(1) The writer has in his possession a warrant signed by Aguinaldo, March 17, 1899, appointing an Igorrote cabeza (head man) of a barrio of Duquis, in the mountains of northern Luzon, and this cabeza was exercising his office under this warrant a year later just before the collapse of the insurrection in that section. Moreover, in all parts of the island the curious, if they so desire, can examine the records of the revolutionary government now preserved in the municipal archives.

occupy the archipelago. It is true we announced our good intentions toward the people and promised them a right to participate in local government when they should show themselves capable. But promises were of no avail. The determination of Aguinaldo and his councillors had now become fixed. Their proclamations all pointed in the direction of war and they were improving every moment's delay to be ready when it should come. Still the Americans believed a peaceful adjustment possible and strained every nerve in that direction. A peace commission was sent to the islands but arrived too late to stem the tide. Even at this late date, had we sufficient force to occupy all the important centres and to demonstrate to the Filipinos the futility of resistance, it is possible war might have been averted or quelled in its infancy. But we had only about seventeen thousand men in the islands, and some of this force had been sent to Iloilo. Then came the night of February 4, 1899, when the lone Nebraska sentinel at San Juan bridge fired on some advancing forms who failed to obey his challenge; an answering volley, and the war was on.

It is probable that the first shot in this drama was fired by the Americans, but it must be remembered that a few days before, namely, on January 22, the Filipino congress had promulgated to the world the constitution of the Filipino Republic, a document that was in itself a declaration of war against American sovereignty in the Philippines. There was but one way to avoid war and that was to withdraw the army from the islands, but this was contrary to the policy and wishes of the American people, and war followed.

It is not the purpose of this article to recount the campaigns and battles that finally culminated in the collapse of the insurrection. That would require volumes. But at the first onset the insurgents were hurled back from their intrenchments around the city and shortly afterwards their capital, Malolos, was captured. Then came the pursuit of Aguinaldo and the disintegration of his army, whereupon he gave orders to fight no more in the open but to resort solely to ambush and guerilla warfare. The task of the army then became doubly difficult because the inhabitants assumed the dual rôle of being friendly to the Americans and at the same time of secretly working for their extermination. Practically the Filipinos had to be conquered individually, a condition necessitating the occupation of every town and hamlet, and a much larger army than would have been necessary to operate against an enemy in the field. Accordingly the army was finally reinforced to seventy thousand men and, operating from Manila as a centre, gradually occupied all the pueblos and important towns in the islands and established military government therein.

The legality or rightfulness of this government and the powers

exercised thereunder by the army, grew out of the disturbed conditions, but were, of course, authorized by the laws of war. In a hostile country military rule, or martial law, as it is called in the instructions issued for the government of the army of the United States in the field, consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.¹ A hostile country occupied by our army is by virtue of said occupation under the martial law of the invading army. No proclamation is necessary, military rule becoming operative at once, and the functions of the local government being suspended wholly or in part as circumstances seem to warrant or military necessity demand.

Acting under these laws the commanding general in the islands became, by virtue of his position, the military governor, and as such was, of course, responsible to his country for the good administration of all political affairs throughout the archipelago. His paramount duty was to establish the sovereignty of the United States, not because conquest was the object, but because only by the restoration of peace could the welfare of the people be advanced and the wheels of progress set in motion. The work of reconstruction was not delayed until the conquest was complete, but whenever the conditions in any locality would permit, the people were led back into peaceful pursuits, civil government was established, and the evil effects of war removed as far as possible.

How well this work has been done by the army under the able leadership of men like Generals Otis and MacArthur the results will attest. It is almost impossible to even outline the steps taken by them to accomplish this work, but an examination of the orders and proclamations emanating from the office of the military governor, and covering almost every conceivable subject growing out of war and embraced in the curriculum of government, will give some idea of the magnitude of the task accomplished.

Commerce, coast trade, customs, internal revenue, administration of justice, admission to the bar, postal regulations, appointment of notaries, the manner in which poor persons should be defended, amendments of the Spanish law in regard to evidence and the bringing of an accused person to trial,² registry of property, schools, sanitary regulations, questions

(1) G. O., No. 100, A. G. O., 1863, paragraph 3, *Our Laws of War*.

(2) G. O., No. 43, *Headquarters Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corps*, series 1899.

respecting marriage and divorce, claims against the United States, and regulations providing for the establishment of civil government in pacified districts, are among the subjects acted upon and regulated by the military governor, and the provisions in regard to which were enforced by military rule. In many instances these orders have been continued by the Civil Commission as the law of the land, notwithstanding military government has ceased.

On August 8, 1899, instructions were issued for the establishment of order and temporary government in towns occupied by the United States forces. They were to be put in force by the senior officer present who was required to exercise an immediate supervision over the formation and proceedings of such government.¹ It practically continued the existing Spanish form of government, with which the people were familiar, modified to meet American ideas. It provided for a presidente, who was also treasurer, and a municipal council composed of the presidente and cabazes of barrios, with powers usually inherent in such bodies, subject, however, to the approval of the commanding officer. The presidente was assisted by a vice-presidente, who was also *ex-officio* lieutenant of police. The council had no jurisdiction in civil matters but might render an award when the value of the property in controversy between the stipulating parties did not exceed five hundred dollars. In criminal cases the presidente made the preliminary examination, and either released the accused, or turned him over to the provost court for trial. No person was to be arrested for the non-payment of taxes or for debt. This was a tentative measure but it was a beginning, and later on was amended and amplified by General Orders, No. 40, series 1900, which will be referred to below.

Under the Spanish régime the islands had been divided into provinces over each of which a civil or military governor presided. The provinces were subdivided into pueblos (counties), bearing the same name as their chief town, or county seat, and having at the head a petty governor styled captain or, as he was called by the Filipinos, presidente. These pueblos were further subdivided into barrios (townships or wards), the

(1) As an illustration of the scope and ability of some of these orders the attention of the reader is invited to G. O., No. 58, issued by General Otis as Military Governor, April 23, 1900, and amending the Spanish criminal code of procedure. It covered the subjects of prosecution, rights of the accused at trial, arraignment and council, demurrers and pleas, incidents of the trial, appeals, the record. Also trials in justices' courts, evidence and proof, bail, writ of *Habeas Corpus*, search warrants, and others. This order is the law of the Philippine Islands today, and will be found on the desk of every judge and justice in the archipelago.

chief, but by no means unimportant, official being a *cabeza*, or head man, who was directly responsible to the *presidente*, as the *presidente* was to the governor of the province, and the latter in his turn to the governor-general of the archipelago.

This system or chain of responsibility was admirably adapted to military government and was quickly adopted by the army in its dealing with the native population. As soon as the strength of the army permitted, companies were stationed in each *pueblo* with detachments in less important places, the local commanding officers thus being responsible to their superiors for the peace and good order of the communities where they were stationed, and facilitating the enforcement of the order referred to above.

Early in 1900 General Otis, deeming the conditions favorable for such a step, convened a board to prepare a form of municipal government for the *pueblos* or towns occupied by the American forces. The labors of this board were embodied and published, March 29, 1900, in General Orders, No. 40, Office of the Military Governor, referred to above, and municipal governments were established thereunder. A part of this order is quoted to show its purpose and to give an insight into the conditions existing at that time.

"OFFICE OF THE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

"MANILA, P. I., March 29, 1900.

"GENERAL ORDERS,

"No. 40.

"The Board of which his Honor, Don Cayetano Arellano, Chief Justice of the Philippines, is President, and which was called in General Orders, No. 18, of January 29th, last, from this office, to submit a form of municipal government for such of the *municipios* of the Islands as are prepared to adopt representative control over their own civil affairs, and which may become applicable to others as soon as they demonstrate a fitness for self administration, having reported a plan of government which meets existing conditions, the same is approved and will receive practical application in accordance with the mode of procedure therein outlined.

"It is with great satisfaction that the United States authorities, in consonance with former promises, promulgate in this order the law by which the municipalities of the towns of the Philippines are to be established and governed in the future. The law is inspired by a genuinely liberal spirit and the principles of autonomous government. It is in itself educating. It is calculated to urge on the people in the path of true progress, if they are desirous to understand their duties as free citizens and make legitimate use of their privileges.

"For the first time the Philippine people are to exercise the right of suffrage in the election of municipal officers—a right only slightly restricted by conditions which have been imposed for the purpose of rewarding as well as encouraging the people in their

just and natural aspirations to become educated, and worthy to enjoy all the benefit of civilization. With the new municipalities, a really autonomous and decentralized municipal government will be established in the towns. * * * * *

“It will be noted also that the ample powers given the *Alcalde* (the representative of the executive power) to punish and repress misdemeanors and infringements of a governmental or administrative character, provide that before a penalty or correction can be applied the accused must be heard, and allowed to submit evidence in his behalf—a proceeding heretofore unknown in these Islands.

“A reading of the provisions of the law clearly demonstrates the purpose, tendencies, and beneficent intention of the United States Government. Naturally, it is impossible to frame legal provisions which are perfect, but these are susceptible of future improvement in order that they may meet future necessities and keep pace with the development in political knowledge of the Philippine people, with whom now rests the creation of municipalities which shall faithfully administer their interests and protect their rights and liberties.”

Then follow the provisions of the law, too long to be given here, but an examination will show that they were an amplification of the government provided for in G. O., No. 43, already considered. G. O., No. 40, have also been adopted by the Civil Commission as the foundation of the municipal code in accordance with which the *pueblos* are governed today.

Much more could be said in this connection, but there is already enough to show that the military government is not necessarily arbitrary, and that the army, once active resistance has ceased, can administer a government where justice shall be maintained and individual rights secured.

But the American people are by tradition opposed to military rule. To them it is autocratic and savors too much of despotism. For this reason, probably, it has always been found that where the American army has been called upon to administer military government it has, as soon as possible, introduced civil forms and paved the way for as speedy a restoration of peaceful conditions as circumstances would permit. So it has been in the Philippines, military commanders not only disturbing as little as possible the local *pueblo* officials when discharging their duties in good faith, but aiding them in many ways in the administration of good government. It has, of course, often been necessary to punish these same officials for treasonable conduct, but this only rendered more complex the problems that had to be solved. It is probable that the civil administrative work done by the army in these islands will never be thoroughly appreciated, but it is safe to say that never again will the *pueblo* affairs be administered throughout with the same integrity, same economy and thoroughness, as when under the supervision of the United States army. Taxes were honestly collected and municipal disbursements carefully scrutinized. Public works were undertaken and carried

through, roads and bridges built, schools opened and attendance enforced, enlisted men being detailed as teachers, and officers themselves often conducting classes. Streets were graded, towns drained, and a condition of sanitation introduced that, in the Philippine Islands, is only possible under military rule. The pueblos became models of neatness and a spirit of wholesome rivalry was engendered. Vaccination was made compulsory, and small-pox instead of recurring as a yearly epidemic has now lost its terrors. Interference in church matters was strictly avoided, and little by little the people were led to understand what was meant by the separation of the Church and State. Nor were these efforts spasmodic or confined to particular localities, but were general throughout the islands wherever and whenever the work of pacification permitted.

THE MOROS.

In the islands occupied by the Moros a different method from that outlined above was pursued. These people had never been thoroughly subjugated by the Spaniards and had been permitted, in a great measure, to manage their own affairs. Possessing a wholly different religion, to say nothing of customs and laws, the American authorities recognized that any attempt to suddenly force upon them a new government would undoubtedly lead to a war that would result in their extermination. This, if possible, was to be avoided, and, accordingly, steps were taken that finally culminated in a treaty by which they retained their tribal relations and were little interfered with by the Americans.

This treaty has been a subject of much criticism in the States, but it is believed that time will show the wisdom of the measure.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE ISLANDS WHILE UNDER MILITARY RULE.

While all the functions of government of a hostile territory occupied by an invading army are suspended by virtue of such occupation, the laws of that territory, on the contrary, both civil and criminal, continue in force unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power.¹ In fact, even when the occupation becomes permanent it is a principal of international law that the local laws continue in force until abrogated or suspended by the new government.

But in an occupied or conquered country it cannot be expected that the local courts, supposing them to be open and in the discharge of their functions, would administer impartial justice in cases of violation of the

(1) G. O., No. 100, A. G. O., 1863, par. 6.

laws of war by the native inhabitants, or of crimes committed by them against members of the invading army. For this reason the laws of war have authorized the institution by the commanding general in the field, of military tribunals having jurisdiction of these crimes, and, in fact, of all legal controversies, civil as well as criminal, arising in the occupied territory, should he so order.¹

In our service these tribunals are known as the military commission, consisting of one or more officers, generally three,² with plenary jurisdiction, and a minor tribunal called the provost court, consisting of one officer and having a limited jurisdiction determined by the general commanding.

In the Philippine Islands these tribunals have tried many hundreds of cases and have inflicted punishments varying from small fines, or a few days' imprisonment, to forfeitures of many thousands of dollars and the infliction of the death penalty.

While these tribunals have been necessary instruments in the suppression of crime at a time when crime was common, they have also been powerful adjuncts, especially the provost court, in putting an end to the insurrection, and making the establishment of civil government possible. The manner in which the insurrectos carried on their guerilla warfare has already been pointed out. Even when active resistance in a locality had apparently ceased it was found that warlike measures were still carried on, supplies and money were still collected, men enlisted, and a reign of terror and intimidation introduced that made it worth the life of one well disposed towards the United States to so declare himself.

It was known that the leading men of the very towns where the troops were stationed were often engaged in these practices, and in intimidating the poorer classes over whom, on account of their position, they wielded a powerful influence. It thus became necessary to determine who these men were, single them out in the community, punish them, and thus deter others from following in their footsteps. This the provost courts did, their investigations oftentimes extending over months before sufficient evidence could be obtained to convict the guilty parties. But once convicted, their punishment, though often light compared with the gravity of the offence—that of being a war traitor—was swift and certain, and led many to conclude that the war was unprofitable and peace desirable. Their influence, too, when once they had been convicted, was strong, and many insurrectos in the mountains were induced

(1) See *Mechanics' and Traders' Bank vs. Union Bank*, 22 Wallace, 276.

(2) See, however, *Davis's Military Law*, 2d. ed., p. 309—Composition.

to surrender because some relative or friend had encountered the heavy hand of the provost court, and was languishing in prison. These offences, however, were political and when hostilities ceased the sentences of those undergoing punishment were generally remitted and the prisoners released.

But much of the work of the provost courts was analogous to that of police magistrates in the States, having to do with breaches of the peace and violations of the regulations established for the good government of the community. As soon, however, as the *peublos* had been organized non-political offences were generally left to the local courts, the military interfering only when manifest injustice was being committed, or the welfare of the command was threatened.

The maximum punishment that could be awarded by the provost courts in the provinces was an imprisonment for two years and a fine of one thousand pesos. The collections from this source produced a considerable revenue which was applied at first to the benefit of the community where the fine was collected, such as the payment of school-teachers, public improvements, the relief of the poor, etc.¹ Later on provost court funds were turned into the insular treasury and became a part of the general funds of the islands.

Such, in brief, is a meagre outline of the achievements of our soldiers in these islands, beginning with the volunteers in 1898, and ending with the regular army July 4, 1902. A thankless task it has been, but one that will shed new lustre on American arms and on the American people when once the mists of prejudice shall clear away.

(1) The writer is cognizant of an instance where General Bell, when commanding in the north of Luzon, purchased from this fund several thousand dollars' worth of galvanized iron roofing to repair schoolhouses that had been partially destroyed during the insurrection against Spain.

WHY CRIMINALS OF GENIUS HAVE NO TYPE

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STUDENTS of criminal anthropology have had to confess, from the very beginning, that the ensemble of abnormal facial characteristics which form the criminal type—the very heart of all our new science—is almost always wanting in criminals of genius, and even in those of great intelligence. This fact is of immense importance, since one would naturally suppose that, as the question is one of two forms of degradation united in a single person, the characteristics of degeneration would be more numerous rather than the contrary.

This is what induced honest observers to deny the existence of a type, especially as regards individuals who impress the imagination and represent the maximum of danger to those about them, as, for instance, Napoleon I., whose human sacrifices surpassed the million, while the common murderer will cause, perhaps, at most, the death of eight or ten persons. But above all, criminal science has accustomed students to abstain from measuring, as judges too often do, the degeneration of the criminal according to the amount of harm which he has done, since, if one should follow this system, the carelessness of an engine driver, which causes a train to plunge into an abyss, should be judged as more criminal than the outrages of the most ferocious brigand. It must also be taken into consideration that the number of men of genius is very small, and naturally that of the criminals of genius even smaller. If, in a quota of born criminals there is a percentage of thirty-five immunes from external degenerative features, there must also be a similar percentage among criminals of genius. On the other hand, malefactors of genius have by nature no type (while all others have) when they belong to almost or quite barbarous populations; their criminality is not then a diseased, but a physiological, characteristic; crime for them, as for their fellows, being nothing but a deed that, at most, finds an occasion or a special help in their strength and intelligence. Thus I explain the fact that Sardinian and Calabrese chiefs of brigands have in general almost no features that distinguish them from the population among which they live. Of these it is enough to cite Delogu, Carbone, Gusai, Farina, Mariani.

Sanna Salaris¹ writes that twenty-four per cent of Sardinian sanguinaries are entirely lacking in the criminal type, and thirty-two per cent have only half the type, while of other criminals fifty-four

(1) See *Una centuria di Delinquenti Sardi*, edited by Bocca, Turin.

per cent are without type and only twenty-four per cent with half. In "Criminal Man" ("Uomo delinquente") I have also demonstrated that Pace, Franchi, Malaguti, Venetu, Pasquali, Carbone (Southern brigands) have no type, and Church depicts us the Varadelli as real mediæval heroes, very handsome physically, and under some aspects, even morally. It is also true that many of the offences of the criminal of genius rise much above those of the born criminal, and therefore the facial characteristics also have a less hereditary base, with fewer signs of brutality, and more easily concealed by the general lines. Michon finds that in the handwriting of criminals of genius "the lines of cleverness veil and sometimes suppress the characteristics of criminality, as, for instance, in Lucenair."

The habit of complicated or elevated thought gives a special facial cast (high forehead, large cranium, orthognathous face), which is just the reverse of that of criminals. The hereditary type of the born criminal, beside degeneration, is due to brutal, sensual habits, peculiar to brothels and low inns, to sensual abuse which renew the customs of primitive man, and to the accentuation of certain facial and cranial characteristics, such as the narrow, peaked forehead, and the highly curved eyebrows and zigoma,—features that are never found with great mental power, and are, therefore, naturally lacking in criminals of unusual intelligence. It is known that many anomalies are found in correlation with others, and it is thus probable that the excessive development of the cheek bones diminishes with the widening of the forehead and the development of thought; there is, thus, less need of unusual muscular force, as this is compensated for by astuteness and intelligence. Here we find a reason why the jaw-bone is less prominent. Ottolenghi justly observes¹ that criminals of genius have no type for the same reason that the weak-witted exhibit the maximum of the degenerative features, and the victims of paranoia the minimum, for while the moral sense is often wanting in both, intellectual development is very considerable in those suffering from paranoia, and, since these are more mature, mentally they have no longer any trace of that hereditary type which, on the contrary, is very prominent in the weak-witted.

The criminal type is found principally in those who in their actions reproduce essentially hereditary tendencies,—rape, murder, extortion, with the accompanying hereditary violence; and it is natural that the type should not exist, when the crimes are forgery and fraud, which require a certain subtleness and delicacy of traits, and belong, indeed, to modern

(1) *Archives*, vol. xx.

progressive criminality. It is, in fact, a specialty of many criminals of genius, such as Desrue and Holmes, to commit horrid crimes by perfected means and arts without ever resorting to brutal violence; they are criminals who have recourse to murder, not from passion for blood, but only to obtain their ultimate object,—money. Some of them had, in the beginning, only criminal tendencies, but opportunity led them into occasional wrong-doing; the practice became habitual, and they traversed the whole scale of crime. Thus we see Tiburzi and Fioravanti, who had no criminal tendencies, not even excessive avidity, and who, when circumstances were favorable for attaining their objects, did not profit by them to shed blood needlessly; they became thorough criminals, though they tried at the same time to exercise justice, and thus proved that they had a high instinct of right.

Here it will be advisable to give more minute demonstrations by a rapid glance at the lives of those criminals who the better illustrate my thought.

Let us begin with Holmes, who was certainly the most considerable and the most modern criminal of the nineteenth century. From a study of his photographs I am convinced that, even though he was exaggeratedly dolichocephalous, with dark hair and heavy eyebrows,—in which features he differs a little from the normal Anglo-Saxon,—and to a certain degree platycephalous,—pale, with thin lips,—he exhibited on the whole a scarcity of degenerative features, which were certainly not in proportion to the moral anomalies. There were, on the contrary, a number of distinctly normal features,—such as scarcity of wrinkles, abundance of beard, good conformation of the teeth, and a long and undulating nose. It is still more singular that in him the graphical features of murderers were wanting, the too energetic traits of the pen, the round letters, the underlinings, the brackets, the exaggerated capital letters, and the enormous size of the first and finishing letters. His handwriting as a whole presented characteristics common to all intelligent, cultivated, and energetic persons.

Not even in his youth were there traces of his bad character. When a child it seems he showed extraordinary intelligence, so that he was adopted by a rich patron who sustained the expenses of his studies, which he accomplished brilliantly, taking his degree in medicine. It was only after he was thirty years of age that he met Pitezel, his first victim, a man with little brain, whom he made his associate and goose to lay the golden egg, as he insured the life of the man in a very complicated policy, and so arranged that in case of death, a large portion of the insurance would come to him. A few months later Pietzel was found dead in his room

with an explosive bottle broken near him. In his last days Pitezel had assumed the name of Perry, but Holmes succeeded in demonstrating to the insurance company the identity of the body by making Alice Pitezel, a girl of fourteen, swear to the identity of her father. The change of name to that of Perry had been made in order that the news of his death should not reach his wife through the newspapers, and that it would be safe to send a telegram to the daughter Alice, signed by Pitezel, to induce her to leave her family. This witness, after having thus been made use of, became doubly dangerous and disappeared in an unknown way, as no trace of her was ever found. The mother was not alarmed because Holmes, always in the name of the father, wrote to her that he had placed the girl in a school to better her education, and he continued thus for several years to communicate with Mrs. Pitezel in her daughter's name, giving news of her health and studies. For his security, however, it was necessary that the whole family should disappear, and he began by entrapping with apocryphal letters, a sister and a younger brother of Alice, who soon disappeared in like manner. Meanwhile he sent to the mother little packages containing bombs, to be taken here and there, hoping that one of them would explode and kill her and her family. This plan failed, and when she continued to ask news of her husband and children, he answered, giving her appointments now in one place, now in another, and then postponing them at the last moment. The poor woman, knowing little English and being little intelligent, never doubted him, but after ten years went to Chicago at the insistence of her eldest daughter, who was clever and spirited and determined to make an investigation. Holmes at once offered them a dinner, with the intention, probably, of poisoning them, but the daughter refused. He then again began offering new and strange appointments, but no notice was taken of them as the girl had already begun to suspect the truth, and interrogating the neighbors had found that ten years before a man had died, who was called Perry, which was not his real name, and that he had been recognized by his daughter. The astute girl, ignoring Holmes' telegrams and appointments, succeeded in ascertaining that Pitezel was really dead and that his life insurance had been withdrawn by his *father*. As soon as Holmes was in prison, from everywhere came reports of deaths, and of insurance policies paid to the prisoner under various names. He had outside of the city a manufactory of chemicals, all his employees had their lives insured, and all, after a certain time, disappeared. In the manufactory—to which the sinister name of "Castle of Death" had already been given—were found rooms the doors of which closed behind one with a spring, the unfortunate inmate thus trapped was asphyxiated and fell into a bath of

sulphuric or nitric acid, which completely consumed the body. It seems that in this way a new partner, who had brought a considerable sum of money to the firm, a girl acting as secretary whom he had promised to marry, and several employees, had been killed. During the trial it was discovered that Holmes also circulated counterfeit money, and that, under different names, he had married three women to all of whom he showed much affection, and neither one suspected the existence of the other. It was also found that other persons whom he had destined to die before long, were, under false names, insured in different life insurance societies, so that, through a complicated mechanism, he could get two or three policies on each person at their death.

All these combinations indicate the true criminal of genius, and how clever he showed himself in his defense, especially when, near the close of the trial, having no hope, and studying my "*Uomo delinquente*," he tried to appear as a moral lunatic, as a born criminal, inventing and describing a long series of crimes which he had never committed, exaggerating those which he had committed, and pretending that his physiognomy had changed in the later years of his life, which was totally untrue. In conclusion we see that Holmes made use of every resource, even the smallest, which modern science gives a man to commit evil: medical art, knowledge of chemistry and poisons, graphical ability, grasp of the mechanism of life insurance, etc. He represents, in other words, that same progress in crime which the North American people have made in the application of science to industry. He is the criminal, rapacious, more than cruel, needful of the power that gold gives, so much so that his murders are always chemical play, poisonings, explosions, with the object of enormous and immediate gain, each crime being invariably preceded and followed by forgery and fraud, and committed without recourse to sanguinary violence. He was not a murderer who killed for the pleasure of killing, but a swindler who killed when he could not reach his object in any other way. This is why he is lacking in the external features of the born criminal, there being at most only some anomalies which are common in swindlers and poisoners. The psychical characteristics are, however, not wanting, such as the absence of remorse, imperturbability when confronted with the proofs of his crimes and with the victim from whom he stole children and husband, and at whom he looks tranquilly while she cries and despairs, the lasciviousness common to all swindlers, the vanity of crime, and exaggeration in confessing crimes partly imaginary. However, the criminal cleverness is not wanting in a diseased aspect shown in the excess of complications, as well as in the want of foresight, which was demonstrated when he placed the body of his first victim in such a way that any scientist

would at once understand that death was not due to an explosion.

In Italy we had the famous chief of brigands, Tiburzi, who had an immense cranium, high forehead, tranquil and serene countenance, such as that of the famous writer, Correnti. The autopsy of Tiburzi only showed a greater subdivision than is usual of the frontal circumvolutions (which is not proven to be necessarily peculiar to criminals), and no one of those histological anomalies of the brain which the new school has discovered in malefactors. But in him also there was criminality much less hereditary and cruel than that of the ordinary criminal. In fact, up to twenty years of age he had committed no crimes, and not even one of those ferocious acts in which born criminals always indulge. He was already thirty-one when, in 1877, he perpetrated his first murder, killing a forester with whom he had quarreled. For this crime he was condemned to eighteen years' imprisonment with hard labor, but in 1882 he escaped and joined a band of brigands.

After his escape he committed murder twice, manslaughter five times, assault with robbery three times, theft twice, woundings twice, incendiary four times, but his principal crime was extortion to which he resorted about twenty-four times. In his last years he abandoned assault for robbery on the public roads, and that is the reason why, after the first years of his sad career, he disdained to associate with professional brigands, such as Menichetti and Ansuini. In general his bloody crimes were not the effect of that wantonness and cruelty with which born criminals are affected, but were the consequence of revenge and revindication, which, in barbarous countries, represent justice, and without which the infamous profession of brigandage could not be exercised. He slew, for instance, a shepherd, a certain Pecorelli, because he had killed a pig belonging to his son, but he first made sure of the shepherd's guilt, he verified and counted the nails in the shepherd's shoes and compared them with the marks left in the soft earth, thus acting just as any lawyer would have done, helped by a clever expert; he killed his colleague, Pastorino, in a kind of real duel, provoked by an insult, also a certain Becchinelli, in order to put an end to his excesses which threatened to compromise Tiburzi himself, and, finally, Gabrielli, because he thought he was a spy. To sum up, his crimes had not rapine as their object, but the execution of brigandage laws over spies and outlaws, who attempted to invade his domain and disturb the tranquility of his feudal lords, namely, the landowners by whom he was protected and whom he, in his turn, shielded from the attacks of others.

"He," Sighele justly observes, "transformed crime into a contract and theft into taxation, strange metamorphosis, in which one does not know

whether the astuteness of him who accomplishes it is more admirable than the cowardliness of him who accepts it." A crown council thus confessed to Sighele, "From the day we had Tiburzi, crimes in the commune of Viterbo were notably diminished, because malefactors were more afraid of him than they were of the law." At a trial held at Viterbo against the accomplices of, and those who favored, Tiburzi, a police official testified that landowners considered Tiburzi as a necessary evil, and paid him taxes both to be left unmolested, and because the service of public security was in reality maintained by the brigands, which statement meant that brigandage accomplished a true social and political mission. In other words, Tiburzi, one may say, undertook the tranquility of that district by contract (and it seems that he got not less than six thousand dollars a year through the transaction) and succeeded in maintaining peace by the authority of his person alone. To live easily and to make his dependents do likewise, he treated with the landed proprietors as between power and power, and established for each a fixed tax, according to the extent of their belongings, granting in exchange—better than the constituted authorities could have done—the tranquil holding of their possessions. He not only cleared the forests of other brigands, but kept relative justice there, even acting the part of police in strikes, obliging striking harvesters to return to their work by simply displaying his own forces. With the local proprietors and the sportsmen in the environs of Viterbo he conversed as a gentleman on the topics of the day, without revealing the sanguinary man. As would an English landlord, he left his domain for many months of the year and lived as a "grand seigneur" in Rome and Paris, without ever betraying himself by a vain or impulsive act, as a born criminal would have done, which is a new proof of that strength of self-denial seen only among normal, or almost normal, persons, and never in the born criminal. To do all this, to exercise for over twenty-four years an incontestable dominion, Tiburzi needed also singular intelligence, administrative and strategical ability, and such temperance and self-denial as is not usual in born criminals, and also relative, and perhaps absolute, genius. If he had been born in a propitious century he would have become a Sforza, a Piccinino, or a Medici of the Black Band, and very likely he would have founded a dynasty, as he had all the aptitude for it. One of his adventures was really worthy of a Sforza, that in which he, accompanied by Fioravanti alone, appeared at a farmhouse where fifty harvesters (Adolfo Rossi, who made a journalistic inquiry about him, says eighty) armed with scythes and whips were gathered, and intimated to them to withdraw, that he might kill Gabrielli.

There are, however, other reasons which better explain his want of type, as well as the regularity of his features, the principal reason being that he, in great part, reproduced the local color and nature of the inhabitants of his district. The roads there are beds of mountain torrents often impracticable, on which horses refuse to go. Imagine a vast, hilly tract, the only wooded region there, sixteen thousand, four hundred and thirty-five acres in extent, on which volcanic eruptions have thrown enormous heaps of dark masses, covered with moss and creeping plants of all kinds, thorns, and here and there trunks of old trees, and under them holes and caverns known to the brigands and unknown to the police. "Put a practical man here," the foresters said to Rossi, "and then tell me who can discover him!"

The civil atmosphere of that district was worse than the natural formation of the land. In fact, Rossi says that Cellere, where Tiburzi was born, is a place celebrated for its ancient criminality. It seems that originally it was inhabited by Albanians who gave, in great and in small, in all spheres, as high even as the ministerial, a very large percentage to Italian criminality. It was in an outskirt of Cellere, at Tamiano, that other famous brigands sprang up, such as the celebrated Veleno, eventually murdered by his parish priest who had a knife in his pocket and killed Veleno with little charity, but most opportunely, while having his eyes bandaged by this brigand who had attacked him.

Tiburzi, who felt very strongly the love of his birthplace, never touched the peasants. To explain his power and prestige it must be added that in that region, just because tendencies were more primitive, justice with its proverbial slowness and administered through a corrupt and impotent bureaucracy, had no power against him, while brusque, active insolence, adapted to the place because energetic, had direct and efficacious influence, gave him great prestige, and accomplished, at the same time, a truly social function.

Luciani, an unusually clever journalist, adulterer, murderer, perhaps thief,—certainly the brother and son of thieves,—had nothing of the criminal except the unsteady temperament, now sweet, now ferocious. His forehead was ample, he wore a luxuriant beard, and he had an intelligence so acute that, although not very cultured, he became one of the best journalists in Italy, and only just missed being elected Deputy at Rome, although he had not the required age. He, partly because of adultery, partly for professional reasons, induced another person to kill the proprietor and editor of the paper of which he was one of the staff, whose wife he had stolen.

In all of the above instances the type is lacking, or almost so, because of the fact that the genius dims the crime, and is much superior to it. It must also be noted, as De Candolles illustrated so well, that the majority of men of genius come from the cultured classes, especially from the upper middle classes, while criminals more often come from the humbler ranks of life. Among the latter, as has been well noticed by Samuel Smith¹ we find more frequently, through muscular exercise features which are confounded with those of degenerates, such as the great development of the jaw-bone and cheek bones. Beside the consideration that criminals of genius generally belong to the higher classes, it must be remarked that the least criminality added to a more or less pronounced intelligence obtains injurious effects one hundred times worse than those produced by common criminals without genius, culture, or prudence. So the most mediocre malefactor possessed of genius passes for a great criminal because of the terrible effect of his deeds; Dante well says:—

“Chè dove l'argomento della mente
Si giunge al mal volere ed alla possà,
Nessun riparo vi può far la gente.”²

The explanation is that intelligence is the soul of things; it is such a lever that it can raise a little criminal, an individual with scarcely the tendencies to crime, simply through a diminution of the moral sense, to the most terrible heights of wrong-doing; intelligence is a wind which can transform a small spark into a great fire. Hence we consider these individuals much more criminal than the degenerates, while in reality they are so only in a limited degree, and we only so consider them because of the damage which they do, in the same way that in monarchical countries we regard regicides as terrible malefactors because their crime is so disastrous in its consequences to the country, while in many cases they are simply criminals from passion.

Sometimes we have also in savage criminals the absence of any type. This is explained by the fact that criminality developed at a late age through meningitis, osteocope, or syphilis, and consequently the natural criminal features, and partly those which are generally acquired, are not discernible. I studied in Turin for a long time a certain Ballor, who, when thirty years old, murdered an uncle and four women in the most pitiless way and

(1) See *Popular Science Monthly*, 1901.

(2) * * * for when brute force
And evil well are back'd with subtlety,
Resistance none avails.

succeeded for a long time in eluding the police, thanks to his extraordinary intelligence, and I did not find in him one criminal feature ; he appeared, in fact, like a shop clerk. Patient search proved to me afterwards that he was very good until his eighth year when he had meningitis, after which he became a thief, ravisher, and finally murderer. In this case meningitis instead of producing paralysis of the body induced paralysis of the moral sense, leaving the intelligence intact.

Thus I explain the crimes of the cruel Grasrubascia, recently beheaded in Austria, who committed violent rape, robbery, and lately, for an insignificant motive of revenge murdered Alton and his neice, and still, except for a very slight facial asymmetry, a certain greater development of the jaw-bone, and a lowering of one corner of the mouth, his appearance presented no anomalies. At the autopsy, conducted by Professor Ibsen of Innsbruck, of which I have just received the results, pachymeningitis and atrophy of the frontal circumvolutions were found, and what is more important, two osteomas inside the left frontal lobe, anomalies of which no one could have had any idea while he was alive.

The same can be said of Faella, an ex-Italian officer, honored by all, who left the army, undertook speculation in grain which failed, and started on his criminal career only after he was thirty. He began by forging commercial notes, bearing the signatures of rich friends, to be presented to their heirs after their deaths, the next step was to compass the deaths. He prepared a trap-door in his villa and invited there one of his richest and most intimate friends, Costa, who fell through the door and was killed. He then spread the rumor that Costa had run away, and presented a note for fourteen thousand dollars to the heirs and authorities, which aroused suspicion, and the crime and his guilt were discovered. Arrested, he tried to prove an alibi, denied any crime, and finally, when he saw that he was on the point of being condemned, took his own life. This man, who in all his life had never shown any abnormal characteristics except a great hyperæsthesia to light and alcohol, and whose physiognomy was completely similar to that of King Humbert, was found when the autopsy took place to have beside valvular insufficiency, pericarditis, enormous pachymeningitis, and big spiny osteomas in the falx major, which penetrated into the ascendent parietal circumvolutions. Every one knows that osteomas, especially in the young, are very rare,—even among lunatics there are only two or three per cent,—and particularly so are the spiny, and that they produce an irritative process, the so-called dry pachymeningitis.

Gasparone was certainly a type of the born criminal as he never understood what remorse or guilt were, and as, according to the revela-

tions of his secretary, Nasi, he used to kill a man with less repugnance than a butcher kills a lamb. However, he had a real dislike to continued labor, so that after having not only been pardoned but having obtained a well remunerated office from the Papal Government, he returned to brigandage, showing true strategic genius, demonstrated in many cases but especially on one occasion when, surrounded by twenty thousand Austrians in a narrow valley, he succeeded in escaping by having his brigands put the same white band in their caps which he saw on the heads of his enemies, and thus he was taken for an ally. In his countenance there were no pronounced anomalies but his skull presented a Wormian bone in the bregma, which recalls the third eye of the reptile fossils, and a long series of anomalies in the right frontal circumvolutions.

Sometimes, as in Vacher, neither brain nor skull shows well defined anomalies, while the histological anomalies are pronounced, such as the want of granular stratum, the hypertrophy of the pyramidal cells, etc.

Some years ago, Willigh had already noted in a young innkeeper of Prague, murderer of his clients, and who apparently had no anomalies either in skull or physiognomy, an extraordinary number of pigments in the nervous cells, especially in those of the frontal lobe.

A few years ago, in my clinic, a young man died by committing suicide, who, after he was eighteen years old and had suffered typhoid fever, stole money and other small objects, first from his schoolmates, then at home, then in the public shops; arrested, he showed with complaisance the newspaper which spoke of his crime, and yet he was a student of literature, very intelligent, of good family, and had composed poems which might have procured him great fame. This man had no facial criminal characteristics, a very fine formation of the skull, and a handsome and pleasant face, but when the autopsy took place histological anomalies were found, especially the atrophy of the granulous stratus and of the nerve cells of the white substance of the brain, which our school declares specific of criminals.

It also happens with genius that even having the criminal type it passes unnoticed no matter how pronounced. A certain number of men of genius which I consider criminal, as they were always cruel, sometimes even sanguinary without cause, and indifferent to the sufferings of others, such as Alexander the Great, Napoleon I., and Peter the Great, have the type complete, and only the prestige coming from their great deeds (which always augments after death) makes us blind, so that in them, physically and morally, we only see the traits of genius and not those of the criminal. It is certain that in the busts and portraits of Napoleon I., after the Consulate, we find no more the asymmetric face, stern eyes, the exaggera-

tion of the jaw-bones, and the alveolar pragnathism which he really had, and, in the same way, few busts of Alexander the Great reveal his criminal type, with vertical wrinkles in the forehead, with the acrocephaly, etc. The same thing happens with us in judging their actions; we go to the point of excusing common crimes (murder of the prince of Enghien), and even as far as considering the butchery of the Borgias as works of genius, as did Machiavelli, and admiring the most insensate enterprises, such as those of Napoleon in Spain and Russia, and those of Alexander in India, taking them for profound conceptions as though errors and crimes, when made on a large scale, change their nature. Not only do people forgive, but they forget, the cynical indifference of Napoleon to the thousands of deaths which he caused and at the sight of which he did not know what to say except, "A night of Paris will adjust all this," and they also forget the order to shoot "en masse" three hundred innocent Calabrese, setting fire to their village, because some one had shot at his soldiers, and they forget the parricide of Peter the Great, and the firing of an entire city at the order of Alexander the Great only to please a courtesan, who murdered his best friend.

In conclusion, in criminals of genius the type is often lacking because the lines of genius, which belong to the greater evolution of humanity, tend to overshadow the hereditary traits of the criminal, but sometimes, however, it is the prestige which genius inspires which makes us shut our eyes to the signs of the type, and again, in other cases, what the face does not reveal is discovered especially by the anomaly of the brain and skull which death alone can make clear.

THE DRAMA IN SPAIN

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IN THE middle ages a simple sort of drama had been slowly evolved out of the liturgy of the church; it had grown sturdily until in time it was strong enough to stand on its own feet; it took over the primitive farce of the strolling jesters and thus supplied itself with the comic contrast needful in any adequate representation of life; it spoke the language of the people and it embodied their beliefs and their aspirations; in short, altho it was as yet clumsily inartistic and frankly unliterary, it was at least alive; and it had won its right to survive. A single brief scene acted in the church, by the priests themselves, and in Latin, had slowly led to the performance of a sequence of scenes, in the vernacular, by laymen, outside of the church. The mystery, which was a sequence of scenes in the life of Jesus, had a rival in the miracle-play, which was a sequence of scenes in the life of some wonder-working saint. Disregarding the invisible line that divided the sacred from the profane, the medieval drama was in time able to take as the central figure of its straggling episodes a hero of secular legend or of romantic narrative, or even of actual fact. So the chronicle-play came into being, and the "history," such as we see it in Shakspeare; and while the miracle-play was intended to be exhibited gratuitously, in an open square, by bands of amateurs, upon some special occasion, the later chronicle-play was prepared to be performed by professional actors, at regular intervals, in a building set apart for the purpose, before an audience that had paid its way in.

It was at this moment of the development of the medieval drama that the Renaissance arrived, bringing with it the masterpieces of ancient art. Scholars in love with the severe beauty of Greek tragedy turned with disgust from the formlessness and the vulgarity of the popular performances. They could not know then that the Attic stage had grown out of beginnings quite as humble, and that the medieval drama needed only to be lifted into literature, just as the crude Hellenic dialog and chorus had been elevated by the power of the poet who had accepted the primitive form, filling it with the might of his genius. They did not perceive that the massive simplicity of Sophocles was due partly to the conditions under which his tragedies had been performed in the Theater of Dionysus,—conditions wholly unlike those obtaining in western Europe two thousand years later. Indeed, the scholars of the Renaissance gave little thought

to the actual performance, devoting their attention chiefly to the merely literary merits of the ancient dramatic poets, and accepting as the model to be followed not so much Sophocles, the marvelous playwright, as the unactable Seneca. They were impatient to thrust on one side the rude but living drama of their own day, in order to make room for imitations,—and imitations rather of the clever Hispano-Roman rhetorician than of the noble Athenian dramatist. They did not perceive the vigorous vitality of the chronicle-play, which had established itself solidly in conformity with the actual conditions of the medieval theater; and they could not suspect that the plain people were right in clinging to the existing drama, shapeless as it was, and in resisting all attempts to substitute for it a merely literary exercise.

The chronicle-play was artless enough, but it was exactly suited to its public; it had a stage of its own, and actors to perform it, and audiences to enjoy it; and all that it needed was that the poets should perceive its possibilities, and that they should accept it as it was, biding their time to cleanse it from vulgarities, to bestow on it the art it lacked, and to give it the harmony and proportion it had neglected. The example of the great dramatists of antiquity could not but be useful to the poets who might attempt this purification of the drama of the middle ages; and the study not only of Sophocles, but even of Seneca, might be serviceable. And, as a matter of fact, we find that in the several modern languages a dramatic literature has come into existence only when successive poets have taken the popular form as they found it, and tried to give it something of the unity, the propriety, and the dignity which they had admired in the classics of Greece and Rome.

This is what happened in Spanish, in English, and in French; and in these languages the modern drama is an outgrowth of the medieval, modified more or less by the acceptance of the classic models. This influence of the ancients is most obvious in the French theater and least evident in the Spanish, while in the English it is pervasive rather than paraded. In Italy the scholars were opinionated and intolerant; the poets scorned the medieval drama, both serious and humorous, sacred-representations and comedy-of-masks; they insisted on casting aside all that the middle ages had accomplished and on returning absolutely to antiquity. The Italian men of letters did not firmly grasp the fact that a living drama is always the result of a long partnership between the audiences and the actors, and that it is always conditioned by the circumstances of its performance, including the traditions of the actual theater. As a result of this hostile attitude on the part of the leaders of the new culture, we discover that the Italians developed no dramatic literature of their own.

We perceive that their efforts resulted in little more than a few lifeless imitations from the antique, acted by main strength now and again, but failing absolutely to establish a new tradition in an actual theater. We observe also that the main body of the Italian public had to satisfy its desire for the drama with the unliterary and semi-acrobatic comedy-of-masks.

Perhaps it was this dearth of a living dramatic literature in their own language which helped to lead the Italian critics astray in their ingenious deduction of a code for the control of dramatic poetry. They spurned the only plays they had had occasion to see actually performed; and with the intellectual subtlety of their race at that epoch, they got together a body of rules, not exactly evolved out of their inner consciousness, but derived from their misinterpretation of what Horace and Aristotle had said. Misguided by what they had misread in the Roman lyricist (who had also no acted drama to sustain his theories) and by what they read into the Greek philosopher (who was specifically analyzing the Attic drama only, that being the sole theater he could know anything about), the Italian critics proceeded to set up the standard of the Three Unities,—the Unity of Action, the Unity of Time, and the Unity of Place,—insisting that a tragedy should have a single story to be completed in a single day and to be shown in a single place.

They persuaded not only themselves, but also the men-of-letters of all the other countries where the new learning established itself, that an acceptance of these rigid limitations was obligatory upon all the dramatic poets who might seek to follow in the footsteps of the ancients. But fortunately they were never able to convince the unlearned public that it was wise to insist on these arbitrary restrictions; and so it was that the practical playwrights, who were trying to interest the plain people, did not find themselves forced to enter the triple-barred cage of the Unities. The critics might protest shrilly, but the dramatists kept on working in freedom; and when the spectator had been amused by a play he never cared to raise any objection, even if the action did ramble along for many days and in many places.

We can see now that the Athenian audiences were in reality not more exacting than the English or the Spanish, since the code the Italian critics promulgated had often been violated in anticipation by the Attic dramatists. Even the Unity of Action is not always discoverable in a Greek play; and it is due to the accidental conditions of the performance in the Theater of Dionysus that the Unity of Time and the Unity of Place may seem generally to be observed. But altho the common sense of the broad public refused to hamper the playwright by needless limita-

tions of his liberty, the plays of the Greeks were not without immediate and abiding influence upon modern dramatic literature. In the course of the years, the severe restraint of the Attic drama and its majestic movement made a profound impression upon the popular playwrights, who began to choose loftier themes and to build their plots more artfully. Slowly the string of episodes came to be knit more closely together and the central characters came to be more veraciously brought out. The struggle, which is at the core of every good play, was more clearly seized and more boldly presented.

In all the modern languages, the loftier drama is the result of a stimulation of the actual folk-play, as we find it in the middle ages, by the study of a model supplied by the Attic stage directly or indirectly. The modern drama is due to a fecundation of the medieval by the antique. Of the new dramatic literatures thus elaborated from unliterary beginnings, one may owe more than another to the example of the great Greeks; but all of them owe much,—even the Spanish, in which the influence of the Renaissance is least obvious.

II.

The Renaissance has been called the bridge which connects the middle ages with modern life,—a bridge more than one span of which was built out of the relics of antiquity; and altho it would be an overstatement to assert that the most of the Spanish people did not care to go over to the new world of thought explored by the leaders of the Renaissance, it is not too much to suggest that those of the Spaniards who did venture across carried over with them more medieval characteristics than the Italians or the French burdened themselves with. The Renaissance was, above all things else, an emancipation of the human intelligence; it was a declaration of independence put at once into deeds; and this gift of freedom the Spanish people had no wish to accept. In fact, they were glad to reject it, for among them there was no parallel to the questioning curiosity of the Italians, to the speculative liberty of the Germans, and to the mental alertness of the English. Willingly they had accepted the guidance of the Inquisition; and to them the liberation of man's spirit was not only unwelcome,—it was even abhorrent. The Spaniards had no sympathy with the sensuous joyousness, the sheer delight in living, which stands out as an essential element of the Renaissance. The Spanish ideals were ever ascetic and mystic,—whatever might be their actual practices. However much they might in fact enjoy life, in theory at least they held it to be only a dark valley of transition; and here the

Madrid of Philip is as opposite as possible to the London of Elizabeth and the Florence of the Medici, as well as to the Athens of Pericles.

The evidence of this hostile attitude toward the newer ways of thinking is abundant on every page of Spanish history and in every contribution to Spanish literature; and nowhere is it more clearly visible than in the Spanish drama, which even in its best days is far more closely related to the medieval drama than is the later drama of France or even of England. In the splendid epoch of Lope de Vega and of Calderon and of the throng of inventive playwrights that encompasses them about, the Spanish drama is strangely similar to the drama of the middle ages. It is loose in its construction, careless of proportion, never afraid of monotony of topic, full of repetitions, devoid of concentration. It has always an air of improvisation; and altho it is never quite so unliterary as were most of the mysteries and the miracle-plays, it rarely attains conciseness of speech or polish of phrase; and very seldom indeed does it aspire to a true harmony of plot. It is as reckless in anachronism, and it reveals the same absence of the historic sense which is so distinct a characteristic of the medieval writers, to whom, as it has been well said, "past centuries seemed to form only a single and grand epoch in which were united all the celebrities of history." It deals with actions chiefly, but occasionally with emotions, and almost never with thought. Its temper is uncritical; and its tone is sometimes even more superstitious than was common in the medieval plays. Of course, the Spanish playwrights soon attained a technical skill such as no one of the unknown scribes of the middle ages could achieve; and indeed it is this dramaturgic adroitness which saliently differentiates the brisk Spanish plays from their lumbering medieval predecessors.

The rise of the theater in Spain was aided by two circumstances which were lacking in Italy. The Spanish had achieved their unity as the result of a strenuous effort sustained for years,—an effort which had stiffened the national will and aroused the national consciousness; and they had found at last a focus of national life in their new capital, where the dramatist could make sure of all sorts of spectators. The Spaniards also shared with the English a gift not bestowed on the Italians,—they were makers of ballads; and they had thus supplied themselves with an abundance of the material most fit for the playwright to handle, while the making of the ballads had helped to train their poets to deal directly and simply with situation and with character.

Throughout western Europe the folk-theater of the middle ages is very much the same everywhere; and in France as in England, in Italy as in Spain, we are shocked by the same irreverent commingling of the

sacred and the profane, and by the same obtrusion of realistic farce into plays intended for edification. For a while this gross incongruity was accepted with only slight protest; but after heroes from history and from romance had been substituted for the saints, and after the humor of the comic episodes had been broadened beyond the borders of decency, the ecclesiastical authorities sometimes became aware of the objectionable features. In Spain, for example, a formal law forbade a priest from taking part in "scornful plays" or from attending them; and it declared that such plays should not be performed in the churches. But the same law specifically authorized a priest to act in representations of the Nativity and of the Resurrection. "Such things as these move men to do well and be devout in the faith, and may be done in order to remind them that they really happened. But they must be performed with great decency and devotion in the large cities, where there are archbishops and bishops who may order them, and they must not be represented in villages nor poor places, or for the purpose of gain."

If this law was actually enforced, the villages and poor places could have had no other theatrical entertainment than that supplied by little bands of strolling players. These were probably as prevalent in Spain as in Italy and in France; and their repertory was as primitive. The leader of one such company was Lope de Rueda, who is hailed as the founder of the Spanish theater,—very much as Thespis is held to be the beginner of the Greek drama. He was at once sole playwright and chief performer. Cervantes tells us that "in the time of this celebrated Spaniard, all the apparatus of a manager was contained in a bag, and consisted of four white shepherd's jackets, bordered with gilt leather, four beards and wigs, and four shepherd's crooks, more or less. * * * The stage was merely composed of four square blocks of wood, upon which rested five or six boards, that were thus raised about four palms from the ground. * * * The furniture was an old blanket hung on two cords, making what they call the dressing-room, behind which were the musicians, who sang old ballads without a guitar." Here we find in Spain, just as we can find also in Greece a score of centuries earlier, one important actor accompanied by a few singers, performing upon a platform set up in the market-place with an improvised dressing-tent behind it.

Exactly what kind of play it was that Thespis was wont to act in his wanderings we can now only guess; but by good fortune certain of the simple pieces of Lope de Rueda have been preserved. They are very simple indeed; but they have the same open fidelity to the facts of life that we find in the English scene of Mak and the Shepherds and in the French farce of the "Tub"; and they are sustained by the same humor-

ous observation of human nature. One of them, entitled the "Olives," begins with the stepping up upon the stage of a Peasant, who calls his Wife. His Daughter it is who comes out from behind the dressing-room curtain, to say that her mother is at a neighbor's. While the Peasant scolds, the Wife returns, and bids her Daughter cook the father's supper. Then she asks if the Peasant has done as he promised,—if he has planted the olive tree? When she learns that this has been attended to, she foresees that in six or seven years the tree will yield them several measures of olives and that by planting the branches from time to time they will have a field of olives in a score of years; and then the Daughter will sell them for two reals a peck. At this the Peasant protests; the olives are not worth such a price. The Wife declares that they are, the tree being from Cordova; and in spite of her husband's objections, she turns to the Daughter and orders the girl to charge two reals. The Peasant calls the Daughter and bids her obey her father and not ask so much. The Wife insists on the girl's selling the olives for two reals. The Peasant furiously threatens to beat the child if she does not do as he tells her; and thereupon the Wife, also moved to anger, begins actually to beat the girl for disobedience. While the Daughter is beseeching both father and mother not to kill her, a Neighbor steps up on the stage to ask the reason of the outcry. The Peasant explains that the cause of dispute is the price to be asked for certain olives, and the Neighbor naturally asks to see them that he may judge for himself. When he is told that the tree is only that day planted and that the fruit they are quarreling about will not be gathered for many years, he laughs at them all, crying, "What an absurd quarrel! Who ever saw the like? The olives are scarcely planted—and yet they cause the poor girl to cry."

Nothing could be more unpretending than this little scene; and its most valuable quality was that it was perfectly portable, and that it called for neither scenery nor costumes. It could be acted wherever and whenever four performers happened to be banded together. Quite as elementary as the "Olives" is the "Blind Beggars and the Boy," written by a friend and follower of Lope de Rueda's, Juan de Timoneda. One Blind Beggar enters and whines forth his customary chant of entreaty. The other Blind Beggar comes on from the opposite side and also intones his prayer for alms. A Boy crosses the stage, and as he sees the first Blind Beggar he is about to flee, recognizing the master he has robbed and deserted. Then the urchin remembers that, since his master cannot see him, he is safe so long as he keeps quiet. After a time, the two Blind Beggars drop into chat with each other, while the Boy listens. Believing themselves to be alone, the two Blind Beggars discuss the advantages and

disadvantages of their calling; and at last the first tells the second how he has been robbed by his rascally boy. The second then explains how he protects himself by always carrying his ducats sewed in his cap,—whereupon the Boy steals forward, knocks off the precious cap, and escapes with it. The owner naturally supposes that it is the man he has been speaking with who has taken the cap, and he asks for its return; but of course the other at once denies all knowledge of it. Here is matter for a swift quarrel; and the little play ends with the two Blind Beggars engaged in an angry fight.

Even before the populace had been easily amused by lively trifles like these, and while the mystery was still at the height of its vogue, professed poets had sought to imitate the more scholarly attempts of the Italian men of letters. They had devised pastoral-plays, of varying poetic merit but always of a hopeless artificiality. If any of these pastoral-plays happened to be actually performed, it was always by amateurs, for they were written to delight a noble or a royal patron, much as masques were in England not long after and the latter mythological ballets of the French court. They were none of them composed to please a real public that had paid its money to see a genuine play; and, as might be expected, they seem to have had little or no influence on the growth of the acted drama. Until Lope de Rueda was followed by Lope de Vega, the literary play was not popular and the popular play was not literary. It was Lope de Vega who accepted the popular drama, such as it was, and gave it the art it lacked.

It is to be noted that one great figure intervenes between Lope de Rueda and Lope de Vega—the figure of Cervantes, the greatest in all Spanish literature. A score or more plays did Cervantes write; and they were actually acted with some small measure of success or—to use the words of the author himself—“without their receiving tribute of cucumbers or other missiles.” Of those early attempts two survive to show that Cervantes, like Balzac and like Tolstoi, had only a moderate share of play-making ability. They are not without merit, of course, for they came from the pen of Cervantes; but they are cumbrous, and sluggish, and almost as ill proportioned as the mysteries upon which they are modeled; they are wholly without the briskness and the pleasant inventiveness which Lope de Vega was soon to bestow on the Spanish drama. That Cervantes was lacking in the dramaturgic faculty is made evident again by the plays which he published later in life, after Lope had set up a new standard. Indisputable is it that Cervantes was far more richly endowed than Lope, and also that his single splendid achievement in fiction outweighs all that Lope ever accomplished in all the departments

of literature ; but equally undeniable is it that Lope had the one thing needful for success upon the stage, and that this was precisely the qualification which Cervantes wanted.

III.

Lope molded the Spanish drama to suit his own gifts ; he stamped it forever with the impress of his own personality ; and even if we must admit that Calderon, who came after, also rose higher, and that the younger poet surpassed the elder in the lyrical elevation of several of his plays, none the less must we remember always that the greatest dramas of Calderon are examples of a class of which Lope had set the first model. If we acknowledge, as we may, that even Calderon trod only where Lope had first broken the path, we must record that all the other dramatists of Spain were also followers in his footsteps. From out the numerous mass of Lope de Vega's works, it would be possible to select a satisfactory specimen of every species of the drama as it has existed in Spain. What Lope was, so was the Spanish drama. He came first, and he was the most original of all, the most fertile, the most indefatigable, the most various, the most multifarious.

His influence on the stage of Spain was far more potent and more durable than that of Sophocles on the theater of Greece or of Shakspeare on the drama of England. It was Lope who earliest discovered how to hold the interest of a modern audience by the easy intricacy of his story and by the surprising variety of the successive situations, each artfully prepared for by its predecessor. If Schlegel found an ingenious felicity of plot-making to be so characteristic of the Spanish drama that he was led to suspect a Spanish origin for any play in which he observed this quality, it was to the practice and to the precept of Lope de Vega that his fellow-dramatists owed their possession of this merit. One of these fellow-dramatists it was who summed up the good points of the Spanish drama in lines which have been thus Englished by G. H. Lewes :—

“Invention, interest, sprightly turns in plays,
Say what they will, are Spain's peculiar praise ;
Hers are the plots which strict attention seize,
Full of intrigue and yet disclosed with ease :
Hence scenes and acts her fertile stage affords
Unknown, unrivaled on the foreign boards.”

It was the lack of a metropolis which had helped to deprive the Italians of a drama worthy of their intellectual supremacy in the early

Renaissance; and it was the choice of Madrid as the capital which made possible the sudden outflowering of the Spanish dramatic literature. The many little bands of strolling players, similar to the company Lope de Rueda had directed, and containing performers of both sexes, looked longingly toward the court; and two of them were in time allowed to settle in the royal city, bringing with them their elementary repertory of songs and dances, of simple interludes and of lumbering chronicle-plays. The theater assigned to each of these companies was as primitive as the entertainment they proffered, for it was no more than the courtyard of a house. At the farther end of this courtyard was the shallow platform, which served as a stage, and which was shielded by a sloping roof. Near to the stage were a few benches, and then came the space where the main body of the rude public stood throughout the performance, unprotected from the weather. Behind them rose several tiers of seats, stretching back almost to the house, and affording accommodation for the women, who were kept apart from the men. Then the rooms of the house itself served as private boxes; and in time these came to be so highly valued that the right to one passed as an heirloom. A few privileged spectators were allowed seats on the sides of the stage. There was neither curtain nor scenery.

The performance took place by daylight in the early afternoon, so there was no need of artificial illumination. It began with the appearance of the musicians upon the stage itself, where they played on the guitar and sang popular ballads until an acceptable audience had gathered or until the boisterous impatience of those who had arrived compelled the actors to commence. Then the musicians withdrew; and a chief performer, often the manager himself, appeared to speak a prolog, amusing in itself and abounding in compliments to the audience. When at last he left the stage free, the actors who were to open the play came out and the first act was performed. Simple as was the medieval stage with its neutral ground backed by the stations, which became mansions in France and pageants in England, the Spanish stage was simpler still, since the stations were abolished and there remained only the neutral ground—the bare platform. Neither authors nor spectators ever bothered themselves about the place where the characters were at any moment supposed to be. The actors then engaged in carrying on the story were standing in sight of the audience; and this was the sole essential, the background being merely accidental. If by chance it became necessary for the audience to know just where the action was about to take place, then this information was furnished by the dialog itself, without any change of the stage-setting, the platform remaining bare of all scenery. Thus the dramatist was at

liberty to select such incidents of his fable as he saw fit, not having to consider the difficulty of making the successive places visible in the eyes of the spectators.

When the first act was ended the actors left the stage; the musicians came forward again; and there followed a song-and-dance or even a little ballad-farce to fill the interval between the acts of the chief play. Then the second act was presented in its turn; and after it there came another song-and-dance or another comical interlude. The third act of the play was always the last, for the Spanish dramatists early accepted a division into three parts. When the chief play was finally concluded, it was at once followed by a farce, and often also by one of the national dances; and then at last the entertainment came to an end, and the noisy and turbulent spectators withdrew, having applauded boisterously if they thought they had had their money's worth, and having with equal freedom made vocal their dissatisfaction if they did not happen to think so.

These were the apparently unfavorable conditions under which were represented the works of the dramatic poets of Spain at the moment when the drama flourished most exuberantly; and no one who knows the circumstances of the contemporary theater in England under Elizabeth can fail to perceive the striking similarity. The dramatic poets of England, like the dramatic poets of Spain, saw their plays produced by daylight, on an unadorned platform, set up in what was no more than the courtyard of an inn, open to the sky. The English plays, like the Spanish, were acted without scenery, before a noisy throng of groundlings who stood in the pit; and in England also there were what were called "jigs" by the clown between acts. The English plays, like the Spanish, were devised to please the public as a whole and not to delight only a special class. Such differences as there are between the Spanish drama and the English are due not to the conditions of the performance, but directly to the characteristics of the two peoples; and Shakspeare is not more representative of the Elizabethan Englishman than is Calderon of the contemporary Spaniard.

In Spain, as in England, the people had given proof that they possessed the first requisite of a truly national drama,—a steadfast determination, steeled for instant action. The Spanish kingdom was then seemingly at the very climax of its might; and having compacted the monarchy and driven out the Moors, having overrun half Europe and taken all America as their own, the Spaniards had the pride of a chosen people. They thrilled with a consciousness of a lofty destiny, while at the same time they accepted with enthusiasm feudal and chivalrous ideals of fidelity and loyalty and honor. Men of very varied individuality, they were united

in their devotion to the church, in which they had an unquestioning faith, and to the king, who ruled by divine right and could do no wrong. Lope de Vega, for example, had been in his youth a soldier on the Invincible Armada; and later he became a familiar of the Holy Inquisition. It is true that the religious fervor of the Spaniards was often only empty superstition; and that it was in no wise incompatible with a strangely contorted ethical code which approved of vengeance as a duty and justified murder to remove a stain from honor.

The Spanish language is a rich and sonorous tongue, as characteristic of the race that speaks it as is English or French; and in the hands of the dramatic poets Spanish lends itself readily to the display of an eloquence which only too often sinks into facile grandiloquence. One of the most marked peculiarities of these plays is a rhetorical redundancy which often rises into a lyrical copiousness, but which not infrequently also condenses itself into a sententious apothegm. The personages taking part are as likely to reveal a vehement luxuriance of phrase as they are to disclose a perverse subtlety of intellect. Formal and pompous their speech is on occasion; and at other times it is easy and natural, refreshing in its humorous lightness, sparkling with unpremeditated wit, and bristling with pungent proverbs. As we read these plays we are constantly reminded that Seneca and Lucan and Marcus Aurelius were all of them Spaniards.

IV.

These characteristics of the language itself, and of the people that spoke the language, are familiar to all who know "Don Quixote"; and they are made visible in the plays of every Spanish dramatist, especially in those of Lope de Vega, because there is scarcely any kind of drama which he was not the first to attempt. He has left us farces as slight in texture as those of Lope de Rueda; mysteries more artfully put together than those of the medieval scribes; chronicle-plays not unlike those of his immediate predecessors, but with a heightened dramatic interest; dramatized ballads and romances far more skilfully wrought than any seen on the stage before he took it for his own. He gave a lyric grace to the briefer religious plays, which were called sacramental-acts; and he himself invented the play of plot and intrigue and mystery which is known as the comedy-of-cloak-and-sword. He showed the same fertility of ingenuity in devising comedies of incident and of character. He solidly constructed somber tragedies of honor and revenge. He seems to have written hundreds of plays of every kind and description; and scores of them are still preserved in print. They vary greatly in merit;

many of them are mere improvisations; but very few of them fail to display his dexterity, his perfect understanding of the theater, his mastery of stagecraft.

The art of the playwright is a finer art today, no doubt; it is at once firmer and more delicate than was possible in the Spain which was just emerging from the middle ages; but the dramatists of every modern language are greatly indebted to the models set by Lope de Vega,—and none the less because the most of these later writers are unconscious of their obligation. Nowhere has modern dramaturgic craftsmanship been carried to a higher pitch of perfection than in France; and it must never be forgotten that the “*Cid*,” the first of French tragedies, and the “*Liar*,” the first of French comedies, were both of them borrowed by Corneille from Spanish plays written by contemporary disciples of Lope de Vega’s.

From out the immense mass of Lope de Vega’s dramatic works it is not easy to make choice of any single play as truly typical. The selection is indeed difficult when we have before us pieces of so many different classes, from the sacramental-acts and from mere dramatized anecdotes to comedies sometimes perfervidly lyrical and sometimes frankly prosaic, from chronicle-plays loosely epic in their structure to true tragedies with an ever-increasing tensivity of emotion. But one of his most famous plays is the “*Star of Seville*,” and perhaps this will serve as well as any to suggest his method of handling a story on the stage.

The first act begins with the King of Castile and his evil counselor, Arias, coming upon the stage with two of the Alcaldes of Seville, who compliment the monarch on his arrival. After they withdraw, the King asks eagerly about a beautiful girl he had remarked as he entered the city. Arias tells him that she is Estrella, known as the Star of Seville because of her loveliness, and that she is a sister of Bustos Tabera. The King confesses his sudden passion, and sends Arias to fetch Bustos to him, hoping through the brother to get at the sister. Then two Officers enter in turn, each asking the King for a vacant governorship; but he dismisses them without deciding. Arias returns with Bustos, a man of blunt honesty, who is surprised when the King proffers the governorship to him. He conceals his suspicions when the King flatters him, asks about his family, and finally promises to provide a proper husband for his sister. After the men have left the stage Estrella enters, so that the spectators are supposed now to be witnesses of a scene in her home. Accompanying her is Don Sancho, to whom she is betrothed and with whom she exchanges protestations of love. Bustos appears and tells his friend of the King’s intention of finding a fit husband for his sister; whereupon Don Sancho reproaches him for not having informed the monarch that

their marriage had been agreed upon. When they depart, the King and Arias enter, and the dialog makes it clear that they are now to be imagined as standing at the door of Estrella's dwelling. The King has come to visit the brother in hope of getting speech with the sister: but Bustos, when he appears, finds excuses for not asking the King to enter the house. So the monarch takes the brother off with him, leaving Arias behind to corrupt the sister. When the stage is again left empty, Estrella enters with her maid-servant; and therefore the audience perceives that they are within the house as before. Arias presents himself to tell Estrella of the King's passion for her; but her sole answer is to turn her back on him and walk out of the room. Thereupon Arias promptly bribes the servant to admit the King that night. After they depart, there is a scene at the palace; Arias comes in to report, and the delighted monarch bids him see that the servant is well rewarded. Then the King and his evil counselor leave the stage empty and bring to an end the first act,—an act of swift and spirited exposition, taking the spectator at once into the heart of the situation and exciting the interest of expectancy.

The second act opens with the admission of the King into Estrella's house, and with the unexpected return of Bustos, who confronts the intruder in the dark and demands his name. The King has to declare himself; but the sturdy fellow pretends not to believe this, asserting that the monarch, being the fountain of honor, would never have come there to bring dishonor. The King is thus forced to cross swords with the subject, but he escapes unhurt as soon as the servants bring lights. Bustos hangs the treacherous maid-servant, and bids his sister prepare for her immediate wedding with Don Sancho. In the later scenes the King, resolved on a private vengeance for a private affront, decides to have Bustos made away with by some devoted soldier; and at the suggestion of Arias he sends for Don Sancho. The monarch explains that he needs to have a guilty man slain, and gives Don Sancho a written warrant for the deed; but the loyal subject prefers to rely on the royal word, and destroys the authorization, agreeing to slay the man whose name is written in the sealed paper given to him by the King. Don Sancho, left alone, receives a letter from Estrella, telling him that her brother desires them to be married that very day. The soldier is doubly overjoyed, for this is now his wedding morn, and the King has just confided to him a dangerous task. Then he opens the paper to find that the name of the man he is to kill is Bustos Tabera. Horror-stricken, he debates his duty, only to decide at last that he must obey the King's command, kill his best friend and thereby give up his bride. At this moment Estrella's brother enters, and, to his astonishment, Don Sancho forces a quarrel on him.

They draw; Bustos is slain; and Don Sancho is led away to prison. Next the spectators are shown Estrella's happiness as she is decking herself for the bridal. But all too soon come the Alcaldes, bearing the body of Bustos, and telling her that the murderer of her brother is the bridegroom she is awaiting. And here ends the second act, wrought to a high pitch of intensity, with sudden alternations of hope and despair.

What happens in the third act may be more briefly indicated. Estrella comes to the King and claims vengeance on the murderer of her brother,—the man whom she herself loves. The monarch (whose passion has now faded as quickly as it had blazed up) gives her the key of Don Sancho's cell, and with it the power of disposing of the murderer as she pleases. Thickly veiled, she goes to the prison, leads her lover forth, and bids him go free. But when he discovers who it is has released him, he rejects his freedom at the hands of the sister of his victim. He returns to his cell, and as he refuses to give any motive for the murder, the civil authorities condemn him to death—altho the King tries to influence the sentence of the Alcaldes, and even thinks he has succeeded, only to be taken aback by their official independence. So the monarch has at last to declare that he himself gave Don Sancho the fatal order. With the fanatical loyalty of the time, one of the Alcaldes remarks that no doubt his Majesty had a good reason for this command. But none the less does the blood of Bustos separate the two lovers, and they bid each other farewell forever, to the astonishment and admiration of the sovrán. The comic servant of Don Sancho has the last word, addressed straight to the audience: "You have heard the tragedy Lope has written for you, and never can you forget the Star of Seville."

Here we have a painting of the passions by means of the primary colors only and with the boldest contrasts. Here we have a rapid succession of surprising situations, following each other so closely that we have scarce time to grasp their full meaning. But whatever defects the drama may disclose when dissected critically in the library, there can be no doubt that it would always be interesting in the theater itself, before Spanish spectators in absolute sympathy with the high-strung magnanimity of the hero and the heroine. It is like a dramatized ballad; and not a little lyrical hyperbole lingers in the dialog, side by side with the homeliest directness of speech. This admixture of the toplofty and of the matter-of-fact is most characteristic of the Spanish drama, which made no formal distinction between tragedy and comedy,—following the medieval practice rather than the doctrine of the Renaissance. A play with a tragic climax might have comic incidents and comic characters,

just as a play of humorous intention was likely to contain at least one duel with a possibly fatal termination.

In almost every piece we find the *gracioso*, as the Spaniards call the conventional comic servant of the hero, whose task it is to supply fun at intervals and to relax by a laugh the tension of the overwrought situations. Like the modern melodramatists, the Spanish playwrights understood the value of "comic relief," as it is termed today. The *gracioso* has a part of varying importance; sometimes he is a mere clown always trying to be funny and yet having but little to do with the plot; sometimes he is a clever fellow, quick-witted and sharp-tongued and therefore a chief factor in the intrigue; sometimes he serves as a chorus to voice a common-sense opinion as to the superfine heroics of his master,—and this he does at the end of the "Star of Seville," for instance; and sometimes, with the assistance of a female partner, he provides in the under-plot a parody of the main story of the play. The relation of Sancho Panza to Don Quixote is that of the *gracioso* to the hero; and indeed there is no better example of the *gracioso* anywhere than Sancho,—except that the hasty playwrights never gave the *gracioso* the vital individuality which the genius of the novelist bestowed on Don Quixote's squire. The *gracioso* is plain-spoken at times, but he is never so foul-mouthed as are not a few of the comic personages in the Elizabethan plays. Indeed, the Spanish drama is distinctly more decent, both in word and in deed, than the English drama which was contemporary with it.

In Lope's hands the *gracioso* was more easily witty than in Calderon's, just as Lope's lighter pieces were more gracefully humorous than were those of his great follower. Lope was naturally gay and seemed to improvise laughter-provoking intrigues, whereas Calderon laboriously constructed his humorous situations, with skilful certainty, no doubt, but with little spontaneity. The fun of Calderon's "House with Two Doors" is indisputable, but it is rather mechanical when contrasted with Lope's playful comedy, the title of which in English would be the "Dog in the Manger." Here Lope revealed a delicacy of perception into feminine psychology; his heroine is a true woman, whereas his hero is a pitiful creature, finding a father by fraud; and in the author's bringing about the marriage which ends the play, we have another instance of the careless cynicism and of the moral obtuseness which accompanied the religious enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

V.

Calderon accepted the several dramatic species which Lope de Vega had devised for his own use,—just as Shakspeare took over Marlowe's

formula in his youth and in his maturity borrowed Fletcher's also. But Calderon modified scarcely at all the framework his predecessor had prepared. In general his craftsmanship is more careful than Lope's,—altho his expositions are inferior, being often huddled into a long speech or two, as artificial almost as the prologs of Euripides or Plautus, whereas Lope's opening scenes are marvels of clever presentation, taking the spectators immediately into the center of the action.

After the plot is once set in motion Calderon has a more vigorous grasp of his situations than Lope, and a stronger determination to get out of them all they contain of effect. Not only is his technic more conscious and more artful, but also his nature is richer, whereby he is enabled to pierce deeper into his subject; he is more of a poet than Lope. Inferior in comedy, he is superior in tragedy, in his vigorous handling of themes of terror and horror, of supernatural fantasy and of ghastly gloom. Incomparable in his invention of somber situations, he is ever what Lowell called him, an "Arab soul in Spanish feathers." His plots are unfailingly romantic, even tho there are realistic touches here and there in his drawing of character,—as, for example, in that fine, bold drama of the "Alcalde of Zalamea," in which the peasant-judge has a grim humor of his own.

Calderon's acceptance of the tenets of his church was quite as unhesitating as Lope's, and his religion was even more ardent. But his faith was medieval in its narrowness; and this sadly lessens the final value of the plays in which he sought to embody spiritual themes. Altho he reveled in the supernatural, his views of the other world seem now as childish as Marlowe's; and the mind of the Spanish playwright was incapable of any such philosophic speculation as we find more than once in the English poet's "Doctor Faustus." Even in his ecclesiastical dramas intended to be performed in the streets on Corpus Christi day, the so-called sacramental-acts,—which were religious masques, descended from the medieval miracles and moralities,—Calderon inclines to make the allegory unspeakably obvious, to bring the mysteries of religion down to plain matter-of-fact, and in short to produce the concrete out of the abstract.

Yet his spectral muse inspired him in the composition of more than one very striking play, on subjects charged with spiritual suggestion. One of these is the "Devotion of the Cross"; and another, quite as direct in its disclosure of the medievalism of the Spanish, is the "Wonder-working Magician." In this latter we are made acquainted with Cyprian, a young student of Antioch, who burns with unholy passion for a Christian maid, Justina. To possess her he sells his own soul to the

Devil, writing the compact with his own blood. The Devil gives the student a year's instruction in necromancy; and he also sets the powers of darkness at work to seduce the girl. But when at length the Evil Spirit tries to carry off the maid, she proclaims her faith and he has to release her. Baffled by her resistance, the Devil seeks to deceive the student by a phantom. A cloaked figure enters and bids Cyprian follow; but when, supposing he has Justina in his arms at last, he joyfully takes off the cloak, he discovers, to his horror, that he is clasping a fleshless skeleton,—who tells him that “such are the glories of the world!” The student insists on an explanation; and the Evil One has to admit that he cannot keep his bargain since Justina is under the protection of a superior power. It is to this power, therefore, that Cyprian appeals when the Devil tries to bear him away. So the student also becomes a Christian; and he and Justina are united in death, both being burnt as martyrs to their faith.

In these plays Calderon shows himself a true Spaniard, as Lope was also, of a temperament not reflective but essentially sensuous, satisfied to deal with the externals of the mystery of life and not craving an internal solution. What interested him in a plot was what the personages did rather than what they were; and here we see that the difference between Calderon and Lope de Vega is not in kind but in degree. Both of them are interested in situation rather than in character. The fiery young adventurers who woo and seek revenge in Calderon's plays, as in Lope's, are all closely akin; they are first cousins to one another, with a strong family likeness; they are, as Goethe called them, “all bullets cast in one mold,” with the same unreflecting bravery and the same sense of honor as something outside of themselves and wholly unrelated to conduct,—“a matter of form rather than of feeling,” as Lewes said.

VI.

Calderon is a great playwright, no doubt, and so is Lope also; but it may be doubted whether either of them is truly to be considered as a great dramatist. Striking as are their best plays, loftily lyrical as the language may be on occasion, startlingly effective as the successive situations are, we do not find in them an exquisite harmony and a beautiful proportion of the parts to the whole; we do not thrill with an irresistible appeal to our common humanity; we cannot but be conscious that now and again the story has been twisted arbitrarily for the sake of the incidents; and we fail to feel ourselves swept forward by an inexorable movement toward an inevitable end.

Lope de Vega was the earliest of the host of Spanish playwrights, and Calderon was almost the latest, outliving most of the other dramatic poets who had also revealed surpassing fertility of invention,—Guillen de Castro, to whom Corneille owed the “Cid,” Alarcon, from whom he borrowed the “Liar,” and Tirso de Molina, to whom Molière was indebted for the imperishable figure of Don Juan. There had been only two playhouses in Madrid when Lope de Vega began to write for the theater; and before Calderon closed his career there were twoscore. The simple platform which had served at first as a stage had got itself in time some sort of scenery; and it was capable at last of some sort of mechanical effects. In the “Wonder-working Magician,” for example, the Devil flees away finally on the back of a fiery serpent,—just as Medea at the end of the drama of Euripides is borne off by a dragon; and probably the device whereby this spectacular marvel was accomplished was as elementary and as obvious in Madrid as it had been in Athens.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TAINE AND RENAN

ALFRED FOUILLÉE

MENTON, FRANCE

THE two directors of conscience for the letters of the second empire in France were Taine and Renan, two men representative of their epoch, who exercised upon it each in his turn an important influence due to their intellectual power and to the magic of their style. Both had the philosophic vocation; both alike began their career by presenting themselves at the competitive examination, so important in France, for a fellowship in the philosophical society, which gives the right to the professorship of philosophy in the lyceums. Renan was first admitted to this examination in 1848. Taine, who was admissible on written tests, dissertations in philosophy and in the history of philosophy, met with final rejection at the oral tests, on account of his heterodox views. It was the time of the anti-liberal reaction and the ministry had put at the head of the jury of philosophy a magistrate utterly unacquainted with philosophy, named Portalis.

Renan and Taine soon abandoned teaching to devote themselves to their private labors, which were not slow in taking the direction of historical studies. History and criticism were then the vogue, and they were destined even to impress upon the nineteenth century, in its second half, a new direction, which was not always a happy one.

The philosophy of Renan and that of Taine have received the most opposite interpretations. We shall lay upon ourselves the task of pointing out in the case of each of them, the dominant thought which beneath the variety of the subjects and of the style, sometimes even beneath apparent contradictions, constitutes the secret unity of the work. Renan has been treated too much as a sceptic, Taine as a dogmatic and destructive positivist. Both were minds too broad to be confined within the narrow limits of a system; nevertheless both of them cherished ideas too fixed in their nature, Renan, even, whose thought at first appears so elusive.

I.

When the philosophy of Renan has been subjected to a thorough examination, there is revealed, throughout all its metamorphoses, one invariable tendency; and if, after all the changing visions and vistas

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opening in every direction, one feels the need of bringing things together, of finding out one's whereabouts, even of summing up the thought of the great writer in one brief formula which shall enable him to classify and define it, he discovers that it is an inconsistent Hegelianism, transferred to literature and criticism and tempered by a demi-scepticism which is destined to end in dilettantism.

Renan, like Auguste Comte, believed in science, in its benefits, in its future. He died without having heard certain literary writers proclaim the bankruptcy of science,—a bankruptcy which would have made him smile. He would assuredly have been on the side of those who rejoined: the only failure is that of ignorance. It must be conceded, however, that Renan himself contributed to bring about the anti-scientific reaction through the inadequate conception he entertained of science, in accordance with that of Auguste Comte. He attributed the scientific character only to the natural sciences and, strangely enough, to the sciences of erudition, to history, to philology. He did not perceive that if there is any discipline which is far from meriting the name of science it is history, with its allied studies. Still further, sharing with the nineteenth century its superstitious respect for history, Renan had the presumption to derive therefrom all the sciences of the spirit and of humanity, under the pretext that the fundamental nature of things is universal development. Philosophy has no longer any proper existence of its own; it is founded in history, it comes into being with history and in history.¹ Thus understood, science was indeed exposed to failure where moral and social questions were concerned. As to the supreme law of science, Renan recognized it, with Auguste Comte, as "universal causality," excluding all miracle. His rupture with theology engaged him in a bitter and persistent quarrel with the idea of the miraculous and the supernatural, and, therefore, with all the superstitions which he found at the base of religions.

He preserved, nevertheless, the religious spirit, understood as a sentiment of the unity of things and of their ideal end. This sentiment is for him essentially human and moral. External nature does not reveal God; it conceals him; it is profoundly immoral. History, ever the external history of human actions, is nothing but one long "scandal." But man, in the depths of his thought, cherishes "the category of the ideal." This is what Renan borrowed from Kantism to superpose it upon Comtism. This category of the ideal is what we call God. Now

(1) See especially, *l'Avenir de la Science* (written in 1848 and published in 1890); *Essais de Morale et de Critique*, 1860; *Dialogues et fragments philosophique*, 1876.

a great problem presents itself which has divided the interpreters of Renan. Is God for him only a category of the human reason, or is he also a reality? On this point Renan continually contradicts himself saying yes and no on the same page. His real thought, nevertheless, seems to be that some principle founds the "ideal" in the "real," but concerning this principle one can say nothing at all; "every proposition applied to God is impertinent, one only excepted: He is." "Outside of nature and of man, is there then anything? you will ask me. I answer, there is everything. Nature is only an appearance, man is but a phenomenon. There is the eternal source of things, there is the infinite, there is substance, the ideal; there is, according to the fine Mussulman phrase, 'that which endures'; there is, according to the Hebrew expression, 'that which is.' This is that father from whose bosom all comes forth, to whose bosom all returns. The ideal is the idea in the Hegelian sense, the infinite spirit which is evolving in the universe. Therefore true theology is the science of the world and of humanity, the science of the universal 'becoming,' ending as worship in poetry and in art, and, above all, in morality. In nature and in history I see the divine far better than in the abstract formulas of a superficial theodicy and of an ontology having no relation to facts." "God," adds Renan, "is he who 'is,' and all the rest is what 'appears' to be * * * God, providence, immortality, so many good old words, a trifle clumsy perhaps, which philosophy will interpret in expressions more and more refined, but which it never will replace with advantage. Under one form or under another God will always be the summary of our super-sensible cravings, 'the category of the ideal.'"

Thus, it appears to him, one may reconcile these opposing views by saying, God is at the same time the ideal "in relation to ourselves" and being "in himself."

Renan never abandoned the view that there is a consciousness at the base of the universe, obscure it may be, instead of having that clearness which the religious attribute to the divine thought; but this consciousness is, nevertheless, the spring which moves the world; it is, as it were, a virtual God which some day may become a real God, which may at least approximate without cessation to actuality. It is "the soul of the world" of Plato and the Stoics. Renan speaks of "*τὸ πᾶν* the mysterious existence wherein everything is harmonized and justified." The All is God. Duty consists in adding, "I will what He wills." "We believe, for our part, that one is religious when one is content with God and with himself."

But to be satisfied with God and with ourselves it is necessary that the final victory should belong to the good. This is likewise the faith of Renan. According to him the work which the All is carrying on will be accomplished sooner or later; it has eternity before it: *patiens quia eternus*. We, on our part, shall contribute to it without receiving personal recompense. Virtue is disinterestedness; the reward of sacrifice is the sacrifice itself. When the good man devotes himself for the sake of the good, he sacrifices himself to an ideal, of which he does not see, of which he will not see, the realization. If he looks about him, the nature which he beholds ignores him, ignores morality, ignores good and evil. By and by there will be a better nature, there will be a flowering out of the universal consciousness; but at that time the individual that was you or I will no longer exist; it will exist only in the good which it shall have done, or in the good to which it shall have contributed. Shall we then have been duped? Yes, in a certain sense. Nature makes use of us for ends which are not truly our own; she deceives us. The illusion extends even to the virtues, from courage and temperance even to love of others and to sacrifice. But, says Renan, "Evil consists in revolt against Nature, even when we have seen that she is deceiving us." In reality, we may be assured, the deception will not be absolute; even if we ourselves are duped, Nature will not be deceived, the world will arrive at last at full consciousness and happiness. "The soul is where it acts, where it loves. God being the ideal, the object of all love, God is essentially the place of souls. It is in God that man is immortal." The categories of time and space being effaced in the absolute, that which exists for the absolute is as well that which has been as that which shall be.

In God live, in a manner, all souls which have lived. Why, even, "shall not the kingdom of the spirit, the consummation of the universe, be the resurrection also of all conscious minds?" When the kingdom of God shall come "the moral sense shall find itself to have been in the right: the faith which believes against appearance shall be justified. Our little discovery, our effort to bring about the triumph of the good and the true shall be a hidden stone in the foundations of the eternal temple." The true support, then, of faith in God is purely moral: "if humanity were merely intellectual, it would be atheistic; but * * * duty, devotion, sacrifice, everything of which history is full, are inexplicable without God."

Renan ends with an utterance of religious faith and love: "O heavenly Father, I am ignorant of what thou hast in reserve for us. * * * Is it despair that is right and shall truth mourn? Thou hast not willed

that these doubts receive a clear response, to the end that faith in the good may not remain without merit and that virtue be not a mere calculation. * * * Blessed be thou for thy mystery, blessed for thy hidden being, blessed in that thou hast preserved to us the full liberty of our hearts." From the human point of view, if God *is* not yet visible, he *will be*. God, who *is* in eternity, *becomes* and *appears* in nature and history. Science shall make God real. The universe, thanks to science, shall end by attaining full consciousness of itself, wherein all consciousness shall be united. Then, at last, God shall exist for conscious minds. In bringing about this kingdom of God (which is the kingdom of thought!), the men of science are the indispensable initiators. Like Comte, Renan dreams of the priesthood of scientists. More than that, he dreams of their absolute sway. Whence his aristocratic polity and contention with democracy, which he believes to be fatal to the development of scientific and artistic genius. He dreams thus of an age of gold and of iron in which the savants, armed with the most terrible secrets of science, will make the common herd of humanity move at their will, by threatening them, if they do not obey, with a veritable scientific "inferno."

Science, if necessary, in case of refusal of obedience, may threaten to blow up the planet. While awaiting the final era in which science and the moral sense shall have created God, every one ought to devote himself to the great work and submit, for the sake of that, to all sorts of misery, just as animals would be bound to offer themselves to vivisection if they had the sense of the future benefits of science.

Such is the Hegelian creed which Renan cherishes in the innermost depths of his soul; but, since it is only a beautiful dream, which, nevertheless, is worth more than all present realities, he is very careful never to be dogmatic; he makes of scepticism ever a kind of moral obligation, while at the same time he cultivates it for literary effect. He pays a certain attention, a dalliance with self-contradiction, to passing from yes to no, from no to yes, winding up effusions of the heart with witty turns of interrogation, tempering enthusiasm with irony. "Have confidence in the truth. There is perhaps nothing at the end." Under pretext of sincerity Renan ends by being no longer sincere and by making of literature in relation to philosophy a play of wit upon serious subjects. He becomes almost a buffoon and a mountebank; he seems to desire to win the suffrages of the public by pretty tricks of intellectual prestidigitation. The straining for popularity results in the abasement of this great intellect to trivial witticisms, to petty play upon words. He seeks to astonish, to please; he dances upon the tight rope of ideas: *saltavit et placuit*.

But the bad Renan must not make us forget the good. In reading him we should not pay too much attention to his paradoxes and his foolery. Let us have always present to our minds the hidden inspiration of Renan, which is *desire of the ideal and secret faith in its reality*.

II.

Taine, at the higher normal school of Paris, where the élite of the professors of the University of France get their training, had had for his master Vacherot, who was then director of this celebrated school.

Taine represented Vacherot more or less faithfully in his "Philosophes classiques" (a book directed against Cousin and his disciples) under the character of the systematic M. Paul, as opposed to the analytical M. Pierre, who has the characteristic traits of Littré and who represents positivism. It is accordingly necessary to present in a few lines the leading features of the philosophy of the principal master of Taine.

Vacherot had meditated much upon Spinoza and Hegel. He found in Spinoza a profound representation of the "real world," which develops itself across time and space under the modes of extension and thought, inseparable from one another, and inseparable also from an infinity of other worlds which man does not know. But what Vacherot refused to admit was the identity, scandalous in his eyes, established by Spinoza between the real world, the abode of imperfection and of suffering, and that ideal of perfection which is God. Unable to make up his mind to hold with Spinoza, that reality in its totality may be perfection itself, may be God, and that our tears are elements of the divine felicity, Vacherot made a violent separation of absolute existence from perfection; to the first he gave the kingdom of reality, to the second that of the pure ideal.

In his book, "Metaphysique et la Science" (1858), which attracted universal attention Vacherot superposed upon a naturalistic pantheism a metaphysics in which all transcendence was denied; the world is one, continuous, immense, eternal, in a word *infinite*, but it is not *perfect*. The perfect is incompatible with infinity, consequently with reality. The perfect has all qualities, save possibility and existence. The real is not the ideal, the ideal is not the real. "If man be suppressed," says Vacherot, "God exists no longer; no humanity, no thought, no ideal, no God, since God exists only for the thinking being. The universal Being, the 'real' God, if it is permitted to speak thus, will always exist, seeing that being is necessary, and that thinking being is only a contingent form of it, however superior it may be; but the 'true' God will have ceased to exist."

Renan was doubtless right, according to Vacherot, in calling God the category of the ideal, but he was wrong in believing that the ideal itself could also at the same time have its own reality and even constitute the true reality. Vacherot thus left his philosophy cut in twain, and he was never able to bring the fragments together. He was never able, in a word, to explain the relation of the ideal to the real, of the perfect to the existent, and he came finally to this paradoxical conception, that as for the perfect, it would truly be an imperfection of real being. This reversal of the proof of Saint Anselm, by which Vacherot deduced from perfection non-being, was still more dubious than the famous reasoning of Saint Anselm, who deduced being therefrom.

That the reality known to us is not perfect is evident to every one who is not ready to deny evil, nor suffering, nor death; but that perfection, in itself and by itself, excludes being, this is what our Saint Anselm *redivivus* could not demonstrate; and it is likely that, since no one is in possession of the secret of being, no one will ever make such a demonstration.

The philosophy of Taine (born at Vouziers in 1828 and died at Paris in 1893)¹ may be defined as a Spinozism superposed upon positivism. Taine transformed the positivism of Comte and of Mill into a doctrine not only of "facts" and of "laws," but of immanent "necessities," no less absolute than those of geometry which bewitched the mind of Spinoza. For Taine, beings and things shall be at the same time theorems and verities; the rational and the real shall make but one, causal necessity being identical with logical necessity. That which dominates the whole system of Taine, as we are going to show, is this very idea of a necessity at once rational and causal; and this idea he borrowed from Spinoza, rather than from Hegel, with whom the "becoming" was less mathematical and did not proceed in the manner of a theorem.

Contrary to the opinion of the French empiricists and of the English disciples of Hume, for whom knowledge does not pass the limits of "phenomena" and who see in the order of things only "a chance encounter of facts," Taine believes that, however limited the basis of experience, our thought may nevertheless go "beyond that which is purely relative and accidental, even to the absolute and the necessary." An assertion which would have made Auguste Comte and Littré spring to their feet! So long as we contemplate nature in the way of observation

(1) See especially, *Les philosophes classiques* (1856); *L'Intelligence* (1870); *De l'idéal dans l'art* (1867); *Essais de critique et l'histoire* (1858); *Histoire de la Littérature anglaise* (1853).

alone, we do not see her "as she is"; we have only a provisional and illusory idea of her. She is in that case really "a tapestry that we are looking at on the wrong side. Accordingly we try to turn it over." This is the work of the philosopher. For this purpose he sets himself to determining the "laws, that is to say, the natural groups which are really distinct from their surroundings and which are composed of elements really united together."

Without being brought to a stand by the "critique" inaugurated by Kant, Taine accepted as a postulate the possibility of seizing upon the objective reality of things, and of seizing upon it in the ultimate data of pure thought. These data are obtained by an analysis analogous to that of Condillac, which seeks for "identities" and takes for its instrument "abstraction." Condillac is one of the masters of Taine. The purely empirical doctrine, which breaks all connections between phenomena and shatters the world into a multitude of scattered fragments, appeared to Taine incompatible with the notion of "necessity" and, consequently, with that character of absoluteness which he wished to preserve to knowledge. Taine himself went so far as to believe that reality may be deduced from possibility, by logical necessity.

"Is it experience only which can prove existence? * * * May it not be assumed that real existence is only one case of possible existence, a particular and singular case where the elements of possible existence present certain conditions which are wanting in other cases. This granted, may not one seek for these elements and these conditions. * * * Hegel did so, but with enormous presumption; perhaps another, with more moderation, will renew his attempt with more success." Taine seems here to think that Hegel wished to deduce "becoming" from abstract "being" and from "non-being"; he attributes too much to Hegel, the deductive method of Spinoza. The truth is, the dialectical method of Hegel is inductive. "Being," posited at the beginning of the dialectic, is a simple abstraction and the true real and realizing principle is, for Hegel, the Absolute Spirit.

If Taine is not a pure empiricist, no more is he one of those "critical" idealists who, adopting the doctrine of Kant, believe it to be impossible to pass from thought and its laws to the essence of things themselves, still less to their existence, and who limit all our knowing to a purely relative knowledge, determined by the conditions and constitution of our mind. Taine, on the contrary, believes in the possibility of a higher and genuinely "metaphysical" knowledge. Without a philosophy, says he, "the scientist is a mere mechanic and the artist a trifler," and that, too, a philosophy which includes investigation into primary elements, first prin-

ciples. Taine, who had studied Spinoza and Hegel so much, considered the study of metaphysics very useful, "inasmuch as it furnishes the framework within which our knowledge may be arranged." Metaphysics as "form," facts as "matter," such, then, according to him were "the elements of true science." At the end of his book on "Intelligence," Taine writes, "Here we are on the threshold of metaphysics; in my opinion it is not an impossibility. If I halt, it is from the feeling of my insufficiency; I perceive the limitations of my own mind, I do not see those of the human mind." In his "Notes on England," speaking of those who disdain great philosophical ideas, he exclaims, "So much the worse for them. For what does a nation or an age exist but to form them? Man is not completely man save in this. If some inhabitant of another planet should make his descent here to inquire what sort of beings we were, it would be necessary simply to show him the five or six great ideas we have about the mind and the world. That alone would give him the measure of our intelligence."

Metaphysics is possible, it must be said, "only on the condition of its remaining at a great height, of its not descending into detail, of its considering merely the most simple elements of being and the most general tendencies of nature." The Germans, says Taine, alluding to Hegel, have seen that "thought is the final term upon which the whole of nature is suspended"; but relying solely on the laws of thought they believed they were able "without traversing experience," at a single stroke, to attain to the innermost being and the supreme law of the universe, and they have attempted to rediscover by pure thought the world which observation has revealed to us. With an "heroic audacity," a sublime genius, and an inconsiderateness greater still than their genius and their audacity, "they have sprung at a bound to the primary law, and, closing their eyes on nature, they have attempted to discover by a geometrical deduction the world which they have never looked upon." Destitute of exact ideas, "lacking the French analysis," borne up at the start to the summit of the prodigious pyramid the steps of which they have not chosen to climb, they have fallen with a great fall, but "in that ruin, and at the bottom of that precipice, the fallen remnants of their work still surpass human constructions in their magnificence and their massiveness, and the shattered plan which may be made out in them, indicates to future philosophers, by its imperfections and by its merits, the 'end' which must be finally attained and the 'way' which must not be attempted at the beginning."

In a word, the positive sciences, for Taine, are only inferior analyses; above them "there is a higher analysis which is called metaphysical and

which carries 'laws' and 'types' back to some universal formula. This analysis does not contradict the others, it completes them." The various sciences should, then, by the aid of experience and deduction, condense themselves into generative "definitions," which will in their turn themselves condense into a unique and primitive fact. "The ultimate object of science is this supreme law, and he who, at a bound, can transport himself into its bosom, will see there as from a fountain head flowing out, by distinct and ramifying channels, the eternal torrent of events and the infinite sea of things." As for religion, it is itself, in his view, "a metaphysical poem, accompanied with belief." This is also the conception of Guyau, who adds that this poem is made authoritative by the social idea and by social motives.

We have seen that the whole doctrine of Taine turns upon a certain conception of "causality." The "spiritualists," he says, put causes "outside of objects into an invisible, incorporeal world; the 'positivists' put causes outside of knowledge." "If, then, it is proved that the order of causes is blended with the order of facts both are refuted at the same time." Taine does not admit with the empirics, that the principle of causality is a "synthetic judgment *a posteriori*," a "custom" like that of which Hume speaks, a purely mechanical "expectation" like that of which Stuart Mill speaks, a simple generalization of "effort" of which we are conscious in ourselves, as Maine de Biran believes. No more does he admit with Kant that it is a "synthetic judgment *a priori*." He is, accordingly, obliged to maintain that the condition and the conditioned do not present the heterogeneity which Hume allows; he is obliged to maintain that Hume and Kant were wrong in distinguishing the causal relation from purely logical relations. It is from these latter relations that Taine believed it to be possible, as we have said, to derive everything. Accordingly, he is fairly obliged to go back to the thought of Spinoza, who contends that all the relations of "causation" are reducible to relations of the "principle of consequence," whence is derived the universal legitimacy of the geometrical method. So we see Taine, in "Intelligence," attempting the reduction of the "principle of explicative reason, or of causality" to the principle of "identity." The result of this conception is the logical and geometrical phenomenism of which we have spoken. There are not two worlds, the one transcendent, the other immanent, the one that of hidden causes, the other that of visible effects or phenomena. No, there is but one world, immanent in itself, and it is that of phenomena or facts; but it is that also of causal necessities, since these arise from the relations of logical necessity existing between the facts. There are some facts more important than others, controlling

facts, which, when posited as principles, carry with them necessary consequences. These legislative facts, which are also governing powers correspond to the "essences" of Spinoza. Each being, above all living being, has its essence, not in a world of "Platonic ideas," nor in a world of Aristotelian "entelechies," but in the world of phenomena, because phenomena form a hierarchy ruled by logical necessity. Accordingly the essence of a being resembles the essence of a triangle and, given the definition of that being, one can deduce from it all that it will manifest in reality. "The world is a living geometry." "Man is a walking theorem." Science presupposes and searches for "the puissant formula which, by establishing the invincible bond and the spontaneous production of beings, puts within nature the spring of nature, at the same time that it closes and buries in the heart of every living thing the steel pincers of necessity." But beyond "the eternal axiom," the "creative formula," there is no substance at all, as Spinoza held, for that would be to reestablish something transcendent. Taine, at this point, approximates to the Hegelian idea of "becoming," without admitting, with Hegel, the specific form of primordial activity,—Spirit.

On its phenomenal side, the philosophy of Taine recalls that of Heraclitus: every being is "a series of events of which nothing endures but the form." "A universal flow, an inexhaustible succession of meteors which flame up only to expire and burst out again and again expire without intermission and without end, such are the features of the world." "Nature is a great Aurora Borealis." But, once more, all this phenomenism is "necessity." There results therefrom a final and complete "unity." "The world forms a single, indivisible being, of which all beings are members." Heraclitus becomes Spinoza.

Like this latter philosopher, Taine admits a kind of higher grade of thought, namely, intellectual contemplation, in which the religious sentiment finds satisfaction. In thinking the eternal order which brings nature into existence and makes us to be ourselves, we perceive, as Spinoza said, we experience the fact that we are eternal. Nature is God. "The indifferent, the unmoved, the eternal, the all-powerful, the creative, no name exhausts her, and when she lifts the veil from her serene and awful face, there is nothing in the mind of man which does not fail before it, wrapt in admiration and in fear. At the very same instant that mind recovers itself, it forgets its mortality and its littleness; it rejoices in sympathy with that infinity which it thinks on and participates in its greatness." "Things are divine, and that is why it is necessary to conceive of gods in order to express things. Religions are an attempt at expression by the medium of gods." Recalling the *amor intellectualis Dei*,

extolled by Spinoza, Taine ends by going further than Spinoza himself, and by reinstating in the world a kind of finality. There is nothing, he says, superior to intellectual contemplation, because it enables us to discover that "this bundle of 'laws' issues in an 'order' of 'forms,' that matter has for its ultimate end 'thought,' that nature is consummated in 'reason,' and that this 'ideal' to which the aspirations of man, despite so many errors, hang suspended, is also the 'end' to which converge, across so many obstacles, all the forces of the universe. In this pursuit of science, in this conception of things there is a new art, a new morality, a new politics, a new religion."¹ This new religion will be that of science and of philosophy, henceforth indivisible, and requiring of art forms in harmony with themselves. "Science is coming forward at last," says Taine, "and coming forward as the science of man; it has passed beyond the visible and palpable world of the stars, the rocks, the plants, where, ignominiously, it has been confined; it is upon the soul that it goes to work, furnished with accurate and penetrating instruments of which three centuries of experiment have proved the precision and measured the scope. Thought and its development, its range, its structure, its attachments, its deep roots in the bodily life, its immense growth throughout all history, its splendid efflorescence at the present day, this is now the subject of science, the subject in which for the past sixty years it has been making discoveries in Germany, and which explored slowly, surely, by the same methods as the physical world, will become transformed under our eyes as the physical world has been transformed."

Taine excelled in what, with Condillac, he calls analysis; but the general defect of his system is in having too much ignored that which Kant called the criticism of knowledge. To speak the truth, Taine did not criticize at all; he accepted dogmatically the postulate of the universal necessity of phenomena as something objective, without raising the question, with Kant and Schopenhauer, whether this postulate may not be subjective, and what are the ultimate reasons which allow us, nevertheless, to objectify causality. He admits with Hegel, that everything, ultimately, turns upon thought, but he does not inquire with Kant what are the essential and immanent conditions of thought itself. The analysis and the criticism of thought should, however, have *crowned*, or rather have *formed the foundation* of a system which reduces everything to the laws of logic, therefore to the laws of thought. Taine sometimes makes allusion to Kant, but only for the sake of discussing the theory of Spencer. If, he says, the constraint experienced by our minds in the presence of

(1) *Histoire de la Littérature anglaise*, iv., 423.

necessary truths (the internal force which obliges us to affirm them) "has for its primary cause our *mental structure*," it has "for its ultimate cause the adjustment of our mental structure to the structure of things." But let us inquire, how are we to know the structure of things? If it is by simple experience, that will not suffice to establish completely the law of universal necessity. If it is by analysis of the content of thought, we move in a subjective circle. The famous reduction of "causality" to "identity" is an enterprise which Taine was unable to carry out to a successful issue. No analysis whatever will make proceed from a cause an effect "different" from itself and even "heterogeneous" which necessarily differs from the cause.

Identity cannot explain difference. It is necessary, then, to begin by admitting outright that, in the world, differences are given, that variety and change exist. It is only when differences and identities are given, in fact, that the principle of contradiction can be applied to them.¹

We have seen the phenomenism of Taine is not, like that of Hume, a purely empirical phenomenism, but a necessitated phenomenism in which reason is immanent in phenomena, and in which the necessity is explained by itself. But now let us ask again: How are we to explain a necessity which does not rest, ultimately, upon any "activity," and which is derived from the abstraction of a primordial "law." That law can produce the world only as it acts and, in some manner, includes within itself feeling or thought. The "eternal axiom," which Taine puts at the source of things, declares itself to be itself without knowledge whence it comes and without intelligence to determine whence it comes. But, once more, how can a primary law direct all the rest, if it is not itself the evolution of an activity? Suppose (what is not true) that an axiom may be, in fact, the law of laws, how can this law produce the world? Is it not itself rather the product of activities of some sort in conflict within the world?

Taine, in a word, by adding to "phenomenal experience" merely "abstract analysis," hopes in vain to change the phenomenal succession into necessary and logical causality. He hopes in vain to find a first principle from which the necessity may be derived. An abstraction explains nothing. True philosophical explanations can proceed only from *reflection on ourselves*, which allows of our seizing upon *reality within ourselves*, since we cannot hope to seize upon it beyond ourselves.

We must always come back to the *cogito* of Descartes. One may

(1) See the criticism of the theory of Taine at the conclusion of our *Philosophe de Platon* (tome iv.), and in the *Liberté et Déterminisme*.

contest the right to pass from the *cogito* to the *sum*, while the *sum* is conceived as a different substance from the thought itself, but that which remains the incontestable point of departure for all philosophy is, that thought seizes upon itself as the immediate reality and is able to conceive of other realities only by imparting to them something of itself. Philosophy is a reflective analysis of the concrete facts of consciousness, not an abstract analysis of notions, in the manner of Condillac and of Taine.

III.

One of the great achievements of Taine is his work in experimental psychology set forth in the book on "Intelligence," and which was to be completed in a book on "The Will," unfortunately sacrificed to historical studies. Taine shook off the yoke of the Cousin psychology, and, at the same time, rejected the condemnation pronounced by Auguste Comte upon psychology itself. He has given an example and a model of this scientific psychology in which were to excel at a later period M. Ribot, M. Espinas, and other psychologists, no less devoted to facts than Taine, and, like him, disposed to systematize them and to make of them a connected whole, a "theory." Taine transported naturalism into psychology: he reduced mind to "a flow and a bundle of sensations and impulses, which, seen in another aspect, are also a flow and a bundle of nervous vibrations." We believe, he adds, "that there is neither mind nor body, but simply groups of thoughts actual or possible. We believe that there are no substances, but solely systems of facts."¹

The most original part of "Intelligence" is that in which the author speaks of perception, which he defines as "a true hallucination," as well as of the phenomena and laws of imagination, of the tendency of the latter to disturb the unstable equilibrium in which our mind oscillates unceasingly between sanity and madness.

"The true and broad psychology," Taine concludes, "is a magnificent science, which lays the foundation for the philosophy of history, which vivifies psychology and opens the way to metaphysics."

Taine has maintained, in his "Intelligence," the doctrine of the "double aspect," the one physical, the other mental, which recalls the two "modes" of Spinoza. But is it movement which forms the basis of feeling or feeling which forms the basis of movement? At the beginning Taine fluctuates between the two doctrines; at the end the second seems

(1) *Histoire de la Littérature anglaise*, t. v., p. 396; *De l'Intelligence*, liv. iv., chap., iii.

to prevail with him. "Is there in nature," he asks himself, "only the series of fleeting sensations which constitute the existing subjects, and the enduring possibilities of existences, and the enduring possibilities of these same sensations. Is there nothing of an 'intrinsic nature' in 'this stone?'" Taine replies that the plant, the stone, every inanimate object, is not merely, as Stuart Mill maintained, "the possibility of certain sensations of a perceptive mind," but, in addition, "a distinct series of facts, or of real or possible events, events which would still take place *were all sentient beings eliminated*." What, then, are these facts or events which form the real basis of the stone, that which it has of an intrinsic nature within itself? Taine at first admitted, with Hobbes, that all the facts and events of nature are to be traced back to movements. At a later period, he perceived that this mechanical point of view was altogether relative and external, and that, seen directly, the type of existence is the mental event. "The physical world," Taine concludes, "is reducible to a system of *signs*, and to construct it and conceive it *as it is in itself*, there is left to us only the materials of the *moral* world." Nevertheless, it may be believed and we ourselves believe that Taine would consider movements and thoughts, or rather sensations, as absolutely inseparable, in the manner of Spinoza, without finally subordinating the one to the other.

IV.

Man being, on the mental side, a theorem, and on the physical side, a mechanism, vice and virtue "are products like vitriol and sugar."

Taine explained himself with regard to this statement which seemed scandalous. "This is not saying," he remarks, "that they are *chemical* products like vitriol and sugar; they are *moral* products, which the moral elements create by their coming together; and just as it is necessary in order to make vitriol and to decompose it, to be acquainted with the chemical substances of which vitriol is composed, so likewise, in order to create in man the hatred of lying, it is useful to seek out the psychological elements which by their union produce veracity. * * * The analysis once made, we are not on that account brought to a state of moral indifference, one does not excuse a criminal because he has explained his criminality; when one has become well acquainted with the chemical composition of vitriol, he does not pour it into his tea. One may be a determinist with Leibnitz and nevertheless admit with Leibnitz that man is responsible, that is to say that the dishonest man is deserving of blame, of contempt and of punishment, that the honest man deserves praise,

respect and reward.”¹ Taine, however, sees in man as he actually is only an animal partially tamed, always ready to return to the savage state. He is not even a sane animal; he is diseased and demented by nature; wisdom and sanity are only happy hazards upon which it is unreasonable to count. Whence arises a polity hostile to the “rights of man,” to “equality,” to universal “liberty,” to that “fraternity” merely verbal which disguises the real war of all against all.

According to Taine, ethics has not for its object to engender virtue, for there is no artificial means whatever which can be substituted for nature; ethics simply *states* in what circumstances, according to what laws vice and virtue appear. There is here, as we believe we have shown elsewhere, an incomplete determinism, from which is excluded the intelligent and conscious determinism.² If I know according to what laws a given quality is realizable, this knowledge, joined with the desire to realize it, renders possible the realization of the quality itself. I have between my hands a link of the chain the other end of which is attached to the object; I am able from that moment to draw it. More than that, the idea itself which we have of our possible freedom permits us, in a certain measure, to begin the realization. Taine is too much of a fatalist. Taine ends, however, in the optimism of Spinoza and Hegel: the world is good in its totality because it is the whole. We have no right to criticize, we, who are merely parts; a judgment of a part is a partial judgment. “That which we take for deformity is form, that which seems to us the subversion of a law is the accomplishment of a law.” This principle pushed to its limit, would result, whatever Taine may say of it, in the justification of everything, including therein moral monstrosity, which is a “form,” and the subversion of the law which requires that I respect your life, because this subversion is itself the accomplishment of a “law.” There is everywhere wanting in this system a more exact and more ethical conception of determinism, a reconciliation of determinism itself, or of auto-determinism, with moral freedom rightly understood. In his attempts to justify his necessitarianism, Taine is led to say that since it is *we* who are determined, it is as if *we* were free. “The fundamental aptitudes and dispositions of a soul belong to it; those which it acquires from the general environment, or from the national character are its own, or ‘become its own’ personal traits, in the first degree; when it acts from them, it acts by itself, by its own proper energy, spontaneously, with complete initiative, with entire

(1) *Debats*, 19 Décembre, 1872.

(2) See our book, *La Liberté et la Déterminisme*.

responsibility." This is as if Taine would say, when I am lying in deep sleep, in which all my powers and all my being are overpowered without the possibility of resistance, I am sleeping a free and responsible sleep. Freedom begins to exist within us only when we consciously act in view even of that freedom.

The moral necessitarianism of Taine reappears in the social order. We have not, he says, to create the form of society into which it may be our pleasure to enter and remain: "in this particular, our preferences would be vain; nature and history have chosen in advance for us; it is our part to accommodate ourselves to them, for it is certain they will not accommodate themselves to us." Is this quite true of history, which we contribute ourselves to form? Taine speaks as if in human societies, everything were determined by destiny beforehand independently of individuals. But if there are, indeed, some things which do not depend upon ourselves, like choosing between an abode on the earth and one on the moon, there are others which depend upon our ideas, our sentiments, and our actions, like the modification of social forms, of social and political laws, of private and public rights, etc. Auto-determinism, which, according to us, is at bottom liberty, shows itself yet once more absent from this fatalistic and geometrical determinism of Taine. In sociology as in ethics, it is necessary, then, in our opinion, to restore the action of man and his *ideas*, which are social *forces*, quite as much as "the race, the environment, the moment," and all the objective elements.¹ The Spinozism of Taine is a form too purely naturalistic, in place of harmonizing itself with idealism and issuing in the pursuit of the ideal in accordance with the laws of reality itself.

V.

Philosophers cannot too much regret the too purely historical direction which two great thinkers like Taine and Renan ultimately impressed upon their labors. After he had received my book on "Criticism of Contemporaneous Moral Systems," Taine wrote me a long letter (November 4, 1883), in which, after having admitted that I was right on almost all points, he added these characteristic lines on what I have elsewhere called "the illusion of the nineteenth century."² "If I had had the necessary leisure, * * * * I would have treated what you call the *physics of morality*, according to the English method, with this difference

(1) See our *Science social et contemporaine*.

(2) See our work entitled, *La Réforme de l'enseignement par la philosophie* (1901).

that instead of taking my point of departure as Darwin does from animal societies, I would have taken it from human societies, from history; I would have treated ethics as I have treated esthetics, experimentally, by analyzing and comparing the principal systems of practical (and not merely professional) morality in China, among the Buddhists, among the Greeks of the time of Cimon, and of the Romans of the time of Cato the elder, in primitive Christianity, in France under Saint Louis, in the Italy of 1500, in the Spain of 1600, etc.; and I should have attempted to conclude with a chapter entitled: Of the Ideal in life, analogous to that which I wrote upon the "Ideal in Art." In my opinion, the various moral sciences,—esthetics, ethics, politics, logic, political economy, can never become stable and progressive if they do not follow a little more closely this method. Time has failed me to apply it all along; I hope, however, that my fourth volume will present you a chapter in which I am about to introduce, in a historical way, an objective, positive, and not simply personal idea, concerning rights and the state."

Is there not something of simplicity in the faith of Taine and of his age, in this pretended historical method? Does his chapter on rights and the state truly and objectively spring from the facts which he stated at the beginning, that is to say, *selected* from among others and put in an order already subjective? The morals of the Chinese, of the Buddhists, of the Italians of 1500, and the Spaniards of 1600,—will we thus be much enlightened in respect to the morals of the twentieth century? The personal and philosophical reflections of Taine are precisely the best part of all his history or of what he believes to be impersonal history.

Taine tells us that "the matter of all science," *a fortiori* of history, consists "in quite unimportant facts well *selected*." There is the question! According to what *idea* are they to be selected? "Important." Then they are not petty facts; and how shall you measure their importance? "Significant." It is you who make them signify what you have in your mind. "Amplly circumstanced and minutely characterised." If there were nothing but "memoranda" without connection, you would have neither history nor science. M. Zola employed exactly the same method and, in place of history, he made romance.

After having written his beautiful book on "Intelligence," Taine was to have written one on "Will." He had even, between 1853 and 1855, written out some chapters of it, which the "Revue philosophique" has recently published. But the historical labors interrupted and put a stop to it all. His philosophy perished in history, and in a history destined to be immediately contested, refused, superseded. The most interesting

views, once more, are the great theoretical views which are embodied therein and which concern social philosophy in its relation to history.

As for Renan, he equally lost himself in historical studies. And this erudite historian winds up with showing us Jesus as "possessing in the highest degree that which we regard as the essential quality of a distinguished person, I mean the gift of smiling at his work," while Paul "crassly believes." He regrets that Paul did not end, like Renan himself, with a second abjuration, "saying, he also, *ego erravi*"! He shows us Nero creating, by his lubricity, Christian esthetics. "Brought into existence under the eyes of Nero, the esthetics of the disciples of Jesus, until then ignorant of itself, owed the revelation of its magical power to the crime which, tearing off the robe, ravished the virginity." This is the kind of "objective history" to which Renan devoted himself. Nietzsche was right in exclaiming at the time when the author of the "Vie de Jesus" was still living, "This spirit of Renan, a spirit which enervates, is a great calamity to France," to that France to which, according to the same Nietzsche, Europe owes its true intellectual nobility, "that of sentiment, of taste, of manners, nobility, in short, in the most elevated signification of the term," that France which, "even now is the seat of the most intellectual and the most refined culture of Europe and the chief school of taste."¹

History, and above all that part of history which Renan and Taine called criticism, sees only signs and evidences; and signs have no value except as they are interpreted. It occupies itself with the resuscitation of the souls of the dead, with imagining what they thought and intended in their actions. This resurrection is evidently only a construction by analogy, only a poem connected with a given subject, only an epic the great material events of which are prescribed, and only the moral characters of the actors remain to be created. As for the positive science, the creed of which Renan and Taine borrowed from Auguste Comte, it turns solely upon a system of symbols the inner significance of which is reserved and remains *x*. It submits these symbols to measure, to calculation, to observation, and to reasoning; when it has found out how they are connected together its task is ended. It does not consider what is deepest in the movement; that which is going on within the atoms, if there are atoms, goes on outside its domain. History itself attempts rightly to penetrate into the human atoms; it does not content itself with saying: Marcus Aurelius carried on such a war and established such institutions, it seeks to discover what Marcus Aurelius thought and felt.

(1) Nietzsche, *Par delà le bien et le mal*, ss., 254.

And it is then that a Renan transforms himself in imagination into Marcus Aurelius, forcing himself to discover a romance which shall be approximately the inner life of Marcus Aurelius (or that of Jesus). Nothing better, provided one is not duped. How could Renan, who feared being duped above all things, be innocent enough to believe that "criticism" is a positive science?

Renan, however, is full of ideas. How could a man of high intelligence help having ideas when he did not oblige himself to prove any of them and when he philosophized by fits and starts, as in a conversation? Going from paradox to paradox, one would be very unfortunate if he did not stumble by hazard on some veritable truths. Renan might have been a profound philosopher; he was content to be an essayist, a moralist of the antique type, which does not exclude a good deal of "immoralism."

By the manner in which he was pleased to accept and to reject by turns all affirmations and negations, to play the artist with all opinions, Renan favored one of the intellectual and moral amusements of the nineteenth century in its dotage,—dilettantism. In place of arousing the mind and the will, he sterilized them by turning them toward scepticism and inertness. He did the work of dissolution more than of renewal. The dilettante, indeed, does not seek to trace connections and to comprehend things, he seeks only to enjoy them with a refined enjoyment. He sympathizes with everything, from a distance and Platonically, because he admits that everything must have a reason for its existence, but he is very careful not to inquire laboriously into this reason for its existence; he accepts all beliefs, not as certainties, but as admitting of explanation by some state of things or some state of mind. This universal sympathy ends by taking everything with an air of indifference. Thus it is that "criticism" goes to wreck in estheticism, and ends by finding pleasure, as much as curiosity, in the follies of a Nero.

Taine (whom Nietzsche admired without reserve) has solid ideas, but of a precision too hard and fixed; Renan has fine thoughts, but they are too indefinite and fluctuating. The one works with sharply defined lines and colors, the other by suggestions which too easily permit the blending of contraries. Both, to speak truly, made the same philosophical voyage, but in contrary directions. Taine, we have seen, started from the worship of material nature and ended, in his works, by assigning a greater and still greater part to the moral ideal, and to the moral needs of humanity; he idealized more and more his naturalism. Renan, on the contrary, began with the most idealistic of affirmations, then in the latter part of his life, becoming more and more sceptical, he multiplied his doubts in

regard to the ideal and clung more and more to sensible reality, making a certainty of it. This certainty, nevertheless, in his case never interfered with dreams.

To sum up, the nineteenth century was looking for workmen capable of constructive work; what one saw was lofty minds at work in history, in learning, in art, and contributing thereby to the universal disintegration, in place of coöperating, as much as they were able, to the positive work of reconstruction. Moral and social problems press upon us on all sides; it is upon the solution of these problems that the twentieth century should labor, which will not be, like the preceding, "the century of criticism and of history," but let us hope, a century of moral philosophy and of sociology.

FAITH IN NATURE

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ONE of the conditions which determines the intellectual development of a folk is that they shall attain to some generally accepted view or views concerning their relations to the world about them. Until this view, whatever it may be, is commonly adopted by that saving remnant, the thinking people, there is no firm foundation on which to build a literature or an art except in its simplest terms. If we examine into the state of peoples who have developed intellectually to a high degree we find that before attaining such success they have come to something like a common understanding as to the meaning of the world about them so that their minds are in a way adjusted to that world. There are good reasons why this relation between the conception of events which men obtain and their other thought and action should exist. Some sense of spiritual reconciliation with nature is the necessary support for all the higher work of the mind, whatever the nature of that work may be. Moreover, all considerable endeavors of fancy or of reason relate to the unseen and need to do so in some rational manner. There may be any measure of diversity in the character of the views as to man's relation to the outer realm which exists in an intellectual society, and the productive activity of its folk be by that diversity increased, but its largest successes, those which stamp its age and people, appear to be nurtured in its common belief as to man's place in the realm and his relation to the powers which rule its actions.

In the earlier states of culture these folk interpretations of nature have all been necessarily made by some form of polytheism. The realm beyond vision has been peopled with humanlike beings who shaped it as men do their affairs. Since the revival of learning and the introduction at that time of Greek science into modern Europe, there has been gradually developed another view of the universal order, one in which the control of the realm is no longer conceived in terms of human motives, but in those of immutable *natural law*. At first this view was held by but few philosophers, and by them usually in a very incomplete way; the older interpretation remaining as the real background of thought and action even when it had declaredly been dismissed. Gradually, however, this concept of *natural law* has with increasing insistence penetrated into the minds of men until it is now visibly affecting the body of our western civilization. It has, within a century, not only broken up the stubborn

remnant of the polytheism which survived in the popular notion of elves, fairies, and demons, but is displacing the concepts of the theologies which have been elaborated from the teachings of Christ.

To the observant naturalist this change in the mode of interpreting the visible universe is the most interesting of all the many large movements of the human mind. It clearly indicates a great enlargement of the basis of all intellectual life, a change that is certain to modify in most important regards the conduct of men. While from its phenomenal side this revolution is thus interesting to all, from the point of view of the naturalist it is of the very highest importance, for it promises to bring about a momentous change in the conditions which influence the conduct of men. It is clear that if men are no longer to feel that the universe is guided by powers like unto themselves in quality, but is essentially controlled by physical laws which operate without the intervention of any Providence, we must expect a profound alteration in this basis on which rests their moral life. The change will be even greater than that which came about when the ancient polytheism gave place to Christianity. Though that was in many ways revolutionary for the mass of the people, it involved no more than a substitution of a new set of divinities with new attributes for those which were set aside. Morally, the advent of Christianity was of the utmost importance, but so far as the attitude of man toward the universe is concerned it was without great effect. The Roman priest of the new order, clad in the vestments of the old, explained the world as ruled by anthropomorphic powers as did his predecessors and, so far as this teaching was concerned, men adjusted themselves easily to the new faith. It is otherwise with the modern conception; in it we have a new heaven and a new earth and perforce must have a new and, so far as the masses of mankind are concerned, an as yet untried adjustment to the changed conditions.

It is evidently to be the largest intellectual task of this century to provide men with the basis of an understanding as to their relations with the material universe. We may assume that decade by decade the progress of discovery will greatly increase the body of evidence which goes to show that all there is done is done in an inevitable march of events, and that the sense of mechanical order, already strong, will but for certain possible corrections become more and more the basis of the conceptions as to the quality of the realm. How grievous in its effect this view is likely to be we may judge from its effect on various naturalists, who, along with their interest in the phenomenal side of things, have taken account of the moral aspect of their problem. Huxley, for instance, for all his intellectual valor appears to have been fairly appalled by the sense of the

fatal quality of *natural law*, which his vigorous constructive imagination set before him, summing up the story when he said, "I wash my hands of nature." There is no question that this state of mind is common among students who have the capacity to see beyond the immediate goal of their inquiries, or that if it is not in some way mended it will soon be the common attitude of men to the world about them.

The question as to the influences which may serve to limit the hard mechanical view of the universe which there comes to us is one of much difficulty, yet of such importance that it is worth while to essay some answer. Taking first the Darwinian hypothesis, which brings the concept of *natural law* nearer to men than any other feature of science, let us see how that opinion of organic evolution is likely to be modified. It is, indeed, evident that to this explanation of the conditions of organic life more than all the knowledge of the inorganic realm, is due the state of mind which will make many earnest folk desire to "wash their hands of nature."

The history of the doctrine of natural selection is in certain ways exceptional. For more than a century naturalists had been in increasing measure troubled to account for the origin of species. The doctrine that each kind of animal and plant had been arbitrarily created became, with the advance in the sense of logical order, in natural events utterly untenable. The supposition of Lamarck that species change their shapes because of a continual effort on the part of living creatures to adopt new habits of life, with a resulting modification of their form, was evidently not applicable to plants and to animals, if at all, only in a very small measure. Moreover, it supposed a kind of effort which cannot well be assumed to exist except in the higher groups of the animal kingdom. It, therefore, found no general acceptance. In the middle of the last century there was among naturalists and, to a great extent, among all educated people of free thought a singularly intense expectation of some theory which would account for the origin of species. Among astronomers there had been a like tension of mind which was relieved by the gravitative theory of Newton. But in no other instance has the longing for the solution of an ancient riddle been so intense as that which awaited the advent of Darwinism. Thus it came about, that for all the noisy battle against that view it was with singular promptness accepted by an overwhelming majority of naturalists and in less than a generation had found a place in the common thought of all intelligent people.

In some part the welcome with which the doctrine of natural selection was received was due to the fact that of all important scientific theses involving extended inquiries it was the most completely elaborated at

the time when it was first announced. Except perhaps the Newtonian discovery of the law of gravitation, none other had ever been so patiently worked out before publication. Not only was the observational basis prepared with singular care, but the logical side of the work was remarkably complete. Never before in the history of learning had such exemplary and silent patience been devoted to a problem as Darwin gave to his. It was no mere hulk that he launched on the sea of thought, but a ship well rigged and ready for battle. In other part the prompt welcome of the theory and the excessive value given to it by the general public, and by many naturalists as well, was due to certain of its curious qualities and of the complex which it seeks to explain which naturally led men to an unreasonably great estimate of its scope and efficiency. Certain of these beguiling features I shall now briefly set forth.

In considering the problem of organic life or any other problem of the universe men are instinctively, indeed necessarily, led to the opinion that all the facts are explicable by a very few or possibly by a single train of action. This idol of simplicity, as Francis Bacon would have termed it, is the most misleading of all the instinctive prejudices which men bring with them to the study of nature. It requires but a slight knowledge of the history of science, especially when the learning is applied to any broad field of knowledge, to show that the most perplexing and the most hindering errors have arisen from the tendency of inquirers to explain every complex of phenomena by some single cause. Thus it came about that the theory of selection, because it was so admirably satisfactory as an explanation of certain rather limited groups of facts exhibited by the organic world, was swiftly and with scant logic extended so as to account for all the phenomena of organic succession. Men were not content to read the vast riddle of life bit by bit, they leaped to the conclusion that because they had a possible solution of a part of it they could explain it altogether by conceiving that somehow it would, if we but saw far enough, explain the whole.

It should be said that Mr. Darwin, for all his masterful advocacy of the doctrine of natural selection, appears never to have believed in any such unreasoned extension of it as characterizes many who have claimed to be his followers. In a conversation I had with him about two years before his death he said that he was by no means sure as to the limits that would be in time assigned to the theory, and that the satisfaction he personally won from it was the knowledge that it had made men think. Notwithstanding the evidence derived from the study of animals and plants under domestication, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that a single

species of the two to three millions now inhabiting the earth had been established solely or mainly by the operation of natural selection.

In accepting the Darwinian hypothesis without requiring its full verification, modern naturalists in a way returned to the habit of the Greek inquirer and thereby the process of verification which is the most precious instrument of modern learning, for, after the manner of an Hellenic man of science, they accepted without criticism a view as to the nature of actions because it seemed on mere inspection to fit the facts. If there was even a general correspondence between the hypotheses and the phenomena to be explained the Greek philosopher accepted it for the reason that experience had not taught him, as it has his successors in our time, that such seeming explanations are fruitful sources of error. Thus if Aristotle had come by the notion that the moon and earth attracted one another in the ratio of their masses into the square of their distances, and observations had showed him that there was an error of only about ten per cent between his computations and the facts, he would have at once jumped to his conclusions. Newton, however, laid his hypothesis of gravitation aside for seventeen years, and would never have regarded it as proved had not further and more accurate measurements of the moon's distance demonstrated that the discrepancy between theory and fact fell within the reckoned limits of error due to the astronomical instruments which were then in use. In so doing he set a type of modern investigation as distinguished from that of the ancient mode of inquiry.

It is not to be supposed that every hypothesis which deserves acceptance is susceptible of the apparently complete proof that has been given to that of gravitation. In fact, the Newtonian theory as to the conditions of stellar movement has always, and fitly, been regarded as one of the very best instances of demonstration that has yet been attained by physical science, for the reason that it is verified by experiments in the laboratory as well as by observations which show that it is true for all the important spheres of our solar system. All that was known of the remoter suns, until the last century, appeared to justify the belief that the theory was of absolutely universal application. Beginning, however, in 1830 we have a series of discoveries which have revealed to us a considerable number of stars that, in place of having the rate of motion through space such as gravitative attraction may bring about, a rate of about nineteen miles a second, move at a speed of as much as one hundred and eighty miles a second, a pace which cannot be due to gravitative action as we know that action in our solar system. Although there are only about a score of such bodies known, as yet, to astronomers, the conditions of the inquiry make it certain that these exceptions must be

very numerous. But even one such instance goes to show that the Newtonian view does not serve to account for the movement of all the celestial spheres.

To explain the exceptional speed of the stars belonging to the Grombridge 1830 type, we have to qualify the gravitation account of celestial motion by other hypotheses, of which there seem to be but two, either of which militates against its supposed absolute universality. We may assume that these empty moving bodies have wandered into our stellar realm from some remote part of the universe where gravitation has a far greater value than it has in our solar system, or we may conjecture that these masses acquired their velocity by the explosion of some great sphere of which they once formed a part. It is not necessary for my purpose to examine into the reasons which make both these hypotheses unlikely means of accounting for the facts; all that is here desired is the evidence they afford as to the essential unfitness of the best established theory in science completely to account for matters as apparently simple and essentially computable as are the motions of the celestial spheres.

When the student of nature and of the process by which it has been interpreted into terms of human understanding goes over the record of hypotheses which have been in their time reckoned as amply sufficient to account for this or that series of facts, only to be found insufficient in the light of the knowledge of a later age, he becomes doubtful of all universal affirmations. He does not cast aside the theory of gravitation or the atomic theory because numerous orbs have a speed that cannot be accounted for by attractions such as earth and moon exert on each other, or for the reason that certain phenomena indicate that atoms are divisible. What he does is to qualify his conception as to the nature of what we call laws. In effect he disabuses his mind of the question begging quality of the word *law*; that unfounded notion of some absolute unqualified controlling power which determines any sequence of events in a certain order, and in its place understands that the sequence, however long continued, is likely to be broken by some interfering action. He does not for a moment think that the theory of Newton or Dalton are overthrown because apparent or even certain exceptions to their absolute validity are discovered; he merely extends his conception as to the complexity and variableness of the action and interaction which exist in the physical realm.

When we come to apply these considerations concerning the absoluteness of inorganic laws to the organic world, we see, in part, the illogical character of the process by which the doctrine of natural selection has,—far more by the disciples than the master,—been urged as a full explanation of all organic development. Great as are the complexities of the

inorganic individuals in the range from atoms to suns, we have to believe that the order among them is relatively simple as compared with what we find in animals or plants. The difficulty of proving long trains of action due to single causes,—trains which are in no wise interfered with by other causes,—is beyond doubt vastly greater in the living realm than in that which lies in the lower plane. All the phenomena of life show us that in that group of individuals we have an exceeding instability of conditions, which is apparently due to the fact that a great and varied array of influences are there acting together in such a manner that we cannot hope to define the laws of their operation or, in other words, predict the sequences with anything like the certainty with which we can do this in the lower field of nature.

Perhaps the main reason of the difficulty we find in discovering in organic individuals any semblance of the laws or determined sequences which are found in the inorganic realm, is that they are controlled by inheritance, and inheritance is an invisible and as yet incomputable efficiency. Considered merely as a chemical and physical problem an animal or plant is, as compared with a molecule or a crystal, beyond account complicated. But when we remember that all its so-called material processes are under the control of inscrutable influences derived from the experience of innumerable ancestors, we see that in the present state of our knowledge any effort to discover laws approaching in validity to those which have been found in the lower state of matter is likely to be futile. Such sequences of action as we may find are certain not to have anything like the continuity or the wide application of those which hold in the fields of chemistry or physics.

It is necessary to approach the so-called law of natural selection with some understanding as to the nature of the laws which have been discovered in the inorganic realm, and to recognize that the conditions which make such discoveries possible in the fields of chemistry or physics do not evidently exist among living creatures. Thus considered we see that in holding that the vast complex of organic evolution could be explained by a single series of consecutive events we run into a serious kind of danger, for we are seeking to apply single universal causes to a vastly complicated series of phenomena when they cannot be without qualification applied to the relatively simple physical realm.

In the eagerness with which the Darwinian hypothesis was received by the greater number of naturalists no account was taken as to the antecedent probability of its serving as a clew to all the great series of organic events. There was in it an element of captivating simplicity along with a curious appearance of universal efficiency. It is hardly too much to say

that by its very statement it carried conviction of its truth. There has never been a proposition which found in its hearers' minds so much that gave it validity. Enchanted by the fascinating hypothesis naturalists proceeded to do what their predecessors in many other branches of science had so often done before; they gave it an extension and a measure of affirmation that was unwarranted. For a generation there was an almost bewildering endeavor to turn all biologic knowledge into terms of selection or the survival of the fittest. We had, indeed, something like an intellectual frenzy for the new doctrine, such as will be likely to puzzle the historians of science when they come to shape its account. It is now evident that this unbalanced and utterly unscientific state of mind is passing away; it begins to be evident to naturalists that the Darwinian hypothesis is still essentially unverified.

That the process of natural selection is at work in the individuals of every species is perfectly clear; that it contributes in some measure to control the development of new kinds from the old is eminently probable; but that it is the sole cause, or the generally efficient cause, of specific variation appears to be doubted by an increasing number of inquirers. There are many very large and important groups of facts which evidently cannot be reasonably accounted for by selective action operating through the survival of the fittest with nothing but accidental, undirected variations as the basis of the process. The greater part of the beauty of the organic world clearly has been brought into existence by other influences than the survival of those varieties which were economically the fittest to live. The marvelous processions of development which lead to the elaboration of such architectural series as we find in the echinoderms, yet consign the most admirable successes to death or to a degradation in which all the gains of ages are lost, cannot be thus readily explained. Nor can the simpler and even more stately orderings of structure in the eggs of animals be satisfactorily accounted for by such essentially rude processes.

Perhaps the most effective criticism of the extreme views as to the value of natural selection in guiding the path of organic development rests upon two extended series of facts, those which show in the same group an almost infinite difference in the amount of variation brought about by diversities of habit, and those which reveal a long continued and determined effort to accomplish an end that is not only, so far as we can see, unprofitable but fatal to the life of the series. Even a casual inspection of the organic realm discloses a host of these instances which serve to deny the universal dominance of selection. I will set forth but two of these, one from each group, though my scanty knowledge of like facts

would suffice to advance a larger array of examples than can be adduced to show where selection probably has controlled the shapes of animals and plants. First, as to the signal inequality in the results which should have been accomplished by selective action on the supposition that it is the masterful guide of development, let us note the contrast between the structure and the habits of the ordinary crustaceans, i. e., the lobsters, crabs, shrimps, barnacles, etc., and the kindred crayfishes. As a whole the crustacea exhibit a remarkably complete adaptation of their form and structure to their particular habits of life. In general each such variation of habit is attended by a modification of the body which, to use the well devised phrase, reconciles it to the environment. We see excellent instances of this in the hermit crabs, the groups that inhabit burrows in the mud of the shores, and in the barnacles; but for the crayfishes, the class of crustaceans would in its general aspect afford a most strikingly complete body of what looked like evidence in favor of the supposition that the survival of the fittest leading to a reconciliation to the environment, had determined the conditions of these creatures in the manner the extreme selectionists maintain it has done. As this evidence from the crayfishes has been quite overlooked it will be well to set it forth by a brief statement.

The group of crayfishes diverged from the main stem of the marine crustacea apparently as far back as the beginning of the carboniferous period. In betaking themselves to the fresh water they encountered an environment which differed widely from that their ancestors of the sea had experienced. They brought with them to their life in the rivers the general form of the lobster which they so closely resemble that only the trained observer is likely to note the differences between the two groups. In teaching the comparative anatomy of the crustacea I have often given students doing elementary work a plate showing the anatomy of the lobster as a guide in dissecting a crayfish, or vice versa, with the assurance that they would find the correspondence between diagram and object sufficiently close for their work. Thus, for somewhere near half of the recorded history of organic life, a duration which cannot well be less than about fifty million years, this group has retained in the conditions afforded by the fresh water streams a shape which is proper to the quite different conditions of the seas. Moreover, and this is the main point in the argument, the crayfishes have generally developed a remarkable group of habits which lead them to form very extensive and well constructed burrows in the earth. Sometimes these burrows extend many feet from the water ways with horizontal galleys, vertical shafts, and considerable chambers for lodging during the winter season. The work

thus done is by far the most peculiar of any effected by crustaceans. It has evidently been accomplished for geological periods, yet this group of species though belonging in the class which more than any other *seems* to be under the control of selection has in no wise changed its form of structure to meet these most exceptional needs. In a word the evidence from this group throws doubt on the efficiency of the survival of the fittest to account for the accommodations we find elsewhere in the class.

The extremists of the selectional school may endeavor to turn the point above made by claiming that for some occult reason the crayfishes do not offer to selection the variations of form and structure such as afford the necessary foundation for the struggle between diversely ordered groups and the consequent survival of the fittest. But, as far as I have been able to determine by a rather careful inquiry, the individual and specific variability of these fresh water crustaceans is quite as great as they are in corresponding groups of marine forms. Moreover, if we grant this apparently unwarranted assumption, we may hold it to be in effect a confession that in the unseen of organic life there are interferences which may for ages entirely annul the effect of natural selection, where according to their contention it should have been most efficient. This instance fairly exemplifies a host of similar cases in which we find embedded in a series of exceedingly variable forms a group which, while individually variable and exposed to varying conditions, remains for many geological periods substantially unchanged.

The other class of facts to which attention is particularly due, that in which we find a series of developments that evidently lead not only to no profit but to positive disadvantages, may be illustrated from a group of crinoids or sea lilies, as they are commonly termed, in which the cup, or calix, of the animal, the part corresponding to the body of a starfish, or of a sea-urchin, is supported by a long column much as a head of wheat is upheld by the stem of the plant. This crinoid stem is normally formed by many score of circular or regularly polygonal discs, piled like pieces of money, one on top of the other. There are very numerous experiments essayed by the crinoids with their stems, few, if any, of which can conceivably be determined by the survival of the fittest; one of them is at least distinctly disadvantageous, yet it is persisted in to a complete finish. This experiment is made in the group termed the *Platycrinidæ*, and in the following manner: the discs composing the stem gradually change from their original circular form to an oval shape, the major axis of which is about twice as long as the minor. The discs are so placed that the axis of each is rotated a few degrees of the circle with reference to the disc next lower it in the series. The result of this

arrangement is that the stem becomes a twisted column. In some species the turns are so rapidly made that the stem has almost the form of a corkscrew. It is difficult even to conjecture any profit that can be derived from this curious alteration. To the suggestion that a greater flexibility would thus be given to the stem it may be answered that the earlier and simpler forms evidently have all the required freedom of movement. Moreover, a detailed study of the structure shows that there is no reason to believe that it possessed any such advantages. To the utterly unscientific proposition that it may have been in some unknown way profitable to the creature, the naturalist is not required to make any answer, though he may, if he pleases, call attention to the fact that when, after much endeavor, the *Platycrinus* group attains the end it seeks, and has finally converted its once serviceable cylindrical column into the less effective twisted shaft, it promptly passes out of existence.

The number of these instances in which series of animals strive towards and finally attain some end which appears to be from its nature not only unprofitable but positively harmful, is very great. They usually exhibit the same general character as that just above noted, in that a feature which was originally serviceable becomes modified in the direction of ornament. Once the form has abandoned the direct path leading towards utilities it is likely to fall into any measure of extravagances. The effect is curiously like what we note in human fashions where, in a similar manner, the æsthetic motive often leads to an alteration of features which were originally devised for service so that they become merely decorative. I shall not here discuss this very interesting but very large question as to the meaning of the æsthetic on the organic realm; my purpose is no more than to note and insist on its existence and enforce the point that it also indicates, that the process of natural selection cannot be regarded as effectively controlling the successions or the shapes of organic species. What, then, is the place of this action in the field of life?

In the present state of the debate concerning the limits of the Darwinian theory as to the origin of species it is impossible to make any safe general statement of the trend of opinion among competent naturalists. I believe, however, that a majority of those who, like myself, were at first or in the first decade of the controversy disposed to believe that it afforded a clue to all or nearly all the changes, which the series of animals and plants exhibit, are now convinced that it plays a much more limited part. My own belief is that while natural selection necessarily enters into every equation of actions which determines whether a species or variety survive or perish it rarely, if ever, is the sole agency in determining what

the characters of a form or a series of forms shall be: that this determination is, in all probability, in most instances, due to very numerous other influences than the immediate struggle for existence brought about by the excessive number of contestants for each opportunity of life. Furthermore, allowing, as we evidently must do, that in very many, if not most, instances, the possession of some profitable variation determines the survival of a particular form, it has yet to be proved that this useful innovation is often perpetuated by further selection so as to be made the basis of a new species.

It is impossible here to discuss the vast and closely knit arguments that Mr. Darwin has arrayed in defence of his hypothesis, which is by far the greatest work that has ever been done to establish a scientific thesis. My aim is no more than to indicate that the inundation of belief as to the efficiency of natural selection is now passing, as other like tides in science have passed, and that in the cold and truly scientific reckoning that is now being applied to the matter it is already evident that it is but one of several, perhaps one of an almost infinite number, of influences which shape the destinies of organic life.

Although it is not yet possible to assess the value of natural selection in organic development, the apparent fact that it is no longer to be regarded as the overwhelmingly dominant influence in the evolution of animals and plants altogether changes the moral significance of the matter. As one of many effective instruments it will not be any more revolting to the minds of men than is its agent,—death. When we recognize, as I am convinced we shall have to, that operating in the organic realm and going far to shape it there are potentialities, whatever their nature, which make for beauty as does the spirit of man in his handiwork, the brutal quality of the selective process will no longer produce the impression it now does on the public. If, as seems to me most likely to be the case, within a generation to come it is recognized that living beings have been moulded by no one or even by a few determining forces, but that they are the product of increasingly, we may fairly say infinitely, varied impulses, the spectacle of life as revealed by knowledge will be far more exalting and afford a vastly better basis for faith in the realm than it did under the old dispensation.

II.

There can be no question that in proportion as the universe is explained by what is termed *natural law*, the effect of the process upon the greater number of men, upon all, indeed, who are not by nature or occupation inquirers, is to limit their sympathetic interest in the realm. So long as the

processes of the world were deemed to be the result of humanlike agents there was a basis for sympathetic relations between man and the unseen about him. It is true that these relations were oftenest in their nature brutal, that fear predominated over love, that base superstitions were built thereon, yet they were even at their worst human. They tended to stimulate the imagination and to keep the world other than commonplace. So long as a demon lurked in any bit of darkness, the life of a savage, however unhappy, was not likely to be dull, and in the better mental estate of the higher religions the concept of nobler or better similitudes of men shepherding their flocks of earth uplifted the soul. Of this all exalted religious literature is proof.

I have elsewhere, more than once, called attention to the way in which the early interpretation of order in nature, through imagined manlike deities, was gradually changed in the alembic of Greek thought to that of *natural law*. The philosophers of Greece, in the last intellectual period of its marvelous culture, revolted at the ancient crude notion of humanlike powers controlling the universe. They gradually eliminated the man, leaving only the ruling influence without any bodily shape. Further on, at first distinctly in Aristotle, we find the concept of *natural laws*, in effect an algebraic expression designating an unknown something which determines the succession of events in the manner we indicate by the terms cause and effect. This idea as to the unknown that makes for continuity of action is perhaps the most unchanged of all the vast intellectual store which we have inherited from the Hellenes. It is, indeed, the very cornerstone of our science or of any ordered knowledge we can imagine.

While the concept of *natural law* has been the prime condition of all logical interpretation of nature,—for without it we should never have been led in the paths of scientific inquiry,—it has in certain regards had a most pernicious effect on the masses of people and even on those who are experts in inquiry. To the great majority of people who have to take their understandings of science at second hand, if not more remotely, the notion of *natural law* renders itself into terms as anthropomorphic as those of the ancient polytheism, only in place of a god, of a man with a crown of divinity, we have a base conception of an inanimate brutal something which compels events to fall as we find they do. This idea of a demoniac automaton standing behind and guiding the successions of units in each series of occurrences appears to hold not only in the minds of those who have no intimate relation with scientific inquiry, but in many of those who discover and define these orders of nature. It is curious to note how generally men of science picture the system of the

universe as essentially a great mechanical contrivance, as a vast thing with infinitely numerous cogged wheels, which, geared to one another, turn relentlessly and inevitably through the ages, counting out the results in the manner of a calculating engine. Thus, for all that we moderns have gained in our interpretation of nature, we are still in the anthropomorphic stage of the task, only, in place of setting a sublimated man behind the curtain we place there one of his contrivances in a well geared engine. When we come to a critical study of the method of interpreting nature we see why it is, that strive as we may to deal with the realm, man is absolutely limited to his experience for any suggestions as to the character of the control that there exists. He can make not even a conjecture which does not come forth from that experience. Accepting as we must the principle that however we account for natural operations we have to do so on a human basis, the question arises whether we are thus limited, on the one hand, to the divine manlike individual and, on the other, to the arbitrary self-acting gear such as we are prone to conceive *natural laws*. It appears to me that within the restricted limits open to the imagination it is possible to frame a concept of the control in nature which, although necessarily human and finite, will be far less open to criticism than those of ancient theologies or of modern science.

It is evident that any interpretation of nature must depend on the idea of what is behind the curtain of the visible. The process, indeed, demands a judgment as to what lies in that hidden realm. So far as that belief as to the unseen is well formed we may hope that our ideas concerning the meaning of series of events, i. e., of laws, will be valid. The question is, therefore, in what way we can use our knowledge so as to check our instinctive prejudices concerning the way in which natural actions are guided. Examining into this matter, we discovered that a part of the trouble in our notion of law arises from the fact that we instinctively assume that the manifest in nature substantially exhausts the possibilities of the realm. To the ordinary man, and to many of high scientific training as well, the universe is conceived as like a Parisian shop where all the wares are in the windows. This *idol* of the evident is so firmly planted in our finite quality that it can at best be only in part overthrown. Yet all hope of a larger view of nature depends upon our casting it away. Let us see what of our knowledge can help us to do this task.

Of all the fields of inquiry chemistry is that in which we have been able to go farthest on lines which seem to show something of the relation between the actual or manifested, and the potential or unmanifested, phenomena. Something approaching a like result has been won in that part

of physics which takes account of the vibrations or oscillations of matter or of ether, but the results in chemical science are for my purpose most valuable. In the earlier stages of chemical science, indeed well into the last century, it was tacitly accepted, as it still is by the public as regards the universe in general, that all the possible combinations of the elements were actually attained. That nature, here as elsewhere, had in a way exhausted itself in bringing forth what exists or had existed in this or other like spheres. When the art of analyzing substances, which was at first the ultimate object of the chemist's processes, led on to synthetic work where elements were combined so as to form materials useful in the arts in ways before unknown, the science entered on a new stage, one in which it became a creator of things which had not before existed. Pushing on in this field the chemists have found that of the possible combinations of the elements, such as could, if made, give rise to chemical species only an insignificant part exist. We may, indeed, say only an infinitely small part of them have ever been actually brought into existence in this world.

The point just above noted is so important to the problem we have in hand that we must consider it in some detail. Limiting the consideration to the field of organic chemistry, i. e., that which is mainly concerned with the combinations of carbon, let us first note the fact that this element is, along with oxygen and hydrogen, the basis of animal and plant life. If there are any elements the compounds of which in our part of the realm have had a large chance to manifest themselves in their variety they are those just mentioned. Yet the actual result in chemical species is to the potential in an inconceivably small ratio. Taking but one class of the carbon compounds, the alcohols, it is safe to say that by natural processes in this or any other like world, the number of species related to each other, much as ordinary alcohol is to wood spirits, which are or have been naturally formed cannot exceed a few score. Yet the potential number of the diverse associations of atoms, not taking account of more than twenty, each grouping giving rise to a distinct species, is so great that it would, according to a careful estimate, require twenty libraries of five hundred thousand volumes of one thousand pages each to set forth their formulæ, but a single line being taken by the symbols describing each species. Extending this surprising computation to the wider field of carbon compounds in general, it has likewise been reckoned that it would require five spheres the size of the earth to hold the libraries in which like record of the possible combinations of the elements were recorded.

It should not be supposed that by any process of experiment all these combinations could be effected. It is, indeed, not unlikely that in many

cases the combinations would be interfered with by various disturbing conditions. Thus the attractions which hold the atoms in their relations to one another may be in cases too weak to maintain them in their necessary positions, yet it remains true that something like the number of species above indicated are in the potentialities, the vast body of unmanifested latencies of the chemical realm.

Striking as is the numerical aspect of the facts above noted their importance, for my purpose, does not end with the mere numbers. Each of these compounds of carbon with other elements when it is brought about gives rise to new groups of qualities in some measure distinct from any which existed before, which qualities would be actually created by the combinations effected. Thus each of these associations, made for the first time, though it adds nothing to the so-called matter or energy of the universe, does originate new conditions of action through the qualities which came with it into existence. As will be readily seen the quality of these newly formed chemical individuals, the molecules in question, is but a term to indicate the influence they have on other individuals of whatever grade which come within their sphere of action. Thus by forming a combination of preëxisting matter and energy a new species of molecules, an absolute addition, is made to the realm, a creation within the creation is brought about. This peculiar aspect of all the process of developing larger individuals by combining the lesser in potential ordered association, goes on in the whole range of individuation from atoms to celestial spheres and from molecules to man. We need but note it here but it requires a fuller setting forth.

Although the evidence is less clear we have something of the same nature as that chemistry affords us from that part of physics which takes account of the movements of matter and ether. It now appears tolerably certain that the number of what we may, for convenience, term species of vibrations and pulsations is indefinitely great, the difference between the several kinds being determined perhaps among other things by the speed and amplitude of the movements. Although there is reason to believe that we are just beginning to learn something about the range in amplitude of these movements, we have already found them, as in the case of light waves, as small as one five millionth of an inch, while in magnetic waves they may be some feet in amplitude. So far as we can see there is no reason to suppose that there is any distinct superior or inferior limit to the size of these movements. It is also likely that in form there is something like the variety in these waves that exists in their dimensions and frequency.

In picturing to ourselves the oscillations or waves that are moving through the realm we have to imagine that with each difference of amplitude and perhaps of power we have distinct, though momentary, individualities, each with the essential mark of the individual in that it has its personal quality, i. e., it effects other individuals within the sphere of its influence in a unique manner. We have thus to assume that within the realm of atoms and in the ether that envelops and penetrates them, there are infinitely numerous waves passing each other, the separate kinds existing and moving on until they are changed into other modes of motion, each kind with the quality-bearing property belonging to its species. We do not yet know, and may never learn, whether all possible species of waves exist or whether their actualized variety is limited, as in the case of molecular compounds, so that it would be within the limits of experiment to establish new kinds of movements. It may, however, be said that if there are in existence all the possible species of oscillations they are evidently not manifested to us in phenomena of which we have or are likely to have any cognizance; while if the number be limited then there, as in the field of atomic association, it would evidently be possible to create new kinds with the qualities proper to their species. Though the evidence is incomplete it is to the effect that in the group of vibratory actions, as in the chemical, the ratio of the actually operative to that of the potential existences may be very small.

Although the effect on the mind arising from the very limited survey of the inorganic realm which our knowledge enables us to make, is to show that the actions done in this world are to the actions possible as one to an inconceivably great number, the discrepancy, though less easily shown, is yet greater in the realm of organic life. It is estimated that there are at the present time somewhere about two million and a half species of animals and plants, and that there have been during the vital period of this planet perhaps fifty times as many kinds which have lived and passed away. This is a vast total, but it fails to take account of the really important beings which are not the species, but the separate individuals that are grouped in these species, for in them we find those centres of quality, of influence, from which radiate the greater part of the actions which constitute environment for other living units. We have no kind of measure as to the average number of individuations in organic species. As compared with the atoms or the oscillations of the inorganic realm it is exceedingly small, yet it doubtless amounts to a million million, perhaps to the cube of that number. Yet each of these individuals above the very lowest is composed of a host of subordinated individualities or centres of organic action, the cells, the organs, or the coöperating vital units

of the circulation such as the white corpuscles of the blood. Thus in the body of man there are probably far more individuated parts, each a centre of influence affecting every other in the association, than there ever have been of distinct species in the organic realm.

It is, or rather quickly becomes, one of the characteristic features of living forms that they combine, each in itself, a host of lesser subordinated vital units all operating together to shape the higher unit of life, the visible functioning individual. Thus a body such as our own may be described as an aggregate, first of atoms, which have been brought to exceedingly varied molecular associations. These molecules in turn have been placed in control of the organic forces which build them into cells or other vitalized units; then the host is controlled by the larger mastery of the whole form. Thus the life of the creature depends on the give and take of quality which gives us a social organism where the interchanges may be between thousands of millions of separate members, each living for itself and for the society which gives it a chance to live.

After having by such considerations as have just above been set forth, attained to some slight and necessarily most inadequate sense of what diversity exists in an organic body it is well to set against this impression certain things which go to show how small a part of the possibilities of organic life are, or are ever likely to be, manifested on this planet, if, indeed, on any other in the visible universe. In this inquiry into the limits of vital organization, it will be well to first attend to the fact that all organic life as we know it, surely all this sphere has known, absolutely depends on the properties of oxygen and hydrogen in that mode of their presentation which forms water. In that state of those combined elements, when the fluid they make has a temperature between the freezing point and about one hundred and fifty degrees Fahr., life finds the first of its possibilities; the second of them arises from the fact that water in that range of temperatures can take into and yield from solution a considerable range of other substances, in fact the greater number of them that exist in the earth and air, including the air itself.

Next in the order of considerations let us see that the properties of water just above noted are common in some measure to all fluids; their importance in water arises from the fact that of the indefinitely great number of atomic compounds which may be found in the range of temperature existing in the realm, water is the only one fluid at the particular scale of heat that the balance of actions generally maintains on this earth. That this balance is rarely delicate is shown by certain very evident facts which need to be briefly set forth. The heat of the sun is certainly far greater than any we can produce on the earth; it is probably more than

one hundred thousand degrees, that of space several hundreds of degrees, below the zero point in the scale; yet owing to the adjustment of the air, the earth's distance from the sun, its rate of revolution on its axis, the rate at which heat flows out from the interior of this sphere, and many others operating a filmy layer between the depths of the sea and three or four miles above the ocean level for the geologic ages has been a possible field for water organisms. Measured by all the guages by which we take account of the universe, by time, temperature, space, or scope in the field of possible action, organic life, so far as we know it, as something made possible by the chemical union of oxygen and hydrogen within a narrow limit of heat, is a momentary event, limited, transitory, so far ephemeral, that judged by these physical measures it appears of less importance than any other discernable feature of the realm.

When, from such general considerations as to the place of organic life in the stream of the larger life of the universe, we turn to an inquiry into the development of the series of animals and plants we find again startling limitations in the measure of success to which they attain. To the novice the spectacle of two or three million existing species and some fifty-fold as many that have lived is very impressive; it gives an idea of almost indefinite multiplication of organic forms. But if he becomes trained in observation so that he knows the condition of a few groups he will, if he scans them to good purpose, be convinced that considering what seem to be the possibilities of the situation, the number of species which have been evolved is extraordinarily limited. Speaking generally and on the basis of a knowledge of a very few groups the impression made on me is that only an insignificant part, perhaps not as much as one per cent, of the possible species in these groups have ever been established. Very much value cannot be attributed to this impression for the groups still extant may hereafter indefinitely produce species, and those living and dead doubtless have had a host of kinds of which we have no fossil record. Yet taking only those orders which have passed away but which for one reason or another seem to have been well recorded, I believe that most paleontologists will agree with me in the judgment that the number and variety of the species developed has been very far within the limits of what seem to have been the bounds of opportunity. Thus nature, here as in the inorganic world, is sparing in creative work.

There is yet another view of the realm, which, though less clearly than the others, still suggestively indicates this curious limitation in presentation to which we are attending. This relates to the development of intelligence in individual forms. We are compelled to believe that our

judgment as to the importance in the scale of existence of intelligence is justly formed and that the capacity to look forth and comprehend is a consummate accomplishment. We see that in the millions of species below man there is some approach towards this capacity, yet in man alone has there been what we may esteem to be a success attained in this series of endeavors. There is good reason to affirm that from the animal kingdom no other species of high intelligence than man can be evolved; for the branches from which a new and higher intellectual group could possibly spring have passed the stage where such new series could be instituted, or as is most generally the case they have altogether passed away. For while the earth, for all we can see of it, is by no means in its decadence, it holds no promise, we had better say it affords no possibility, of a higher and better creature than man. Thus for all the seeming striving towards intellectual accomplishment which we find in the animal kingdom there is but one unique supreme success to be won out of the earth's life. In a word, so far as we know organic life the ratio of its actualities to its potentialities is in that regard limited much as it is elsewhere in the realm.

It should be said that while the conditions of organic life, so far as this earth is concerned, are limited to such as permit water to exist in large quantities in a fluid state, it is not impossible, though it be improbable, that in spheres of our own or other solar systems there may be in other adjustments of temperature and atmospheric pressure diverse fluids which would play the rôle that water does here. It is not likely that in the universe the impulse which leads to the progressive organization of matter into higher and higher molecular units and finally into the organic form exists only when water is present. It is certainly not to be looked for in the seats of very great heat such as the sun, for there disassociation of atoms is enforced, but it is quite imaginable where planets, if such there be, have any permanently fluid substances upon them. It may, indeed, be that certain features of Mars which appear to show the coming and going of some temporarily existing structures is due to a kind of life that is not dependent on the fluid that shapes the living covering of the earth. It may also be that here and there the planets of other suns are to be found in just the relations which have led to the vitalizing of this earth though when we consider how delicate is this adjustment we have to confess if such they be they are most likely seldom.

The foregoing brief and inadequate account of the conditions of organic life may, along with the like sketch of the inorganic field, help us in bettering the conception of *natural law*. By such considerations we may clear away the harmful notion that nature is represented by its

actualities; that it is made up of statical and dynamical phenomena, of things doing and things done. On the contrary it is evident that the ratio of the potential to the actual, of the things that might be yet may never be is inconceivably great. In other words, there is behind or rather amid this manifested nature of which we know an infinitely small part, a vastly greater infinite of the imminently possible yet never happening of which we know nothing except where, as in the synthetic work of the chemist, we have a seldom chance to break into it. Thus we rid ourselves of the notion that the phenomenal world is the whole world,—than which there is no error that is more hindering to insight into nature.

The next point for our consideration is the actual nature of the processes of succession to which we give the name of laws. The common idea is that each of these laws designates some kind of power which directly compels the sequence. What we can discern of the realm makes it clear that most, if not all, occurrences are determined, not by a single impulse, but by a vast and complicated equation of inferences. In the relatively simple plane of purely physical actions these equations may be so established that the results are expressed in long continued sequences giving the appearance of mechanical stability. As we ascend in the complication of structure to the level of the organic individuals where newly developed units often appear, each the centre of new influences, the equations become with the process of advance, more and more unstable. Here, as in the inorganic realm, every event follows on antecedents so that logically they may be expressed in terms of law; but they are essentially incomputable because the elements in the equation are so very numerous and so completely hidden that they must ever defy scrutiny. Thus the term *natural law*, as we apply it to the conservation of energy, to gravitation, or to chemical processes, has a meaning that it does not have when it is applied to the unending flux of actions and reactions which takes place in vital phenomena. Accepting the sound principle that the term should be applied to those sequences alone which can, with a high order of certainty, be predicted, it evidently should not be applied to any of the occurrences we note in animals and plants; for such the better word is tendencies or trends by which we denote no more than we really see.

Making a rough classification of what has been accepted as *natural laws*, we find at the foundation of the series a group relating to the general properties of matter. Of these apparently the best founded is that of gravity, yet even to it, as has been noted, there are what seem to be exceptions. While the mere fact of gravitation, i. e., that one particle of matter attracts another may well be of universal truth, the law of the

ratio of the action can be said to be proved for no more than the planets of our solar system and some of their satellites. Only within this narrow field has the Newtonian theory been established. Closely related in generality to the law of gravitation is that of the conservation of energy, but it rests on a different basis of proof. Experimentally we know it only in a limited way. Our confidence in it is moral rather than inductive; we believe it to be universal because we cannot well imagine it to be otherwise; we accept it as such much as the ancient Greeks did their conjectures, because it is so mightily satisfying. So, too, with the admirably demonstrated and very numerous successions of phenomena in the fields of physics and chemistry. They have been proved to hold on this planet and in our age; the idea that they have been true in all times or are now so in other spheres rests upon an assumption of continuity in the equation that determines actions which we have no logical right to make. There may be elsewhere in time and space exceptions to their validity as startling as those which appear to make uncertain the claim as to the universality of the law of gravitation. Thus reviewing the groups of *natural laws* we find that they are not fairly to be understood as evidences of inevitable and infinitely distributed successions of events but as having a limited field of certainty. I would not be misunderstood in this contention; my argument is not against the value of the true validity of *natural laws* but against the excesses and often unreasoning scope that is given them and the narrow, indeed, debasing conception of the universe they are breeding in man.

As we depart from the field of primary physical actions, those which control the material substratum of the realm, we find a host of so-called laws which mean no more than that observers have noted coincidences in a certain grouping of facts. A familiar instance of these is to be found in what have been called the *laws* of the continents of our earth. By such use of the term *law* geologists and geographers do not intend to indicate successions of any such generality as those to which the word was first applied. In all such cases the basis of the induction is too limited to justify the term, and while the results in question may be due to a common equation of actions, evidence is lacking that the equation has any such permanence as the term connotes. To use the word *law* for such limited continuities would lead us to apply it to all actions whatsoever, which result in two or more like occurrences. Once again it should be said that laws should only be recognized where their results can be computed.

Attention has already been called to the misuse of the term *law*, in the realm of life and to the fact that the introduction of new individ-

uals, each with new efficiencies makes it quite impossible to apply computation to the occurrences. A further word may be said covering the so-called law of natural selection which is, perhaps, nearer to possessing a truly "legal" character than any other of those which have been applied to animals and plants. From the point of view here taken natural selection cannot properly be called a law because its validity is not to be supported by evidence going to show any quality of inevitability in its action. It is not to be denied that in very numerous instances the process of selection occurs, but it is evident that it is extremely likely to be interfered with and is very often annulled by other actions. It is, in a word, incomputable. To call it a law would justify us in saying there is a law that guns should shoot straight for their mark, or that words should be appropriate to the state of mind of the speaker; some persons have a fancy for such use of terms but they do not help the cause of inquiry by so doing.

If we but clear our minds of that question begging epithet *law* and look attentively at the mere coincidences and successions which it denotes we take the first step towards a bettered understanding of nature: a step which leads us to see that for all the illogical suggestions implied in the word it means no more than that through the existing balance of influences, the ultimate nature of which we cannot discern, certain results now and then regularly occur. All that we divine of the unseen leads us to conceive that it is a realm of unending and infinitely varied originations. Each new individuality of every kind that is produced is a centre of qualifying actions which may efficiently extend through an indefinite range. The present aspect of the visible universe may, on the basis of this view of its organization, be conceived as the result of an equation of actions in complexity only less than infinite. Into this incessantly determining equation is continually going the influential qualities of newly formed individualities and from it is continually being withdrawn those that pass away. Thus considered the realm of nature appears no longer as a rigid mechanism, but as the place of incessant creation each of the creatures in its measure affecting the whole; each sharing in the universal life as the corpuscles in the blood of man share in the work of his body.

But what, it may be asked, becomes of those concepts of law which are the basis of all scientific inquiry? How can we imagine a realm where there is no fixity giving to our understandings such impressions of inevitable sequences? The answer may well be that it is most reasonable to accept these evidences of continuity as results of the adjustments as they now and here exist; as true for the infinitely small part of the realm that we in time and space can know. Looking upon the universe

as the seat of incessant origination of new influences in newly manifested individualities, we can well believe that in the resulting complex certain trains of action would, in any one field, be long kept in continuous operation, and that between the most and least permanent of these succession-giving actions there would be an indefinitely extended scale of them, ranging in value from the most widely prevalent to the absolutely exceptional and unique. In a realm thus conceived it may be held as doubtful if there would ever be an absolute at either end of the series of successions, i. e., a *law* so universal that it would never change or an occurrence that would never be repeated. But between these extremes there may evidently be an indefinitely great range in the permanence of the equations which determines the sequences.

As to the extent to which this view of the nature of law may tend to better man's attitude towards the realm no certain reckoning can be made. The soul of man is a vast complex which, as all else in the realm of law, in the true understanding of the term, is essentially inscrutable. As in all moral judgments of this kind the most we can do is to found our opinion on our personal experience. To me this conception of the nature of the control of the realm, one to which I have been slowly driven by the study of phenomena, comes as a vast relief from that to which I was led by my misconceptions as to the true meaning of law. The sense of the infinites of the latent, of the unmanifested, denied by the crude and essentially illogical idea of what the manifested series mean, clears away all the brutal suggestions of the mechanical view of nature. In such a realm the spirit may contentedly dwell feeling that it is in its own fit house.

ETHNOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

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IN THE history of modern science it is the imperishable glory of comparative philology that she has cast light on the mist-shrouded origins of the Indo-Germanic race, of which neither history nor monuments give us any information, and that in giving us a history of language she has sketched for us in broad outline the development of religious, mythological, legal, and esthetic ideas. From this point of view it is easy to understand the pride which speaks in the words of one of the pioneers in this newly discovered field, namely, Max Müller:—

“If I were asked what I consider the most important discovery made in the nineteenth century and pertaining to the ancient history of mankind, I should reply that it was the following simple etymological equation: Sanskrit *Dyaus-Pitar*; Greek *Zeus-pater*; Latin *Jupiter*; Old Scandinavian *Tyr*. This equation asserts, not only that our own forefathers and those of Homer and Cicero spoke the same tongue as the inhabitants of India,—this is a discovery that has long ceased to stir surprise, incredible as it at first seemed,—but it asserts, and also proves, that they all had once the same religious faith and for a time worshipped the same supreme deity under the same name, a name which signified *Heaven-Father*. This point cannot be emphasized too often; for whoever has not completely grasped, appropriated, and digested it can frame no just conception of the light which it throws on the earliest history of the Aryan races. The history of antiquity has been as completely transformed by this one discovery as was astronomy by the heresy of Copernicus.”—“*Anthropological Religion*.”

But, however great the worth of those discoveries, however complete the refutation of the errors of the last century concerning the origin and development of religious and mythological views, and all the theories that held religion to be the invention of crafty priests or the work of a few great minds have been forever refuted,—nevertheless it was soon evident that, both in general questions and in details, other departments of science must come to the aid of philology,—above all ethnology. The common ground on which all investigation was to meet was psychology, for the origin and development of religious and mythological ideas was beyond doubt a psychological problem, though its full scope could not be grasped until the validity of the psychological point of view came to be recognized in ethnology.

Not until our own century was a final break made with the naïve and totally inadequate conception which taught our forefathers to see in eth-

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nology an arbitrary collection of queer novelties, of strange customs and habits, that were in sharp opposition to our own ways of thought and feeling. In its place has arisen (everywhere the unmistakable evidence of scientific thought) the honest effort to trace a definite causal connection in the tangle of phenomena; but the mythology and religion of savage races has been compelled to labor unreasonably long under a variety of hindrances. Here we must put first the blunders and misconceptions of missionaries, who, with the best of intentions, attained only meagre and defective results. To their lack of skill in questioning the natives, who, unfamiliar with abstract thought, did not understand at all the point of their queries, must be added a very one-sided and dogmatic treatment of the subject,—sometimes even deliberate falsification or destruction of native traditions, especially if they showed a striking resemblance to Christianity, in which case these instigations of the devil had to be hushed up as promptly and completely as possible, as, for instance, among the ancient Germans and among the Peruvians at the time of the Incas. To make the situation worse, objective difficulties presented themselves. In most cases it was a question of some secret doctrine jealously preserved by the priests, its official guardians, a doctrine to which was often attached a stern tabu,¹ as, for example, in the South Seas. A very characteristic experience in Hawaii is told by the veteran traveler, Bastian. He asked a man, broken by age, yet in whose eyes (so the narrator says) shone depth of soul, for detailed information concerning the relation of legends touching cosmogony and etnogeny. Beyond the original God, the Old Man of the Sky, one could not go back, said the old man, for while the process of development can be watched in yonder tree from the seed up, the origin of the latter cannot be, so that one must stop with the seed. Bastian continues:—

“What more would one have? Unhappily I had drunk at the spring in the royal archives and had grown overwise thereby, so that I still wanted to know more; for in these archives was preserved an ancient temple poem which reduced all existence by strict logic from the common source, Kumulipo. Accordingly I made reference to a certain Kumulipo, but my aged friend held his tongue. Around us were sitting his children and grandchildren, who had Americanized themselves as much as possible in habits and ways of thought, and who were anxious to please the visitor, whom they

(1) Cf. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 32: “Even a stronger deterrent closes the mouths of most savages from giving much information. It is *tabu*, prohibited under severe penalties, to impart it to any stranger or even to another tribesman. The tendency to the secret, to the esoteric, belongs to all religions, and especially to those in which the emotions are predominant, as is the case with primitive cults.”

seemed to consider a great lord. So they urged their grandfather to tell at least a little. * * * At first the same silence, then, after long urging, he looked up with a melancholy reflective glance such as I had seldom seen in him, laid his right hand on his breast and said with trembling voice in a tone that pierced my heart, 'Will ye rob me of my only treasure?'—*"Heilige Tage der Polynesier,"* p. 157.

What makes the natives most shy and distrustful toward the missionaries, is the very comprehensible circumstance that the priests see in them the enemies of their hereditary faith. There is a second question, which, however, cannot be decided here, namely, how far in the presence of this secret doctrine, which finds its support chiefly in the self-interest of the priests, can one speak of "popular" traditions, of a so-called "lower" mythology, which sometimes maintains itself more tenaciously than would be supposed at first glance?

No less unreliable testimony, which can scarcely claim any scientific value, is that which we have from the lips of superficial or one-sided observers, who, moreover, not seldom approach their task with definite prejudices, as, for instance, with the dogma of the absolute absence of religion among certain peoples,—a dogma unhappily not even yet wholly outgrown. It would be inadmissible at the very beginning of our investigation to try to set up an exact definition of the true religion; this must rather come with the progress of the discussion. But it is plain from the start that it is doubly impracticable to approach a savage race with a ready-made standard. The most mortifying contradictions and retractions must result. In view of this, one is almost tempted to agree with Max Müller when he says that for a time the aim of investigators was to discover man on so low a plain of culture that he could serve as a bridge between man and beast (*"Anthrop. Religion"*). At any rate, with all the races of the earth, a later and more careful examination of the facts has shown the injustice of the earlier verdict of condemnation, and the assertion of Lubbock and others to the contrary is no longer scientifically tenable. We will cite in this connection only the dwarf inhabitants of the Andaman Islands, so often scornfully assigned to the lowest plain of civilization, to whom, through the honesty and thoroughness of conscientious travelers, a like justice has been done as to the natives of Australia. If, without binding our hands for the future, we follow Tylor in defining religion as belief in spiritual beings, we can agree with this experienced writer when he says:—

"As far as I can judge from the immense amount of testimony at our disposal, we must admit that this belief is found in all the lower races with which we are well enough acquainted; while the assertion that such a belief does not exist, is limited to

ancient or to more or less incompletely described modern tribes."—"Beginnings of Civilization."

No less one-sided was the procedure, until a few decades ago, of purely speculative science, the so-called Philosophy of Religion, which treated the content of religious ideas according to a fixed dialectic scheme, reducing them to a mere succession of neatly worded concepts. A further error, in addition to this almost deliberate contempt for experience, was the limitation of the discussion to the ultimate problems of religious consciousness, very often with especial reference to Christianity, while earlier stages of development, especially the timid germs among savage peoples, were totally disregarded. From this resulted with the lapse of time more and more irreconcilable contradictions with the facts of experience; the dogmatic attitude excluded all objectivity and scientific impartiality. Such results as there were could naturally not be valid for all humanity, and hence not for the development of the religious consciousness in general, but only for single conspicuous phases of that development. It is, however, clear and needs no particular proof that only the widest possible experience and observation can disclose to us the real psychological connection of religious and mythological ideas, and that we can arrive at knowledge of the origin and the progress of this world—a world which at first glance makes so strange and fantastic an impression and yet in the end is one so sternly subject to law—only along this road, toilsome though it be. We must, therefore, before we venture farther, make more fundamental observations concerning the method to be followed.

In the first place it is necessary to collect material that is trustworthy and fit for critical treatment, material such as is, in the main, furnished us by the voluminous documents of ethnology. From this point on the procedure is the same as in any other historical science which deals with historical testimony and not with experiments and immediate observation, although these, too, play a certain rôle. Objectivity and freedom from partisanship are here the first requisites, both for the original ascertainment of the facts and also for their later discussion. The momentous character of the rôle played by the individuality of the investigator—who often enough casts only a hasty glance on lands and people—is self-evident, and has been illustrated above in the utter irreconcilability of different reports. To the obstacles already indicated in obtaining really serviceable material must be added the unhappy circumstance, that, as is well known, the contact of a higher civilization with savage conditions produces an inevitable distortion, a falsification of the original pure con-

ception of the world which naturally has its influence also on religious and mythological ideas. If the investigator is dealing, not with tribes which have no accessible chronology, tribes in which at most only psychological distinctions and stages of development can be traced, but with nations illumined by the full sunlight of history,¹ he can, with the aid of definite documents, follow closely the successive transformations of religious ideas. One need only instance, as an example, the relation of Judaism to the teachings of the Parsees, or of Greek philosophy to Christianity. But, on the other hand, the problems often subdivide in a most confusing fashion. Still, although the first requisite for science is to lay the necessary foundation beyond the reach of all assaults or doubts, the task of criticism is not exhausted or completed thereby. It is, I admit, often very hard to be compelled to confess to a gap, larger or smaller, in tradition, in the mythological or religious picture of the world, and only too often has creative fancy under such circumstances been reduced into glittering but very infirm hypotheses. But this abuse can never discredit the historic and inalienable rights of speculation, that is, the attempt to transcend the immediate realm of empirical facts and reach an ideal unity by a systematic classification of the phenomena. Every science sets for itself, of necessity, this goal, if it is not to sink into a mere meaningless collection of miscellaneous items that have no common content, and this indispensable classification, on whatever principle it be made, demands criticism, demands selection, a criticism and selection determined by the nature and significance of the material involved. We thus approach the basic principle of the scientific study of religions; it consists of the *causal* explanation and the *psychological* interpretation of the problems involved. These two principles cannot be separated; on the contrary they stand to one another in closest interrelation. It is one task to show the organic connection of the several conceptions,—their interdependence, their development, their decay, etc., if possible with reference to definite chronological, topographical, ethnographical, and historical conditions,—as, for example, in the problem of the origin of Islam. Thus we have before us all the stages of development in clear outline; our intellect and our historical conscience are satisfied, since we are able to give a logical reason for every change of the religious consciousness within this sharply defined area, without being compelled to examine the content of the various conceptions with reference to their deeper psychological significance, nor, above all, in reference to the

(1) Cf. Hardy, *Was ist Religionswissenschaft* in *Archiv für Religionswiss.*, i., 31, ff. Freiburg: Mohr, 1898.

important question, how far *universal* human nature finds expression in the historical forms of religion. This latter point is of supreme importance (one may say) for the history and significance of modern science in general, and hence I may perhaps be allowed to take a somewhat wider survey.

The historical method of studying religious and mythological ideas is limited to a relatively narrow field, since it deals with a phase of universal development that lies within close limits of time and space. In the majority of cases, too, it is the ethnographic relation of the individual groups that is important, since religion is only one of the many factors of civilization in general. Hence we have a history of religion for most or all the races that have attained to the higher plane of civilized life, and this constitutes an indispensable part of what we commonly call "Universal History." On occasion, it is true, this narrower field is abandoned, the more special ethnographic areas recede into the background, and give place to a more comprehensive anthropological perspective. For instance, we speak of the characteristics of an Indo-Germanic religion, of an Aryan mythology as the common mother from which, later, others have sprung. But usually with this enlargement of the horizon the colors grow pale and the concrete content vanishes under our hands. These characteristics of development have been determined for most sciences by the genealogical tree drawn by comparative philology, but she has of late been outdone by a science based on sociology, one which transcends the province of ethnology and investigates the development of mankind in general. I mean the science of comparative law and of ethnology in the higher sense. That is, it has been shown that similar legal institutions and views are found among peoples that are not only distinct in blood but also widely sundered in space, peoples between whom borrowing or transference is absolutely excluded. How is this to be explained? Simply by the similarity of nature and disposition in mankind as such, a similarity that asserts itself in certain fundamental traits through all differences. Post, a pioneer in this realm, too early lost to science, writes:—

"Ethnology, a very modern but very vigorous science, has, with the aid of an immense material, proved beyond dispute, that in the lives of peoples countless phenomena repeat themselves without regard to the continent they inhabit, the race to which they belong, or the group to which they are assigned. There exists in every national life an immense stock of common humanity, a very large cycle of customs and views which are the common property of the genus *homo sapiens*."—"Aufgaben einer allg. Rechtswissenschaft," § 17.

This is just as true of religious ideas and mythological views, down to

the most trivial detail of fairy tale or superstition, so that we can say with Brinton :—

“Whenever we turn, in time or in space, to the earliest and simplest religions of the world, we find them dealing with nearly the same objective facts in nearly the same subjective fashion, the differences being due to local and temporal causes. This cardinal and basic trust in the unity of action of man’s intelligence, which is established just as much for the arts, the laws, and the institutions of men as for their religions, enables me to present broadly the faiths of primitive peoples as one coherent whole, the product of a common humanity, a mirror reflecting the deepest thoughts of the whole species on the mighty questions of religious life and hope, not the isolated or borrowed opinions of one or another tribe or people.”—“Religions of Primitive Peoples,” p. 9.

This is, in fact, that real spiritual unity of mankind which the work of our modern ethnologists, such as Bastian, Tylor, Hartland, Ratzel, and others, have made an irrefutable certainty. Of course the ethnographic and historical methods are not condemned once for all to silence in the presence of this wider method (which aims only at showing identity of thought) nor of the psychological explanation that goes hand in hand with it. On the contrary it must always be the first duty of ethnology to consider, with the utmost caution and alertness of mind (and if possible to prove), the possibility of a real and hence historical contact and influence. But, on the other hand, nothing does more harm to scientific progress than a fantastic passion for combination that lacks all empirical support and revels in glittering hypotheses.

The nearer we approach the beginnings of civilization (which in spite of all vagueness of detail can in their main outlines, through the common labors of ethnology, anthropology, and archæology, be considered the secure possession of scientific thought), the more do we meet, as has been said above, with a surprising agreement in custom, usage, belief, thought, and art. We then arrive at the authoritative social-psychological standpoint already pointed out, which has asserted itself more and more in ethnology. In the common conception the ego is the final source of all thought and action, and every psychological investigation has, therefore, to begin here. But recent research has shown that mental activity and the personal ego do not by any means coincide, but that the latter is only a small segment of the former. That keen thinker, Post, whom I have already mentioned, expresses himself as follows :—

“What we call our consciousness is only a minute part of the totality of mental life which is active within us.¹ Consciousness floats like a bright cloudlet over an

(1) Thus Bastian says, “That not we but something within us does our thinking, is clear to whoever is accustomed to note what goes on within.”—*Beiträge zur vergl. Psych.*, § 1.

unfathomable ocean. From the depths rise incessantly all kinds of pictures, but only a few attain to such distinctness of outline that we are conscious of them. * * * From every side on which we can approach it our world is the product of mental activities of which we are unconscious."—"Einleitung in das Studium der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz," § 11.

As has been said, ethnology has made this principle her own; for her, religion, mythology, law, custom, art, are no inventions of individuals, no products of great personalities, but socio-psychical phenomena in the organic development of the race. In origin and essence religion is a *social* function and not something left to the pleasure of the individual, as it seems to us to be. Here it is that religious injunctions and prohibitions find their sanction, as the French sociologist, Durkheim, points out:—

"En effet, ce qui caractérise les croyances comme les pratiques religieuses, c'est qu'elles sont obligatoires. Or sont ce qui est obligatoire est d'origine sociale. Car une obligation implique un commandement et, par conséquent, une autorité qui commande. Pour que l'individu soit tenu de conformer sa conduite à certaines règles, il faut que ces règles émanent d'une autorité morale qui les lui impose, et pour qu'elle lui impose, il faut qu'elle le domine. Autrement, d'ou lui viendrait l'ascendant nécessaire pour faire plier les volontés?"—"L'année sociologique," ii., 23.

For this reason Durkheim looks for the origin of religion (we shall return to this later), not in the moods and emotions of the individual, but in common social views and facts. Ethnology especially, since it has to do with the beginnings, not with the achievements of human morality, looks at the growth of religious and mythological ideas solely from this standpoint,—at first within a definite ethnic group, then (and here strictly speaking ethnology resigns its office to the science of universal religion) by comparison of groups and the use of psychological methods. In fact the common field where the two sciences meet is *psychology*, by which I mean a definition of divinities and institutions based on their intrinsic significance, without reference to their historical and ethnographic environment. What is aimed at is a history of the development of the religious consciousness, not in single individuals but in the human mind at large, as revealed in the institutions of society. That we must carefully distinguish the collective from the individual, that the collective organism and collective mind possess absolute reality, we shall see later; it is enough if we posit the social factor in religion hypothetically for the present, a factor which is nearly as pronounced in religion as in law. As the legal consciousness is precipitated in concrete definitions and institutions, so is the religious consciousness in rites, divinities, and doctrines. In Schiller's phrase, man pictures himself in his gods, and a keen eye can read in the

representation of a divinity the history of the religious ideas from which it was evolved. Even if we should not succeed in tracing in uninterrupted sequence the development of the religious consciousness from the simplest, crudest, and most sensuous views up to the most lofty ideas, we shall at any rate attain to an exact causal arrangement of the immense mass of material, and be able to demonstrate for the whole process a course exempt from all individual caprice and fancy. Perhaps, too, we may show within certain limits the presence of great laws, or at all events of periodically recurring rhythms, which, to be sure, cannot claim the uniformity of the laws of nature, but still prove an underlying unity.

In order to exhibit our method in a practical illustration, let us look at the fruitful results of comparative philology and comparative mythology. The latter, with the aid of the ever increasing mass of ethnological material, has shown the most striking parallels between peoples of such completely different stock (as, for instance, between Polynesians and Greeks, Aryans and American Indians) that there is left us only the socio-psychological explanation of derivation from the common human stock. The same holds true of the science of religion, whose best strength lies in precisely this wide comparison, freed as it is from all ethnographic, geographical, or historical limitations. Comparative mythology, for all its uncertainty, has a firm basis in certain conclusions and conjectures whose probability increases the more the material grows which is subject to comparison. No unprejudiced mind doubts nowadays the socio-psychological principle which bids ethnology to no longer limit itself to the well tilled fields of linguistic and ethnographic research, but pass on to the discussion of the great problem, how a mythological conception of the world could arise at all. The science of religion shows the same aim in the universality of its comparisons and in its exclusion of all that is divergent or abnormal. Like its sister science, it finds its fundamental conceptions, its typical characteristics, among savage races, in the dawn of religious feeling. But for so comprehensive an investigation there is need of the aid of comparative psychology. This alone can lead us to the goal. As Brinton says:—

“The comparative method noted the similarity and differences between the religions of different tribes or groups, and gradually extending its field to embrace the whole species endeavors, by excluding what is local or temporal, to define those forms of religious thought and expression which are common to humanity at large. The psychological method takes the results of both the previous methods (historic and comparative) and aims to explain them by referring the local manifestations to the special mental traits of the tribe or group, and the universal features to equally universal characteristics of the human mind. The last, the psychological method, is

the crown and completion of the quest; for every advanced student of religion will subscribe to the declaration of Professor Granger, that all mythology and all history of beliefs must finally turn to psychology for their satisfactory elucidation. In other words, the laws of human thought can alone explain its own products."—"Religions of Prim. Peoples," p. 5.

After these preliminaries before undertaking to trace the origin of religion with the help of the various theories,¹ we must ask how far we are warranted in speaking of a *universal* religious consciousness at all. It is at least possible that we are deceived by a mere philosophical phrase, by a creation of a lively speculative fancy. The question is: Is it only to the individual that we can ascribe reality, efficiency, actuality, or can we ascribe these also to a collective whole, no matter how made up? The view of the last century sought the ultimate source of all mental life in the individual alone, and therefore ascribed all such phenomena as religion, law, custom, state, art, ultimately to personal initiative. This view must be regarded today as antiquated, inasmuch as it contradicts experience and is unable to explain the facts. These presuppositions, says the acute Wundt, spring from a conception of reality which transforms the elements of phenomena assumed by metaphysics into the actual starting points of these same phenomena. That isolated individual who is represented as standing at the beginning of every line of social development, is to be found nowhere in experience. Experience shows the union of individuals to be the condition of physical development and in a still higher degree an indispensable factor of mental life. Language, customs, religious conceptions,—the nearer we approach to their beginnings the less can we conceive of them as the inventions of individuals. They are products in which not only many have had a hand, but which could not come about at all apart from the conditions of a unity which embraced every individual life. The validity of our moral ideals, all the worth and meaning of history, rest, in fact, on the silent recognition of the reality, the mutual efficiency, that inhere in these great socio-psychological phenomena. If we try to explain the origin of religion, if we conceive this problem to be a scientific one, one that can be solved by criticism, we must turn away from all individualism, from all exclusive reference to the personal wishes of the individual, unless we want to fall a prey to vain imaginings. It leads to nothing to dispute whether religion has its source in fear,—as Petronius and after him Lucretius thought; in the imperious instinct to seek a cause,—as Peschel and Waitz will have

(1) Cf. E. v. Hartmann, *Das relig. Bewusstsein*, Berlin, 1882, § 31, ff., and C. de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Freiburg, 1897, i., 7, ff.

it; or in the fancy or some other power or function of the soul,—all are more or less one-sided hypotheses. From the point of view of ethnology the familiar saying of Schiller is sound, “Man paints himself in his gods,” as the Eleatic Henophanes pointed out when he said:—

“Each pictures the gods as he himself is, the negro black and flat-nosed, the Thracian blue-eyed and redhaired; if horses and oxen could paint they would doubtless picture their deities as horses and oxen.”—Stein, “Die sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie,” Stuttgart, 1897, § 158.

But this observation, just though it is, proves only the ethnic variety of religious ideals and gives us no key to their origin. We must take our stand on facts to gain the right point of departure for our investigation. Wherever trustworthy information carries us back to the verge of the mist-veiled past, or observation of modern savages gives us standing ground, we find definite communities and tribes with equally definite mythological and religious ideas. If we resolve these composite pictures into their elements, we come at last everywhere to *feelings of affection and feelings of reverence* (that is, to *universal* human traits) as the motive power. Both are directly conditioned by community life, by social intercourse, of which they are born. Without them every organism, however humble, would fall asunder into a chaos of unrelated fragments. To these original causes,—original because bound up inextricably with human nature and social development (which are seen everywhere together, e. g., in the worship of ancestors and of the dead in general),—must be added other elements, such as dreams, visions, and the almost illimitable realm of the unconscious which is all the more effective for being withdrawn from the direct influence of the will. This has recently been treated, in its religious bearings, by D. G. Brinton, whom we have mentioned before and who has, alas, been snatched from his tireless industry. We must limit ourselves to a brief extract. After speaking of the importance of suggestion in modern psychological research, he goes on:—

“Powerful means of suggestion are the monotonous repetition of certain words, the fixation of the sight on a single object, the concentration of the mind on one thought, the reduction of the ordinary nutrition, association with persons already under its influence, continuance of the same motions, prolonged hearing of the same note or rhythmical chord, silence, darkness, and solitude. The *rationale* by which this is reached is through developing the automatic and unconscious action of the mind into a conscious display of its powers. This may be repulsive or admirable, above or below the normal capacities, but is always correlated to the individual and connected with his experiences. This is the explanation of nearly all the religious experiences of primitive peoples, as it is of what is known as theopathy everywhere, and of modern forms of theosophy, mesmerism, and hypnotism.”—“Religions of Prim. Peoples,” p. 55.

This discussion has led us to the right standpoint for the discussion of our chief query, namely, What do we mean by Religion? It is a question of determining the meaning and sphere of the word apart from all dogmatic limitations. It makes little difference which of the numerous definitions we adopt, whether, with Max Müller and others, we emphasize the longing for the infinite, or, with most of the ethnologists, practical needs and relations (the basis for later ethics). For us who aim at the utmost possible unity, religion, mythology, and ritual observance form one indivisible whole. In religion as such the desire of mankind to find deliverance from the hardships of existence is most prominent; in mythology primitive man's conception of the world is mirrored, and his own origin, that of the gods and of the world in general, the destiny of the soul, etc., also belong here; and, finally, ritual includes the endlessly varied practical relations of man to his gods, especially on the basis of sacrifice. If we must have a definite starting point for our inquiry, we might say, Religion is all that pertains to an ideal existence apart from reality.¹ But more important and more fruitful is the careful investigation of the several subdivisions of this wide field. That we must limit ourselves in this to fundamentals and can give even these only in concise form, is plain, in view of the abundance of the material and the divergent theories. In the first place we must find our bearings in regard to the development of the idea of God and the most important theogonic and cosmogonic conceptions, and then view the wide field of ritual. If savage man is led inevitably by his own psychic organization to that animistic conception of the world, i. e., primarily, of his environment, which we find everywhere and in accordance with which he judges everything from the point of view of his own nature² (the marvels that face him in the phenomena of nature and in the incomprehensible fact of death play here an essential rôle), it cannot fail to happen that among the throng of deities that is always growing larger and being developed by ancestor worship, definite distinctions of rank should be developed, distinctions reinforced by social differences. We will not enter here on the disputed question whether we must assume an original polytheism, idealized copies of chiefs and princes, or as Max Müller will have it, a Henotheism, but keep simply to the facts of scientific research. In spite of the often very fragmentary condition of tradition, we are able to show an effort (often, it is true, a vain one) to distinguish amid the con-

(1) Cf. Wundt, *Ethik*, § 41.

(2) Cf. Bastian, *Beiträge zur einer vergl. Psych.*, § 9, ff.

fusion of deities one lofty figure that rules the whole.' Ratzel tries to explain this organic process of speculation as follows:—

“The question concerning the One, the Lord of Heaven, the Creator, God, is not the first to issue from the mass of religious conceptions; only now and then do we catch a glimpse of him as if between the branches of a sacred grove. Still less do we get a clear idea of his nature from the brooks that flow from the various springs in which he is reflected. Doubtless worship of ancestors leads to the gradual elevation of conspicuous figures above the others and into heaven. Such apotheoses can be pointed out in Africa and in Oceanica; in the case of the Incas they began during life.² By transference to heaven the necessary condition for far-reaching and effective activity was fulfilled. The millions of dead must have rulers to lead them, and for this those who were once rulers here are best adapted. Since, moreover, it belongs to the nature of deity to produce various effects from one central point without being conditioned by time or space, he must be set apart from the crowd. The mass of souls become spirits (in their representations fetishes), a few become tribal deities, and from these arise by diffusion of the cult widely recognized deities,—a god of the world from Jehovah. Creation demands at least a first man, and besides him a god able to create. Usually the sky or the sun is exalted to this dignity; there dwell the sacred ancestors, who become merely a part of creative deity. And finally, the view of the savage demands great ruling spirits for greater events, as well as numberless minor spirits for small ones.”—“*Völkurkunde*,” i., 47.

Nevertheless it is incontestable that not till this point was reached did riper thought,—often, perhaps, hieratical speculation that deliberately diverged from the simple popular tradition and cast it in the shade,—give birth to a system in some degree logical. Such abstract working up of individual impressions was too remote from the unsystematic methods of thought of the savage.

If, as has already been said, we must recognize in early mythologies and religions the reflection of the mental life of primitive peoples, it will not surprise us if the ideal figures of their fancy bear the plainest marks of earthly thought and feeling, having in short, a very material character. Who does not recall the Roman deities, drawn with such delightful naïveté and vivid truth? They are simply men raised to a higher power

(1) For the immediate practical needs of the common man the *dii minorum gentium*, the lesser domestic deities must suffice; the supreme deity must not be appealed to for trifles. So, for instance, the Odschi say, “Nianku-pong is too far off for prayers to reach him, his face is veiled in clouds.” (Bastian, *Controversen in der Ethnologie*, Berlin, 1894, § 2, ff.) The same is the case with Unkululu, the chief god of the Zulus, or with the Polynesian god Tangaloa. (Cf. my *Über Mythologie und Cultus von Hawaii*, Brannsch, 1895, § 15, ff.)

(2) As a parallel might be cited the divine honors paid the Roman emperors distorted though they were to the verge of madness. They go back to the same source. (Cf. Tylor, *Anthropology*.)

and so dependent on material conditions that they cannot dispense with food and drink, indulge human passions without scruple, and commit the most shameful deeds with no pangs of conscience. For a naïve, child-like mind these contradictions and blemishes simply do not exist; a keener eye, a more sensitive glance, a more delicate feeling was needed to discover the unseemly elements in this picture and hold them up to condemnation, as was done in Greek philosophy by Anaxagoras. When criticism wakes, at that instant the instinctive impulse of the mythological consciousness toward creation dies, the incurable breach is begun, and analysis enters on its irresistible course. Every mythology bears in its bosom the germ of death, and the well known pictures of the death of the Greco-Roman and the German mythologies (to instance only familiar examples) throw a significant light on the process in which in a certain sense we are involved today. Still we can trace, even on the lowest plane of development, a certain rude dualism, a distinction between good and evil, which, to be sure, demands many improvements to suffice for views and claims that are in some degree purer and higher. It is also well known that the distinction of good and evil, which at first was social,—conditioned, that is, on the contrast between one's own tribe and another,—gradually became more and more valuable and authoritative from the point of view of ethics. At first the slaying of a stranger was not only justifiable but out and out praiseworthy; only slowly did those who stood outside the tribal union win a certain tolerance. Physical qualities were prized out of all proportion to the spiritual and moral ones. But this belongs to the history of the development of moral ideas,¹ which we must not here follow farther. Only we may remark in this context, that religious dualism takes everywhere a more definite form under the hands of the priests, most definite, perhaps, in the Persian system of Zoroaster. But elsewhere, too, we see a bitter struggle between white and black magic which try to outbid one another in blows and abuse, between the priest with his fetish and the demons and witches which are by no means limited to the Europe of the Middle Ages. Still the worship of the devil by the peculiar sect (still leading a rather despised existence in Mesopotamia) of devil worshippers, the Tzedis or Tezedis, must be regarded as a striking exception.

In this very general survey it is readily seen that we cannot treat the several stages of development of religious consciousness in detail, if for

(1) Cf. the author's work, *Moderne Völkirkunde*, Stuttgart, 1896, § 407, ff., and in general, G. Roskoff, *Geschichte der Teufels* (2 vols.), and Graf, *Naturgeschichte der Teufels*, Jena, 1890.

no other reason than that this is precisely the field in which strife reigns. A few remarks must suffice. If fetishism is usually assigned to the lowest stage this is in some degree justified by the fact that it is here that the crudest anthropomorphic forms of worship are found. But it is questionable whether one has the right to call fetishism a sharply defined form of religion and not rather a very general psychic conception, not to say mood, of which are born mythical religious figures. One would hardly have the courage to try to show that fetishism is today in Europe an existing religious form, a creed; yet fetishlike traits are by no means unknown to Catholic Christianity and its cult. Just as little can Shamanism and totemism be marked off as special stages; here, too, we have the familiar animistic conception, one that fills the mind with conjuring and spectres, but for all that does not constitute the real religious content, which is seen subjectively in the personal relation of the individual to the deity, objectively in ritual observance, in sacrifice and prayer. Whether we are dealing with a Siberian Shaman, an Indian medicine-man, a Brazilian Piaí, a South African Ganga, an Endoxe, or an Australian and Papuan Kilo, everywhere we find the same fundamental thought (to be discussed later) of winning favor with the deity by certain rites, vows, fasts, or sacrifices, or even compelling him to personal service; so that (as Peschel says) this self-deceit may insinuate itself into the purest souls. It attaches to all that is symbolic, to all ritual, and is at work wherever a result that is not strictly necessary is sought from a symbolic action.¹ In view of this we need a psychological analysis of the chief cosmogonic and theogonic ideas, in order to grasp that part of the mythological picture of the world which is most essential from the point of view of savages and other representatives of less advanced civilization. Here too, we must of necessity confine ourselves to the main outlines.

God and the world are, as is easily conceivable, closely united even for primitive fancy and speculation. The oldest legends everywhere begin with the creative activity of the gods, who call things to life out of some abyss or other, with the assistance of certain original elements, and give them their concrete shape. Only a shrewd speculation can pierce through the throng of individual phenomena to the beginning, to absolute empty space, the last and indispensable condition of creation. But even savages, for instance, the active minded Hawaiians, trace the world back to an all-enveloping night out of whose dark womb even the gods are sprung.² Soon there is a more or less strict theory of development, which either dis-

(1) *Völkerkunde*, § 280.

(2) Cf. Bastian, *Heilige Tage der Polynesier*, § 137, ff.

penses with a creating deity (as, for instance, in the unique ancient Hawaiian temple poem that Bastian found in the royal library in Honolulu) or, most commonly calls in the activity of some higher being, especially for the creation of man, which is usually brought about by the union of the earth and the sky, unless, as is often the case, the first man is himself a god. Ratzel speaks in this sense of a world-myth whose sharpest contrast is that between sky and earth. The sky presents itself, now as sky, again as sun, or the sun is the eye of the sky; they are interchangeable, as when among the Indians of South America belief in the sky takes the place of the North American Indians' belief in the sun, as the future home of the soul. In creation the sun is the helpmate of the sky. The earth occupies the same position toward both; its creations are subordinate, generally only the one woman with whom the sky begets all that is, especially mankind. With sun, lightning (the thunder god), fire, volcanoes, and earthquakes is associated also the idea of an assistant of creation who is revealed in the motion of the sun, in the flash of the lightning, in volcanic eruptions, and is as near to earth as the sky is remote. Hephæstus and Prometheus, demiurge and stealer of fire, life-giver and destroyer, he stands at the centre of many a cult, while the sky, the All-father, recedes far into the background. The Mani myths¹ are universal, not solely Polynesian. They might just as well bear the name of Loki who is also a limping subterranean deity, or of Daramulun, the thunder god of Australian tribes, whose name means literally "Leg-on-one-side" or "lame," or of the Hottentot Tsingoab, "Wounded Knee." At any rate sky and earth, and after these the phenomena of the weather, are for the active fancy of the savage at once the quarry and the motive power for pictures and poems, although there are other elements of the process that must not be forgotten, above all the social ones. The endlessly various sun myths² which trace with the greatest detail the various changes of that great luminary from the dawn until it sinks in the ocean or is extinguished in the western land of the dead—these poetic transfigurations of nature (which we meet not only among the ancient Hindoos or Greeks but also, for example, among the Polynesians) may be assumed to be familiar. Nor can we here go into the various forms the

(1) This figure interests us for more than one reason, for we can see here very vividly how even popular fancy ventures on the most difficult problems, for Mani is a favorite of the common people. (Cf. an essay of the author's in *Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag Bastians*, Berlin, 1896, *Der Mani-Mythus*, § 539, ff.)

(2) Cf. Tiols-Lund, *Himmelsbild u. Weltanschauung im Wandel der Zeiten*, Leip., 1899, a book much given to hypothesis.

myth takes,—how the sun appears now as a maiden that is swallowed by a monster, now as a warrior (e. g., in most Indo-Germanic and Semitic legends), now as the eye of God (e. g., in the Germanic figure of Odin), etc.¹ Nor can we discuss here the other personifications of the stars and the phenomena of nature, as, for instance, of the moon which savages try to aid during eclipses against the threatened violence of a hostile demon, the myths of the wind, streams, etc. They belong rather to the field of details, whereas we are dealing only with the main outlines. We must, however,—without furnishing any detailed proof,—point out briefly the rôle of the first mentioned social element in the development of mythology. It was a blunder of philology to emphasize only the esthetic feeling of mysterious awe which primitive man experienced over against the unintelligible forces of nature, and modern anthropology and ethnography are within their rights in protesting against this one-sidedness of method.² We have transferred too many of our own feelings to the primitive ages of a slowly maturing civilization, and so have unconsciously falsified the facts. The contrast, to us so important, between man and nature is completely foreign to the naïve perceptions of the savage; animals are his equals and the two worlds are not distinguished. To the ancient worship of animals is added, under the influence of sympathetic emotion, the worship of ancestors and totemism, which sees in a beast worshipped as a god, the ancestor of the whole tribe. But even aside from this special form (which is found chiefly among American Indians and Australians) the worship of animals as divine has an immensely wide diffusion and is found not only on low but on relatively high planes of civilization,—e. g., among the Egyptians, Hindoos, Persians, etc. As to the rest, the mythological view of nature, the assigning of a divine essence to everything, the great spectacle, continually repeated everywhere, of a dramatic setting for the phenomena of nature (conceived of as wrought by no fixed mechanical laws, but as springing from individual whim) is too well known to need to be discussed here. If, as we have already seen, mythology is bound up inseparably with religion and ritual observance from the ethnological point of view, we can nevertheless postulate certain distinguishing characteristics even for primitive conditions. Mythology includes the totality of the conception of the world as framed by primitive man, a conception into which is woven

(1) Cf. also Lukas, *Die Grundbegriffe in den Kosmogonien der alten Völker*, Leip., 1893, where also in part the analogies are drawn from savage peoples.

(2) Cf. K. v. Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Centralbrasilians*, Berlin, 1894, § 221, ff., and Jos. Kohler, *Der Ursprung der Melusinensage*, Leip., 1895, § 37.

also religious elements. But these do not gain any decisive prominence until man sees in these mythological figures the *ideals* towards which he aims. We must not suppose that this significance is abrogated by the fact that, tried by our standard of criticism, the world of deity is stained by the gravest blemishes. This proves only that the relative rudeness of the original conception asserts itself even with the gods. Still even here an effort is apparent toward a higher conception, as, for instance, Brinton shows in the heroic myth so widely diffused among the Redskins:—

“This myth is that of the national hero, the mythical civilizer and teacher of the tribe, who at the same time was often identified with the supreme deity and the creator of the world. It is the fundamental myth of a very large number of American tribes, and on its recognition depends most of their mythology and religious life. The outlines of this legend are to the effect that in some exceedingly remote time this divinity took an active part in creating the world and in fitting it to be the abode of man, and may himself have formed or called forth the race. At any rate, his interest in its advancement was such that he personally appeared among the ancestors of the nation and taught them the useful arts, gave them the maize or other food plants, initiated them in the mysteries of their religious rites, framed the laws which governed their social relations, and having thus started them on the road to self-development, he left them, not suffering death, but disappearing in some way from their view. Hence it was nigh universally expected that at some time he would return.”—“American Hero Myths,” *Phil.*, 1882, p. 27. Cf. Brinton, “Religions of Primitive Peoples,” p. 70, sqq.; Bastian, “Vorstellungen von der Seele,” *Hamb.*, 1875; Virchow, “Sammlung von Vorträgen,” No. 226.

Just here, where the imagination has its widest field for fantastic creation, an attentive eye can note the influence of ethical motives, which, although at first but the vague idea of a universal moral order valid for all men, struggles slowly toward competent expression. On another side the worship of the dead shows no despicable ethical motives in the ancient and significant worship of ancestors, which among many tribes has reached a comparatively advanced stage of morality. This we shall discuss later.

Ritual observance, the third element of religion, consists of prayer, vows, and sacrifices. We pass by the question of the universality of prayer. It is a fact, that appeals to the spirits are found among very primitive peoples, and that the alleged exceptions have for the most part turned out to be the result of insufficient observation. We need not be surprised if, on the whole, most of the petitions are of a very material sort—for booty in war, luck in hunting, etc. Yet, as Brinton remarks, finer qualities are intermingled:—

“A prayer of the Khonds, a Dravidian tribe of Northern India, reads, ‘O Lord, we know not what is good for us, Thou knowest what it is. For it we pray.’ It is

strange to find among the Navahoes, a rude hunting tribe of our western territories, an intense longing for the beautiful. One of their prayers runs, 'O Lord on high, whose youth is immortal, ruler above, I have made you the offering, preserve my body and members, preserve it in beauty, make all things beautiful, let all be completed in beauty.'—'Religion,' p. 105.

Often certain repetitions and traditional formulas are in vogue which, deprived of their original sense, survive all the more obstinately from generation to generation. They attain thus to a magic sanctity, a mysterious power, in the eyes of the common folk, that very naturally is exploited by the priests and medicine-men.¹ This is the first step to the use of sacred vows in priestly speculation and mystic doctrine, such as we find in Egypt, in Rome, in Palestine, and especially in India and Persia and which, in spite of all divergent details, shows substantial agreement. The Vendidad distinguishes, for instance, between the three sorts of healing, the surgical, the medicinal, and the magical, which used the word Honover that alone gives victory over the enemy Ahriman.² Systematic mechanical duplication has, as we know, played its part in this field and attained the highest degree of perfection in the famous Buddhist prayer mills, driven by water or wind, soon, probably, by steam or electricity.³ In Europe, as Tylor says, the least development is seen in the use of the rosary. But this religious counting machine is an Asiatic invention. If not its origin, at any rate its special development, is to be traced to the ancient Buddhists, and the hundred and eight beads slip, today as of old, through the fingers of the modern Buddhist, as he counts the sacred formulas whose repetition consumes so large a fraction of the life of the devout. Not until the end of the Middle Ages did the rosary pass to Mohammedan and Christian lands finding in the conceptions of prayer there in vogue so favorable a soil that it has steadily flourished.⁴ Even in the most ancient times and among the lowest races, we find definite legal prescriptions, for the most part (and characteristically) prohibitions. These are dressed in divine splendor as decrees and words of deity⁵ and become in the hands of crafty priests a real social power,

(1) Cf. Bartels, *Medicin der Naturvölker*, Leipz., 1893, § 173, ff.

(2) Cf. Lippert, *Culturgeschichte*, Stutt., 1887, ii., 460.

(3) Cf. Köppe, *Religion der Buddha*, ii., 319, and Lamairesse, *L'empire chinois*, Paris, 1893, p. 386, sqq.

(4) Cf. *Beginnings of Civ.*

(5) To cite only the best known ceremonial laws, as those of Moses, Zoroaster, Mani, Confucius, Mohammed, Christ, whose words were later transformed into absolute dogmas. But even here we find the underlying conditions already existing among savage races.

such as Brinton describes in the well-known Polynesian tabu:—

“The tabu extends its veto into every department of primitive life. It forbids the use of certain articles of food or raiment; it hallows the sacred areas; it lays the foundation for the ceremonial law. The penalty for the infraction of the tabu includes all that flows from the anger of the gods, reaching to death itself.”—“Religion.”

Of the same practical significance is the revelation of the divine word and law and the unveiling of the future by prophets. The more the riddle of existence eludes the dim eye, the more indispensable is such an official herald of the divine will. It is, however, worthy of note (and we shall come back to it) that even on low moral planes we find priests and intermediaries between God and man. It is easily seen, too, that gradually a certain technique will be developed that is not the affair of every one but the prerogative of the initiate. Hence the universal and highly esteemed corporate bodies and colleges of priests, that are sometimes a peril even to secular rulers. The methods of entering into intercourse with the gods are various. Visions, dreams, ecstasy, hypnotic states, etc., recur in various forms among most peoples.¹ Even hysterical and epileptic subjects pass often for the chosen messengers of the supernal powers, but often, too, of hostile demons, that must be exorcised by suitable conjurations, so that a special science, that of demonology, is developed. These conceptions touch human life most intimately when it is a question of warding off death or disease, or of revealing the dark future. By magical spells the sorcerer succeeds in saving the sick man from death, visiting the enemy with a dangerous sickness, averting threatening plagues from the land, bringing rain or sunshine, procuring rich booty, etc. The conception of a struggle between good and evil spirits, who are contending for the possession of man, plays always the chief rôle; beyond this we cannot here go into the very extensive detail.

The second element of ritual observance, one closely associated with prayer, consists in vows and fasts by which man tries to make the gods disposed to accomplish his wishes. The inventive mind of the sorcerer has managed to impose on the defiant savage a whole sequence of such pledges and renunciations down to the most painful castigations. The quixilles of Western Africa are repeated with small variations everywhere, even in Judaism² and Christianity, and form an omnipresent and often bloody

(1) Cf. Lehmann, *Aberglauben und Zauberei*, Stutt., 1898.

(2) Very justly has Lippert referred the Jewish blood atonement and like customs to this basic conception. (*Culturgeschichte*, ii., 319, ff.) They also recur in many classic legends.

background of all civilization. Even the rudest tribes, such as the Tagas who suck the blood from the living bodies of their enemies, subject themselves willingly to these penances. Especially effective are such fasts at the great crises of human life by way of averting sickness and death, or when the youth at the age of puberty is received into the ranks of acknowledged manhood. Only after the most frightful tortures is the *toga virilis*¹ (to use the Roman phrase) granted them.² On this follows a mystical new birth, the former existence is forgotten, the old ego begins to give place to a new personality, and this religious transformation is celebrated with great pomp. In all later rites of purification (among which must perhaps be counted circumcision) blood—"that very peculiar juice," as Mephistopheles calls it—plays for animistic reasons a very significant rôle, especially terrible in cannibalism.

The savage brings, however, the strongest pressure to bear upon the gods by sacrifice, and that (to touch at once on the most pronounced form of this rite) by human sacrifice, in which either others are dedicated to the deity or a man surrenders himself. Here it is the question of a present which demands a gift in return from the other side. It is, therefore, from the legal point of view, a formal contract and is concluded with all due religious observances between the parties, of course with the assistance of the priest. Blood, steam, smoke, and fire, play at first, in accordance with original animistic psychology, an important rôle; the eating of the victim by the deity gives way only gradually to a view in some degree more ideal. The whole cult of ancestors and of the dead,³ as well as the idea of warding off evil spirits by such sacrifices, finds here adequate expression, and can be seen, now in coarser, now in more refined shape, in all the religions of the world. Human sacrifice—which, to judge from indisputable reports and unmistakable survivals, was once very widely diffused—the various atonements by child sacrifice, by that of prisoners, and by other bloody rites, are all descended from the same source. Animals everywhere furnish the transition to later forms of substitution; for instance, the Brahmins limit themselves to offering, in place of the real victims, figures made of meal and butter, and in Mexico, instead of the former hideous massacres (but with careful observance of

(1) The latest historical form of this conception is seen in the knighting of the Middle Ages.

(2) Cf. for detail, Bastian, *Zur naturwissenschaftlichen Behandlungsweise der Psychologie durch die Völkerkunde*, Berlin, 1883, § 139, ff.

(3) Cf. in general, F. de Coulanges, *La cité antique*, and R. de la Grasserie, *Des religions comparées*, Paris, 1899, p. 97, sqq.

earlier rites) the heart was taken out of figures of dough and the fragments eaten.¹ In the variegated abundance of ethnological material, here peculiarly rich, we cannot enter. It must suffice to refer to the admirable introduction to the study of rites in their social and personal aspects which Brinton offers.²

We must not close this sketch of ritual observances without indicating in a few words the position of the priest. The characteristics of this class—one so significant for the development of religion and mythology, both on the lower and on the higher planes of civilization—are everywhere so uniform,³ that a brief discussion will serve. From the point of view of an animistic conception of the world, which sees in sickness and death the work of mischievous demons, the priest must necessarily be also a medicine-man, and hence it is his double task to be the intermediary for intercourse with the gods and to watch over the life and health of his fellow tribesmen. Above all, as has already been said, no sacrifice is possible without his intervention, whether we have in mind regular guilds of priests such as exist among many savage tribes (Cæsar, for instance, mentions them among the ancient Celts) and claim the possession of traditional superhuman knowledge, or single individuals exceptionally endowed with imagination, sensitive organizations, and keen powers of observation, the latter being for the most also chiefs. It is easily possible, as Post says, that the earliest rulers were at the same time fetish priests⁴ for, in fact, spiritual and secular power, which we know only in more or less complete isolation, were originally united in one class. As sorcerer the priest possesses all those miraculous faculties which gain him his reputation and which on fitting occasion—often with no little personal risk—he is pledged to exhibit to his tribe. The healing of the sick,⁵ the exorcising of evil spirits, the summoning up of the dead, the performance of miracles, in tropical regions the making of rain, etc., are the tests of his skill. If

(1) Cf. Zipport, *Culturgeschichte*, ii., 275; Tylor, *Beginnings*; Nadaillac, *Die ersten Menschen und die prähistorischen Zeiten mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Urbenrohner Amerikas*, Stuttgart, 1884, § 238, ff.

(2) Cf. *Myths*, p. 177, ff.

(3) Cf. in general, Lippert, *Geschichte des Priestertums*, 2 Bde., Berlin, 1883.

(4) Cf. *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, i., 440.

(5) Here, too, one must not blind one's self to the results of strict psychological investigation by general catchwords, such as were in vogue in the last century describing priests as deliberate deceivers and charlatans. Moreover, it is proved that they often possessed both good medical knowledge and no small technical skill. (Cf. Bartels, *Medicin der Naturvölker*, § 311.)

he shows himself incapable, he must clear himself by ordeals or fall a victim to popular vengeance, which punishes him as a common cheat. The struggle of the true priest with his hell-inspired rivals which, as we have seen, plays so prominent a rôle in dualism, is traceable even among savages, although it is not until later that it develops its whole intensity. In the course of time the priest becomes the official guardian of mythological and theogonic traditions,¹ he trains a school; the priesthood becomes a caste equipped with far-reaching social and political privileges, almost equal to kings in rank and power. If, now, the conception of the incarnation of a representative of the heavenly powers is added, as the Dalai-Lama in Llassa for Buddhism and the Pope for the Catholic Church, his influence becomes enormous, so far at least as the savage's naïve conception of the world supports this complex idea.

I shall touch only briefly on the widely diffused secret societies that again show the close union between religion and law. The "mysteries" of the Egyptians and Greeks are the most familiar examples, but the already mentioned rites of puberty among savages with their religious character also have their roots in the same soil. Specially well known are the Clobbergöll of the Palau Islanders and the Egbo order of the West African coast (the Dark Continent is rich in such phenomena), which have a declared social aim, namely, to maintain justice in the absence of law.² On a higher moral plane (especially in connection with agriculture) the rites develop, with the closer relation of man to nature (ripening of fruits, driving off evil spirits, etc.), more and more, and often take a speculative turn. There are, of course, within each society various grades which the novice must pass through. Equally intelligible is the use of a secret language, of which we still find traces among the Mexicans and among various Indian tribes. Brinton writes:—

"All these stratagems were intended to shroud with impenetrable secrecy the mysteries of the brotherhood. With the same motive, the priests formed societies of different grades of illumination, to be entered only by those willing to undergo trying ordeals, whose secrets were not to be revealed under the severest penalties. The

(1) They must also be credited with the beginnings of scientific research, especially astronomy, which was practiced not only, as we know, by the Chaldeans but by savages. (Cf. Brinton, *Myths of the New World*, p. 320.) They also cast the horoscope for new-born children. That the interpretation of dreams was an effective means of winning a supernatural halo is self-evident. In Peru there had arisen a very detailed specialization of the several functions. (Cf. Brinton, *Ibid.*, p. 319.)

(2) Cf. in general, Post, *Afrikan Jurisprudenz*, i., 242, ff.; Andree, *Ethnograph. Paralleler*, N. F., § 136, ff.; Bastian, *Der Papua*, § 184, ff.; Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, i., 327, ff.; Schelis, *Moderne Völkerkunde*, § 411, ff.

Algonquins had three such grades, the *waubeno*, the *meda*, and the *jossakeed*, the last being the highest. To this no white man was ever admitted. All tribes appear to have been controlled by these secret societies. Alexander von Humboldt mentions one, called that of the Botuto, or Holy Trumpet, among the Indians of the Orinoco, whose members must vow celibacy and submit to severe scourgings and fasts. The Collahuyas of Peru were a guild of itinerent quacks and magicians who never remained permanently on one spot."—"Myths," p. 327, ff.

In this investigation, as our theme required, we have laid the emphasis on questions of origins and of universally valid motives of religious feeling, without meaning thereby to forestall an analysis of later stages of development. We have kept, for the most part, in order not to enlarge our survey unduly, within the field of savage races, and sought here the necessary material for the psychological investigation of ideas and impulses. For it is our firm conviction, that, if we are not to lose ourselves in the labyrinth of fanciful speculation, the largest possible collection of unassailable empirical proofs as the starting point of investigation is indispensable. This, it is hardly necessary to say, can be attained only by the aid of that modern ethnology which includes in its survey all stages of human progress. Only thus can a really thoroughgoing, consistent, psychological explanation of the various organic functions of the religious consciousness of the human race be attempted; otherwise it only hovers in the air as a fanciful hypothesis. We wish to protest emphatically against any possible suggestion that we oppose or depreciate the well known works of E. v. Hartmann, Tiele, C. de la Saussaye, Pfeleiderer, Köstlin, Seydel, and others, merely to mention a few. Far from it. For the *historical* study of religion they must be emphatically commended. But beside and beyond this, there is a deeper-going recognition of religious feelings, which, without binding itself to ethnographical, chronological, or topographical limits, strives to grasp those *universal* laws of development which underlie all changes of detail in the phenomena. As comparative law—also characteristically on the basis of wide ethnological material—has succeeded in discovering in the legal activities of mankind certain universal conceptions and forms that exhibit the fundamental structure of law as such, so also it is the task of a pragmatic science of comparative religion to establish for the whole family of mankind certain fundamental types of religious feeling that, in spite of all specific divergences, recur everywhere. In this the eye passes beyond the purely individual; religion appears as a social factor, as a social-psychological phenomena, and not till then does it reveal its full organic significance and its normal character untouched by degeneration or decay. Hence in the end religion, as Siebeck justly says, is seen to be an immediate and

integral factor of human civilization at large, a view with which we will close this sketch:—

“It is only reasonable to assume that the existence and the course of development of religion represent that side of life which, within the world itself, is the expression of the latter’s relation to the supermundane. And this holds true the more fully the greater the height which the civilization of a people or an age has attained. The religious conceptions and usages of savages, for instance, correspond to the native crudity of their source; just as the Greek religious feeling and religious forms correspond to the mental activities of the Greeks, or those of the Brahmins and Buddhists to the intellectual life of the Hindoos. That in religious development a higher stage has been reached, is shown in the retroactive effect of the religion in question on the ethical standards. From this point of view the kind and the degree of progress are marked by the ideal goal taking the form of a conception which does not determine life’s worth by the mere summation of a certain number of separate items, but decrees itself what is to pass for good, in the relative and the absolute sense of the word, from the point of view of a spiritual interpretation which is viewed as of supreme value.”—

“Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie,” Freiburg, 1893, § 447.

THE BEGINNINGS OF MIND

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IT WAS one of the features of evolutionary doctrine at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as formulated by Erasmus Darwin in England and Lamarck in France, that intelligence was regarded as a guiding factor in the onward progress of animal life. "From their first rudiment," said the genial author of "*Zoönomia*," "to the termination of their lives, all animals undergo perpetual transformations, which are in part produced by their own exertions in consequence of their desires and aversions, of their pleasures and their pains; and many of these acquired forms and propensities are transmitted to their posterity." It was perhaps an inevitable step in the transition of thought from special creation to evolution, that the conception of mind as a moulding influence on organic life should not be wholly abandoned but should be transferred from without to within, and thus be implicated in the genetic process partly as product, partly as determinant. It was thus still possible, philosophically, to conceive mind as the immanent principle underlying development, gradually unfolded throughout the ages, and reaching by slow and painful steps such partial self-realization as is possible under the trammels of the flesh. There was, indeed, to the many with no bias towards philosophy or science, an element of shock in the idea that there could be any beginnings of mind or any progressive development, either organic or mental; but then, as a set-off, for those who would seek and find, how great the hortative opportunities! If the yearning of the giraffe for the higher leaves and his continual endeavor to attain thereto led onwards to a longer neck and greater reach, here were facts from which an obvious moral could be drawn, and some people, nay, many, dearly love a moral, as is seen by the vogue of Professor Drummond's works. The hope of discovering such morals is often a most potent incentive to study; and there are folk who would never even glance at scientific disquisitions were it not for the chance of finding therein something really profitable of this kind. But, moral apart, the search for intelligent or rational guidance, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the progress of animal life seems to be natural to the inquiring mind—perhaps just because it is mind and knows itself supreme in things terrestrial. Even now, after nearly half a century of Darwinian influence, the question of the part, if any, which mind has played in the onward sweep of organic evolution is one which is keenly discussed, and to which much interest

attaches. Unfortunately the progress of biological thought has rendered the discussion more subtle than of yore and introduced nice distinctions provocative of impatience in the layman. And it is felt by not a few, who rely perhaps rather on intuition than on argument, that, if the rigorous application of the principles of natural selection and organic heredity leaves mind an epiphenomenon—merely a product of, and not a determining factor in, the progress of animal life—so much the worse for the principles. There must be something wrong in a doctrine which leads to conclusions alike repugnant to common sense, wholesome sentiment, and healthy prejudice. None of these things are to be despised—especially when they support one's own conclusions. Even the philosopher, who is not always supposed to be on the best of terms with the practical and prosaic friend of the family, finds it pleasant, in his leisure moments, to walk arm in arm with common sense down the beaten highway, though he is forced to leave him plodding along the main road while he tries new paths over the spreading moorland of thought.

Now I hope at once to enlist the sympathies of the many, even if I excite the antagonism of the few, by stating at the outset that in my opinion common sense, sentiment, and prejudice, are, in the main, right in urging that intelligence has been a factor in the evolution of animal races and species. Let us, however, approach the subject by seeking an answer to two fundamental questions. First, is mind a product of evolution; second, is mind a factor in the evolutionary process, and if so, under what limiting conditions? Both open up almost interminable avenues or rather labyrinths of metaphysical disquisition. Pleasant as it might be to me to wander amid the intricate subtleties of this maze, I must remember (what metaphysicians appear occasionally to forget) that pleasure at the expense of others is the essence of selfishness. Let us, therefore, so far as may be, avoid speculative issues, confessing ignorance where we have no facts to guide us, and making assumptions where they are helpful towards, at best, a provisional interpretation of a difficult problem. And first for a confession of ignorance. Neither in the case of the individual development of man or monkey from the fertilized ovum, nor in the case of their racial evolution from we know not what protoplasmic ancestor can we say when consciousness first comes upon the scene, or from what it derives its origin. We simply do not know, and, more than this, there is no definite prospect of our ever ascertaining. Moreover, though the conception of evolution involves that of continuity of mental progress in the ascent of mind, we are debarred by ignorance, or rather nescience, from predicating continuity of consciousness. From mother to son there is continuity of material substance and probably also of

physical process, but whether in the germ there be any relatively undifferentiated mind—protoplasm (or whatever else we like to call it) to connect her mind with his—who can say? Of course we may assume that a conscious or quasi-conscious aspect accompanies, even in the germ, certain molecular vibrations, modes of energy, or other physical changes—be they purely physical or specifically vital. But there are assumptions and assumptions, and this particular assumption belongs to that class which is rather comforting—nay even perhaps necessary—to the metaphysician, than fruitful for the man of science. What, then, are we justified in assuming for the purposes, not of metaphysical speculation (important and right human as that is in its proper place) but of scientific interpretation? A number of facts, which need not here be detailed, since they are sufficiently familiar, warrant us in believing that, in many cases, mental states are, in some way that we cannot at present explain, the concomitants of certain organic happenings in nerve centres. Now the assumptions of science will be found when analyzed to involve an extension to other cases, perhaps to all analogous cases, of that which we seem justified in inferring to hold true for certain observed occurrences. They are generalizations extended beyond the limits of actual observation. Applying this principle of extension we assume that mental states are not only in a great number of instances, but always and whenever they occur, the concomitants of changes in nerve centres. Every psychical state has its physical or vital counterpart in the brain or analogous organ. But are we in a position to make this a convertible proposition? Can we say that every physical change in the brain or analogous organ has its concomitant state of consciousness? Assuredly not. All that we have a right on the principle of extension to assume is that some nervous changes are accompanied by consciousness, and that all states of consciousness have for their physical counterparts such nervous changes.

Let us now see what follows from our assumption. A very large and well attested body of evidence has been accumulated by biologists, from which we may safely infer that there is continuity in the development of the nervous system from the fertilized ovum onwards, and that there is continuity in the evolution of the germinal substance of which that fertilized ovum is a detached fragment or more often the product of the coalescence of two such fragments. On the basis of our assumption it follows, therefore, that if there be an evolution of the nerve centres some part of the functional activity of which in some way involves mental concomitants, the associated mental states undergo a parallel or identical evolution. It follows, also, that we may interpret mental heredity in terms of organic continuity. And these corollaries square with all that

we may directly infer from the study of the behavior of both during the development of the individual, and in so far as it is exemplified in the existing types which most nearly, but still very inadequately, represent the evolutionary series. We are just beginning, but it must be confessed scarcely more than beginning, to trace an evolution of behavior such as to warrant the inference that mental evolution is its concomitant and to this, also, we apply the principle of extension. To the question, therefore, Is mind a product of evolution? we must reply that, on the basis of our assumption, the observed development and evolution of the nervous system and the observed development and evolution of behavior justifies a definitely affirmative answer within the limits of scientific interpretation—so long, that is to say, as it is clearly understood that the question of the ultimate origin of consciousness is excluded, and that we are only dealing with the genetic or proximate origin of higher from lower phases of mentality.

To our second question, Is mind a factor in the evolutionary process? we hope also to give an affirmative answer after we have cleared the way by removing some preliminary difficulties. One of them is the difficulty of conceiving how mind can act on matter or matter on mind. They seem to be incommensurable. It is true that in strictness, and for all clear headed thinkers, the mental series of states of consciousness and the organic series of changes in sense-organ, brain, and muscle, are inevitably distinct. Let us at once confess our complete ignorance of the nature of the ultimate relation of one to the other. But, certainly in many cases the observed facts show that, our ignorance notwithstanding, they *are* somehow related. Let us assume, then, that they may be so related in any such case. And, since we cannot know the nature of the relationship, let us be content to seek for some of its conditions. The incommensurability may still, however, trouble us. It is true that, in the strictest strictness, the environment of any conscious state is constituted only by other commensurate forms of like order, falling, that is to say, still under the category of consciousness, just as the environment of any neural state is constituted only by the organic and physical conditions; and, hence, that both the mental series and the physiological series respectively are ideally complete in themselves, for the psychologist on the one hand, and for the physiologist on the other. What does this imply? It certainly does not imply that either series would remain just what it is if the other series were non-existent. As well might two Irishmen assert that because each saw but one side of the boundary hedge the other side did not count for anything at all, at all. A Scotchman would point out that both sides counted but that you could not see both at

once. The inevitable incommensurability of the physiological and the mental series implies that we can only pass from the one to the other in the same argument by changing the point of view. But, when once the disparateness of the objective and subjective points of view is apprehended, and it is also granted that mental state and neural condition are only different phrases applied to the self-same natural occurrence (for that is what our assumption amounts to, whether it be stated in terms of parallelism, or concomitance, or diverse aspect), then we can use the terms of either series, organic or mental, interchangeably according as the one or the other may be the more convenient for the immediate purposes of interpreting that natural occurrence. The biologist and physiologist are sometimes wont to term consciousness an epiphenomenon without effective influence on the sequence of phenomena with which they deal. On precisely similar grounds and with equal cogency might the idealist term the brain as a self-existent material substance independent of consciousness, an epiphenomenon. Both statements imply a limitation of standpoint. But if psychologist and biologist wish to work hand in hand they must consent to survey the property of which, by the will of science, they are joint heirs from both sides of the hedge which bounded the moieties of their predecessors. From this psycho-physical point of view, as Professor Mark Baldwin calls it, we may claim once for all the right to neglect the relation of the two terms, mental and physical, in all circumstances whatsoever and to pass freely to and fro from the one to the other in the same argument, so long as it be clearly understood that we do so deliberately under the limiting conditions of scientific interpretation, leaving, that is to say, the relation we choose to neglect to be discussed in another court.

We are thus, within these limits, perfectly free to regard mind as a factor in organic evolution and to infer, if the evidence justifies the conclusion, that intelligence has guided the course of life's progress. Mr. Hobhouse, in his recent work on "Mind in Evolution," not only accepts this conclusion but goes further. In the analysis of his first chapter he states that the normal tendency of evolution is not towards higher but towards divergent types. In the resulting diversity old types survive, and there is deterioration as well as improvement. But within these divergencies there is one line of true development. This is the evolution of mind. To say that the highest thing that man knows is mind, may be to state an axiom, or to make an assumption. If the latter, he says, I must, at any rate, for the sake of clearness make the assumption. Evolution upwards,—orthogenic evolution as he terms it,—forgetful that Eimer had already used the term with other implications, is the growth of mind or

of the conditions which make mind possible. Evolution in any other direction,—which he calls *doliogenic*,—is the growth of any other qualities whatever that assist survival. Of course we may so define the terms “higher” and “lower” as applied to divergent types, and so delimit “the one line of true development,” as not only to prevent our calling the forest oak or the marsh marigold higher products of evolution than the cellar mould or the pond conferva, but also to exclude from any share in evolution “upwards,” the whole of the plant world. But the author’s meaning in this apparent over-statement of his case is that the ascent of mind is one definite line of evolution, and that which eventually reaches the highest known form of development, even from the organic point of view. Other lines of development with an indefinite number of relatively higher and lower grades are off the main track to the highest that we know. Thus the evolution of the plant world does not provide the organic conditions which make mind possible. Neither the forest oak nor the marsh marigold has a nervous system.

Some botanists, and among them men of the highest standing, do, indeed, attribute to plants mental or quasi-mental qualities. If the root-lets grow towards damp earth, if flowers or leaves turn sunwards and lightwards, if the grass stem bends upwards at the nodes in a direction opposite to gravitative attraction, they speak of plant *perception* in a way that vexes the soul of the psychologist. Now the term “perception” is used with a very varying range of significance. But it is always used by psychologists as connoting some phase of intelligence, however rudimentary that phase may be. It implies that the percipient organism profits by individual experience. It implies, at the least, that through experience, a given conscious situation has acquired what Dr. Stout calls “meaning” and that this meaning determines future behavior in a similar situation. Now there is, at present, not the smallest shred of evidence that in the hypothetical sentience of plants anything like a conscious situation is developed or that they ever have any experience which can acquire “meaning,” or, in other words, that there is the most rudimentary form of perception in the sense in which psychologists employ this term. All that we can say is that they react to certain stimuli, often with much delicacy of coördinated response; but, if they be conscious, they do not show any of those objective signs which among animals are regarded as the criteria of a consciousness which plays its part in the guidance of individual behavior.

No one is likely to question the fact that a true relationship exists between the physiology of plants and that of animals and that the protoplasm of each exhibits specific forms of irritability. But whether we

agree with Dr. Haberlandt in his assertion that these specific forms of irritability are completely analogous to the senses of animals depends entirely on the connotation of the word "senses." If it carry a conscious connotation it is clear that the statement implies that we may find among plants the beginnings of mind. But if, on the other hand, it is used with a purely physiological meaning as descriptive of an organ structurally related to other parts such as those by which movements are effected,—that is to say, a sense-organ in which the irritability is enhanced and specialized,—then there is no such implication. Now Dr. Haberlandt, as summarized by Mr. Francis Darwin in "Nature" (I have not yet seen the original work), has materially increased our knowledge of plant physiology by his researches on the tactile papillæ and tactile pits which are found in many genera of plants. There can be no objection to terming these "sense-organs" so long as the implication is purely physiological; but I would urge that the term "perception" should be reserved for cases in which the implication is distinctly physiological, and that botanists should exercise due caution, especially in popular writings, in the use of phrases which suggest mental attributes or processes. Mr. Francis Darwin, for example, long ago (1878), said that "both the young stem and the young root have an instinctive knowledge as to where the centre of the earth is, one growing towards the point, the other directly away from it," but that the runners of the strawberry "have a strong wish to grow down instead of up," while "side roots that spring from the main ones, though their method of growth is identical with that of the main roots, have no wish to grow downwards." He says again that the plant is "not bound to grow always in a vertical line, but is ready to be turned from its course if some other direction can be shown to be more advantageous," and exemplifies the fact by an experiment made by Sachs in which the roots of the pea "were enticed from the vertical by an oblique damp surface." And after describing some of the phenomena of growth under the influence of gravity and of light he concludes, "It looks as if the case might be put thus:—grant the plant the power of knowing where the centre of the earth is, and grant it the power of knowing where the light comes from, then the plant itself can decide what course of growth is most advantageous." Now we have not the smallest particle of evidence that the plant knows anything, that it has any wishes, that it can be enticed, or that it can itself decide what course of growth is most advantageous, or that (to take another of the cases he adduces) "a crocus can appreciate a difference of temperature of one degree Fahrenheit," and is thus "warned of the coming danger by the shadow of a cloud." All this interpolation of

mental factors in the midst of reactions which seem to be purely physiological is wholly unnecessary and apt to be misleading. It is true that Mr. Francis Darwin's lecture was delivered nearly a quarter of a century ago, but it is referred to this year (1902) as "the earliest popular statement of this point of view,"—a point of view which I believe is open to serious criticism. It leads onwards to such statements as Canon Oven-den makes in a little book just published, where it is said of some plants that "they determined to do by cunning what they could not accomplish by force," and of one "very clever plant" that it "seems to have foreseen this danger and provided a remedy." Popular writers must remember that popular readers will accept their statements very literally and quite seriously with all their seemingly curious implications.

I am not concerned either to assert or deny that plants possess some dim form of sentience. This is a matter concerning which we are at the mercy of conjecture. If, however, it can be shown that a plant profits by individual experience—ceases to do this because on previous occasions it was painful, does that the more vigorously because it is pleasant—the whole position will be altered; then and not till then shall we have evidence in the vegetable kingdom of the beginnings of mind, and every evolutionist will welcome the extension of our existing knowledge. But at present, so far as I am aware, we cannot assert that there is any individual learning in plants; and it is questionable whether it is satisfactory to apply the term "learning" to racial adaptation through natural selection. Mr. Francis Darwin says that we find plants adopting new modes of conveying their pollen when the old modes fail. Thus a wild cabbagelike plant which grows in Kerguelen's Land is now fertilized by wind-blown pollen. The insects being there wingless are incapable of ministering to fertilization. "Thus the pollen of the cabbage has to learn to fly because the insects will not fly for it." It may, indeed, be said in a sense that the plant in this way profits by the experience of the race. It would be a distinct advantage, however, if we could agree to limit the use of the term "experience" to that which, however dimly, takes form in the individual consciousness. Mr. Hobhouse, in his recent work, speaks of a correlation of experience, reaction, and welfare, before intelligence (which he describes as the capacity of the individual to learn from experience) comes into play. And he says, "The structure of eye, wing, beak, and claw that makes perfect the swoop and pounce of the falcon are the result of countless ancestral experiences in the course of which the structure, which made some slight approach to this point of perfection, prevailed over others, and prevailed more surely the more nearly it reached its goal." Biologists distinguish two kinds of organic adjustment: (1) adaptations due to varia-

tion having its origin in the germinal substance, and (2) accommodations due to modification of the bodily tissues in the course of individual life and growth. Under the head of experience, in the passage just quoted, Mr. Hobhouse includes one or both of these. And in a sense all organic happenings may be ascribed to organic experience and their similar repetition to organic memory. But it would be more convenient, and often prevent misconception, if the term "experience" were restricted to that body of conscious data on which intelligent behavior is based. It is surely from such experience, and such only, that the individual has a capacity for learning. And it is in such experience and in memory, as conscious reinstatement leading to expectation, that we must seek the beginnings of mind.

Among infusorial animals, notwithstanding all that has been urged by M. Binet in support of their varied psychic life, it is questionable whether we can infer with confidence that they acquire individual experience or can profit by it. When one watches a number of slipper animalcules, under the microscope, sees them turn hither and thither apparently at will, note how they cluster around and feed upon some clot of organic matter, observe them assemble in a region rendered very dilutely acid, or avoid a slightly alkaline drop; and, when one extends such observations, so as to embrace the reactions of these or similar organisms to light or the influence of gravity, one appreciates the grounds on which M. Binet affirms that "we could, if necessary, take every single one of the psychical faculties which Mr. Romanes reserves for animals, more or less advanced in the zoölogical scale, and show that the greater part of these faculties belong equally to the micro-organisms." Sensation, perception, memory, choice, emotion, such as that of fear, and other signs of intelligence seem to be present. But when one reëxamines the question, under the guidance, for example, of Dr. H. S. Jennings, and takes up, as one is bound to do, the critical and cautious attitude of scientific investigation, one finds that the evidence for anything like the genuine exercise of intelligence is absent, or at the best exceedingly doubtful. Apply the criterion of intelligence, ask if the micro-organism learns from experience to shun this or to seek that with added zest, and there is nothing to convince that wise scepticism which science inculcates as a stern duty. The more careful the study the less valid appears the basis for the inference that in the infusoria there is anything like conscious choice, anything beyond organic reaction to stimulus. And such reactions must be placed in the category which Mr. Hobhouse terms the pre-intelligent stage. Correlation in a sense there is, for the organic behavior is in definite and delicate relation and adaptation to the environment; but of psycho-

logical correlation there is apparently at present no sufficient evidence. If there be sentience its elements do not seem to be brought into those relations which give them cross-reference in terms of meaning in and for conscious experience.

Where, then, in the animal kingdom do we find the earliest evidence of experience in this restricted sense? Where can we trace the beginnings of mind, and see the objective indications of a conscious adjustment to the conditions of life superimposed upon and modifying the unconscious adjustment of hereditary adaptation? In truth, we cannot say with any approach to confidence. The behavior of the lower organisms is difficult to study, and has not in many forms been investigated with the patient care which Dr. Jennings has bestowed upon the infusoria. The criterion of learning by experience is not easy to apply and, if evolution has been continuous, the borderland cases must be hard to distinguish. Ideally and for purposes of classification the distinction is clear enough; on the one hand, purely physiological reactions, on the other hand, the modification of such reactions in the light of feeling; but what animals or groups are to be placed in this class or in that, is by no means as clear. The sponges are probably below the divisional plane; so, too, may be the cœlenterates, corals, sea-anemones, and the embryonic medusoid forms in this group. Romanes, indeed, attributed to sea-anemones powers of discrimination. But all that we observe is differential response to different stimuli, and this is seen among plants, for example in the sun-dew; of learning by individual experience there is no conclusive evidence. Mr. Yerkes has lately studied with care the behavior of a medusa (*Gonionemus*). The effects of stimulation, normal and abnormal, were watched and gauged under experimental conditions. "We are now in a position to say," he concludes, "that *Gonionemus* neither seeks nor avoids things in the human sense of these terms. Its reactions are definitely determined by the quality, intensity, and location of the stimulus and not by the end to be attained,—expectation. In general the quality of the stimulus determines the kind of reaction to be given (whether motor or feeling, etc.); the intensity determines the quickness, duration, and extent of the reaction; the location of the stimulus determines the part or parts to react, and the direction of the movement. Food is found by movements which, although apparently fortuitous, because they are very imperfectly directed and determined by the unequal stimulation of symmetrical points of the body, are not wholly so." If there are here the beginnings of mind they are very rudimentary.

Starfish and sea-urchins show remarkably adaptive movements appropriate to the righting of the organism when it is placed in awkward or inverted positions; and if nice adaptation of behavior to circumstances were a sufficient criterion of intelligence we should without hesitation infer the guidance of consciousness under the polarizing influence of feeling. But it is difficult and unsafe to set limits to the nicety of organic adjustment, and conscious accommodation to circumstances as the result of individual experience has yet to be proved for starfish and sea-urchins. Even Romanes, who was so well acquainted with their multifarious and complicated reflex actions, and was liberal in his bestowal of mental qualities, could not say more than that they "almost present the appearance of being due to intelligence." Mr. Hobhouse thinks that there is not much evidence of a capacity to learn from experience among *coelenterata*, *echinodermata*, or worms. It is possible that the way in which earthworms draw leaves into their holes, some by the base, others by the apex, according to their shape and nature, may indicate intelligence. But, notwithstanding Darwin's careful observations, further detailed investigation is required. Professor Whitman discusses the behavior of a leech, *clepsine*, in terms of natural selection. He notes that, when a stone to the under side of which a leech is attached is turned to the light, the creature may either remain quiet, or creep slowly away, or roll itself into a ball and drop, but if it has eggs it always remains quiet over them. Here we have differential response to what appear to be the same external stimuli. And if we can be sure that the stimuli are really the same, the difference in the behavior would seem to be due to an internal factor which may be associated with consciousness. It looks as if conscious situations were perhaps taking form and that behavior is modified in accordance with their meaning. If so we have here the beginnings, or something more than the beginnings, of mind.

In the higher molluscs, crustacea, spiders, and insects, and probably among all true vertebrates, there is amply sufficient evidence of learning by experience. Schneider observed a very young octopus seize a hermit-crab on the shell of which was a *zoöphyte*; stung by this the octopus recoiled and let its prey escape. Subsequently it was observed to avoid hermit-crabs. Dahl gave to a spider a fly soaked in turpentine. Thrice did the spider spring upon and then relinquish her prey. But after the third attempt the spider, taught by experience, turned aside when the fly came in sight; nor would she for some hours attack a fly of the same species. Such are sample cases of intelligent behavior based on experience individually acquired. It is unnecessary to give further examples among the higher invertebrates. But in the lower forms of insect, molluscan,

and crustacean life, the evidence is less convincing, and there is both the opportunity and the need for further detailed investigation. Such systematic studies as those of Mr. Yerkes on the relation of entomostraca to stimulation by light, and those of Mr. Frandsen on the reactions of the slug to directive stimuli, afford such data as are only preliminary to a comprehensive discussion of the beginnings of mind.

It is noteworthy that, in those cases which leave little room for doubt or question, there is always a nervous system which has reached some amount of complexity, and which exemplifies that differentiation and integration with which Mr. Herbert Spencer has made us familiar. But what amount of complexity (if complexity be the determining factor) may be requisite we do not know. Nor can we at present go so far as to say that wherever there is a nervous system, there do we find the signs of intelligence. If this were so our task of interpretation would be simplified. As the case stands at present we may subdivide the pre-intelligent stage of organic adaptation into three substages: (*a*) that in which the adaptation is effected without cellular differentiation as in the protozoa and protophyta; (*b*) that in which the adaptation is effected without a nervous system, although individual nerve elements or their analogies may be present, as in plants and sponges; and (*c*) that in which the adaptation is effected through the instrumentality of an integrated and differentiated nervous system. And perhaps we are justified in surmizing that the third substage alone affords the conditions for the subsequent development of mind. Here occur those reflex actions, involving nerve centres, through the compounding and integration of which instinctive behavior is reached.

The exact position of instinct in any scheme of evolutionary progress, especially that which attempts to deal with the ascent of mind, is apparently anomalous and is by no means easy of rapid and clear apprehension. Of old it was piously regarded as a mysterious faculty implanted in animals as a substitute for the rational faculty of men. Of late, Romanes used the term to comprise all the faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the end attained. Professor Wundt, too, lays stress on the conscious aspect of instinctive activities which he says are accompanied by emotions in the mind, their performance being regulated by these emotions. Such regulation would place instincts under the heading of conscious accommodation. On the other hand, Mr. Hobhouse, in his recent work, places instinct in the pre-intelligent stage of organic adjustment and says that in so far as an act is instinctive it is not intelli-

gent, and, conversely, in so far as an act is intelligent it is not instinctive. It is indeed generally admitted that instinctive behavior is independent of individual experience, and it is therefore small matter for wonder that, in the days when the animal itself was regarded as a product of special creation its hereditary modes of procedure were attributed to the same source of origin. The essence of the modern doctrine of instinct is that it is a product of organic heredity and hence for contemporary thought the outcome of organic evolution. At the same time Mr. Hobhouse clearly states that no impassable gulf severs instinct from intelligence but rather that intelligence first arises within the sphere of instinct. And at first sight it does not seem easy to see how instinctive behavior independent of experience can contain within itself the germ of intelligent modification under the influence of experience. The point that has to be grasped is that, although instinctive behavior is not the result of experience, yet experience may be the result of instinctive behavior. Indeed, only on the condition that the hereditary response affords the data of experience is there any possibility of the origin of intelligence within the sphere of instinct.

We have already noted that, in a sense, we are not justified in speaking of mental heredity—only of the organic conditions which are the concomitants of mental processes. It is true that on the assumption of psycho-physical identity or parallelism this suffices for scientific as contrasted with metaphysical interpretation. Still it is well to distinguish the aspect which we can trace from that which must elude our most careful scrutiny. If we follow Mr. Hobhouse in classing, for the moment, with instinct all that belongs to the hereditary structure of the organism,—a wider conception, as he notes, than that of instinct in the strict sense,—we may say that it forms the organic means of connection between the behavior of parent and offspring and renders possible continuity of mental evolution and the ascent of mind from grade to grade. Intelligence may render the behavior of the individual more serviceable and in nicer and more delicate adjustment to the circumstances of its life, and organic heredity may transmit the conditions under which the offspring may take up the thread of mental progress at the higher level thus attained.

But is there any such direct inheritance of the modifications of nervous structure which are the concomitants of the exercise of intelligence during the course of individual life? A generation ago there seemed little reason for questioning the fact. Just as in the formation of habits through frequent repetition, the guidance of consciousness and the exercise of intelligence becomes unnecessary, the nervous system having been already moulded to its work by use during individual life, so, it seemed, in instinc-

tive behavior is the exercise of intelligence unnecessary since the parental moulding of the nervous system is directly inherited. Instinct could thus be defined, as it was by Samuel Butler, the hereditary opponent of Darwin, and by Eimer, the champion of Lamarckian doctrine in Germany, as inherited habit; in instinctive behavior, they said, are retained the organized effects of ancestral guidance by intelligence, which, in the phrase of George Henry Lewes, has lapsed, its work having been accomplished in the past and its continued exercise thus rendered unnecessary. But many modes of instinctive behavior could not be brought under this formula. Among insects, for example, the egg laying and cocoon spinning may be performed once and once only in the course of individual life, and yet may involve a complex train of highly adaptive acts. In these cases there is none of that frequent individual repetition which goes to the formation of a habit. The formula had to be remodeled or abandoned for such instincts; and, under the influence of Darwinian thought, those of this type came to be regarded as purely of organic origin, and directly due to natural selection without the intervention of any learning by experience. Thus Romanes was led to class instincts as (1) primary, due to natural selection; (2) secondary, due to inherited habit by lapsed intelligence; and (3) blended, where the two modes of origin coöperate. To the secondary class, pure and simple, he could, however, assign but few doubtful cases. The categories were practically reduced to two, comprising, on the one hand, instincts due to natural selection alone, and, on the other, those in the formation of which intelligent guidance had coöperated. Meanwhile Weismann had, on strictly biological grounds, thrown serious doubt on the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired characters—that is to say, the hereditary transmission of any modification of structure acquired during the life of the individual. If his denial of such transmission be based on assured fact the coöperation of intelligence in the genesis of instinctive behavior can no longer, it would seem, be invoked. Natural selection reigns supreme.

In order that we may adequately grasp the full meaning of this conclusion in its bearings on the interpretation of the ascent of mind in the animal kingdom we must realize how essentially an individual matter is the exercise of intelligence. In order that behavior may be modified in the light of experience the animal must acquire for itself this experience. No doubt the conditions under which it may be gained are transmitted in the form of hereditary structure and inherited modes of response; no doubt a capacity of profiting by the experience is also transmitted in the form of innate plasticity and modifiability of the nervous system. What, therefore, is inherited may be broadly defined as unspecialized intelligence

and the general conditions under which it may be exercised. It is the function of intelligence to give special direction to behavior in accordance with the teachings of experience. What Weismann and his school deny is the hereditary transmission of *these special lines of direction*. To put the matter in concrete form: A fox sees a dead bird dangling by a string, seizes it, hears a sharp report, feels the burning sting of a shot in his flank, and escapes. The whole takes form in his consciousness as a definite situation, and, when he again sees a dangling bird, it suggests that situation and all it involves, and the bird is left untouched. His behavior is guided by intelligence, but this particular line of its exercise is not inherited by his offspring, for the specialized results of experience are not hereditary. Or some particular situation is found in his experience and that of the vixen, his mate, to be pleasant and beneficial and is enjoyed a thousand times until their behavior under the circumstances becomes habitual. But even here, this particular line of behavior, just in so far as it is individually acquired, is not inherited by their offspring. It is due to a modification of brain structure, and there is no sufficient evidence that specially acquired modifications are transmitted through the germinal substance to future generations. Thus it would seem that though intelligence as a directive force, if we may so call it, is inherited, the special lines of its guidance are acquired in the course of individual life and are not passed on through heredity. In a word structural modifications of brain tissue which are the concomitants of intelligent behavior rendered habitual, and germinal variations which are the concomitants of all advance in instinctive endowment, are independent variables. From which it follows, if we accept the conclusion in this form, that, in biological evolution, the directive influence of intelligence in this line of behavior or in that, or in the strengthening and functional efficacy of this organ or of that, can have no effect on the course of hereditary progress.

The whole subject in its modern development involves niceties of distinction which are troublesome to those who have not had occasion to be confronted by the difficulties it presents. And one of these distinctions is that between two kinds of racial progress; on the one hand, biological progress in native endowment, and on the other, what we may term sociological progress in opportunities of acquisition, the native endowment remaining unchanged. Human progress is chiefly of the latter kind. Biologically we of the twentieth century are little better than our ancestors of the tenth; our native endowment is much the same, but our opportunities are immensely greater from the evolution of our social environment. With the registration of experience of the past for the guidance of experience in the future a higher phase of evolution

was rendered possible, and biological progress was superseded by human advancement. When we are dealing, however, with the beginnings of mind, this kind of social heredity, as Professor Mark Baldwin calls it in contradistinction to physical or organic heredity, is wholly inoperative. The controversy between the adherents of Lamarck and the followers of Professor Weismann refers exclusively to this physical or organic heredity; and in this sense I shall use the phrase "racial progress." Let me now state the matter boldly in a series of propositions. If one must be dry, one may at least endeavor to be brief.

(1.) On the Lamarckian hypothesis racial progress is due to the inheritance of individually acquired modifications of bodily structure, leading to the accommodation of the individual and the adaptation of the race to the conditions of its existence.

(2.) This proposition is divisible into two, (*a*) Individual progress is due to fresh modifications of bodily structure in accommodation to the conditions of life; (*b*) Racial progress and the evolution of species is due to the adaptation which results from the cumulative inheritance in a series of generations of such acquired modifications.

(3.) Anti-Lamarckians do not accept (*b*). They contend that acquired modifications, such as result, for example, from intelligent accommodation to circumstances, can in no wise specifically affect the germinal substance, the independent adaptive variations of which are the sole source of hereditary improvement and racial progress.

(4.) They do not deny, however, that individual survival is partially due to fresh modifications of bodily structure in accommodation to the conditions of life; and from this it logically follows that there are two factors in survival, (*a*) adaptation through variations having their origin in the germinal substance, (*b*) accommodation through individually acquired modifications of the bodily tissues.

(5.) But, they say, the genetic relationship between these two is wholly in one direction and in no case reciprocal; (*a*) may beget (*b*), but never does (*b*) beget (*a*). In other words, intelligence may be a product of variation and the more intelligent may survive, but the specific exercise of intelligence does not produce variations in the same specific direction.

Direct genetic production is not necessarily, however, the only relationship which may hold good between the individual and the racial factors in survival. And from the corollary stated under (5) above, we are saved by an hypothesis which is called by Professor Baldwin organic selection and which is considered at length in his recent volume on "Development and Evolution." Let us grant for the purposes of argu-

ment and exposition the most extreme claim of Professor Weismann and his school, that variations due to the unfolding of germinal potentialities are genetically independent of those modifications which are the direct outcome of the exercise of intelligence. Now natural selection deals with the organism as a whole. Those animals survive in which adaptation through germinal variations and accommodation through modification of structure jointly conduce to survival. It would seem, therefore, (1) that where adaptive variation v is similar in direction to individual modification m , the organism has an added chance of survival from the coincidence $m + v$; (2) that where the variation is antagonistic in direction to the modification, there is a diminished chance of survival from the opposition $m - v$; and hence (3) that what may be called coincident variations will be fostered while opposing variations will be eliminated. Intelligent or other modification is thus in a sense part, and probably a very important part, of *the environment under which variations are evolved*; and those variations are constantly selected which are in harmony with this ever present environment. Hence congenital instincts may arise along the same lines that have been marked out by persistent accommodation to oft recurring circumstances through the exercise of intelligence. Or to put the matter again in concrete form: Cattle are introduced into a new country where there are poisonous herbs; many die; a few sicken but recover and learn by experience to scent and avoid the herbs which if eaten in quantity would have killed them too. Intelligence has thus saved some of the race from extinction; without it all would have eaten freely to their destruction. In each generation many die, but some learn in time and survive. Meanwhile, however, some are born with an instinctive and congenital dislike to the scent and taste of the herb in question. This is only one of the thousands of variations which are constantly occurring and upon the existence of which natural selection depends. But those cattle in which this particular variation, at first perhaps only slight in amount, supplements intelligent avoidance of the herb, have an added chance of survival; on the other hand, variations in the direction of a special liking for the herb would not supplement but would thwart the play of intelligence, and would, like alcoholism in human folk, lead not to survival but to destruction. Among the survivals in each generation, therefore, there will be an increasing number of those in which the variation in taste coincides in direction with intelligent avoidance of the herb from experience of its painful effects. At last the avoidance becomes instinctive throughout the race; but the instinct has followed the line which was set by intelligence, which has been its fostering nurse, but not its parental begetter.

In such a way may have arisen the instinctive tendency of many birds to escape from their enemies by running off with trailing wings—by feigning to be wounded as it is said in language which implies a somewhat anthropomorphic interpretation. In such a way, too, many other instincts which have been attributed to lapsed intelligence or have been placed by Romanes in those of blended origin.

We must remember, as I have elsewhere said, that habits acquired by the exercise of intelligence on the one hand, and congenital variations of instinctive behavior on the other, are both working in their different spheres towards the self-same end, that of adjustment to the conditions of life. If, then, acquired accommodation and congenital adaptation reach this end by distinct methods, survival may well be best secured by their coöperation—and the more thorough and complete the coöperation the better the chance of survival. There would be a distinct advantage in the struggle for existence when inherited tendencies of independent origin coincided in direction with acquired modifications of behavior; a distinct disadvantage when such inherited tendencies were of such a character as to thwart or divert the guidance of intelligence. Thus any hereditary variations which coincide in direction with modifications of behavior due to acquired habit would be favored and fostered, while such variations as occurred in other and divergent lines would tend to be suppressed. And intelligent modification would in this manner often lead the way, and instinctive variation follow in its wake.

There is one more point in this connection which is, in my opinion, of no little importance to a right understanding of the rôle which the psychological factor has played in organic evolution. I have termed it the consonance between the biological and the psychological end of behavior. The biological end is survival; the psychological end is the attainment of pleasure or satisfaction. But these two ends are consonant. "Only those races of beings," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable feelings went along with activities conducive to life," and again "the most numerous survivals must ever have been among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best." Now in the beginnings of mind any modification or readjustment of organic behavior is due to the accompaniment of feeling which is either pleasurable, endorsing and enhancing the existing organic adjustments, or painful and deterrent, checking or inhibiting certain modes of hereditary response. Consciousness thus plays a selective part, permitting certain adjustments to survive and eliminating others. And the conditions of this intelligent selection are pleasure and pain. But these conditions are hereditary and not acquired;

and they must be consonant with the end of survival if they are to be a factor in organic evolution. For if they be not consonant they will inevitably lead the organism to its own destruction. Hence in its inception at the beginnings of mind and to a large extent throughout the range of the ascent of mind, the lines on which intelligence works are laid down by the requirements of organic evolution, are founded in heredity, and are subject to natural selection. In brief, intelligent modification of behavior in individual life must be in the main similar in direction to the trend of organic progress in the race through congenital variation, if the common end of survival is to be reached.

This being so there must be constant and subtle interaction between organic adjustment and conscious readjustment. And if, following Mr. Hobhouse, we regard them as successive stages in an upward evolution, we must remember that the one does not cease when the other begins; that, while organic adjustment is always the precursor of conscious readjustment, the converse is also true, just in so far as intelligence is really a factor in organic progress; that, if we place instincts in the pre-intelligent stage, we must do so without prejudice to the view that intelligence may be their nurse if not their parent, and that, throughout the ascent of mind, the basis of continuity is given in the hereditary structure of the organism.

It will now presumably be obvious that if we are asked to indicate, so far as is possible in the dim light which is all we have for guidance, the organic conditions for the beginnings of mind, the answer will be different according as the question has reference to the individual organism or to the animal kingdom as a whole. For we have reached the conception that it is the province of mind to effect a modification of the pre-existing organic adjustment. Now in the case of a mammal at birth, a newly hatched bird, or an insect just freed from its chrysalis skin, each is a going concern, each inherits a more or less complex and varied set of organic adaptations, and the opportunities for conscious modification are not less complex or varied. In other words, the primary data afforded to consciousness by the organism, as an already going vital machine, are dependent on one instinctive or other congenital modes of behavior which form the animal's inherited stock in trade for the commerce of life. One of the chief deductions from the generalization that the starting point of mind is conscious accommodation is this: that the starting point varies with the hereditary adjustment with which consciousness has to deal. In the study of individuals the beginnings of mind have to be sought at an indefinite number of different levels, dependent on the range of organic adaptation of behavior to circumstances which has been already reached

in the biological evolution of the race. And there can be little doubt that we have here one of the primary determinants, not only in any given case, of the level at which mind starts in its individual career of accommodation, but also of the range of intelligence in the animal in question. And it is a point to be borne in mind that, so far as the application of the criterion of intelligence enables us to judge, even at the very beginnings of mind among the several grades of animal life, organic adjustments have already reached such a level of complexity as to present to the nascent consciousness orderly groups of data. If, as Mr. Hobhouse puts it, intelligence first arrives within the sphere of instinct, we have in instinctive behavior well coördinated and nicely adjusted organic situations which are the basis of, and afford the requisite data for, the conscious situations of experience. Mind at its inception, so far as observation of behavior enables us to form an opinion, has to deal, not with separate elements which have to be somehow grouped into the related wholes of concrete experience, but with ready-made wholes, the outcome of organic evolution, hereditary structure, and congenital modes of behavior.

But if intelligence thus arises within the sphere of the instinctive or other forms of congenital response to stimuli, if the level of mind at its starting point in the individual is largely determined by these organic conditions, there are also other organic conditions by which it is determined. The conditions which afford the data for accommodation do not necessarily afford the ability to deal with them. Granting that this also has an organic basis it must be a distinct and separate basis.

If there is one feature which is essentially characteristic of the popular conception of the influence of mind in the conduct of affairs, it is that effective consciousness is a controlling influence standing in some way apart from the organic happenings over which its control is exercised. Is this popular conception unfounded and erroneous? Take the simplest case of accommodation, through a modification of behavior due to pleasureable or painful tone arising within the preëxisting system of inherited adjustment. Can we conceive how this pleasureable or painful tone, as the concomitant or accompaniment of the nervous processes involved in such adjustment, could either increase or damp down this or that element of the motor response, could either augment or inhibit the existing imperfect adaptation? I, for one, am incapable of doing so. If consciousness is to be effective in guidance it must play the part of selective environment. Huxley, fully realizing this, and denying any selective influence, regarded mind as an epiphenomenon. "The consciousness of brutes," he said, "would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be

as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence on its machinery." This conclusion has been as scornfully rejected, on the one hand, as it has been gladly welcomed on the other. It seems to be a strictly logical deduction from the assumption of concomitance, which we have ourselves accepted; and it seems to be none the less contradictory of and subversive to the position we have taken up with regard to consciousness as a factor in organic evolution. How can we escape from the difficulty thus presented? How can we reconcile the inference to which Huxley's keen logic led him, with the conclusion that the beginnings of mind inaugurated a new era in evolutionary progress?

Let us review our position. (1.) We have assumed that some nervous changes are accompanied by consciousness and that all states of consciousness have for their physical counterparts such nervous changes. (2.) We have taken conscious accommodation as our criterion of mind or intelligence as a guiding factor in the behavior of animals during their individual life. (3.) We have endeavored to indicate the relation between this individual accommodation and those congenital variations which contribute to racial progress, and have said that intelligent modifications of behavior are in a sense the environment under which coincident variations are selected for survival. (4.) We have confessed our inability to conceive how pleasureable and painful tone, or, indeed, any other form of conscious accompaniment, can possibly modify, let us say, truly congenital and instinctive behavior so long as such consciousness is the concomitant of the inherited neural adjustments or adaptation. Can we combine the results embodied in these propositions in further synthesis?

Only on the basis of a further assumption. Human physiology has familiarized us with the fact that in the cerebral hemispheres of the brain there are certain centres—and they are those in which the association with consciousness obtains—that exercise a controlling influence on the lower brain centres, and through the "pyramidal tract" on the centres of the spinal cord. There is thus a controlling system superimposed upon the rest of the nervous centres, those, that is to say, which are probably concerned in congenital modes of response. Our final assumption involves the extension beyond the limits of actual observation of this conception of a control system with which consciousness is associated. It seems to me that we are inevitably forced to assume that at the very beginnings of mind there is a *differentiation of centres of readjustment from those of congenital response*, and that the ascent of mind is the concomitant of the evolution of this control system which, during individual life, is constantly playing down upon the system which is concerned with

organic adjustment. If only nature, in the process of development, had contrived to stain the one system sky blue and the other a delicate pink, how much simpler our task would be! How helpfully she would have enabled us to prove by ocular demonstration the truth of this assumption! But nature refuses to be diagrammatic, and leaves that for the blackboards of her most favored children. An assumption it must for the present remain, though histologists with *their* staining methods, may some day develop what is written in nature's invisible ink. All that we can now do is to note some of the implications of this assumption, combined with that which we have before made. In the first place the control system plays the part of environment to the centres of inherited organic adjustment. This squares with the conclusion to which we were led, that intelligent modifications of behavior are in a sense the environment under which coincident variations are selected for survival. It harmonizes the popular conception of mind as a selective environment with the biological conception of organic evolution under natural selection. It enables us to see that the level at which any organism starts in its individual career is dependent not only on the range of adaptation which has been reached through naturally selected variations in the centres of congenital response, but also on the amount of evolution which the control system has already undergone. It leads us to alter Mr. Huxley's statement, and to say instead, that the consciousness of brutes would appear to be the subjective aspect of the functional activity of their control system. So complete is the concomitance that "control system" and "mind" are interchangeable terms applied to the same existence considered now from the objective and now from the subjective point of view. Neither is the product of the other though the positive nature of their relationship is unknown. This existence—the embodied mind—is not merely the hooter of the motor car of life, but its driver who guides it along the high roads of adjustment—no mere epiphenomenon but a factor both in individual behavior and in organic evolution.

From the physiological point of view, then, the conditions of the beginnings of mind would seem to be the differentiation of a control system with conscious concomitants. From the standpoint of behavior, conscious accommodation through control as the result of individual experience. And what from the psychological point of view? Is there anything beyond the rise of sentience in its antithetical modes of pleasure and pain? One may surmise that there is, in some dim form of expectation, at least the germ of that looking before and after to which consciousness eventually attains with more and more clearness and with greater and greater range. Of course it is very difficult to say whether,

in those cases in which we seem to discern the most rudimentary beginnings of mind in the biological grades of animal life, there is anything of this kind. But if the criterion of intelligent behavior is learning from experience, it is not easy to conceive how experience can be operative in consciousness except through some form of expectation, however dim. Take the case of the spider which, having been given flies soaked in turpentine, learns to let them and other flies alone, or that of the fish which comes to be fed,—and these cases are cited by Mr. Hobhouse as examples of a very simple form of conscious accommodation,—one is at a loss to understand what kind of consciousness other than something of the nature of expectation is begotten by experience. Such expectation is, indeed, the earliest form of memory, which in its incipient phases has a prospective rather than retrospective value; and (I repeat in some dim form which it is difficult for us to imagine) it would seem to be the earliest manifestation of consciousness in the very beginnings of mind.

THE AMERICAN WORKMAN AND THE FRENCH

ANDRÉ AND JULES SEIGFRIED

JULES SEIGFRIED, LATE MINISTER OF COMMERCE, AND MEMBER
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THE French, accustomed to think of the American democracy as the natural centre of the most advanced and newest ideas, are ready to imagine that the same is true of politics, and that the most extreme opinions will find in America excellent ground in which to develop. And they never fail to be greatly astonished when they learn that the United States may be classed among the nations which are conservative in their politics. In the course of a recent journey in America, there was, indeed, one thing which struck me more than the formidable economic development of the New World,—the prosperity, and the truly conservative spirit of the majority of the workmen employed in great manufactures.

This fact presents a very curious contrast with France, for, of all the continental workmen, the Frenchman is without question the most inclined to exaggerated political opinions, although in private life he preserves great common sense and true prudence. Like the American, and to the same extent, he displays spirit, intelligence, and activity; but he uses these qualities in a completely different way, and his conception of existence seems to be of quite another kind. It may therefore be of interest to study the principal characteristics of the American working man in comparison with the French.

The man who studies American industry will be impressed principally by the three following characteristics: the concentration and the vastness of capital, the universal employment of perfected machinery, and, lastly, the conditions favorable to the promotion of the workmen and clerks.

The concentration of capital in American business appears enormous to Europeans. They have nothing similar to show and they are stupefied by each fresh display of the financial power of the Americans. It is our especial interest here to know in what manner these fresh conditions of economic life are to influence the position of the workman. In France, where capital is considerable, but infinitely less concentrated than in America, it is one of the most cherished assertions of the conservative school, that in the existing economic conditions, the workman by his intelligence and energy, can rise to be an employer, that

the workman of today may be the employer of tomorrow, that the employer of today is often the workman of yesterday. This is evidently a very optimistic picture of the state of things which prevails in France. In reality it is only in rare cases that the French workman rises to the rank of employer.

At first sight it seems that it ought to be the same in America. Given the present concentration of enterprises and the large amount of capital necessary to start any business able to struggle with powerful rivals, it is very evident that the transformation of a workman into an employer is still more difficult, and will become increasingly rare. Indeed it is not a question of finding even some millions in order to start a commercial enterprise; often tens of millions are necessary and only a company or men of immense riches can find them. This fact makes the continuation of private enterprises at times very hazardous; they are sometimes brought up by force, or competed with by brutal and often dishonorable means.

The case of the small capitalist setting up on his own account, is becoming more and more the exception in the United States. And much more unusual is it for the workman to become master of a factory. For a long time, it was thought in France that America offered the workman manifold chances of becoming an employer. Today it is evident that these hopes in the majority of cases are not realized.

Shall I draw from this the conclusion that the American workman sees all the future closed to him, and that his position is from this point of view even worse than in Europe? By no means, for, without becoming, properly speaking, an employer, the American workman may, it seems to me, advance and succeed in a way not less effectual.

I do not know how it is that many workmen pretend to be indifferent to the prosperity of the enterprise in which they are engaged. Surely they ought to understand the elementary fact that it is more advantageous to be in a large concern which is doing well than in a little concern which only just floats or is in danger of failing. The large American enterprises offer a striking example of this; they give work to thousands and thousands of workmen. Their superior employés receive in the form of salaries sums which are sometimes much more than the profits of a European employer on a so-called large scale. Hence, without becoming an employer in the literal sense of the term, what hinders the workman from reaching the first rank? For this he needs no capital; his merit, his intelligence, his capacity, will suffice to make his future assured. In this sense, the great American manufactures are not really adverse to the workman.

It is often objected in Europe that these directors of big enterprises have not the independence of the head. That is a point which must be recognized but against which it is impossible to rebel; we cannot go upstream in economic evolution. Besides, would not many heads prefer fixed sums like those received by the high officials of business enterprises, in America, to the uncertainty of their own profits?

The universal employment of machinery is another characteristic which never fails to impress the European traveler in America. Everywhere in the United States he finds the preponderating influence of this fact, whether from the technical or from the social point of view. In France, the part played by machinery, although considerable, is not nearly so important, and we shall see in particular that French workmen do not regard iron-workers with so friendly an eye as do the American workmen.

The chief cause of the rapid progress which machinery has made in America during these last few years, lies certainly in the high salaries which render workman's labor on a large scale so very costly. In the Far East, for example, as in all the countries where wages are low, the employer is led by the force of circumstances to grow careless, to count upon the extraordinary cheapness of his workmen, and not to seek in progress other reasons for success. Of what consequence is it to him that a new machine saves the labor of several workmen, when these workmen cost nothing or next to nothing? Thus it has been a great advantage for America to be a country where workmanship is dear. The American employer can never afford to sleep; he has one care which never leaves him, that of economizing in workmen and of producing as much as possible with the least possible number of hands. In this way the Americans have acquired what is no doubt the most perfect apparatus in the world and are able easily to excel countries where much less is paid for workmanship.

What is now the position taken by workmen with respect to machines? In France the workman has never been able to overcome his antipathy to the machine. How many times in Paris I have entered upon this subject with workmen whom I might consider of the higher class! I have nearly always found the same prejudices. Speaking generally, they accuse machines of diminishing the number of operatives, of lowering the salaries, of reducing the operative to the rank of a common workman. Political economy has answered these objections many times over; it has proved in an unanswerable manner that by increasing business, the machine in the end always increases the number of workers and that in countries where machinery is the most developed there also the salaries are highest. But the arguments of theorists will never

prevent the workmen from seeing actual and immediate effects. Thus, the invention of new machines is responsible for many a crisis resulting from a temporary stoppage of work. The French workmen do not easily forget this, and the reason is not hard to understand.

On the other hand, it must be added that the crises which result from the use of machines are naturally longer in France, because here the development of business is not as rapid as in America. There are certainly in France working men who have read and learned much, and who understand these matters, and the truth, almost the fatality, of certain economic laws. But the great mass of them preserve an unreasoning and profound hatred for this form of contemporary production.

I have further noticed that in America the ways of thinking are noticeably different. It seems that the American workman has suffered much less from the machine than his French comrade. On the contrary, for him the classical effects of machinery, predicted by official political economy, have been produced. The number of workmen, far from diminishing, has increased in such proportions that it is unnecessary to appeal to statistics in order to prove this statement, so self-evident is it. The salaries have increased, and today the American workman working before a machine earns more than the most skilful workmen of France. And, lastly, I have never observed that the dignity of the American workman has diminished with the development of machinery. There is no country where machinery is more developed than in the United States; and in no country is the "standard of life" of the workman higher.

We must speak finally of the conditions of promotion in France and in the United States. It seems to me that the workman is intimately connected with the progress of business. He contributes to it and he profits by it. Speaking generally, as was said above, it cannot be a matter of indifference to the workman whether the business prospers or not. As he will suffer from a stoppage of work or stagnation in business, so he will profit by the economic activity, by the intelligence and the success of his employer. The skill of the latter will consist largely in increasing the productive power of the employé, in making him profit directly by any progress to which he contributes.

It seems from this point of view that the American employers have often been more politic with regard to their men than the French. In more than one house of business in France, the only demand made upon those who receive salaries, whether as workmen or as higher officials, is that they shall not make a mistake, nor cause a loss of money to their masters. The master fears to lose even more than he desires to gain, and he will not forgive a venture which might have had good results, but

which eventually turned out badly. In this state of things, the subordinate is formally discouraged from taking the initiative; he is distrustful; he confines himself to the exact execution of his own work and is not far from taking as his motto the famous and fatal "No zeal" of officialdom.

America has been successful in avoiding this mistake. She has persuaded employes of every kind that it is to their interest to be zealous, and this is a magnificent result, the far-reaching effects of which cannot be exaggerated. In fact, it is known and believed in America that intelligent zeal is sure to be rewarded, either by a promotion sometimes rapid and even astounding, or by a premium received immediately.

We have noticed the importance of invention in the business development of America. The workman plays a great part in this search for the new. Numerous inventions have been made by workmen who knew the practical handling of their machine and the direction in which its perfecting might be sought. Did these American workmen do this for the love of art? Who knows? Perhaps to some extent they did, for I believe that the workman of the New World possesses proper pride and a disinterested spirit. But, he also knows well that every invention which will be a source of profit to his employer, will also raise him, and that he will not be forgotten. When thousands are seeking, the chances are that some one will find; and this is the reason, I think, why so much is found out in America.

From this point of view, an American workshop is a most edifying sight. Every one is hurrying and making haste; the excitement inspired by personal interest is felt everywhere. This activity, agitation we might almost say, becomes speedily a kind of second nature, which the newcomer, French, German, or Swiss, adopts unconsciously and becomes in a few years a red-hot American. It is the employer who has created around him an atmosphere which induces energy and the initiative.

This, then, is what a just and sure reward of merit and effect can accomplish. The workman feels that he is not working without hope and that there are real and serious chances for his success and promotion. Can as much be said of the state of matters in France? Unfortunately I cannot say that the workman has here the same confidence in the possibility of his promotion. He can, of course, rise in France, as everywhere, and even better than in many countries. But he does not seriously believe that he has his marshal's staff in his pocket, as the saying goes.

This metaphor leads me to recall a comparison often made between the army under the old form of government and the revolutionary army

in France. In the first a corrupted aristocracy reigns supreme and does whatever it pleases; the nobles are colonels at their birth, while the real merit of the commoners languishes hopelessly, without a chance of success, in the lower ranks. A few years later the French Revolution has done its work: Hoche, Marceau, Bonaparte, take the place of the petty marquises of earlier times, and for twenty years the French army is victorious on all the fields of battle in Europe.

The problem is not widely different in the industrial army. There, too, the main thing is to know how to open the way for the rapid rise of talent without consideration of social rank. And this is more difficult than is thought, for if there is no nobility, there are still castes and certain kinds of privileges. Formerly a count, a marquis, hindered the commoner from becoming a lieutenant or a captain. Today, at least in Europe, it is sometimes the "bourgeois" on his pedestal of science guaranteed by state parchments, who bars the way in business to the non-commissioned officer, who possesses no other title than his practical turn of mind and his experience to make his way to the highest positions. Are they not essential qualities, this practical turn of mind, this experience? And yet, in many cases they are not sufficient. It is very difficult in France, for example, to rise from the ranks. Between the engineer, fresh from the "Polytechnic" or the "Central," and the foreman, sometimes worthy of doing the same work and of doing it better, there is literally a difference of class, with the full consequences which this difference entails.

I had the contrary impression in America. Very often there I have seen enterprises the director of which was a former workman. Many times in visiting large factories I have asked the technical director if he had been educated at a great school. To my surprise I generally found that I had to do with a practical man whose success was due to his own efforts,—a "self-made man." In spite of his want of theoretical education, his superiors had preferred him to men who were more cultivated, but less practical. This is just the English school, which believes first and foremost in experience, and in its heart of hearts rather despises diplomas and bookish science.

I have dwelt at some length upon this character, at once democratic and organized, of the American factory. It is calculated, I think, to strike every Frenchman traveling in the United States. And it goes far towards explaining the contentment of the American workman, who is not a sceptic and a pessimist, and who has the firm persuasion that if he has talent and activity he *must* succeed.

Let us speak a little of the workman himself, having thus spoken of the factory and the chief principles which prevail there. It is first most

important to know what he earns on both sides of the Atlantic. When French workmen are told of the salaries their American comrades receive, they never fail to raise their arms in astonishment, and some are at once found who form the project of emigrating to this new paradise of working men. It is true that while a common working man earns one dollar and fifty cents in the United States, in France he only earns from sixty to seventy cents. The salaries of skilled workmen exhibit the same difference as the following table will show:—

	UNITED STATES.	FRANCE.
Mechanics	\$3.00 a day.	\$1.30 a day.
Bricklayers	4.00 a day.	1.20 a day.
Spinners	1.60 a day.	1.00 a day.
Weavers	1.00 a day.	.70 a day.
Clerks	50.00 a month.	40.00 a month.
Shopmen	40.00 a month.	25.00 a month.

It will easily be guessed that under these conditions American salaries appear extremely high to French workmen. But, on the one hand, from the industrial point of view, the use of machinery sensibly diminishes this drawback; and, on the other hand, the American workman really works for the money he earns, which is certainly one of the most interesting phases of his psychology.

He has certainly not the pride in the finish of his work, which makes for the originality and superiority of the French worker. No, but he has the pride in work quickly done and sufficiently well done. He is a true son of his country and of his age. In the large American factories the work is nearly always upon American specialties, machine-made work on a large scale, in which the art of the workman plays only a secondary part. His activity and his intelligence consist in working quickly and in not losing time. This he does wonderfully well. An American workshop resembles an ant-hill where each vies with the other in hurrying. "Look at them," said an employer to me, "they are not forced to make haste like that, they do it of their own accord." In fact, this continual hurry has become one of the characteristics of the American workman; from the woman who runs herself out of breath to do her errands, to the workman who despatches his work with all speed, no one has a moment's repose. We French have the reputation of having won the record for excitement. I think we must yield this honor to the Americans.

If he takes pride in his work, the American workman is at the same time perfectly conscious of his value. He is not humble, but is very

independent. He never gives the impression of one in bondage, as is sometimes the case in the great European factories. When his work is finished he ceases to be subject to the power of his employer. They are equals, and this is felt as much by the employer as by the workman. I think this is one reason why American workmen are so much opposed to charitable and philanthropic attempts on the part of the employers.

This independence is by no means hatred. I have never seen a less malevolent workman than the American. He is proud and pleased with himself; he considers that he is as good as any one. And a man who has succeeded, by his own efforts, is always accorded respect, for the American workman has an innate regard for energy.

This admiration of energy and this absence of jealousy are easily understood in a comparatively new country, where every one has his chance. Let us remember that it is not always thus in Old Europe.

I shall not draw a contrast between the French workman and the American workman, but a comparison or rather a parallel, for they have much in common. First of all, their vivacity and the pride which they take in their work, and which sometimes makes of the Frenchman a real artist, caring more for the work he is performing than for the money he earns by his talent. On the other hand, I could not say that he has that confidence in success which makes of the American workman the type of the optimist. A dangerous scepticism has been developing, especially in these last few years, and particularly in the case of the Parisian workman. He has succeeded in persuading himself that in many cases his promotion depends, not so much on his zeal as on the recommendations that he can obtain. Hence less respect for the man who succeeds and more jealousy; hence the question of the envious, "Why not I?" Hence, in short, quite naturally, revolutionary ideas.

At the same time, in order to compare the lives of the French workmen and the American workmen, it is not enough to compare their salaries; we must further know the cost of life, and the use which they make of their money. Whenever you mention in France the high salaries of the American workmen, people reply, "That means nothing at all, for the dearness of living in the United States must be taken into account." In France there is a regular tradition that the cost of living is beyond all bounds in the United States. Almost all travelers bring back this impression, and it is not surprising if we take into account the kind of life they lead as soon as they arrive in New York. They are generally eminent economists, *grande*s, who stop at the fashionable hotel where they must pay four or five dollars for a room in which they are not comfortable. Their first cab costs them three dollars

and their first lunch quite as much. After this, they may do what they like; they may accumulate statistics upon statistics and observations upon observations; they will leave America with the impression that it is a country where living is exorbitant.

This impression is false, and on the whole the cost of living in the United States is far from being high in proportion to the salary. Let us compare the price of the different commodities of life in France and in the United States.

First of all, lodging is without question most expensive in the United States; it is infinitely dearer than in France. The following are the average prices:—

	UNITED STATES.	FRANCE.
Apartment of one room	\$50.00	\$25.00
Apartment of two rooms	100.00	48.00
Apartment of three rooms	150.00	72.00

If lodging is much dearer in the United States, we shall see that food is cheaper in proportion:—

	UNITED STATES.	FRANCE.
Bread (kil.)08	.06
Beef20	.36
Pork24	.32
Butter50	.48
Cheese30	.30
Sugar12	.21
Coffee50	.70
Eggs (dozen)44	.24

It is the same in the case of clothing, heating, and lighting:—

	UNITED STATES.	FRANCE.
Ordinary boots	\$1.50	\$2.00
Workmen's clothes	8.00	10.00
Clerks' clothes	10.00	14.00
Coal (ton)	3.00	5.00
Paraffine (litre)04	.08 ¹

All facts considered, living is perhaps ten per cent dearer in the United States. As the salaries are about double, it is evident that the

(1) Roughly estimated.

American workman by no means loses in one respect what he has gained in another.

Here we touch on the principal point of difference between the Frenchman and the American. What do they do with their money? The Frenchman saves while the American spends. If money is wanting, the Frenchman will prefer to reduce his way of living so as not to be obliged to work more; the American will work more so as not to cut down his way of living. This is the natural expression of the situation in old countries as opposed to new countries. In the new countries, the people like a large way of living; they will know nothing of privation; they quickly acquire the habit of never doing without, and of gratifying their every whim.

The American workman always amazes us by his confidence, almost carelessness, with regard to the future. He says to himself, "I shall always be able to earn money when I want it; I shall, therefore, enjoy what I earn today." "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." And so he lives on a very large scale; he spends all he earns either in hiring or buying a comfortable house, or in amusing himself and paying for pretty dresses for his wife. When a Frenchman, going through an American town, sees the workman walking with his wife, or goes to visit his house, he always brings back an excellent impression. The house of the French workman has rarely the same degree of comfort as that of the American, in which there is frequently electricity, a bath room, or a piano. Such luxury is practically unknown in France. As to the workman himself, it is difficult in America to distinguish him from other classes of society, so little does clothing differentiate the people of the United States.

I have always been struck by the easy circumstances which the clothes worn in the evening in the big streets display. For the American working man is pretentious. He wishes to look like *somebody*. If the word "bourgeois" had an exact meaning in English as it has in French, I should be ready to say that the American workman would be delighted to be taken for a "bourgeois." This is one of the secrets of the great sacrifices which he will be ready to make in order to dress his wife richly. It is very amusing to observe the indignation of certain French housewives settled in America, when they see their cooks, in spite of moderate wages, buying themselves amazing hats, infinitely dearer than those which their mistresses permit themselves to buy. If harder days come, if salaries are lowered, well, they will reduce a little, as little as possible, the way of living, and they will work a little more.

Nothing is more different from the traditional French conception of economy. In that direction, the American expends, so to speak, no effort;

his wife in particular has, one may say, none of the qualities of the housekeeper, which make the Frenchwoman such a valuable helpmate to her husband. With the aid of his wife the Frenchman finds it possible to make up in part for his moderate salary, and succeeds in leading a life which, if not large, may at least be called comfortable. We may consider the French and the Americans as two high types of workmen. Let us notice to what extent they are different!

After having seen the workman in the factory and in private life, it remains for us to speak of his political opinions and of the way in which he meets the social problem. This aspect of the American workmen causes the Frenchman the greatest astonishment. Coming from Europe, accustomed to the advanced, idealistic, often revolutionary ideas of the workmen in our large towns, he expects to find similar ideas in the American workman. What a surprise for him when, on the contrary, these working men of the New World come and talk to him, almost like "bourgeois"!

I am well aware that extremists may be found in America as elsewhere; but they are not often met with. In France, at least in the large towns, and certainly in Paris, one rarely happens to meet a workman who does not call himself a socialist and a revolutionary. A man who is accustomed to talk with them, to employ a certain vocabulary and certain forms of thought, makes curious reflections the first time he talks with American workmen. I shall always remember the conversation I had one day at New York with a bricklayer. I began to speak to him as if to a Parisian: "Are you revolutionary?" I asked him. He replied exactly as follows: "Revolution? what do you mean by that?" I did not undertake to explain it to him. But, in great surprise that this word, so essential in the vocabulary of the French workman, was unknown to him, I explained in a few words that many French workmen set their hopes on a kind of social overthrow, which would bring their own class into power, and into the possession of riches. My interlocutor appeared rather surprised and replied with a look of quiet pity, "Ah! they are still there!" For himself he declared that if not perfectly satisfied, he was at least sufficiently content with the existing social order. All that he asked for was higher salaries and shorter hours. He exhibited no hatred for the employers. On the other hand, he seemed to have no wish to become an employer himself, guessing the difficulties of the situation. He did not dream of a share in profits, preferring a solid and regular salary. He was, however, very independent, with nothing humble or servile about him: a man earning his living by his trade, asking nothing from any one, having the just consciousness that he was as good as any other.

I believe this type of workman to be representative of the American workman; he accepts the principle of a capitalist society, and has no conception of any other principles. I know working men in Paris who hold these opinions. They are considered by their comrades as reactionary. I remember a discussion which I heard one day in one of the suburbs of Paris, between a workman who called himself a great partisan of syndicates and strikes, and another who declared himself a revolutionary. After having listened to the first, the second rose and said, "Comrade, what you have said is interesting, but it is a deception. While you will not allow before me that speculators and those upon whom they speculate make up the whole of society, it is useless for us to argue together."

In order to hear the expression of such ideas in the United States among real American workmen, it would be necessary to seek very carefully. There certainly are socialists and revolutionists, but generally they are Germans or Frenchmen incompletely Americanized. As soon as they become truly Americanized, they acquire another habit of mind, for it would seem that the Anglo-Saxon mind has an innate distrust of abrupt changes and a respect for established powers. It is not the stupid and often ridiculous respect of the Englishman for nobility or for money; it is a higher feeling, respect for merit which has won success, or even for *all* which has been successful. The American workman to whom I alluded just now did not dream, it was clear, of a day of vengeance when all the "bourgeois" would pay once for all the arrears of their social debts. Even the word "bourgeois," so frequently used by French workmen in their diatribes against the class which possesses money, was unknown to him. The difference of class which it indicates is not known in the United States.

We may say, then, by way of summary that, compared to the French workman, the American workman is a conservative. As soon as he is on the road to success, with the hope of rising in the hierarchy and of attaining position in the capitalist army, he quickly becomes a perfect "bourgeois." He has, then, no other thought than that of building himself a good house, and of paying for different forms of luxury. He becomes, in a word, one of the satisfied, and is lost for the revolutionary propaganda. I do not know what reception he would give to the propagandist who spoke to him of Karl Marx, of revolution, and of collectivism. "Words! Words!" he would think, no doubt, and he would be on his guard.

It is a strange thing that in France suspicion should be attached to the man who does not pronounce the great words of the doctrine, and who seems to wish to speak of nothing but industrial interests. As at

the time of the French Revolution, he will be suspected of being a moderate. The fact is, the American puts the industrial struggle in the first rank, while the Frenchman gives the first place to the political struggle. To raise the salary and diminish the hours of work, this, it seems to me, is the programme, resumed in two words, of the immense majority of American workmen. At times the difficulty is greater, and the very existence of the trade-unions, which certain employers refuse to recognize, has to be fought for. This has been the cause of famous strikes. But this is all, and practically the programme stops here, for the political part seems to be left at one side. In reality it is generally considered as Utopian. To reform the social order, to work for humanity, this is what attracts a Frenchman, but fails to excite an American workman.

In the manifestoes there is, indeed, the necessary *tirade* on tyranny and the speculations of capital. But by talking with the men, one soon sees that it is merely a formal clause, and that it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to it. The American workman often reminds one of the English Fabian societies. He is ready to fall in with any acceptable compromise with the employers, and he will willingly own that the immediate questions alone seem serious to him. He will incur suspicion by taking interest in higher politics for the same reason that a Frenchman will incur suspicion by confining himself to industrial interests.

Thus it is that the old country is the most imaginative in politics, and it is the younger one which teaches moderation. It is constantly repeated in Europe that the social basis of the United States is not solid, that the enormous fortunes which have been built up there will result in jealousy, hatred, and revolution. Macaulay made this prediction a long time ago. We do not see this prediction fulfilled, and the United States presents the spectacle of a nation where there are numerous chances for all, and where real merit is practically sure to succeed. While in the United States all promotions are subject to the principles of justice, and the higher positions are accessible to merit, I fail to see why the social basis of the country is wanting in solidity, and why the American people justify the fears which timid pessimists seem to have for them.

EMILE ZOLA
HIS LITERARY AND SOCIAL POSITION
GUSTAVE GEFFROY

PARIS

THE death of Emile Zola has brought out the unity of his work. From now on, criticism can no longer confine itself to fragmentary judgments; it can no longer take separately the novels or the critical studies, in order to define, upon one point alone, the personality of the man who has gone. This definition was apt to be a condemnation under the pen of the writers of the Academy or the University, and this condemnation was easy to obtain. First of all, we know how great must be the resources of science, of learning, of address, of ingenuity, and of subtility, in a writer destined by education, labors, and habits of mind, for critical functions. Such a one will know how to choose his argument, to multiply his quotations, examples, and analogies. And this kind of criticism was exercised against Zola with a painstaking and studied animosity.

I will take up several examples of this style, in which the contradictions will appear of themselves.

Thus, Emile Zola confessed to his romanticism, to the influence which he had felt, and which he continued to feel, of the apprenticeship of his mind, his early readings and influence that he was destined to feel from the very fact of his temperament and of his imagination. This confession once obtained, it was easy to carry on successfully the work of picking out all the romantic details, all the exaggerations, all the bombastic style, in Zola's writings. The conclusion was that Zola's work was quite opposed to all truth, and in absolute discord with the theories he asserted.

On the other hand, if they wanted to see only the realist in Zola, and the realist entirely taken up with base truths and obscene details, it was a very simple matter to collect many proofs of this affirmation, since Zola did not pretend to hide any of the vices and blemishes of humanity, nor any physiological fatalities. They picked out all such details, not only those that were really unnecessary, or overstrained, but even those that were commanded by the subject chosen, which they deprived of their logical signification by separating them from the drama of the book, by isolating them, by presenting them as unjustified products of the author's will. He was no longer, then, a romanticist, elaborating a false

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and disordered mode of writing, but a realist relieving the platitude of reality solely by obscene details, pictured in a crude and revolting fashion, and this realist was easily made to seem a speculator in pornography.

If they wanted to prove that Zola was only interested in people of the lowest classes, they would draw up a list of the persons of manual occupations whom he had made the heroes of his novels: peasants, pork butchers, venders of fish and of fruit, zinc roofers, laundresses, undertakers, saloon keepers, working men, cashiers, clerks, saleswomen, miners, mechanics, common soldiers, etc. They would dilate complaisantly upon the incapacity of these people to feel life, or experience complicated emotions, to undergo the delicate refinements of suffering that are reserved for rich people alone, who have nothing to do but cultivate their personality in order to furnish wordly novelists with selected and complete experiences. This choosing of vulgar professions was one of the great complaints against Zola, one of the great reasons for depreciating his work. They might have observed with exactly as much truth, but they did not or rather they disposed of it very quickly, that there was another list equally possible of characters taken from other social categories: men of politics, ministers, sovereigns, priests, actors and actresses, managers of huge stores, stockholders and directors of mines, artists, men of letters, professors, scholars, doctors, men and women of the middle class, capitalists, etc. To balance the poor prostitutes, there are rich ones. If there are common soldiers, there are also generals, and all the intermediary ranks. It would, then, have been much more simple to observe that Zola desired to collect in his work all the categories of society, but they preferred to label him as the appointed novelist of one class alone, and in that as merely an observer of instincts.

To demonstrate that the work of Zola was founded upon an error, they urged against him that he had brought the theory of heredity into the programme of "Rougon-Macquart, the Natural and Social History of a Family under the Second Empire." They objected that science did not affirm the absolute truth of the theory of heredity. That is true, but this theory is an hypothesis by the aid of which we can classify, group, and explain a certain number of facts. It is not, consequently, devoid of value, and the novelist had the right to bring his observations and even his intuitions, to the support of a fruitful idea, in spite of the fact that his applications may often have been doubtful, ill-understood, and poorly defined; Zola simply made himself, at his own risk, the representative of a still little-known theory, but this did not by any means play the main part in his work.

Zola was a man of system, but this man of system asserted himself chiefly in his manifestoes, in his persistence, in assuming to be the representative of a genre, the founder and head of a school. When he left his position of critic to take up his work as novelist, he was apt to forget the rules that he had just been imposing. He allowed himself, then, to be carried away by his writer's temperament, by his sensitive imagination. He himself outran the limits which he had laid down and gave free rein to the dreamy fancies, the spirit of description, and the sentimental eloquence which are incontestably his own.

His work seems based upon the theory of heredity, and it is in fact so, if one considers the genealogical tree published at the head of the eighth volume of the series, "*Une page d'amour*," and again published at the head of the twentieth and last volume, "*Le Docteur Pascal*." But, in spite of this tree and the names which its branches bear, we are, indeed, forced to perceive that the characters designated by these names are not everything, and that they are even of little account, as soon as the novel, in which they play their part, has got under way. Immediately we see acting upon them the influences of environment quite as much as the influences of heredity. We must, then, represent Zola as attaching exactly as much importance to the theory of environment. Or rather, the surroundings of nature and the social surroundings are truly predominant, and from this fact comes another reproach, that he has not represented any struggle between the elements presented: the will of man and the natural and social forces which oppose themselves to his ambition, to his conquest, or simply to his development, to the growth of his faculties, the manifestation of his emotions and of his passions. There is to be sure, they are forced to concede, the struggle of the inherited instincts against the influences placed beyond the individual and which make up the surroundings. Let there be adaptation or expulsion, victory or defeat, with this individual the combat exists with its vicissitudes and its uncertainty, and it must be recognized that what we call man's will has its necessary part in the action and the result.

This will, Zola did not and could not deny. He was himself too striking an example of what it can accomplish when it is aided by patience and tenacity. It is merely a question here, as always, of agreeing upon a definition; it is true, however, that there is nothing more difficult than to reach such an agreement. The debate upon the will is thus summed up: some affirm that man is free, while others believe that they can see he is not. One must, in this case, push the affirmation to its limit and decide whether or not nature is free. But the partisans of man's freedom, if they are forced to admit the non-liberty of nature,

none the less venture to separate man from the rest of the universe and come to the conclusion that he depends only on himself, that he judges and decides by virtue of the conscience which is in him, and which distinguishes him, not merely from the so-called inanimate nature, but from all animate nature, from the living cell up to but not including man.

Zola did not see this line of demarcation. He belonged with those for whom life presents itself without any solution of continuity. The most admirable type, that which can best manifest the presence of a conscient individual, is united thus to the whole of existence by the infinite chain of beings and of things. The conscient man, however inflexible beneath social hostility he may show himself to be, however clear-seeing, absolute, resisting the natural fatalities, is a product like the inconscient man, and also, as the definition implies, a factor of action born to create more and more the conscient state in humanity. I have said, just now, that Zola was a will. What ever one may think of the manner in which he manifested himself, and whether one were his ally or his adversary in the crisis wherein France struggled and wherein he took part, he proved that he was also a conscience, or, if one prefers, according to the expression of Anatole France, "a monument of the human conscience." I do not see wherein he is made smaller because he thought he was not free to act otherwise than as he did.

They used to say, too, that Zola was solely the novelist of the vicious and of the mean; though it were so, and it is not, one must then class under the rubric evil, every case, without exception, which is separate from strict and fair uprightness. We are obliged to observe many shades in vice and in virtue. Perhaps Zola did not take sufficient account of the neutral mass which serves to relieve the exceptions of all kinds. There is an uprightness which one might call inactive, the kind, if you like, which was no story, or that knows how to dissimulate its story, by dint of prudence, of foresight, of laziness, or of its way of being merely negative. It is hard, to be sure, as has been said once and again, to make an affecting tale out of the absolute calm of existences wherein are merely the sorrows and misfortunes common to all, borne with resignation, misery, and labor, accepted without rebellion, and death as the conclusion of it all. The novels of Zola have not, however, that monotony of which they have been accused, since they are not made up of such observations but, on the contrary, are impelled by actions and reactions of every kind. Besides, if it is inexact to say that his story of the "Rougon-Macquarts" contains no honest men to oppose to the criminals, no wise men to oppose to the fools, no tranquil natures to oppose to the impassioned, it is necessary, further, to note here that the last series of

books which he undertook and which he left unfinished, that of the "Quatre Evangiles," was made up of dreams of happiness wherein man is shown virtuous and perfectible. It is true that "Fécondité" and "Travail," the first two volumes of this series, have been, very naturally, treated as "berquinades" (insipid moral tales) by the same people who accused Zola of blackening and corrupting humanity.

Such are some of the points which have been insisted upon one after the other to throw light upon the literary action of Emile Zola. I cannot, naturally, collect all the criticisms which have been expressed. The mass of writing upon Zola, is, as every one knows, considerable. I do not make any quotations because of the present impossibility of collecting them in sufficient quantity. I wished merely to sum up a few of the aspects of the criticism brought to bear upon Zola's books. I wished to bring out that it was more especially a question of polemics, and that their special pleading was undeniable. That does not prevent me in the least from knowing and from saying that if there were a number of errors committed, and a wilful disregard of the real significance of Zola's work, there were also many just surveys, many scholarly analyses and judgments. Only, I think it is not enough to be right on one point, but that it is necessary, too, after having noted and analyzed the details, to forget, so to speak, all that one has observed on the way, in order to measure the length and the general effect of the road one has gone over. Before a work of the mass and extent of that of Zola, a due perspective is necessary if one would be just.

If we take up, with this desire, the criticisms already examined, we shall perhaps come to receive a clearer and truer idea of the personality of this novelist.

Like every artist, like every writer, like every man who thinks, Emile Zola accepted or underwent certain influences. It has been said that he will not take a place among the French classics. He will not, indeed, do so directly. Emile Zola was a man of his time, a man of the nineteenth century. If he felt the effects of the thought and the action of the classic writers, he felt them through others, his predecessors and his contemporaries, under whose immediate influence he was. Many writers acted upon Zola, who is not at all an isolated phenomenon, a literary monstrosity. Does this species exist at all? We must not forget that he is a novelist and that his reading was especially in the novelistic category, which does not date from today. But, to keep to the writers nearest him, those whom he certainly knew and read the most, must we not name Balzac, Hugo, Théophile Gautier, Flaubert, and the Goncourts? And if one went on to seek for each of these, what they had helped to

form of sensibility, of intelligence, and of talent, one would probably reread Zola for the totality of French literature and also for certain currents of foreign literature.

I will leave the consideration of the influence of style and of subjects exercised upon Zola by Gautier, Flaubert, and the Goncourts, and will confine myself to the examples of Balzac and Hugo.

It cannot be denied, it seems to me, that there is a tie which unites the author of the "*Comédie humaine*" to the French classics of the seventeenth century. He has their precision, their philosophy, their conclusions. Like them, he defines characters in the struggle with life, like them, he analyzes emotions. He differs from them in this way, that he fills by his definiteness and amplitude the rôle of historian, and it is by that, in turn, that Zola is connected with Balzac. Zola continues the history of manners which Balzac began, and he brings to it, in his turn, a new vision imposed by the movements of humanity in our own times. To deny the presence of individualities and of characters in Zola's work would be futile. It were better to recognize the fact that they are there, but that they show themselves in a peculiar way and that they are shut in by new elements.

Take up no matter what book of Zola's and you will find in it distinctive beings, living and acting in their own fashion, filled with some dominant emotion, having an aim, an ambition, an end, bringing every energy into play to realize their desire for power, for money, science, art, or love. The list would be a long one, but we must at least, distinguish the financier of the "*Curée*," the priest of the "*Conquête de Plassans*," the minister of "*Son excellence Eugène Rougon*," the artist of "*L'œuvre*," among those whose clearly defined character, strongly accentuated personality, and permanent state of combativity it is difficult to dispute. And I do not believe that their combativity is exercised merely against the obstacles which are set in the way of their forward march. If this one is a brutal combatant, that other is an unhappy one, always doubtful, distrustful of self, and all, taken together, are studied in every alternation of action and reaction against their own nature.

Here we may perhaps essay a definition of Zola's distinctive psychology. He would not admit that he was a psychologist. "Who says psychologist," he wrote, "says traitor to the truth." He meant by that that it is impossible to give the complete truth if one limits one's self to the mental study of a being isolated for experiment, outside of the environment in which it lives, and without taking account of its temperament, of its blood, of its nerves, of its health, of its whole psychological being. Zola accordingly proscribed pure cerebral analysis, or rather, the

examination of a problem of emotion, of passion, of morals, such as one may arbitrarily incarnate in a fictitious character. Nothing is to be proscribed, and a study of this kind may be the result of long observation and of a long experience of life. The writer must remain master of the form of his art, and we have to ask of him only beauty and emotion in his tale. But this emotion and this beauty can only be produced by human truth and if these are found in a work of pure psychology, that work stands the test.

But that Zola, head of a school, bound by a programme, thus pronounced absolute judgments, is no reason why the same method should be applied to him. To proscribe or deny his own psychology, under the pretext that he denied all psychological operations, would serve for nothing. It would be much better to see how far he was a psychologist, and by what means he expressed the mentality of his characters. I do not take one book rather than another. It would be easy with the "*Joie de vivre*," with "*Docteur Pascal*," with the "*Trois Villes*," which have the same character for their hero, the Abbé Pierre Froment, it would be easy, I say, to show that Zola could conceive and execute books which are almost purely a mental analysis. But no, it is better to note even though it may provoke astonishment and incredulity, that Zola almost constantly exhibited the psychology of a dramatic writer. I know that he passed for a man who merely made a few attempts for the stage, and I know, as every one knows, that the plays avowed and signed by him, were not thought fit to live and have not, in fact, lived. The verdicts of the theatre are not, however, beyond appeal, and if "*Les Héritiers Rabourdin*" and "*Le Bouton de Rose*" are really only the exercises of an obstinate writer who wanted to apply his will to subjects beyond his ability, we may yet believe that there is a more assured right of occupancy on the stage for "*René*" and especially for "*Thérèse Raquin*." But these do not constitute all of Zola's plays. It is no longer a secret for any one, even if it was ever a secret at all, that Zola was the principal author of the plays taken from his novels and signed with the name of William Busnach, "*L'Assommoir*," "*Nana*," "*Le Ventre de Paris*," "*Pot-Bouille*," "*Germinal*." These are Zola's real theatrical attempts; I mean that in them he is not tied down by anything, and gives free rein to his nature, his skill, and his desire to compose a play of real life. Many of the scenes in these five plays are, indeed, exceedingly alive, even though as a whole they surpass the limits of dramatic convention and of popular poetry. And yet there is one among these five plays, "*Pot-Bouille*," which is not far from being a masterpiece, the drama, amusing and bitter, of the pretty "*bourgeois*," a play which is

truly, with all its strength, its crudity, its violent drawing, its rapid and profound action, one of the race plays of our times that has a Molièresque character.

Then, some one will reply, why was not Zola a playwright? He was, in fact, not so, but no less than was his master, Balzac, because one man's life is not enough for everything, and Zola was a novelist. If he could have lived a second life, perhaps he would have given himself to writing for the stage. Did he not say to a reporter a little while before his death that as soon as he should have finished the "*Quatre Evangiles*," he would devote himself definitely to dramatic art?

If Zola was a novelist, I think it is easy to see that he was, like Balzac, a playwright in the novel, and that the novel gave him free scope to show that he possessed in their entirety the taste and the significance of the theatre. Each one of his books is a drama, with its great divisions, its scenes, its great parts, its lay figures, and its stage settings. He worked according to well defined plans, he strove for regularity and system, he gathered up his notes in sets of pigeonholes prepared beforehand. The form of his books, so supple, so smooth as it became afterwards, in spite of the mass to be involved within it, did not go beyond the original outline. Zola, who had fixed methods of procedure, laid especial stress on composition, order, clearness, and a cleanly defined course. That is not the whole of theatrical writing, but it is a theatrical form, and if the novelist could have become a dramatic author, no doubt he would have brought upon the stage his stylistic form, at once massive and episodic, the same continuity, and the same divisions.

But since we are speaking of theatrical psychology, we must linger no longer over the form. Let us observe the people who come and go, who speak and act through Zola's descriptions. If the novelist does not exhibit their inner individuality by analysis, this individuality is ceaselessly exhibiting itself in the attitudes, gestures, words, and action. It is active psychology. With these characters in the novels, as with living people, we may make out the most complete analyses of the nature of their thoughts, of their dominant preoccupations, of their desires and their inhibitions, of all that constitutes their inner life. Balzac draws their outer life and explains the inner life. With Zola, this second operation is lacking, and yet we cannot conclude that the inner life is absent. Zola demands that we should divine it through acts and words of the characters, and there, in its highest degree, is theatrical psychology.

I have said that these characters manifested themselves in a certain way and that they were surrounded by new elements. At the same time with his individuals, Zola studied groups and classes, not only in their

fundamental organization, but in their times of trouble and in the tumult of social crises. I am not comparing Zola and Balzac but if it were necessary to characterize them, I should find in Balzac a deep penetration into the knowledge of human individuality, and then, quite naturally, I am brought to see that Zola put into his work the collective elements of which I have just spoken, and which had not yet had their life expressed in a work of art.

If we take up, after Balzac, the example of Hugo, we shall find that the latter exercised a very great and constant influence upon Zola. This influence is double. It acts upon his style, for Hugo was, undoubtedly, the greatest creator in the century of picturesque and artistic language. As he said himself, he set his book words at liberty, and gave them all a relief, a color, a power, a grace, an emotion, which made them appear new, as if there had been a sudden springtime for them, full of fresh green, and sunshine. Hugo drew his strength a little from everywhere, from Spain and Germany, from William Shakespeare, from the stories of his travels, and from the dialect vocabularies. But he was not for all that, an accident, a break in French literature. If he did not himself have his books directly in the classical literature of the seventeenth century, he sprang from Rabelais and the picturesque stylists of the sixteenth century, from whom derive Corneille and Molière, and he found the feeling of nature, closer to him, in Rousseau, Chateaubriand, and Lamartine.

Zola, especially in the first part of his work, was a disciple of Hugo, an artist abounding in words, making a visible effort to give the exact sensation of things, as it were, the idea of their real presence, their form, color, and odor. This effort at realism is so clear that we need not insist upon it in the first volumes: "La Fortune des Rougon," "La Curée," "Le Ventre de Paris." The fourth volume of the history of the "Rougon-Macquarts," the "Conquête de Plassans," is an exception and is executed in a precise manner which has for its precedent the manner of "Thérèse Raquin," but this style in "La Conquête de Plassans" is given, also, a coloring in harmony with the theme, which is the story of the long struggle for supremacy at Plassans finally achieved by Abbé Fangas. It is a sober, naked book, a stage setting of phrases slightly accentuated, concentrated, of transparent words, the true dwelling for the ambition of a priest, the equivalent of whitewashed walls, rooms with little furniture, a few images, a crucifix, and the quiet light of the church, the sacristy, and the reception room. Immediately after, comes "La Faute de l'Abbé Mouret," in which Zola returns to abundance and luxuriance of phrase, to lyrical description of a nature in full vigor and full flower, to the intoxication of colors and of perfumes.

His talent, up to this time, was still unformed and seeking for its right expression, in spite of its beautiful developments and strong actualities. Later, he found its positive manifestation in "L'Assommoir," and gave in that book, his first masterpiece. Zola, this time, invented a style for himself, and a style which we must still qualify as psychological, for it allies itself closely to the inner nature, the habitual conceptions of the characters, and reproduces by the manner of narration and the detail of analysis, the state of mind and the complete being of the individuals whom the novelist desires to portray. Hereafter, this was to be Zola's manner, whether we think of "Nana" or "Pot-Bouille," the novel of the prostitute or the novel of the pretty "bourgeoise," of "Au Bonheur des Dames" or "La Joie de Vivre," the novel of immense commerce or the philosophical novel of life and death, of "Germinal" or "L'œuvre," the social novel of the mines or the story of the search for art, "La Terre" or "Le Rêve," the novel of bestiality or the novel of mysticism, of "La Bête humaine," "L'Argent," "La Débâcle" or "Le Docteur Pascal," novels of crime, of financial speculation, of war, and of scientific research.

And in the same way, the "Rougon-Macquart" series once finished, Zola continues through " Lourdes," "Rome," "Paris," which form the trilogy of "Les Trois Villes," through "Fécondité," "Travail," "Vérité," the first three volumes of the series of "Les Quatre Evangiles"; interrupted by his death, Zola continues, with greater and greater simplicity, sometimes with too much rapidity and unrestraint, to write in a style which is, with carefully weighed amalgamation, at once the form of the author's thought and the form of the thought of the character portrayed.

Intervals of lyric writing and of picturesque descriptions are not, however, absent from the story, but the first are rarer and the second shorter than before. One might say that Zola's will and tenacity had mastered the tendency which was within him, which he believed invincible, and which he so often deplored. Truly, if he did not entirely suppress the romanticism within him, which was quite impossible, at least he diminished it in considerable proportions. He could feel the satisfaction of having partly escaped from Hugo, the great creator of literary style in the nineteenth century.

What remained with Zola, was the haunting taste for the "Hugolesque" construction. What the poet did, from the beginning, with "Notre Dame de Paris," by his conception of a cathedral which was as it were a living being, Zola did in almost all his books (it has often been remarked) he, too, constructing his "cathedral" in the markets of "Ventre de Paris," the park of "La Faute de l'Abbé Mouret," the tavern of

"L'Assommoir," the apartment-house of "Pot-Bouille, the great store of "Au Bonheur des Dames," the sea of "La Joie de Vivre," the mine of "Germinal," the fields of "La Terre," the church of "Le Rêve," the exchange of "L'Argent," and the army of "La Débâcle." In these conceptions we find again the pantheism of Victor Hugo. But Hugo, incomparable as poet of the elements, the observer who could be fine and delicate in shading, without losing any of his power, when he created the less important characters of his novels and dramas, yet wandered very far away from the truth and from humanity when he enlarged and inflated the principal heroes of his epic. Now, though Zola was truer than Hugo, from this point of view, and all through his story of the "Rougon-Macquarts," while keeping his desire to be exact, does not hesitate to humble man and show him the slave of physiological infirmities and of the violence of his passions; yet, at the end of his work, he allies himself with Hugo and in his turn enlarges and exalts mankind. A rapid survey will show us how the change took place within him and the road over which he passed.

What is the story of the Rougon-Macquart family? Zola himself will tell us, with the help of the story of "Le Docteur Pascal." The scholar of the family, who has collected files of papers upon all his relatives, thus sums up these files which correspond to Zola's novels:—

" 'Ah,' he cried once more, still pointing to the files, 'there is a world, a society, and a civilization; life itself is there, with its manifestations of good and evil, in the fire and forging which bears everything onward. What a confused and dreadful mass, what tender and what terrible adventures, what joys, what sufferings piled pell-mell in this colossal mass of facts! * * * There is pure history, the Empire founded in blood, at first seeking enjoyment and harshly arbitrary, conquering rebellious cities, then slipping into a slow disorganization, sinking in blood, in such a sea of blood that the whole nation came near drowning in it. * * * There are social studies, commerce great and small, prostitution, crime, agriculture, finance, the bourgeois, the people, those who grow rotten in the sewer of the faubourgs, those who rebel in the great industrial centres, are that upstart growth of sovereign socialism, heavy with the labor-pains of the new century. * * * There are simple human studies, intimate pages, the story of love, the struggle of the mind and of the heart against unjust nature, the crushing of those who cry out under their too-heavy burden, the cry of self-sacrificing kindness, conquering pain. * * * There is fantasy, the flight of imagination outside of reality, immense gardens flowering at all seasons, cathedrals with their delicate spires exquisitely wrought, marvelous stories fallen straight from Paradise, ideal tendernesses that mount up to Heaven in a kiss. * * * It is all there, the good and the bad, the vulgar and the sublime, flowers and mud, sobs and laughter, the very torrent of life endlessly sweeping on Humanity.' "

What Dr. Pascal does not say, and what Zola does not say either, what, it is true, neither one nor the other had occasion to say, is that this

story, which is the balance sheet of an entire society, is also a piece of special pleading from one end to the other. Zola wished to know and to tell everything of human action, but he followed avowedly a pessimistic programme, for he published this programme in the very beginning, and it involved not merely the story of the degeneracy of a whole family, as the result of an initial nervous disease, but further, the study of the decadence of the society of the Second Empire, with the "coup d'état" as the starting point and Sedan as the goal. That would be enough to explain the pessimism of Zola's work, even if there were not life with all its ignominies, its pains, and its sorrows.

But let us see Zola's conclusion. He does not shut the door upon hope, he has confidence in the unforeseen and in the forces of life. You remember that after Dr. Pascal is dead, a child is born who is his child, the last of the Rougons. This is what Clotilde, his mother, thinks as she bends over him, watching him, Clotilde, to whom the novelist entrusts the mission of concluding his work:—

"After so many terrible Rougons, after so many abominable Macquarts, there was born one more. Life did not fear to create still another, in brave defiance of its eternity. She pursued her work, propagating according to her laws, indifferent to hypotheses, pressing on for her infinite labor. At the risk of shaping monsters, she must still create, since, in spite of the sick and the fools that she created, she is not weary of creating, hoping, no doubt, that the healthy and the wise will come some day. Life, the life that flows in torrents, that begins again and again its movement towards the unknown goal, life in which we bathe, life with its infinite and contrary currents, always in flux and vast, like a limitless sea!

"A burst of maternal fervor rose in Clotilde's heart, happy at feeling the little hungry mouth ceaselessly drinking. It was a prayer, an invocation! To the unknown child, as to an unknown God! To the child who would live tomorrow, to the genius, perhaps, who had been born, to the Messiah for whom the oncoming century was waiting, who would draw the people out of their doubt and suffering! Since the nation had to be made over had he not come for that work? He would take up the experiment, would raze barriers, would restore certainty to groping humanity, would build the city of justice whose sole law of labor would assure happiness. * * *

"She herself was hope. A mother who suckles her child, is not that the image of a world maintained and saved? She bent over him, looking into his limpid eyes, which opened happy, seeking the light. What was he saying, this little child, for whom she felt her heart throb beneath the breast that he was draining? What good tidings was he announcing with the gentle suction of his mouth? For what cause would he give his blood, when he should be a man, strong with all the milk that he would have drunk? Perhaps he said nothing, perhaps he was lying already, and yet she was so happy, so full of absolute confidence in him! * * * And in the warm silence, in the lonely peace of this workroom Clotilde smiled at her child, who kept on drinking, his little arms waving in the air, raised like a flag of challenge to life."

This is Zola's starting point in the elaboration of the second part of

his work. "Les Trois Villes" relates the travels of the Abbé Pierre Froment in search of truth. There are three stages: Lourdes and superstition, Rome and the power of the Church, Paris and the world of work. The titles of the volumes which were to form the whole of "Les Quatre Evangiles" have a clear significance: "Fécondité," "Travail," "Vérité," "Justice." Every one knows how, in the first two volumes, Zola enlarged his field as novelist and extended the action of his characters. He, the realist, the theorist of the experimental novel, did not hesitate to transform his realism into a dream and to carry his experience even to a Utopia. Surely this is well calculated to show the inanity of systems and the absolute right of the artist to use, as he will, the elements with which reality furnishes him. Zola, moreover, in his later books, does not deform life; he opens for it endless perspectives, he strives to discover in it a logic of progress and of happiness, he foretells a future humanity which will benefit by all the faults, all the crimes, all the woes of the humanity of yesterday and of today. The novel thus conceived becomes the declaration and the exaltation of an idea, a method of popular education, an immense fresco in which the artist strives to trace clearly, in strong lines and with harmonious colors, the future that loving hearts and just minds have power to create.

If the first part of Zola's work is pessimistic, the last part of his work is optimistic, although, as I have already said, the conclusion of "Le Docteur Pascal" and one might add, the conclusion of "La Débâcle," prevents a solution of continuity between the two periods. We might even go back further and observe that before "L'Assommoir," Zola cares especially for artistic effect, and that after "L'Assommoir," he abandons himself completely to the spirit of social criticism, and to the desire for justice for all, which induce him to write "Germinal" and which finally bring him to "Les Trois Villes" and "Les Quatre Evangiles," which were written to state, not only the great problems of the social world, but the higher problems of the moral world, and to solve them through kindness and justice.

It is certain that these books belong to the class of problem novels, at least in their contrasts and conclusion. The novelist tells what is and what ought to be; he leaves the society of today to dream of the society of tomorrow. But not for that does he interrupt his action. He makes use of the same surroundings, the same characters, and without the gap of an entr'act, he changes the scene, and leaves the sad reality for a glimpse of a possible future. Properly speaking, these are social fairy tales.

If we turn from Zola's novels to his critical works, we complete the verification of his personality; we shall see him, as in his creative and imaginative works, greedy for the truth, ceaselessly searching, feeling an ardent and feverish need to carry his inquiry further. I leave his theories aside. Theories are doubtless necessary for the activity of man's mind, to serve his feverish need for knowledge, but Zola's theories would necessitate a special work since they embrace all kinds of artistic production, all conditions of artistic work, all the relations of art to the social state. Let it suffice here to signal out the fixed points and the developments of Zola's thought, in the collections of his critical and polemical studies. Perhaps, then, we shall see with more certainty the outline of the path which joins in the writer as well as in the man, the starting point to the goal.

In the beginning, on the very cover of the first book of literary and artistic talks, "*Mes Haines*," we read these few epigraphic lines, "If you ask me what I am come to do in this world, I, an artist, I should answer you: I am come to live on the heights." Later, the preface thus justifies the title: "To hate, that is to love, to feel one's soul warm and generous, to live largely in the contempt of shameful and stupid things. * * * I feel that I am younger and more courageous after each one of my revolts against the platitudes of my age. I have made hatred and pride my two guests, I am pleased to isolate myself and in my isolation, to hate whatever injures the just and the true. If I stand for anything today, it is because I am alone and because I hate." Do not forget that Zola was twenty-five when he wrote "*Mes Haines*." Later, his style will grow simple, he will work ceaselessly to eliminate all declamation, but he will keep his lyric soul, and especially will he remain the lonely and passionate man that he was in the days of his youth.

It is his profession of faith, in 1866, which we have just recalled. The following year, in 1867, he published his criticism and defence of Edouard Manet, which was the sequel to a sensational "*Salon*," a series of articles cut short by the "*Figaro*" amid the insults and threats of its subscribers. This defence of Edouard Manet, or rather this spirited analysis of the painter of "*Olympia*," then standing almost alone against every one, is characteristic of Zola's mind. The strange thing about it is, as Zola often told me, that he thought Manet's art incomplete and summary, in absolute disagreement with his own taste for composition and equilibrium. That makes no difference, however; he goes instinctively towards him whom the whole world mocked, he inquires into the reasons of this jeering and of the public wrath, and he finds, as is almost always the case, a man who thinks freely, and who does his

work in all simplicity, with the means that belong to him, and without caring to please by any conventionality or affectation. Zola was right in regard to Manet, who is today considered a master of a school both delicate and strong. His pictures shocked the observer, because they did not resemble others and that was all. The very wise and well measured analysis of them given by Zola was considered also as folly, and that need not surprise. Here was a serious assault upon the painter and his critic, and we may note already the evident pleasure that inspired Zola when he sets himself thus in opposition to public opinion. Yet, if he has the pride of fighting alone, he has also the hope of convincing. In Manet's case he saw, in time, his effort understood and rewarded, and even surpassed, for a generation has come which brings its homage and complete admiration to Manet and the picture of "Olympia" is at the Luxembourg, awaiting the Louvre.

It was very natural that afterwards, taking up theatrical criticism with the special purpose of evolving from it the programme which he believed useful for what he called his "bataille," Zola should come to a very frank discussion of the authors in vogue and to join issue with the verdict of popular success.

So, too, with his criticism of the contemporary novel, which excited such outbursts of wrath to which Zola replied ingeniously that he believed he had the right to frankness, he, who had always been treated with brutality. All was not just in his distributions of praise and of blame, but I am merely seeking here the proofs of an invincible tendency to express his thought without reticence, no matter how many tempests such publication might raise.

In 1882, when he published his articles, "Une Campagne," Zola explained himself in these words: "You will find, in my seven volumes of criticism, only the continual development of the same idea but better and better supported. The man, who, last year, at forty-one, published the articles, 'Une Campagne,' is still the one, who, at twenty-five, wrote 'Mes Haines.' The method has remained the same, and the aim and the faith. It is not for me to decide whether I have shed any light, but I can state that I have always desired light by the same means and with the same demand for truth." And he adds: "They have reproached me for my passion. It is true, I am a passionate man, and I must often have been unjust. Therein lies my fault, even if my passion is high, freed from all the meanness which has been attributed to it. But, I confess further, I would not give my passion for the complaisant old fogeyism and miserable cringing of others. * * * To feel the constant and overwhelming necessity to cry aloud what you think, especially when you

are alone in thinking it, even though one mars the joys of life! That is what my passion has been; I am all covered with the blood of it, but I love it and if I am worth anything, it is through that, and that alone."

I could multiply examples and quotations but in this rapid review is it not enough to point to the logical action of Zola intervening in the Dreyfus affair? It were easy to smile when he spoke, concerning literature, in a bitter, almost tragic manner, of his love for the truth, his isolation, and his passion. They did wrong to smile. Zola was revealing a true sincerity and a true suffering. That was made clear when he obeyed the same irresistible need to cry aloud his thought and when he threw himself into the struggle on the day he was convinced of the innocence of Alfred Dreyfus. Zola had remained a man of letters but a man of letters who was much interested in social questions; condemning politics, it is true, but later recognizing that he had failed to see in them a great means of action. He had already taken his stand against anti-Semitism, and he had only to follow the natural bent of his mind, when, in 1897, the Senator Scheurer-Kestner raised the question of the trial of 1894. Take up his book, "*La Vérité en Marche*," wherein Zola collected all his writings, all his acts of this period. You will find the writer still himself, like, at sixty years, to the young man making his début in letters, to the novelist who wanted to tell the whole truth, to the defender of Edouard Manet, and to the critic of the theatre and of literature, who affirmed his convictions by the keenest polemic. As usual, he stands alone against all, and as usual, he wants to convince. But his mind is modified in this, that he believes, on such a subject, it is easier to convince. He tells himself that it is no longer a question of art, or of æsthetics, but of facts to be pointed out, of certain errors to be demonstrated. Consequently, it will be enough to speak and every one will listen. Consequently, it will be enough for him to shed abroad the light and every one will see clearly. Zola wrote, at the end of his first article upon the revelations of Scheurer-Kestner: "If, for political reasons, they wished that justice should be delayed, this would be a new mistake which would merely hold back the inevitable dénouement, and further aggravate it. The truth is on the march, and nothing will stop it."

Nothing did stop it, in fact, and it will continue its march after the check which, on account of the amnesty, followed the verdict of the court martial at Rennes. Zola did not live long enough to know the end. But who of us will know it? Perhaps all the actors and spectators of the tragedy will have disappeared before the last word is spoken, perhaps this word will only be pronounced by History. On that day, the stern Muse who utters definite judgments will remember that a man

of letters left his work, in the fulness of wealth, success, and glory, to struggle, almost alone against the world, to save an innocent man, and that he did it to obey his conscience and to serve the truth.

And all this life, forty years of uninterrupted labor, a literary life at once most worthy and most upright, a work whose violence and bitterness were born of kindness and of pity, a most zealous and far-seeing civic courage, all that is destroyed by a stupid accident. Emile Zola died in full health, in full vigor, and in full work. I saw him many times when I was making my début in Parisian journalism, when, with Edmond de Goncourt and Alphonse Daudet, he formed that trio of novelists towards whom were turned the sympathies, the admiration of the youth of that time. I saw him in Paris, on the rue Bathe, where he received his friends on Thursdays. I saw him at Médan where I went in company with Henry Céarce and sometimes with Huysmans, and it was there, I think, that one needed to see Zola, in order to know the kindly and affectionate man who timidly hid his real self beneath an anxious air, which many so wrongly thought proud and contemptuous. I saw him, at the time of the Dreyfus affair, when he cast his pen into the falsified balance of justice. I saw him, one day, in the fog of London, when he had found it necessary to seek refuge for his person and his thoughts. And I have always known, not the man of common opinions, but a simple man, attentive to everything that was brought to his notice, doubtless very conscious of his strength and of his position, but not in the least infatuated with his talent and his success, on the contrary, always restless, constantly seeking to learn and understand more. Zola loved difficulties, his combative temperament forced him at every instant into the struggle to reply to the verdicts pronounced against him, to defend and explain his philosophical theories and his artistic methods, and also to attack the tendencies and theories of his adversaries. And since I have intermingled with these pages a few notes upon the man and his character, I should like to add that there was in him a most generous force of illusion. I think that this will be the opinion of every one who saw him at the time of the Dreyfus affair. There is no doubt that he believed he would be immediately followed by the majority of his fellow citizens. He had such a love of the truth, such a confidence in the demonstration of its evidence, that he believed it was enough to address himself to every one, with all the heat of conviction and the science of reasoning in order to be understood. He was far out in his reckoning. Later, he was understood by many, and the number of those who admired him and praised him for his generous intervention was great enough to prevent complete iniquity, and to permit France to recover possession of herself.

Zola, however, was stupefied in seeing his action misunderstood, and had the sorrow of seeing it perverted and defiled by those who did not even fear to outrage the memory of his father, in order to punish him, the son, for having obeyed his conscience and done his duty. He was forced to realize the violence of hatred and the passive opposition of ignorance. But he was not discouraged; he set himself again to work, that great remedy for so many evils. He continued his writing, and it was then that he undertook the series of "Les Quatre Evangiles."

In conclusion, and to sum up these notes upon the literary style and the thought of Zola, if the writer desired to codify art, to impose the law of realism, to apply a fixed rule to works which are individual expressions, he gave, by way of compensation, an example of self-emancipation by being often faithless to his programme and even, toward the close, by modifying this programme from end to end.

He was the historian, the chronicler of a society, in spite of inevitable anachronisms, since he applied his observations of today to a society of yesterday, that of the Second Empire. However, we may remark that, in spite of the breach caused by the war, the greater part of the social forms of the Second Empire were in existence at the time when Zola took his notes and wrote his novels.

He did not, therefore, give us absolutely "historic" fiction, he gave us mixed fiction, a blending of observation and reconstruction.

He created especially representative groups. He is the novelist of the struggle of the classes, the descriptive poet of democracy, of society as universal suffrage has made it. He forbids himself the abstract psychology of the heart and brain, studied solely among the rich, who are isolated from life, and he goes to seek his characters in a full social environment; he takes account of particular mode of being, of education, of profession, and of the part that money plays, which had already been brought so prominently forward by Balzac.

He sometimes watches the environment which he wishes to describe, only for a few weeks, a few months. Then he uses all the information that comes to him, his notes from reading and an amassing of printed material. But he has a prodigious visual memory which permits him to carry in the *camera obscura* of his brain, the whole region that he has surveyed, visited, or studied, and he had the faculty of transforming his notes, of creating according to them, and of turning his documents into living material. He transforms, also, his vigorous observation, and in spite of the number of accumulated details he works only with the whole in view. A programme and a purpose, that is what one finds in every novel of Zola's.

His influence was twofold, good and bad, as is the case with almost everything; I look back to the fable of the tongue as explained by Æsop to his master. Certain people have seen in Zola's books only crude details and scenes of lubricity, to which they have attributed his great success. There was certainly in these a reason for curiosity and for sales and, naturally, there were speculators found to seek the same success by the same methods and by these methods alone. Hence the overflow of obscene literature which continues even to this day. On the other hand, in justice to Zola, we must assert that people have been gravely mistaken in his intentions, that he sought the whole truth and that he told it, that he sought to give to temperament its whole place in the history of man. In fact, sufficient account was not taken, before Balzac and his followers, of the physiological man, and Zola continues that diagnosis by literary physicians which Flaubert and the Goncourts had undertaken.

He has often been accused of giving too great space to sensuality; it has been asserted that he defiled love by descriptions of infirmities of the flesh and the terrors of childbirth. This idea of soilure never entered into his thought, and it should not enter the thought of any one. The mystery of life must not be sullied by any equivocation, love is not debauchery, and maternity stands forth glorious and pure with all its sufferings. That Zola could secure the acceptance of these truths, will not be the least of his claims to glory. So much the worse for those who mistake them. His novel, "Fécondité," has, furthermore, given definite proof of his intentions. As for the pages that bring lubricity so violently upon the scene, though it is unjust to reproach Zola for the ignominious and base facts of life, it is right, also, to reprove the insistence on them and the excess which he has allowed himself, and my conclusion upon this point is that the artist must and can tell all without exhibiting all.

This said, Zola's strength appears great, and it also appears complete. His strength was not in his system but in the element of truth there was in it. And he had the glory of carrying out logically in action, this will for truth asserted by his work.

The composer of this work, the pitiless critic of the feudal "bourgeois" of the nineteenth century, the author of *L'Assommoir* and of "Germinal," of "La Débâcle" and of "Travail," the novelist of multitudes decimated by misery and suffering, by alcohol and the mine, by the machine shop and war, the poet of poor people, of simple hearts, of the resigned and the rebellious, may sleep his last sleep in peace. Not only did he conduct with logic, probity, and conscience, his work as a writer, his quest as historian of customs and manners, but he also knew

how to act after having written, to rise up, almost alone against all, to pluck back from an unjust sentence pronounced against him, a man reprobated and accursed; he devoted himself to save an existence. By that memorable act, "J'accuse," Zola played an historical part and in this character men will see him always.

In that he put his spirit to the test, he certified the writer by the man of action, he showed what was the source of inspiration within him, he asserted the unity of his conscience. He did his part as a good and great workman in the work of Humanity.

DUCHESS AMALIA OF WEIMAR

BENJAMIN W. WELLS, PH. D.

NEW YORK

“**S**MALL, indeed, among Germany’s princes is mine; narrow and small is his land, moderate only his power,” so wrote Goethe of Karl August, Amalia’s son, in words whose deprecation was itself a gracious tribute to the magnanimous prince, whose little duchy had become the Athens of Germany in the classic age of her literature. But that Karl August had either the desire or the ability to make of Weimar what it became in the last quarter of the eighteenth, and the first decade of the nineteenth century, was due in a great measure to his mother, who had conceived this generous ambition for the land of her adoption, and during the years of her wise regency, had laid the foundations of its cultural preëminence. Even as late as 1782, Wieland could write, “Up to now the dowager duchess has been our great helper. Without her Weimar would have sunk into as insignificant, wearisome, and soul-destroying a nest as any in Germany.”

This remarkable woman is hardly less interesting in her personality than for her achievement. Pathetic in her girlhood, admirable in her youthful regency, praiseworthy in her genial maturity, pitifully tragic in her end, she beckons to the biographer for her character, and to the historian for her place in the fostering of German culture. Yet she waited long for some one to gather the abounding materials into a connected narration. She had been dead nearly seventy years before Karl von Beaulieu-Marconnay, a descendant of Henrietta von Egloffstein, one of the most genial of the duchess’ maids of honor, incorporated that lady’s recollections in “Anna Amalia, Karl August, und der Minister von Fitsch,” 1874. The ice thus broken, Springer made Duchess Amalia the central figure of an historical novel, “Anna Amalia von Weimar und ihre poetische Tafelrunde,” 1875. Then Burkhardt edited for the Goethe Society, in 1885, Amalia’s correspondence with Goethe’s mother. This correspondence was reëdited in 1889; a literary magazine of which Amalia was patron, “The Tiefurt Journal,” was published by the Goethe Society in 1892, and in that same year Bornhak brought out his “Anna Amalia, Herzogin von Sachse-Weimar-Eisenach.” It was, however, first in this year, 1902, that the story has been made available for English readers through Frances Gerard’s “A Grand Duchess, The Life of Anna Amalia, Duchess of Sachse-Weimar-Eisenach, and the Classical Circle of Weimar.” Here is gathered for the first time much of curious

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interest, and, though the book has many faults, seldom indicates and often mistranslates the sources of its information, this article is indebted to it for many suggestions.

Anna Amalia was the eldest daughter of Duke Karl of Brunswick and Duchess Charlotte, who was by birth sister to the great Frederic of Prussia and also to the keen-witted Wilhelmine, Markgräfin of Bayreuth, who describes her as "very handsome, very satirical, false, jealous, and selfish," as, indeed, she proved herself to be in Amalia's case. The father, Wilhelmine describes, as "handsome, but stern and disagreeable, and considering his children, especially his daughters, as mere household appendages." Such parentage did not promise well for the little daughter, and Amalia's testimony bears out her aunt's, for in her "Gedanken" or "Reflections," a book of much shrewd, dispassionate judgment and no malice at all, she says: "When I look back to my childhood, that springtime of life, what do I see? An ever-recurring round of sacrifices for others. I was not loved by my parents. They kept me constantly in the background. My brothers and sisters were always put first. * * * I was starving for love and I received the hard crust of mere duty."

Very touching in this connection is a letter written in French, when Amalia was but seven, to "My Very Dear Papa." "Permit me," she says, and we may be reasonably sure no governess conceived or corrected the phrase, "to remind you of your little daughter Amalia, who loves you as well as, if not better than her brothers and sisters, although she has not the same opportunity of expressing her affection. When I am older (here one suspects the "gouvernante's" hand) I shall acquit myself much better in every way and give you satisfaction in my lessons. Therefore, my dear Papa, I beg you to have patience with me." In this there is a preciousness of pathos that is quite touching. Slighted on all hands, finding no sympathy, but rather, if we may trust the "Gedanken," reproach and abuse, she withdrew into herself, learned self-control, cultivated the dignity of wounded pride, and gradually found recourse and consolation in study, in music, and in the arts, for which she developed such aptitudes as to win with advancing girlhood the regard of her father, who accorded to talent the recognition he seems to have denied to blood. This hard school taught Amalia to cherish her own genius and to value genius in others.

When Amalia was seventeen Duke Constantine of Weimar, a distant cousin, asked her hand. Wilhelmine, who was aunt to both, seems to have first suggested the match. He was a frail but lovable youth of eighteen and had just succeeded to a duchy reduced to miserable straits by the misgovernment and fraud of his guardians. The land was, however, capable of recuperation, and Duke Karl's paternal prudence joined

Amalia's filial impatience to hasten a marriage which was partly of convenience, partly of emancipation, and partly of genuine liking. The wedding was on March 16, 1756. Forthwith the bridal pair set out in a roomy berlin for Weimar, with a train of thirty-seven attendants, among them the great composer, Bach, as the ducal kapellmeister.

Weimar is some one hundred and twenty miles from Wolfenbüttel as the crow flies, but as the berlin went it was eight days. They reached the home that the young bride was to make famous on the twenty-fourth of March and, as it were with a premonition of the day's happy augury, duke and people combined to make the entry a sort of triumph of which she bore off the honors most graciously.

But determined as Amalia was to like her new home and people, she had a task before her from which a stout heart might well have shrunk. Henrietta von Egloffstein, one of the brightest and keenest of the future court circle, tells how "instead of the luxurious arrangements at Brunswick she found at Weimar nothing but the scanty remains of former prosperity. During the minority no one had cared either to preserve or to improve the property or even to attend to most necessary matters. Even the household service was disorganized. Accustomed to a circle of cultured people, among whom she had grown up, nourished from a child on the love of the arts and sciences, able to express herself fluently whether in speech or writing in French only, because German at her father's court, as in all aristocratic circles of Germany, was then in disgrace, as the idiom of coarseness and vulgarity, she must have felt herself at Weimar among half-savages, since most of the inhabitants did not speak French and in their manners and customs were like those German provincials whom Kotzebue described so well [in "*Deutsche Kleinstädter*," for instance,) that the duchess in later years used to be reminded by his plays of the time when she, surrounded by like beings and conditions, had hardly dared to hope an amelioration of her state. For ignorance and lack of intellectual interest had brought the usual bad results. Ennui and the plague of scandal that rises from it had the upper hand in the gatherings of Weimar ladies, from whom, as usually happens where culture and urbanity are not at home, the men held themselves absolutely aloof, in order to pursue unhindered their brutal pastimes."

Possibly this picture is overdrawn, but even to the duchess the town seemed, so she wrote to her father, "insignificant." She adds this curious detail. Her maid "says the doors in the castle are hung so loosely that they can be closed with a carrot, just as in the peasants' cottages at home." And the town bore out the promise of this "palace." There were no street lamps. Those who ventured out afoot after dark carried

lanterns, or sent a servant before with one. The usual street conveyance was sedan chairs. These the town watchmen carried at night and were wont to leave their fares in the street while they cried the stated hours. There were probably no sidewalks. Driving was precarious and riding dangerous after sundown. Guards at the town gates registered the names of all who entered or departed. In the homes pine furniture was the rule, looking glasses a luxury of the rich. Many years later Herder calls the town, "That desert Weimar, half village, half capital." In 1756 Jena beside it seemed metropolitan. And to add to her disappointment the young duchess found in Weimar a lack of respectful deference. It was common report that even the ducal correspondence was not inviolable. Gradually, however, her kindly firmness asserted itself and her ascendancy over her husband was soon to be shown, under tragic circumstances, in a way that had in it a dramatic element and a touch of comedy also.

Karl August, the desired heir, was born in September, 1757. Soon after, at the instance of Counsellor Bünau, the duke made a will by which that scheming statesman-in-little might become co-regent. The will was locked up. In May, 1758, the duke died. A few hours later Bünau read this will in council, but was confronted and confounded by a codicil, dated just a week later and appointed to be first read on the day of the duke's decease. This made the duchess the guardian of the infant duke, with her father as joint guardian till she became of age. Appended was a "Conclusion" by the Emperor, stating that the duchess had accepted the guardianship on the condition that the Elector of Saxony would serve as co-trustee, and as he had already agreed to do this the "Conclusion" dispensed him from the usual oath. The contriver of this little "coup d'état" seems to have been the ambitious and jealous Counsellor Nonne, but it was a magnanimous and loving act of the dying duke and it was also an auspicious inspiration. Few minorities have left so happy a memory.

The baffled Bünau then urged the minority of the duchess. She was only nineteen. Her signature would be valueless for two years. Her father must act in every case or else the Emperor must grant a dispensation, *venia ætatis*, and meantime—. But there was to be no meantime. No sooner was the difficulty raised than it was solved. The court advocate exhibited the desired *venia ætatis*, procured some months before.

Viennese diplomacy, however, was not unselfish. Austria was at war with Amalia's uncle Frederic, and the Elector of Saxony was Austria's ally. His appointment was meant to insure the coöperation of Weimar

with Austria in the Seven Years' War. So critical anxiety pressed on the widowed regent. "A minor guardian of minors," Goethe calls her, reminding us by the plural of a second son, Constantine, born to her in widowhood, September, 1758. Yet the duchess, undismayed, saved her state by long and tactful negotiations from the calamity of alliance with either side, secured the Elector's resignation, and played Berlin against Vienna with a pluck and a courage, a skill and a resolution, that extorted admiration from Frederic himself, and even from Bünaü, who from his retirement aided her with his counsels and invoked, not in vain, her intercession for himself with the Prussian king.

Amid these perplexities of statecraft and hardly recovered from child-bed Amalia resolved not alone to maintain but to better her trust. "Every ruler," she wrote to her father, "owes to the country that he governs the duty of raising it to a higher position." She proposed to make Weimar, what the Wolfenbüttel of her girlhood had been, a centre of refinement and culture. Her means were pathetically, almost comically, small. Men pay for a volume today more than she could afford for the ducal library in her whole regency. But she was persistent, shrewd, and she knew what she wanted. Her interests were first of necessity economic; to the last they were singularly economical. She found an empty treasury, an impoverished populace, a disordered industry. But in Counsellor Greiner she discovered an unselfish adviser, "not a great genius," she admits, "but a thoughtful man and a true friend." And with the enthusiasm of a generation intoxicated with Rousseau she adds, "He was the friend of his friend. Since his soul was filled with the loftiest feelings there was no room for the ignoble vice of flattery. Such was the man into whose arms I threw myself. I loved him as if he were my father and like a child I sat at his feet. From him I heard the truth and from him I learned to love it."

Together they planned the resuscitation of the ducal library, gathered and rearranged old collections, adding what they could. They began to reform the schools of Weimar and fostered eagerly the university work at Jena with personal sympathy and, so far as might be, with money also. The duchess managed even to secure three hundred dollars a year for an art museum and got more than one might imagine for her money. In war time, however, she had often to use private funds for current court expenses, even to the extent of several thousand dollars a year. Steadily she grew more beloved at home, more respected abroad. Uncle Frederic said she was too good for so poor a duchy; but she seems to have been content with the affection of her people and her friends, though chafing, doubtless, at the lack of means that checked the generous impulses of

her will. Her rule was paternal, sometimes it was even prosaically maternal. For instance, she once received timely notice that one of Frederic's recruiting, or rather kidnapping, agents was coming to Weimar and promptly sent the young men of the town to the woods to hide, thoughtfully furnishing each with a warm cloak, "lest he should catch cold."

Weimar, however, fared better than the rest of Germany in these trying times and after peace came also, though there was famine and sickness. As late as 1773, only two years before the close of Amalia's regency an Italian visitor, Micheless, wrote, "Sadness hangs over Weimar, and those who escape from the town do not escape the fatal illness, which pursues them wherever they go." But through all this ill fortune the people and foreign public opinion never wavered in admiration of the duchess, "a princess," says Micheless, "whose fine qualities and the wisdom of whose government are acknowledged by the whole world."

She had the art, much prized by rulers, not only to be, but to show herself as she was,—the art of "representation." On Sunday, the German holiday, she would throw open to the public the castle park of Wilhelmsburg and walk abroad there, the marshal of the court going before, pages behind bearing her train, stately Heiduks in attendance, and a dwarf with them the better to set off their majestic stature. Thus attired and attended she would feed the goldfish for public delectation, or drink tea in the guard-house grotto. She made herself *their* princess and the people felt a reflection of the brightness of her court shining in their homely lives. In winter she would vary the programme of the Sunday holiday. The court sleighs would be driven in gay procession through the town streets and out to the country houses at Tiefurt or Ettersberg, with outriders before and the courtier drivers sitting behind the ladies. Occasionally the programme was varied and the duchess would ride, allowing even the humblest to admire her particularly dainty shoes, which it seems were an object of such universal admiration that we hear of little gold models of them being worn as watch-charms. It was her custom, it seems, "to put on every day a pair of new shoes with red heels. Once used these were given to the ladies-in-waiting who in wearing them inflicted on their poor feet untold suffering." The duchess would appear often at the theatre, after Weimar had recovered one, and at subscription balls, taking the princes with her to the masquerade and occasionally making her sacrifice to the god of chance at the faro table.

In all this, even the frivolity, there was method as one may see from the account of Henrietta von Egloffstein, who shared in it from 1795 to 1804. The duchess sought, she tells us, "to awaken the dormant cap-

abilities of her subjects. She followed the inclinations of her childlike heart and chose quite without premeditation the surest way to reach her praiseworthy design. For she drew into her confidence young men and girls and made them companions in graceful plays and festivities that awakened alike in actors and spectators a sense for the finer pleasures of life, out of which the need of a higher culture gradually grew. Though the young regent seemed to be occupied only with frivolous things she was always thinking of the most real and important ones, especially the education of her sons. She was determined that Karl August should shine to his nation as a genuine German prince, which is the more to her credit as she had been brought up prejudiced against everything German."

Many of the letters of the regency concern the tutors that she chose for her children, chief of them, Wieland, whose friendship she kept till death. He came to Weimar in 1772, first of the literary galaxy, and much to the vexation of the "unco' guid," who were so grieved at the hedonistic tendency of his early writings as to bid prayers in the churches for his conversion and to denounce his teachings from the pulpits,—all which the duchess heard unmoved.

When the time came for her to turn over the burden of rule to her son, whom evil counsels had temporarily estranged, she did it with simple dignity, helping at first discretely, but soon retiring to that more genial kingdom over which she ruled by right of native worth. Her town home was the dowager mansion, the Witthumshaus. She had country places at Ettersberg and Tiefurt, all still piously preserved and showing in their fittings comfort, much taste, and some luxury. Freed from care she gave herself to the study of English, Italian, Latin, Greek, art, science, philosophy, working not profoundly, of course, but with lively intelligence and quick receptivity. She also essayed painting and music. Indeed, none of the amenities of life were foreign to her catholic sympathies, which would gladly have embraced even her prim daughter-in-law, Louise of Baden, who preferred to shut up her wounded soul in pride till a common misfortune at last brought the two good women together, after the catastrophe of Jena.

Two journeys interrupted the placid course of the intervening years. The former, to the Rhine country, in 1778, brought to the duchess the prized acquaintance of Merck and the friendship of Goethe's mother. Ten years later her own failing health and Goethe's contagious enthusiasm led her to Italy, where she spent two years and was met by Goethe in Venice on her homeward journey. The visit had been a keen delight to her, but had not the transforming effect on her nature that the

same experience produced on Goethe. She had already come to that understanding with self and life that Goethe attained at Rome.

At Weimar, Ettersberg, and Tiefurt, the years brought new faces, but the general character of the duchess' circle remained unchanged. Among its earliest and constant members were her ladies-in-waiting, the deformed and sprightly Fräulein von Göchhausen and the coquettish "femme incomprise," Frau von Stein, glad to forget her seven children and her husband, who shared her complacent indifference. One also would have met constantly Charlotte von Kalb, of satirical wit, and the gracious Egloffsteins, daughter and mother. A little later came the Gores, Elizabeth and Emily, two somewhat mysterious Englishwomen who, with their enigmatical father, dropping on Weimar as it were from the clouds, in 1788, to win a place in the inner court circle, and disappear from it again. Here, too, might be seen Amalia von Kotzebue, sister of the dramatist, Countess Bernstorff, Marie Oertel, and Amalia von Imhoff, painter and poetess. Among the men were the ex-tutors Knebel and Wieland, the absent-minded chamberlain Einsiedel, Bertuch, comptroller of the duchy's finances, and, as later recruits, Goethe, Herder, Count Stolberg, Schiller, the noted theatrical manager Brühl, Meyer, the painter, and Jean Paul Richter, the sentimental humorist. Occasionally some such cometary portent as Madame de Staël would sweep across the conversational sky.

The stated social functions of a Weimar week began in the palmy days with a state dinner Sunday noon. This was a large affair, taking in the officers on guard and the ladies and gentlemen on duty at the court. Then, on Sunday afternoon there was a reception at the Egloffstein's, prolonged sometimes till the small hours of Monday, which with Tuesday was a social holiday. On Wednesday there was a more exclusive court dinner, one of the few occasions where the traditions of court etiquette were preserved. On Thursday Amalia held public reception at the Witthumshaus. Friday was her literary evening and was much affected by visitors to Weimar from many nations. On Saturdays Fräulein von Göchhausen, wittiest of all the group, had her informal and delightful "breakfasts." Thusnelda, as they nick-named her in comic play on her deformity, could converse fluently in three languages, was very well educated and as kindly as she was brilliant. It was she who copied out the first draft of Goethe's "Faust" and, earlier in her life, evoked the sighing testimony from Knebel that "for a woman she had a wonderful sense of morality." At her Saturdays one was apt to hear good music and occasionally there was prolonged discussion of some vexed literary question of the hour. At the duchess' everything was a little more formal; when talk flagged, there was reading aloud, enlivened perhaps by some

such prankish improvisation as the historic one that led a stranger guest to whisper to Wieland, "That is Goethe or the Devil." "Both," was the answer.

Beside these regular incidents of the Weimar week there were private theatricals which came, especially after Goethe's advent, to take a large place in it, till they gave way at last to a systematic cultural effort through a professional dramatic company. The theatre in the Schloss was burned in 1774. A regular company had acted there for three years, under the duchess' patronage, sometimes giving free performances, so great was her faith in the refining influence of the stage. After the fire the actors went elsewhere and to fill the gap, at least for the elect, the duchess improvised a miniature stage, first in the Fürstenhaus then in the Redoute. Expenses were met by subscription and the amateurs of Weimar soon outshone those of the greater German capitals. Among the actors were Karl August, his brother Constantine, Knebel, Einsiedel, Seckendorf, Bertuch, Musäus, and soon, best of all, Goethe. Women's parts were taken by the Duchess Amalia, Corona Schröter, and Louise von Rudorf, both almost professional, Amalia von Kotzebue, and Fräulein von Göchhausen. Occasionally they summoned the noted Eckhoff from Gotha to their aid. Goethe was made director in 1776. Many of the actors wrote plays for the company which soon began to be invited to play outside the capital and even the duchy. "The noble vagrants, thoughtless, extravagant, jovial, true Thespians at heart, in a right merry spirit," as Gerard paraphrases Göchhausen's description, "were ready to pack up, bag and baggage, and travel over hill and dale from one hunting lodge, country seat or distant town to another, from Ettersberg to Tiefurt, Belvedere or further afield to Dornberg, Jena, Ilmenau, Erfurt, Rudolstadt or even as far as Leipzig." Goethe favored romantic and humorous parts, Einsiedel succeeded best as lover or page, Musäus in pure comedy, Knebel in heavy business as husband and father. Fräulein von Göchhausen, as one may imagine, liked to play the soubrette. Even children caught the spirit and several plays were staged for them. It was for these amateurs that Goethe wrote the ironical "Triumph of Sentimentality" and the farcical "Annual Fair at Plundersweilern," in which he made frank fun of himself and his friends. But they essayed serious work, too. Goethe acted Orestes in his own "Iphigenia," looking, so Hufeland, a spectator, records, like an Apollo, "Never before had there been seen such a union of physical and intellectual beauty in one man."

In summer or autumn the stage was transferred to one of the ducal country seats, Ettersberg or Tiefurt, the former on a hillside four miles and a half to the north, the latter by the Ilm two miles to the east of

the capital. Here, a rustic setting was arranged for the pastoral plays, then so popular. In a letter to Merck, Wieland tells how the duchess "is arranging to have Goethe's 'Puppenspiel' at her next fête. All hands have been at work for fourteen days and nearly all day. Goethe comes occasionally to see how the work is getting on and the duchess is everywhere, the life and soul of the whole thing. * * * Half the court and a good many of the town-folk play in the piece. * * * I would give a gold-piece if you were here to see the fun, but if you did come you would have to join the company." We have still the playbill of this Plundersweilern "Puppenspiel," which was sent to Goethe's mother by the indefatigable Göchhausen. And after it was all over this genial little body tells how "we, the pack of comedians, enjoyed ourselves at a ball especially given for us, which lasted till daylight and made us ashamed of our revels"; but not it seems repentant, for they often repeated them, with other nonsense plays of Goethe's prodigal genius, several of which survive only in name.

The most elaborate of all these trifles was "The Gypsies," an operetta by Goethe and Einsiedel. It was acted after a hunt. A rocket gave the signal. The hunters and invited guests, led by the duchess and her son, walked through the lantern-lit grove to a theatre of nature's making, with bushy thickets for scenery. The rural stage showed a gypsy encampment, with the conventional fire and kettle. Hither come gypsies bringing various plunder and all join in a carnival of joy. A painting by Kraus, preserved at Ettersberg, commemorates this occasion, of which Goethe and Corona Schröter were hero and heroine.

Less ebullient were the delights of Tiefurt in the placid valley of the Ilm. Here, at the heart of a great ducal estate was an overseer's house, transformed by the duchess into a sort of "Petit Trianon." It was square, old-fashioned, restfully simple. It had been prepared for Prince Constantine. When he ceased to use it, it became his mother's favorite summer residence and all has been piously kept as she left it. Some of the pictures are good. There is a Reynolds and several canvases by Angelica Kaufmann. There is, also, much precious china, Sevres and Meissen. Of the duchess' daily life here, Henrietta von Egloffstein has left a charming picture from which a rather long extract needs the less excuse as the writer was almost the last link of those days with ours. She played no small part in the scenes she describes and she died but thirty-eight years ago.¹

(1) The translation is from her *Memoranda*, printed in the already mentioned monograph of her descendant, Von Beaulieu-Marconnay. In somewhat disguised form it furnishes the unacknowledged substance of pp. 370-375 in Frances Gerard's *A Grand Duchess*.

"In the silent valley through which winds the unpretentious Ilm she created for herself and her countless admirers a pleasant Sanssouci. Tiefert with its low-studded farmhouse became the gathering place of all the great spirits of the last century. The Tiefert way of living best suited her inclinations and she always looked eagerly for the spring which should bring her, the close friend of nature, back to it again. * * * Already at dawn you could see the duchess there in simple dress, her beautiful hair rolled up and hidden under a simple straw hat, feeding her English hens and doves. When this was done she strolled alone, a book in her hand, to her favorite bench in the park. Here she lingered, sometimes reading, sometimes sunk in thought, till from the belfry of the little village church the stroke of noon summoned her to return. Quickly the unpretentious toilet was made and in the course of it she read the morning's mail. Then the duchess passed from her modest chamber to her as modest reception room where her little court awaited her, with those who might be reckoned as the daily companions of her table. To those belonged especially the aged Wieland, for whom Amalia, out of youthful attachment, had provided his own dwelling in Tiefert which he occupied regularly every spring during the last few years of his life that he might complete his later works in comfortable rural repose. The number of visitors was so great however that seldom did a day pass on which several of them did not have to be invited to the dinner table, which, as the only really luxurious object, was the sole reminder that this was a princely dwelling. Dinner over the duchess withdrew and the rest scattered in every direction till the tea-hour united them again. Then, if the weather was good, visitors streamed in from all sides and swelled the company which followed the duchess into the park, where in the shade of great trees the tea-table was spread. Since every one knew that Amalia prized above all cheerfulness and spontaneity the guests gave free rein to their humors and the jests and sports of the younger part of the company soon enlivened the quiet park. But he who could, or would, take no part in the noisy pastime of youth could always find entertainment suited to his age and taste till the setting sun summoned to departure those who were not invited to stay. * * * But now when the solemn stillness of evening followed the noisy activity of the day and seemed to invite to self-communion, the greatest enjoyment began for those who remained in the peaceful house. There was music which Amalia loved passionately; the latest products of literature were looked over and if anything especially attractive was found the Lady-in-Waiting von Göchhausen read it aloud while the other ladies helped the duchess with a great piece of tapestry intended for her beloved son [Constantine]. If the weather was unfit for evening walks the duchess then played some game with Wieland, or perhaps Wieland himself pulled out some just finished bit of his writing. But woe to the one who was not careful to give the closest attention when he read or was responsible for the least noise. Instantly, with bitter complaint, the angry old man stuck his manuscript back in his pocket and went to a corner to pout, where in spite of all excuses and the patient duchess' soothing words he stayed till the little round table with the frugal supper was brought in. * * * The unrestrained liberty with which each could express and defend his opinions in the presence of duchess Amalia led to the most brilliant conversations, but these were quite apt to pass over into heated discussions in which Wieland's capricious faultfinding, Herder's mocking, mordant wit, Knebel's unrestrained passionateness, but above all Goethe's dictatorial spirit were exhibited. Wounding words were not uncommon in these arguments and these would fan so strongly the inflammable material that was always in their minds that even Amalia's presence and her conciliating gentleness did not suffice to extinguish the high-flaming passions."

From all this, however, Schiller stood consistently aloof, and this, says the shrewd Henrietta, was the chief cause that his friendship with Goethe remained unbroken.

In the midst of such activities Duchess Amalia conceived, she tells us, "a little joke for passing the summer." This was "The Tiefurt Journal," a manuscript magazine, intended, so its prospectus states, to contain weekly "all that is noteworthy in the politics, wit, talent of this remarkable age, for the benefit of a select public." Einsiedel was editor and, of course, Fräulein von Göchhausen secretary, for she had the nimblest pen. Among the frequent early contributors were Goethe, Karl August, Prince August of Gotha, Herder, Musäus, and Wieland. Nor were the ladies backward, especially the duchess. With some irregularities of issue the "little joke" lasted for three years. Its forty-seven issues have been reprinted by the Goethe Society.

Other "little jokes" were of a practical kind and suggest rather cyclopean ideas of humor. Such was, for instance, a Barmecide feast whose dishes, all of painted wood, may still be seen at Tiefurt. Such, too, was the walling up of Fräulein von Göchhausen's bedroom door, the search for which, a judiciously arranged draught having extinguished her candle, threw the poor cripple into hysterics. The company beguiled themselves, also, with shadow plays and sylvan spectacles. But these things had begun to pall even before Goethe's Italian journey and after the duchess' return thence they were discountenanced. For though as has been said, that journey had not on the duchess the transforming effect that it had on Goethe, she brought from it a more self-reliant dignity, the result, perhaps, of the distinguished honor with which she had been received by pope, prelates, scholars, artists, and people. Failing health had its effect, also, and the lessons of the French Revolution could not but be chastening, though its first echoes roused in the traveler, as they did also at Weimar, interest, curiosity, and hope, rather than fear. Amalia's return to Germany "awakened her," she says, "from a sweet dream to the prose of every day life." She was soon to find it very stern prose indeed. In 1792 Karl August shared in the discreditable campaign of Longwy and his brother Constantine died at Metz. These were the first of a series of blows with which fate chastened the soul of this noble woman, each bringing to her the consolation of renewed tokens of the sympathy and love of her people. She lived now almost wholly at Tiefurt, welcoming there Schiller, Richter, and Madame de Staël, Heine's "whirlwind in petticoats." In 1801, Amalia's mother died, carrying to the grave her prejudice against the most genial of her daughters, and wounding her with a Parthian shaft from her testament. Then one by

one gaps opened in the charmed circle. We need not number them. Through all the duchess continued steadfast and incessant in her fostering of all that made for culture. Her ever-widening correspondence came to embrace men and women of every profession, politics, and creed; her interest extended to every branch of literature and art; she was joint-president with Goethe of the Society of Natural Science.

The battle of Jena, overtopping her worst anticipations of public disaster, crushed her at last. Close on it came the news of her beloved brother's death in battle. "One must try to live through these bad times in patience and firmness," she says in one of the last letters she ever wrote; and she adds with quaint pathos, "The muses here are asleep I think. I cannot blame them." This was in February, 1807. On April 10, she passed quietly from a life that had grown too sad for her gentle spirit to bear. Her body lies in the Peter-Paul or Stadt-Kirche, the chief church of Weimar, beside the altar. On the wall is a memorial medallion. But hardly less enduring is the memorial of her in the heart of her people. The tradition of her nobility, graciousness, wisdom, and catholic-spirited interest in all things bright and good has lasted now through well nigh a century. Her various dwellings, every memento connected with her, are piously preserved. Hers was a tiny land, but she was its great Alma Mater.

HOME RULE FOR AMERICAN CITIES

ELLIS P. OBERHOLTZER

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THE political evils which afflict us in our great cities are more offensive than the evils that have elsewhere appeared in the American governmental system. To remark upon them is now a trite service. In proposing cures, one leech is almost as good as another. If, in a democracy, it were necessary simply to convince the people of the error of their ways, municipal government might have been reformed many years ago by the fair and natural process of universal suffrage. All whose opinions it is worth while to take into account are of one mind. They are agreed that shameful ills exist, even when they violently disagree as to the course which should be pursued in doing away with them.

It is sometimes said by those who apologize for politics in America, that the government of such a people, in view of their operations in business, is not worse than might be expected. Moral standards are as high in public as in private administration. The councilman and the mayor are as honest and capable as the average business man. Such an observation, so seriously reflecting upon commercial morality in America, which does not suffer in comparison with the professions and business practices of other peoples, may be dismissed as of no value in the explanation of our shortcomings in municipal management. The city governments are far below the standard which we have established for private business, a proposition which needs no statistical support. Nowhere is there a successful private enterprise managed so extravagantly, incompetently, and lawlessly, in a moral sense, as are our municipal governments. This point is impressively illustrated when a passage is made from public to private ownership, as in the case of the Philadelphia Gas Works, which were for a long time so badly administered by the city politicians that public sentiment was almost unanimous in favor of their sale, even while there was a consciousness of scandal in the transfer. The Philadelphia Gas Works, now in private hands, are conducted in a most economical and creditable manner, and the change has been justified in the minds of all thoughtful citizens.

Mr. E. L. Godkin used to say that in our cities we were trying to perform the unexampled feat of governing rich communities with cheap men. In this statement there is a great deal of unvarnished truth. We set up as our governors in high city offices, men who are without large

business training. Those who are experienced in the management of financial institutions, industries, and successful private concerns are almost never selected to fill the public positions which require their special talents. Men who would not be trusted for large tasks in any private capacity are frequently chosen to superintend public works and departments of administration, which call for abilities of the highest order. The city has been growing in size and wealth year by year. Its activities are extending. It collects and expends great sums of money. Its budget vies with the budgets of nations. One American city boasts of outstanding loans greater than the combined borrowings of all the separate States. The problem of municipal government grows in importance, as the population of cities is counted by millions instead of thousands, and as the responsibilities which are heaped upon the heads of the administrative agents are multiplied.

It is usually assumed that our methods are wrong, but how are they wrong, and which methods among the many are so grievously at fault that our governments cannot be placed in better hands? Is it general manhood suffrage which gives our cities bad and corrupt, instead of capable and upright government? Is the evil indigenous to democracy or is it induced by other defects of system which are superficial and therefore easier to correct? An impression has taken deep hold of us in recent years that a principal source of the trouble in city government in this country is the confusion of powers and the complication of authority arising from our attachment to old and absurd forms. Our only model for government in the United States is the England of Montesquieu's time, with a tripartite division of agencies,—executive, legislative, and judicial. We began during the Revolution with other ideas and began badly. The Continental Congress knew no rival. It combined in itself all three classes of powers. The government organized under the Articles of Confederation, concentrated authority in a legislative body of a single chamber. The first government of Pennsylvania under the Constitution of 1776, formed by a few enthusiasts whose theory came from France, and whose example was powerful in giving concrete illustration to the doctrines advocated by Turgot, Condorcet, Mirabeau, La Rochefoucauld, and the group of men whose teachings overthrew the French monarchy and set up the unchecked convention in its stead, was a legislative government. All power was centred in an assembly of one chamber. It was against such a notion in political science that John Adams contended in his "Defence" of the American constitutions, written while he represented the United States in London, which fact led a Democratic wag at home to ask why we should keep an ambassador

abroad at the enormous cost of eight or ten guineas a day to write a panegyric of the British Constitution. Hamilton and Jay understood the impotency as well as the dangers of government by a convention, and soon, when the Federal Constitution came to be framed in 1787, all the principal men of the country were agreed that a system should be established which was not only more strongly federal, but at the same time more complex, with "checks and balances" and features designed to give permanency to the political structure. The English government was known chiefly through Montesquieu's "Spirit of the Laws." The strong note in his description of the British system was the division and separation of powers. Moreover, the colonists, by their experience with their provincial governments which were founded on English models, were rather generally imbued with the idea that one agent should check and balance another, and we organized the nation, the States, and later the cities according to this plan.

However well adapted to the present needs of the nation and the States we may conceive this system to be, there is conviction that the American city at the present time does not require the same agencies of government which were in vogue in England in the eighteenth century. A municipality never did, and does not today, need the same organization as a nation. It performs different functions. It has no foreign relations. The nation has a very different attitude toward the individual citizen, and while it does receive, forward, and deliver his letters and parcels through the mails, an incidental service performed by the national government, it does not build and clean streets, maintain sewers, supply water, gas, and electricity, regulate traffic on crowded highways, or determine the rules which are to be observed by those who wish to erect buildings,—the chief functions of a modern city government. The government of the nation is political; the government of a city is a matter of business and a difficult business, requiring special talents of the first rank.

A most important movement in the direction of a simplification of city government was begun a number of years ago, but by this time has attained a momentum which those who attempt to obstruct its progress find difficult to withstand. We have strengthened gradually the mayor's hand until in nearly all American municipalities he is a much greater power than he was formerly. In not a few cities he is a personage with a dictator's prerogatives. This tendency is justified, and has been promoted by the most competent students of municipal government in this country. Evils have abounded in the representative municipal assemblies. Business has been obstructed by the councils. The members frequently have corrupted the public service, and a corrective has

been sought through the mayor's office. Municipal government has been made less legislative and more executive. It is argued that the agents, whom the people choose to administer their affairs, should be more fully and directly responsible to the people, wherefore the mayor has been entrusted with the exercise of a greater variety of powers unchecked by the city legislature. The desire has been to present to view one official who owes his place to the people, whom the people can watch and who may be made to feel the resentful lash of public opinion if he be derelict in the performance of his duties. To him we should be able to say, "Thou art the man," and thus guide his course with praise, criticism, or blame. In this change all the hopes of the reformers who have advocated it have not been fulfilled. The tendency is in some respects plainly antagonistic to the spirit of city government in Europe where the council is strong, and the mayor is but an agent to execute the will of that body. Some protests are now being filed against the movement. This development is not permitted to go forward unchallenged,¹ although it is my conviction that in a number of large American cities the system has been improved by the introduction of mayor government. This is not to say, however, that council government might not be the better system, if councilmen were elected on a general ticket, and a practical scheme were devised by which men of character should be chosen to membership in the municipal assembly, which is, after all, the real difference between city government in Europe and in America. The selection of men of honesty and talent for places of power is always the principal problem which confronts the reformer of our municipal politics.

Another movement which is meant to prevent confusion, simplify the processes of government, and drive corruption from its sheltered haunts is the emancipation of cities from the State legislatures. I do not remember elsewhere to have read so intelligible a discussion of the incongruities and anomalies in our present system of making local boundaries, as that by Professor Patten.² Lines have been drawn arbitrarily without the slightest regard for the temper or character of the population. Great industrial and maritime cities are thrown into agricultural States. Half the population may be settled perhaps on a few square miles of space in one corner of the State. With wholly different interests these two sections of the people, urban and rural, come together at the State capital, and in consequence the results are mutually disadvantageous.

(1) E. Dana Durand, *Council versus Mayor*, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xv.

(2) *The Decay of State and Local Governments*, *Annals of the American Academy*, vol. i.

Neither section understands the needs or wishes of the other, and the effect is weakening, corrupting, and unwholesome for the political life of both the city and the State. How by practical means they are to be separated, now that they are joined together, is a difficult question to decide. The State was present before the city. The city is an afterthought, and an aftergrowth. It has developed from the village, and while there was no little political friction between New York and Philadelphia and the rural counties a century ago, the understanding is infinitely less today since the cities have grown to their present proportions.

The State legislatures are in serious decline. They have lost much of their former title to public respect, and their powers have been curtailed in a variety of ways by the Constitutional Convention. Not a few of their ills and misfortunes spring from the lack of homogeneity in the population of the modern State. It is a grouping of diverse and discordant elements which work at cross purposes with each other. A partisan majority of one kind in the rural counties confronts a majority of a different kind in the city, and thus there is cordial and direct invitation to trading, bribery, "log rolling," "jamming," and other evils, now very familiar at the State capitals. The State legislatures have made themselves more and more meddlesome in the affairs of the municipalities. To settle some grudge, to "strike" vested wealth for large sums by means of blackmail, to reward party men for some political service, the legislature, without warning, passes a bill changing the legal or institutional system of a city. The municipal government is a derivative creation,—it is the absolute creature of the State,—and the legislature, except as it has been limited by the Constitutional Convention, makes laws at will in reference to cities. It grants the charter, amends the charter, and by "special" and "general" laws is almost everywhere free at each session to make, unmake, or remake the government of any municipality within the State, no matter what its wealth or size. That these arbitrary and evil attacks upon the rights of great cities are contrary to public policy needs no particular demonstration. The disposition on the part of the legislatures, for no honorable or necessary cause, suddenly to withdraw grants which they earlier had made and to abuse the privileges they enjoy in superintending the government of cities, has gone far to condemn absolutely the existing relationship and induce us to seek a safer system. Home rule for cities has become an imperative demand in all parts of the Union, and as a remedy for a certain class of ills, it is full of promise for the American municipality. It is not immediately practicable to separate the city from the State and let it stand in independent and direct relationship with the national government. It is considered

feasible, however, in some States, to attempt to divorce the city and the legislature, a movement which, while still rather new, has met with marked public favor. The elimination of the legislature closes at least one source of corrupt influence and dishonesty. If there is to be corruption, let it originate at home in the bosom of the people who are most concerned about it. The sage American politician, who, in a partisan controversy over a seat, was informed that both contestants were "rascals," and who promptly inquired "which is our rascal?" betrayed a preference that may profitably be recognized in city government. With home rule we need patronize only our own rascals, which is a blessing worthy of note.

The only weapon with which to combat effectively the State legislature is the Constitutional Convention. It is true the legislature, in a season of virtue, may resign its powers over the cities by statute; it may agree as in Louisiana to let the people frame their own charters, and amend those instruments at their own pleasure. When a charter is submitted to the citizens, and is adopted by a majority vote, it gains binding force in any town or city, except New Orleans, which is expressly excepted from the provisions of the law. Such a grant, however, is wholly voluntary with the legislature, and the statute may at any session be repealed or changed. In many States the legislature without formulating its design in general statutory terms, submits local government acts and charters for the approval or rejection of the people of the districts to which they relate. Such a practice, while it is entirely praiseworthy, is likely not to prevail in regard to large cities. In the best case the legislature obeys its own will and whim,—only its honor stands between to protect the cities, and it is this that has sometimes failed us.

It is plain that the city needs a direct constitutional pledge and guarantee. Such a guarantee it secured in Missouri, in 1875, when a new constitution was adopted in that State, and a scheme was devised for freeing St. Louis from the debauching influence of the legislature. The convention took a radical step. It introduced an entirely new principle into municipal government in America, and decided that the city henceforward might, free of the legislature's interferences and restraints, frame its own charter. It might elect thirteen citizens to a Board of Freeholders, submit the charter which they should prepare to the people of St. Louis, when, if the latter approve, the instrument would become the supreme law of the city. On the initiation of the municipal assembly, the charter might later be amended with the assent of the people, and without consulting the legislature. A similar constitutional provision granting home rule to all the cities of Missouri, which should have or

should later attain a population of at least one hundred thousand, led to Kansas City's adopting a Freeholders' Charter in 1889.

Meanwhile the convention which met in California, in 1879, to prepare a new constitution for that State, sought to extend the same privileges to San Francisco; and a provision was made permitting any city in California of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants to elect a board of fifteen freeholders, and adopt its own charter. California, unlike Missouri, must submit her charters to the legislature, after they have been approved by the people. The legislature, however, must accept or reject them "as a whole being without power of alteration or amendment." In 1886, by an amendment to the constitution of California the limit of population was reduced from one hundred thousand to ten thousand, and in 1890 it was further reduced to three thousand, five hundred, so that all the cities of the State may today have home rule if they care to avail themselves of the opportunity to establish their own forms of government. Los Angeles, Oakland, Stockton, San Diego, Sacramento, Grass Valley, Napa, Eureka, Berkeley, San José, Vallejo, and Santa Barbara, followed each other rapidly in adopting Freeholders' Charters. San Francisco, which the provision was designed especially to benefit, did not succeed in getting free from the State legislature until 1899. Again and again, freeholders were chosen to frame a charter for the city, but because of the relentless antagonism of a political clique to this reform, it was only at the fifth election, eighteen years after the first attempt was put forth, that a majority vote of the people was obtained in favor of a new body of fundamental law for San Francisco. These five elections were held in 1880, 1883, 1887, 1896, and 1898. While the legislature in California may at its pleasure refuse to ratify a city-made charter, in no case has it yet withheld its approval.

The State of Washington, when it entered the Union, in 1889, brought with it a constitutional provision permitting cities of a population of twenty thousand or more to frame their own charters. The terms of the grant were practically the same as in California, except that the ratifying vote of the legislature was dispensed with. In consequence of this provision Seattle, Tacoma, and Spokane now have Freeholders' Charters.

The fourth State to adopt the system was Minnesota, which, by constitutional amendments approved in 1896 and 1898, worked out a modified plan of its own. In Minnesota there is no specified minimum limit of population for cities which may avail themselves of the right to the Freeholders' Charter. All cities and villages possess equal privileges. The Board of Freeholders is a permanently constituted body not selected by

the people for a definite service, as in the other States, but appointed by the district judges for a term of six years.

The only obstacle which has been met with in the pathway of the Freeholders' Charter is a serious conflict of authority between the new semi-independent city and the legislature. The State constitution declares that the city shall frame its own charter, but manifestly it may not secede from the State or make rules or regulations for its own government, which place it outside the pale of control of the central state agencies, chief of which is the legislature. In Missouri it is specified that the "charter and amendments shall always be in harmony with and subject to the constitution and laws of the State," while in California and Washington they must be "consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws." The legislature, although in many States forbidden to pass special laws on a great variety of subjects, including city government, because of its reckless abuse of the privilege, still finds a large field for its activity in the enactment of general laws. It resorts to many improper subterfuges. It constructs general "classes" in which but one city or county is a member. In California fifty-seven counties are divided into fifty-three classes. The opportunity for evil is as open and as great as before, and, whether legislation is nominally general or special, it is clear from the judicial opinions in Missouri, California, and Washington, that the legislature must and will exercise supervisory authority over all the territory under its jurisdiction in such matters as schools, streets, and the police system, and I am not convinced that any part of the State should be released from a central control on these subjects. The cities which have adopted Freeholders' Charters are not enjoying these extensive liberties. In many cases the constitutional purpose and intent of the reform have been violated flagrantly, and the city is as completely as before at the legislature's mercy; for a charter, no matter how near at home its origin, which may be changed at will by an outside authority, is, when that outside authority is evilly disposed, not sensibly better than any other charter. Minnesota, taking to heart the lessons learned by Missouri, California, and Washington, has not deceived herself with dreams of free cities. While it is specified that the charters in that State shall be "in harmony with and subject to the constitution and laws of the State," it is also provided that the cities shall be divided into four classes, for which the legislature is expressly authorized to enact general laws, "paramount while in force to the provisions relating to the same matter included in the local charter." In no case shall a local charter or ordinance "supersecede any general law of the State defining or punishing crimes or misdemeanors."

But of all the devices proposed as a means of protecting American cities from the undue interference of the legislature, the system recently adopted in New York State, is most likely to commend itself to careful students of municipal government. Even under Minnesota's modified form of the Freeholders' Charter, there is still no room for special legislation. As universal as the prohibition of this kind of legislation has become in the past quarter of a century, we are beginning to understand that, in the very nature of the case, special laws for localities are sometimes necessary. There are matters of local administration which cannot satisfactorily be brought under a general head. To find a system harmonizing this idea with the idea of home rule was reserved for New York. In that State, since the constitution was revised, in 1894, the enactment of special laws relative to cities is permitted by the legislature, but these laws as bills must be submitted to the municipal authorities of the community to which they relate. The mayor of the city receives the bill and appoints a time for a public hearing when objections to its passage may be presented. He may veto the measure, although the legislature may pass it over his veto, in which case it is expressly declared in its title for the information of all whom it may concern that it was "passed without the acceptance of the city." This constitutional provision legally opens the way to special legislation, while duly regarding the rights of the municipality. It is required that all special acts of this kind shall be referred to the regularly delegated officials within each city, whose government is to be changed; the constitution, however, recognizes the supreme authority of the legislature, the governor, and the other agencies, to which the general welfare has been committed by the sovereign people, when it provides a method for the enactment of the law in spite of possible petty local hostility. Thus, while some difficulties are put in the way of special legislation for cities, it is not made wholly impossible. The reference of the bill to the locality affected affords an opportunity for public discussion and should the measure be unworthy, it is reasonable to suppose that it could not be easily passed a second time, in the face of local disapproval. Whatever the final outcome of this interesting contest between the city and the State, it is plain that we are constantly moving toward results which promise soon to be more definite, and we may hope more satisfactory.

Our better judgment tells us, and theory and experience enforce us in the opinion that the city, however great a degree of independence we may wish it to possess, cannot really be free of the legislature's supervising control. Many subjects must still be regulated by uniform laws, and political opinion has been very generally on the side of the legislature

whenever conflict of authority has arisen between the city and the State. While constitutional checks and restraints upon the legislature are deserving of hearty encouragement, when these are not extreme and give promise of practical results, it must be always remembered that the only cure for the disgraceful political ills which plague our cities, is administrative agents of character and courage. This is the need in all branches of government,—local, state, and national. Home rule will not be better than rule at a greater distance, if the agencies are not at hand to make good government possible. Paris, Washington, and other great capitals of the world, noted for the excellence of their public service, have scarcely a vestige of home rule. Their affairs are administered by the nation. The people of the city are without care or responsibility concerning the government. They enjoy the benefits of a superb system, in which they have no constructive part. But, while it is good men who are the prime requisites of good government, our present methods are in general poorly designed to bring forward such men. To pit the farms against the cities, to look to the State capitals for laws that will be well adapted to the needs of the great populations of all degrees of poverty and wealth, of all nationalities, and of the largest variety of employments, is a crucial mistake. Although our constitutional system seems to suggest no ready form of relief, some more rational alignment of the population into harmonious groups is to many of us what “a firm, wise, manly system of federal government” was to Robert Morris, in 1782, who, in speaking of such a government said, “It is what I once wished, what I now hope for, what I dare not expect, but what I will not despair of.” Is it too much to expect that we will, in the not too distant future, have cities which, simply organized and measurably free, will deserve their liberties; that the American people, developing a civic pride and a sense of true local patriotism, will make their cities the peers of the old Grecian or the Italian and Hanseatic cities whose careers were so brilliant in the Middle Ages?

NATIONAL ANTAGONISMS, AN ILLUSION

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I.

LET us suppose a country in which hail each year destroys harvests valued at a million dollars. If a thousand persons have organized to bear the risks of this loss, each of them will have to pay one thousand dollars; but if the organization numbers a million members, each will be assessed only one dollar. So, too, if it costs a million dollars to establish safety of life and property in a city, where there are one hundred thousand able to contribute for this purpose, each one on an average must be taxed ten dollars; were there a million such inhabitants, the average individual burden would be but one dollar. Or to put it differently, let a Pennsylvanian be molested abroad, and he has eighty million fellow citizens to protect him in his rights; let a Salvadorian find himself in a similar predicament, and he has only eight hundred thousand fellow citizens to extend him their protection. Of course the support of the eighty millions is more effective than that of the eight hundred thousand.

This shows that the benefits of organization increase directly with the number of those comprised in it. Whence the inference might be drawn that if the fifteen hundred million people that inhabit our planet, formed a single association, they would enjoy the maximum of well-being attainable on earth. For surely as no one can deny (other things being equal, of course,) that the association of all mankind would be the most beneficent possible and even conceivable, since the more comprehensive the society the greater are its benefits.

But what does the association of all mankind mean? *Absolute* safety guaranteed to all national groups, and to all the individual members of those groups. It means that every one may rest absolutely secure, knowing that no foreign army will invade his country; that every one may, without the least sacrifice of civic liberty, shift his abode to any part of the habitable globe; and, finally, that every one may enjoy the fullest possible returns from his labor, because he may sell and buy at will in all countries without the least let or hindrance. The association of all mankind would mean, then, that the rights of the individual would be respected and guaranteed by all his fellows, or, put in other terms, there would be juridical relations between the nations of the whole earth, or, yet again,

it would mean the universal acceptance of institutions such as govern the relations of the forty-five republics constituting the United States of America.

One can picture very readily in our day what mankind would do if knit together in one vast organization. All would engage, then, in a warfare only against the ills that nature inflicts: inundations, droughts, epidemics, and so forth. They would labor, also, to bring about such conditions as are most favorable to man: digging canals, draining marshes, irrigating deserts, and the like. In one word, men would no longer devote a single hour to unproductive undertakings. All their energies would be spent on the improvement of their material and moral situation. Is it not clear that, under these circumstances, the welfare of the race would increase quite inevitably at the greatest possible rate?

The wealth of humanity is as yet like the web of Penelope. Every war destroys a part of the work done in time of peace. Need one wonder if the progress of the web is slow? But when mankind shall no longer destroy in a few months of madness the product of long, laborious years, the race will weave in a given time a much more noteworthy length of web than before.

What will mankind be when it produces only and destroys nothing? What will it become when the time spent in casting cannon, erecting fortifications, building ironclads, and drilling soldiers shall be regarded as utterly lost? In our times of militarism and extreme jingoism we can imagine only with difficulty the change. But with almost mathematical certainty we can predict that, so soon as the day of work solely productive shall have at length fully dawned, the welfare and well-being of the race will be at least tenfold that of our times. But it is even now axiomatically evident how, for every man living on the planet, the most advantageous grouping is the association of the whole human race.

Now, granting that this is so, it follows necessarily that all clashes of interest which it is claimed exist between nations, must be apparent only, and not real; for, were they *real*, the union of the whole human race would not be the most advantageous combination,—which is absurd.

If the truth be, then, that the selfish interests of nations are identical, it is clear that whenever they appear to be opposed, what *seems* cannot be what *is*; in other words, a *mistake* is made. If one could make men understand this truth, the supposed hostility of national interests to one another would be considered a mere illusion and nightmare; and that it is so I propose to try to prove.

Men say that the state of constant warfare can never be replaced by a juridical organization of humanity, because every nation will perpetually

seek its own selfish interests. On the contrary, it seems to me, for this very reason will the reign of justice be inaugurated. That every nation desires to protect its interests with utmost jealousy is just as it should be. That is the ideal condition; the famous "Dieu et mon droit" of the English. Such indomitable persistency in the defence of one's interests, at the cost of direst sacrifice, is the very best guarantee of justice.

A great mistake, however, is made when one imagines that what the nations today consider their selfish interests, must indubitably be so regarded on the morrow, whereas one can confidently predict the reverse, since what the nations just now consider their interest is precisely the opposite of their true interest. The errors into which the nations have fallen with regard to their real, sure, and concrete interests, are simply appalling.

The most widespread notion in our day in the public mind, is that the *natural* state of the nations is one of unremitting antagonism. In the Russian national anthem this line occurs, "Reign for the terror of our enemies, O Tsar of the true faith." This presumes that the sovereign must always be surrounded by foes. So long as the nations cherish such a conception their interests will be hostile. But the clash of interests will not be due to the nature of those interests but to the fact that the nations *believe* the clash exists. Had the nations another view, then, of their interests, their feeling of hostility would disappear at once.

Not their interests, but their fashion of conceiving their interests, is what sunders the nations. Or, to put the matter with stricter precision, one can say that what sunders men is the difference in the extent of their mental horizon. Two men are on a mountain. One is short sighted. He sees only what is within a radius of five miles. The other has good eyes. He sees whatever is within a radius of ten miles. Had the two men equally good sight, they would see the same number of things and they would agree. But just because their sight is of unequal strength they see things differently, and they no longer understand one another. This illustration directly applies to the question of interests. Unless a man be insane he guides his conduct by his interests. But this does not prove that one of extended mental horizon will not conceive of his interests in a totally different way from the man of restricted views.

Let me cite one example to support my contention. Public opinion in all civilized countries is divided in two camps with respect to foreign policies. On one hand, the jingoists, the chauvinists, the imperialists. On the other hand, the advocates of peace and federation. The former affirm that the welfare of their native land can be secured only by thwarting their neighbors in their interests. Hence war, conquests, policies of

exclusion, in other words, international anarchy. The latter affirm that the welfare of the same country can be secured only by the most scrupulous respect for the rights of neighboring nations. Hence peace, universal suffrage, liberalism, in other words, an international reign of law, that is, federation.

But the British jingoes and the British peace advocates have only the interests of their country in view. There is not a single British peace advocate who says, "I want the downfall of my country; I desire to see her prosperity brought to the minimum." On the contrary, the peace advocate says, "I love my country with a sacred love; I love her more than any other country in the world; and it is just on this very account that I should like to see her scrupulously respect the rights of her neighbors, because it is to her interest, when viewed most selfishly and narrowly." Likewise the jingo says, "I love my country more than all other countries; that is why I want to see her constantly at war, and trampling on the rights of adjoining states, because this is beyond dispute conducive to her best interests."

Truth is one, hence truth unites mankind. All astronomers agree in saying that the planets journey about the sun in the following order: Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune. No astronomer would in our day affirm that Neptune is nearer to the sun than Venus. All astronomers agree as to the order of the planets. If we could arrive at true and exact notions of what produces the prosperity of countries in mutual relations, we should agree in international politics as we do on the question of the relative distances of the planets from the sun. And, since men agree so soon as they know the truth, it follows that if they disagree, they do not know the truth. It is their errors that sunder them.

We are confronted by two contradictory propositions. One party declares the interests of the nations identical; the other party declares that the interests of the nations are opposed to one another. As two contradictory propositions cannot both be true, one must be true and the other false. If the former be true, the nations ought to federate as quickly as possible; if the latter be true, they ought to fight to the bitter end,—the extermination of the human race. But whether the nations adopt one or the other of these opposite lines, they will in either case, act in accord with what they regard as their interest.

Open the official histories. You will repeatedly come across some such phrase as this, "When King X. came to the throne, his kingdom consisted of fifty thousand square miles of territory. Thirty years after, when he died, he ruled over one hundred thousand square miles of coun-

try. His reign was, therefore, a glorious one." The glory of kings seemed to vary in direct ratio to their conquests. Sovereigns imagined in good faith that their chief interest lay in extending their boundaries beyond those of their fathers. Hence they tried to have the finest armies, the best furnished arsenals, the most formidable fleets. Furthermore, they endeavored to have in their service such diplomats as were most cunning in choosing the moment when an attack upon a neighbor might wrest a province from him. In short, the kings thought it to their interest to behave like beasts of prey and brigands.

Some day history may be written in quite another fashion and one may then meet with such a sentence as this, "When King X. came to the throne, the average annual income of his subjects was two hundred dollars; when he died, a quarter of a century later, the average income of his subjects had risen to four hundred dollars. His reign, therefore, was a glorious one." The glory of kings will be in proportion to the well-being of their peoples. When ideas of this kind universally prevail, kings will consider it in accord with their best interests to have as small an armed force as possible, to spend not a single penny in useless engines of destruction. Kings will put their pride in a scrupulous regard for the rights of their neighbors and will behave not like beasts of prey, but like reasonable creatures, to whom the most sacred duty is justice. In both cases the kings will have been guided in their conduct by their *interests*, though their behavior will have been of an exactly *opposite* sort.

The question, then, of interest is eliminated from the discussion. All we want to know is which of the two propositions above set forth is the *true* one. When the truth has been discovered the foreign policies of all nations will be identical. The Americans will do as the Russians, the British as the Italians, and so on, because the Americans, the Russians, the British, and the Italians, will be equally seeking the welfare of their respective countries.

There are two ways of proving that a proposition is true: the direct method and the indirect, which demonstrates the contrary proposition to be false. I am going to resort to this latter method. In the following pages I shall endeavor to show that the arguments used to substantiate the necessary conflict of national interests will not bear scrutiny; that this conflict is a mere illusion, having no counterpart in reality, an error proceeding from our ignorance, and from the narrowness of our mental horizon. Then the contrary truth will become clear, that for every man living on our earth the most advantageous association is the juridical association of the entire human race.

II.

The causes of national antagonisms are all reducible to two fundamental ideas : it is advantageous to have as extended a territory as possible ; it is advantageous to have as extensive a market as possible. The desire to spread one's borders occasions irreconcilable conflicts. Space cannot be created. If, therefore, the territory of x increases that of z must diminish. There is, then, a complete opposition and clash of interests between x and z , since the gain of one is the loss of the other. The desire to increase the extent of territory against the will of the neighbor is called the thirst for conquest. To be able to make conquests the nations arm millions of men, and practice that extreme militarism that produces our present day international anarchy.

The idea that to have as extensive a market as possible is advantageous, leads also to numerous consequences. First a nation endeavors to reserve for itself exclusively its own markets. That is the doctrine of the protective tariff. Then, while not willing to open its markets to others, it desires to enter those of its neighbor. Hence an antagonism which is held to be inevitable since every nation wants at the same time two mutually exclusive things : namely, to open the markets of others to its trade, and to close its own to theirs. Another cause of hostility is that every nation desires the monopoly of trade. Great Britain, for instance, wants to sell as many of its manufactured products as possible in South America, and wants the United States to sell none.

Finally, a form of the preëmption of markets is a mixture of economic and political procedures. A nation conquers a country to obtain the monopoly of its trade. So France seized Indo-China and Madagascar and excludes British goods ; the United States has "annexed" the Sandwich Islands and shut out European goods. This is the commercial or colonial system. Naturally these trade antagonisms are regarded as inevitable, since the increase of the markets of x is necessarily a decrease of the markets of z .

Further on I will examine each of these cases, beginning with the economical facts. It will be easy to show that whenever there appears to be opposition of interests, it arises only from an incomplete analysis of the facts, that is, from an error of our minds. But before entering deeply into my subject I want to offer a series of preliminary considerations which will considerably strengthen my argument.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, influenced by the great scientific movement headed by Darwin, men have been inclined to

consider too exclusively one aspect of social phenomena, that of struggle, rivalry, opposition. This aspect is real; it has even great importance, but it is not the only one. In nature there appears, also, association, coöperation, solidarity. Every animal organism is an association of cells. There are, then, as many vital associations as there are multi-cellular organisms on the earth, that is to say, billions upon billions. Association is, then, as universal a fact as conflict, and conflict, in fact, presupposes association. When the tiger attacks man, billions of associated cells which constitute the tiger are fighting the billions of cells that make the man.

So soon as one considers competition without at the same time considering coöperation, one falls into the deepest error. Thus the American competition, of which at present so much is being made in Europe, is the product of the very error that I have been pointing out. American competition is a mere fantasm. There is no competition between nations, for the simple reason that the nations as such do not engage in trade. The phrase "Franco-American commerce" is an abstraction, at best a collective statement. France as a whole does not trade with America as a whole. Johnston and Jameson, private persons living in America, exchange their products with Dupont and Durand, private persons living in France. Now a commercial transaction is not a conflict, an opposition. On the contrary, it is an agreement, an instance of coöperation. Only violent spoliation is a cause of division and of enmity. Commerce is an exchange of services.

Nowadays we are apt to forget that there are not merely opposing interests between men. There are also common interests. We are wholly hypnotized by war. There is something more than war in the world, there is peace also. Sweden and Russia made war on one another in the nineteenth century for two years. But those countries have afterwards lived in peace for ninety-eight years. In 1901 six thousand legal measures were proposed in the House of Representatives at Washington. These measures concerned the forty-five republics that constitute the United States. One sees from this that if these republics have differences, as in the time of the great Civil War, they have also a great number of common interests.

The same is true of the European nations. Although they have not yet arrived at a federal organization, like the republics of the United States, the European nations have every day and every hour a great mass of common interests that are settled in many ways. Besides, the fact should be borne in mind that the nations, even diplomatically speaking, are not always hostile. They are often allied. Europe is, in fact, divided

into two great alliances, and no matter how far back we study the past, we find international alliances under very divers forms. It is clear, then, how mistaken those are who consider only the side of opposition, without taking the pains to see, also, the side of association.

Next to this error, of seeing only one side, which does most to prevent the perception of the solidarity of interests between nations, comes that of the false analogy assumed between the individual and the nation. Everywhere about us we see individuals whose interests are or seem mutually hostile, and the inference is made that states like the United States and France, being individual nations, must have antagonistic interests, as beings of flesh and blood often have.

The first error consists in failing to see that if a conflict of interests can arise between Peter and Paul, a solidarity of interests is quite as possible. So, even holding strictly to the analogy, it is quite conceivable that the interests of the United States and of France should be in the latter rather than the former case. But there are in this analogy a number of graver errors besides.

The nations are in the larger whole of the race, as the individuals of flesh and blood in the midst of those political associations. Now, if there were a *real* clash between the interests of the individual and society, society would seek the destruction of the individual, and the individual that of society. That were absurd, since society cannot exist without individuals, nor individuals, again, without society. Were there an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of individuals and of the groups to which they belong, every organism would be a constant self-contradiction, a physical impossibility. It would be a whole of which the component parts would have every selfish reason to work for the destruction of the group and yet would not wish to destroy it. Those beings would be doing perpetually the opposite of their interest, that is to say, would be insane, which proves that the supposed antagonism between the unit and the group it helps to form, is not real but imaginary.

This can be readily proved. Let Peter and Paul be two teachers ambitious to occupy the same professorial chair. They have to subject themselves to an examination. If Peter obtains the appointment, Paul does not. The interests of these men *as mere individuals* are, then, exactly opposite. But Peter and Paul are equally interested in having their examiners honest and impartial; in having justice prevail, that is to say, they are equally interested in the utmost perfection of their country's institutions. Peter and Paul are, furthermore, alike interested that the chair be filled by the worthier. If Peter says to himself, "I admit, in

my secret heart, that Paul is abler than I; but, nevertheless, my *interest* requires that the chair be given to me and not to him." Then Peter *ill* knows his interest; he deceives himself. The existence of a man implies the existence of the society of which he is a member, and if that society sickens grievously (and it begins to perish the moment justice is not rigorously observed), all the individuals that are members suffer with it. Our primary interest is that the group to which we belong, and especially the most exclusive group, namely, the race at large, shall prosper in the highest degree. It is only when the narrowness of our mental horizon prevents us from understanding this truth that we believe we discern a conflict between the interests of society and those of the individual. This antagonism proceeds, then, purely from an intellectual error; it is nowise an actual reality. As nations are to humanity what individuals are to the state, it follows there can be no conflict between the interests of the several nations and those of all the nations as a whole. When, therefore, this antagonism *seems* to exist, we are self-deluded.

The maximum of happiness for each one of us can be secured only on condition that the maximum of happiness has also been obtained for the total population of the earth. This statement may seem very idealistic and high flown, yet it conveys the most positive and definite truth. For the *extensive* should not be confounded with the *indefinite*. A large horizon does not necessarily imply losing one's self in the clouds. Could one at a single glance survey the whole earth, one would enjoy the widest possible horizon for man; yet not on that account would one be soaring in the realm of fantasy. On the contrary, the eyes would behold the utmost reality we are given to imagine, and because it was wholly complete it would be concrete; for it is because the horizon is incomplete that we are ignorant and so fall into error, that is, into the realm of the imaginary and the fantastical.

No statement could, then, be more matter of fact than that the immediate selfish interest of every one of us is found in the greatest possible happiness of all our kind. To produce the greatest sum total of prosperity, all men must be able to contribute to their utmost ability. If Koch discovers a cure for tuberculosis, all consumptives are helped. If Edison patents a new invention, we shall ourselves soon be benefited. Every man who achieves some success is the benefactor of all his fellows. But to enable him so to hasten our progress, he should be as free as possible. Every infringement of our neighbor's rights is, therefore, an assault upon our selfish interests.

The *real* interest of nations is no more than the sum total of the interests of all their component individuals. Now every individual wants the maximum of well-being for the minimum of work. The *real* interest of the nations is, then, the same. But this concrete and positive interest of nations is often not only very different from the interest imagined by diplomats, but is often their exact contrary. Thus the Emperor Napoleon the First, for many years imagined it his interest to "humiliate" Great Britain. For this he sacrificed thousands upon thousands of Frenchmen. But this imaginary "interest" had nothing in common with the real and concrete interest of his subjects. Those who believe that Frenchmen had a real and definite interest in "humiliating" the British are, then, adrift in cloudland, among chimeras, or, in plain terms, are grossly mistaken.

We are accustomed to personify nations and to assume analogies between such collective persons and flesh and blood people. So we are wont to say, "France and Germany both desire Alsace-Lorraine. Their interests are, therefore, quite irreconcilable." But such reasoning implies a serious misconception. France and Germany are not individuals but social groups, capable of sustaining none but social relations with Alsace-Lorraine and can have, therefore, none but a social interest in that province.

Peter and Paul are in love with Mary. Here is between two men, as individuals, a complete irreconcilable conflict of interests. If Mary returns Peter's love, Paul will suffer, and vice versa. The happiness of one is the unhappiness of the other. But the question of Alsace-Lorraine being *collective*, presents itself differently.

If Mary is in love with Peter, she will not return Paul's affection. As individuals, then, the interest of Peter is opposed to that of Paul. But Peter and Paul are equally interested that Mary shall freely marry the man she loves, for it would be a dreadful evil for both if she could be forced to marry the man she did not love. The *social* interest, then, of Peter and Paul is that the institutions of their country, so far as marriage laws are concerned, should be as ideally just as possible.

In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the *real* interest of the German people, as of the French, is exactly like that of Peter and Paul in their relations to Mary *when viewed socially*. The consummation most devoutly to be wished for, the interest of both Germany and France, is that no civilized people should be forced to belong *against its wish* to any state whatever, just as it is both Paul's and Peter's common interest that Mary should not be forced to marry the man she does not love. If the Germans think it to their interest to compel the Alsacians to submit to their rule, it

amounts to saying that the German people believe it to be their interest to have international institutions as bad as possible; that would show the Germans mistaken, but nowise that their *real* interest is opposed to the *real* interest of the French people. The real interest of both nations is absolutely identical, namely, the utmost respect for the will and wish of the people of Alsace-Lorraine as of all other parts of Europe.

Let us now pass to another set of arguments. Count Tolstoi maintains that the truest life consists in restricting as much as possible our material requirements, because he believes "competitious rivalries, quarrels and all kinds of wars proceed from this very desire for the fulness of life."¹ To utter such an idea is to publish one's ignorance of the most elementary principles of political economy. Not only does the acquisition of wealth nowise involve the plundering of one's neighbor's possessions, but societies actually grow rich the fastest in which respect for one another's property is most scrupulous. Count Tolstoi does not seem to understand that all wealth proceeds from changes wrought in the materials offered by nature. In the *economic* realm there are only exchanges of service equally beneficial to all who engage in them. It is only in the *political* realm that there can exist exchanges of ill deeds. It is by reason of our imperfect institutions that one citizen is suffered to despoil another within a state, and that those great expeditions of collective brigandage called conquests are undertaken. Count Tolstoi believes quite naïvely that all wealth is got by despoiling one's neighbor. As a corollary of this colossal error the interests of all nations seem to him antagonistic.

But Count Tolstoi is not alone in such reasoning. Very few indeed nowadays understand that the most absolute respect of neighborly rights is the most advantageous of all conducts. It is generally believed that the oppression of the weak by the strong is beneficial to the weak. Hence there is no little zeal in initiating such oppression. Hence, also, the enmities of nations. But it ought to be clear that nothing prevents the nations from the strictest practice of righteousness in their mutual dealings. No natural obstacle interferes. If the various states could bring themselves to submit all issues and differences to competent tribunals the rivers would not overflow their banks, the sun would not refuse to ripen their crops, nor would earthquakes reduce to ruin all the cities of the world. The antagonisms of nations, proceeding as they do from certain erroneous notions lodged in our heads, would disappear as soon as those notions had been exchanged for the truth.

(1) Cf. *Le Journal de Genève*, September 8, 1901.

I have subjected now to our scrutiny this question of national antagonism in several ways; I have tried to show that these proceed solely from errors of our minds. One can thence safely infer that when the *true* nature of social phenomena is generally understood, no concrete cause for hostility will any longer appear, but, on the contrary, a thousand reasons for solidarity. Sooner or later it will come to be understood necessarily that for each human being the most advantageous combination is that of the entire race. But an abstract and theoretic understanding of this idea (which, by the way, already in our times partly exists) will not suffice. We shall need to have it realized in our political institutions. Such a realization is only possible in a vast confederacy comprising all the peoples of the earth.¹

III.

Let us pass from the general observations of the preceding chapter, to the economic phenomena, which produce the so-called antagonism of the nations. The doctrine of a protective tariff takes the first rank under this head. The nations injure one another by their tariffs and, therefore, they imagine their interests to be opposite. I mean to show by an example how this injury is inflicted.

In 1890 the King of Greece obtained from the Emperor Alexander III. that Corinthian raisins might be imported duty free into Russia. Thanks to this concession, the import trade in this article became enormous. In two years it trebled. From 6,400,000 kilograms it grew to 19,200,000. Suddenly the Russian government imposed on the Corinthian raisin trade a duty amounting to two hundred per cent ad valorem. The importation shrank at once to a ridiculously small volume,—scarcely 5,000 kilograms in all. The Greeks, not being able any longer to sell their raisins, ceased to produce them, and many districts of the Peloponnesus, where were but a little while ago flourishing vineyards, are now abandoned to briars and thistles. Whole populations that lived in comfort are reduced to penury. And it cannot be stated that Russian producers have won what was lost by the Greek producers. Corinthian raisins are not grown in Russia; there is no more culture of the grape now than before the imposition of the new duty. Not unnaturally the Peloponnesian Greeks, financially ruined by Russia, regard their interests as diametrically opposed to those of the Russian Empire, and feel hostile to it.

The instance of the Corinthian raisins yields a general principle, applicable to all commercial transactions. Every country, at the present

(1) Cf. *Fédération de l'Europe*, Paris, Alcan, 1901, p. 189.

moment of world history, seems to have no other passion or purpose than that of stopping the development of agriculture and industry among its neighbors. There is a general conspiracy in favor of universal poverty. There is in this, no doubt, an act of most manifest hostility, which can result in nothing but the bitterest feeling of hatred.

But assuredly no government engages in this odious policy with the avowed purpose of ruining its neighbor. For instance, the imperial Russian government does not cherish a special hatred for the American people, which might make it desire the impoverishment of the United States. Nothing of the kind. There is no *direct* intention of injury to others. The prime motive of protectionism is to benefit one's self. If the governments were persuaded that as great a selfish advantage could be derived from the inauguration of a free exchange of commodities, they would spend as much eager energy on the abolition as they now spend on the imposition of tariff duties. If the protective system were really in keeping with the natural order of things, the antagonism it produces between the nations would be inevitable and enduring. But, since the protective system, far from being in accord with the nature of things, is, on the contrary, an error of the mind of man, all that is needed to abolish the custom houses and consequent national antagonisms that are now deemed inevitable, is a right understanding by the nations of their true self-interest, which lies in a free exchange of their products.

The protective system still has *disinterested* advocates among the cultivated people of our times. A deputy to the French parliament, M. Naquet, who was long engaged in business, and who made himself famous by getting a divorce law passed, M. Naquet, who is not an ordinary man, has just published a book entitled "*L'humanité et la patrie*," from which I make the following extract:—

"What does it matter if a pair of shoes cost one franc instead of twenty francs, if one has not the franc with which to buy them? Better pay twenty francs for them provided work enough and at a sufficient wage can be had, for the workman to earn easily the sum needed for their purchase. *Therefore the principle of free exchange is false.*"¹

If any one were trying to prove that the principle of a free exchange of commodities is absolutely true, he could not produce a better argument. In fact, the passage quoted from M. Naquet is the most perfect proof of the error of protection. Reduced to concrete terms, his doctrine can be formulated thus. Certain citizens of one country must pay money

(1) *L'humanité et la patrie*, Paris, Stock, 1901, p. 251.

to certain other citizens so that these can exchange national for foreign products. Paul needs a pair of shoes. He can buy a pair in the United States for one franc. "No," says M. Naquet to the French people, "that is not to your advantage. See to it that Paul can earn twenty-five francs and that he buys his shoes of another Frenchman." But how can the French make Paul earn twenty-five francs instead of one franc? This is not the day of miracles. The French cannot increase the inventive capacity, the faculties, the working power of Paul. They can do one thing only: cause their government to take from themselves in the form of tariff taxes the necessary amount, and pay it to Paul. But why create special privileges? That is what M. Naquet does not explain.

Let us apply his theory to the facts. France produces, on an average, between ninety and one hundred and twenty million hectolitres of wheat. Let us say one hundred for round numbers. Let us imagine for argument's sake that America can furnish the French this amount at two dollars per hectolitre. The French people will then have to expend two hundred million dollars for their wheat. But French farmers can furnish their wheat only at four dollars per hectolitre. M. Naquet argues, "It is not to your advantage, you Frenchmen, to buy your wheat of Americans at two hundred millions, for then your fields lying fallow and producing nothing, you will have no money with which to buy wheat. Better for you to receive four hundred millions; then you will find it very easy to procure all necessary grain abroad." M. Naquet forgets the most elementary fact. If the French had given up the culture of wheat in their country, and had bought all the wheat they needed in America, would the Americans have sent the French one hundred million hectolitres of wheat without demanding anything in exchange? One cannot readily imagine such a piece of generosity. Whereas if the Americans received from the French some other wares, in exchange for their wheat, that would only prove that the French could engage more advantageously in some other occupation than the culture of wheat.

The reasoning of M. Naquet can also be reduced to something like this, "Other Frenchmen must give their money to Paul, so that he can afford to buy articles of foreign production." Innumerable objections to such a proposition occur at once. In the first place, why buy anything abroad? If the French have no wares to offer their neighbors in exchange for what they want from them, the French can get nothing from abroad. Why should Dupont give the fruit of his labor to Durand, so that Durand can buy foreign products? And if Dupont ought to give his money to Durand, why should not Durand give his to Dupont? But if the phenomenon becomes general, mutual spoliation becomes the social

principle. Now spoliation being the suppression of justice, and suppression of justice being anarchy, we come to the deduction that anarchy, in other words disorder, is the normal condition of society. But then we are forced to admit that disorder is order, which is a contradiction in terms.

These last years people have taken great alarm because of the so-called American peril. It has been claimed that the wonderful development of industry in the United States must bring about the ruin of Europe. So long as America exported only raw materials and agricultural products, Europe could subsist. But the moment America began to export coal, iron, steel, locomotives, machinery, tools, canned foodstuffs, and dry goods, the passing bell of Europe would begin to toll! This portion of the world was to be utterly ruined. The childishness of such a fear is apparent. Besides, we were confronted with a complete reversal of logic. Canada, for instance, had furnished France with wood for fuel. That seemed quite natural because it had been done for many years. The business had brought no one to bankruptcy. But the moment Canada should send *coal* for fuel France would be ruined! As with coal, so with all the other articles of commerce. If Europeans buy certain articles it must be because these suit them. The introduction of American cloths is no more ruinous to Europe than the introduction of American cotton goods, because every commercial transaction, concluded in perfect freedom, is agreed upon only if it be advantageous to both parties involved. Is it not time that serious people should discard that childish notion that the advantage of exchanges is dependent on the *nature* of the articles exchanged; for example, that it is profitable to export manufactured wares, and to import farm produce? Not at all. The profit lies solely in the *values* of the exchanged articles. One can export machinery at a loss if obliged to sell at less than cost, and one can realize a large profit by exporting produce if sold far above cost.

Protectionists, however, are so far, right. There is such a thing as an American peril. Only it is precisely contrary to the peril they imagine. Fancy for a moment, what would become of Europe and in particular of Great Britain if for one single day American goods were to stop coming. There would be dearth at once of the most indispensable commodities; in the first place, of bread. Then the immense cotton industry, in which hundreds of thousands are engaged, would be smitten. In a word, awful economic catastrophies would supervene. Besides, if the Americans ceased selling to the Europeans, they would buy nothing of them. Whence new and further terrible calamities on this side of the Atlantic Ocean: lock-outs and nameless misery. I repeat, there is most

assuredly an American peril, and what is more a very terrible one, but it will come if the United States ceases to send its products to Europe.

Next to the protective system, one of the great causes of the antagonisms of nations is the conquest of markets. Thus, for instance, Great Britain alone furnished formerly machinery and manufactured goods to South America. Now the United States are beginning to export the same articles thither. Hence the exports of Great Britain must diminish; hence, also, the commercial interests of those two nations (and of all in a like predicament) must be antagonistic.

There are in this proposition, again, many fallacies. In the first place, if the Argentine Republic, to be specific, buys metal wares of the United States, it does not follow that she will buy none of Great Britain. That it should be so, the numbers of her population would have to remain stationary, and their needs would have to be fixed and immutable. But the needs of men are more changeable and uncertain than the waves of the sea. Any day the wealth of a country may be increased by a more scientific exploitation of its natural resources, and consequently its purchasing power may be very greatly increased. Then that country will make heavier demands on other countries. In the second place, even supposing that Great Britain should cease selling metal products to the Argentine Republic, it does not follow that she would not sell her customer other wares. In the third place, if Great Britain sells less goods to the Argentine Republic, it is not proved that her exports as a whole must decrease in volume. Losing one market, in which she appears at a disadvantage, she may conquer another market which she can exploit under more favorable conditions. It may happen that Great Britain, by limiting herself to the markets most lucrative for her, will have increased and not decreased her wealth as a result of American competition. Granting the free exchange of commodities, all goods would travel along the most natural roads. Every market would be furnished from its most suitable source of supply. Thus those conditions would obtain which were most advantageous for all concerned, and all false items of cost and all waste be reduced to a minimum.

What has just been said can be put in still another fashion. The nations in our day contend with one another for open markets. They understand that their interest lies in having as extensive a market as possible. But what does the possession of a market mean? It means having the freedom to trade in it without prohibitive import duties, or any legal obstacle. Every American producer possesses already a market of 9,230,000 square kilometres (the territory of the United States). Clearly

it would be better for him if he had a market of 38,346,000 square kilometres (the entire New World). But, of course, if he had an open market including 135,000,000 square kilometres (which is the surface of all the continents) his interests would be furthered, in this respect, to the very maximum. Every producer and every nation, therefore, is interested in having the entire world for an open market.

As a matter of fact, when, in these days, a government negotiates a commercial treaty, it endeavors to give as little and get as much as possible. The ideal of each government would seem to be that the products of its country should enter duty free the neighboring countries, but that the products of those neighboring countries should be burdened with prohibitive duties at its frontier.

Let us imagine that France, Germany, Italy, and the other countries of the world, without a single exception, admit *all* American goods duty free! But if the protective tariff were nevertheless maintained in the United States, that would safeguard only *half* of the rights of American citizens. For they would, indeed, be free to *sell* their products without arbitrary impediment, and to realize thus the greatest possible profits; but they would not be free to *buy* what they liked where they liked. Their rights would be *limited*, since they would not enjoy to the full the free right of purchase. Americans would, in this event, be injured no longer by any stranger, but they would be injured by their fellow countrymen, by those, that is to say, to whom, thanks to the protective tariff, they would have to pay perpetual tribute in the form of an artificial enhancement of price.

Freedom in the exchange of commodities alone can safeguard the interests of the nations. Since they are *all* interested in the inauguration of *the same* commercial policy, their solidarity is manifest, and their supposed antagonism, in this particular matter of trade, is a delusion proceeding from the misapprehension of the *real* play of the economic forces involved.

An epidemic has spread among civilized nations in the last third of the nineteenth century: that of colonial conquests. It has been the chief source of imperialistic and jingoistic ideas, which are just now one of the important causes of national enmities since every nation wants to carve out for itself as vast a colonial domain as possible; and since the territories occupied by savages or barbarous populations are limited, it is said that the nations will have to contend forcibly for these territories; whence an uncompromisable conflict of interests.

To be sure, the colonizing mania will create antagonisms as long as it lasts. But nothing goes to show that it will last forever. The proof that it will pass is the very fact that it is so very recent. Voltaire spoke with the profoundest scorn of the French colonies in America. He called Canada contemptuously "a few acres of snow." Today we indulge in ideas diametrically opposite to those of the eighteenth century. We are full of devout admiration not only of those acres of snow (that melt, perhaps, in summer), but even of the acres of rocky wilderness that remain what they are the year round. But since we do not think as our fathers thought, there is room for the belief that our descendants will not think as we do.

The colonial "rush" of these latter years proceeds from two entirely false ideas: first, that trade follows the flag; second, that the emigrant follows the flag.

Let us first consider trade. In 1900 the trade between the United States and Great Britain amounted, in imports and exports, to \$793,000,000, or \$19.00 per capita of Englishmen. The trade with Australia amounted to \$312,000,000, or \$7.50 per capita. Finally, the trade with the Indies reached \$287,000,000, or \$6.80 per capita. Thus the commerce carried on under the folds of the Union Jack and of the Stars and Stripes is more than double that under the Union Jack alone. Trade does not, therefore, follow the flag in the case of the people of Great Britain. Nor for any other people, for the matter of that. The most important trade of France is with Great Britain and by no means with the French colonies.

As much can be said concerning emigrants. Of the 8,864,576 emigrants from the British Isles who have settled beyond seas, between 1853 and 1900, 5,885,451 (that is, two thirds) have gone to the United States. So of the Germans and Italians few, indeed, go to their possessions in Africa and Australia; the great majority migrate to foreign countries: the United States, the Argentine Republic, and Brazil.

The theory that trade and emigration follow the flag dates from those dark times of anarchy long since past. No French emigrant goes now to Morocco. A certain number, on the other hand, go to Algeria. Why is this so? Because every Frenchman landing in Morocco runs ninety-nine chances of a hundred of being murdered in that barbarous country, while the Frenchman who lands in Algeria is now protected by the French authorities, and can go where he pleases without running greater risks than in the country of his birth. In the barbarous period, when every country promised as little safety to the stranger as Morocco does today, the idea got lodged in our brains that in order to colonize successfully a

country must be occupied by soldiers, that is, must be conquered politically. In our day, the emigrants that go to America and Australia enjoy an almost complete protection. It is no longer necessary, then, to follow the flag to colonize. Conditions have changed, but old ideas have remained. If the antagonism of the nations in these times proceeds from the notion that the emigrant should follow the flag, that antagonism, since it rests on nothing real but only on an error, is a delusion.

It can on the contrary be proved that with regard to emigration the *true* interests of the nations are quite as coincident as they are in respect to trade.

It has been reckoned that the settlement of every family of French colonists in Algeria has cost the home government seventeen thousand dollars. Evidently it would have been more profitable for France had those emigrants been able to settle in Algeria without costing the government anything, as is the case with emigrants that go to settle in the United States. Now what would have been necessary to secure this result? Only that the Algerian government, before the French occupation, should have guaranteed to strangers as perfect safety as the actual government of the United States secures them. All nations, then, without an exception are interested in having the utmost security and order prevail over the entire surface of the globe. But if all the nations are interested in the *same* thing, it is cogently proved that their interests are identical and not antagonistic.

It appears, therefore, that from whatever point of view the interests of the nations are scrutinized, the same conclusions are reached, and they are forced upon us with irresistible force; antagonisms are a mere illusion, solidarity is the most positive and tangible of realities.

IV.

The last cause of reconcilable antagonisms between nations remains now to be examined, namely, political conquest. Germany seized Alsace-Lorraine and wants to keep it. France wants to take it back. How reconcile these contrary interests? Here is a cause of hostility, surely, against which all the prophecies of peace advocates born and yet unborn will break. Man will never become an angel. Never will he prefer his neighbor to himself. Never will he allow himself to be governed by the demand of abstract justice. Besides, justice cannot obtain in international affairs, because justice is unthinkable without sanctions, and there is no international tribunal possessed with the armed power to enforce its decrees.

Such are the arguments of conventional minds. They imagine that mankind will forever show the follies and freaks that it shows in our days. But circumstances change, and to new circumstances sooner or later new ideas correspond.

In the Middle Ages there were six hundred and fifty sovereign states in Germany alone, fifty or so in Italy, and a corresponding number in the other countries. Every head of a state then regarded it as the supreme end of his efforts to "round out" his dominions. There was even a time when little distinction was made between private and public domains, for the sovereigns, when they acquired new territories, acquired more subjects and so more serfs to work for them. The long historical period, during which the conquest of neighboring territory was considered the most lucrative and the noblest of all occupations, has brought forth ideas which still prevail today. But those ideas do not correspond to existing conditions, and must, therefore, sooner or later be recognized as erroneous.

The ancient ideas no longer correspond to our present day conditions, for the simple reason that conquests between great civilized nations have become impossible. There is assuredly not a single monarch in the world, not even William the Second, with his Gothic spirit, who fancies himself able to invade the United States and annex it to his empire. Such an idea would seem even ridiculous in our time; it would strike us as sheer madness. But during the Middle Ages it was not so. Even as late as the seventeenth century the Elector of Brandenburg could take advantage of a set of circumstances to invade the dominions of the Elector of Saxony and annex them entire. An undertaking of that sort was nowise a piece of folly; it was perfectly feasible, and all the great states had up to that time come into existence by resort to such military methods.

But what was feasible, when the whole forces engaged numbered a few hundred thousand men, is no longer so, when they would now be some ten millions strong. The complete conquest of an entire great nation, as for instance, of France by Great Britain or vice versa, has become in the very nature of the case impossible.

One can say almost the same thing of partial conquests, of the annexation, that is to say, of a bordering province. If France, for instance, wanted to declare war against Germany to conquer back Alsace-Lorraine, fifteen million soldiers would be in arms in a few weeks throughout Europe. A formidable war would break out, the issue of which would be wholly uncertain.

The intellectual progress of the race has been applied to military affairs, as to others. The mobilization of armies is now managed in Europe quite automatically. No nation can be caught unprepared. One

cannot, therefore, any longer discover one of those "genial" diplomatic combinations that permit a sudden attack on the enemy promising considerable chances of success. The period of diplomatic conspiracies and of international brigandage, like the conquest of Silesia, the dismemberment of Poland, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, is therefore past. It is a definitely closed chapter of human history, like the expeditions for the recovery of the Tomb of Christ. And this is said not out of *optimism* but out of *realism*. The era of battle with the sword is gone. One need not be optimistic to hazard the assertion. A glance about one is convincing. Our modern armies are equipped with guns that fire twenty-five shots a minute, and their bullets establish by the flatness of their trajectory a deadly zone that cannot be passed.

At present, then, this is the situation. The conquest of a great nation is *impossible*. If, therefore, it is believed to be possible, a *mistake* is made. Hence one need but see things as they are and not deceive one's self, to give up what is clearly seen to be impossible. Let those, then, who direct the course of the politics of civilized nations cease from *mistaking* the facts, and they will at once give up any notions of conquest. But as soon as the policy of conquest is abandoned, the supposed political antagonism of the civilized nations will vanish like a ghost.

On December 14, 1901, Signor Prinetti, Italian minister of foreign affairs, in answer to a question, thus expressed himself, "The friendly relations of France and Italy have become such that the two governments are able to exchange definite and satisfactory statements of their interests in the Mediterranean. These explanations of policy have made it clear that there exists an *entire agreement in their views* as to what concerns their respective situations."

Before, as after, the Franco-Italian "rapprochement," France had the same extent of territory in Europe and Africa; she occupied Toulon and Bizerta; she had the same regiments, the same ironclads, the same arsenals, as well equipped, the same roads, the same financial system. There was then no alteration in the *concrete and real facts*; there was only a change in the ideas of two Italian ministers. Francesco Crispi *believed* that the interests of Italy and France were antagonistic. Signor Prinetti no longer *believes* that. Similarly the governments fancy that the conquests of great nations are yet possible, and, therefore, they pursue their present policies. But when they shall have come to believe that conquests are no longer possible, they will pursue other policies.

But it may be said there are small as well as great powers. The giants can easily eat the dwarfs. Assuredly Germany could invade Hol-

land, conquer the people, and annex their entire territory. But in the first place, even if this is so, this kind of conquest will last but a short time. When all the little nations are absorbed there will remain only the great nations which are admittedly unconquerable.

Nothing, however, proves that the little nations will not be able to hold their own. They can preserve their independence by putting themselves under the protection of the great nations, and by using the rivalry of these as a bulwark. The United States does not want to annex Costa Rica, Guatemala, or Venezuela. Yet it will not permit any European nation to annex these or any other South American countries. The immense power of the United States thus secures all the republics of the New World. So, also, in Europe, any effort to annex Belgium made by France or by Germany might result in a general war. Thanks to this circumstance Belgium enjoys an almost sufficient protection.

This rivalry of the great powers now extends over the whole earth. There are left no unpreoccupied regions. The attempt of the French to seize an African hamlet (Fashoda) almost caused a war between the two greatest nations of Western Europe. Similarly in Central Asia the British and the Russians watch each other closely, and the considerable advance of one of these nations may produce such tremendous European complications that men hesitate to unchain tempests so dangerous. All these considerations cause wars of conquest to become more and more unlikely.

These conditions are of recent origin and few have a clear understanding of their significance. On the contrary, the vast majority of mankind, thanks to traditional routine, go on living in the world of mediæval notions. And this is true not only of private persons but even of public men of political importance. Let us again hear what M. Naquet, from whom I quoted a passage on the advantages of the protective system, has to say:—

“The different countries are condemned always and everywhere to regard themselves as at war, since the conditions of an enduring peace are wholly lacking. Let a people endeavor to increase its well-being, its morality, its intelligence. It will strive to multiply those discoveries which quicken industrial activity; it will exercise a prudent restraint, and keep its population constant. But by so doing it will grow rich, and since the relations of the various peoples to one another are yet characterized by the spirit of brigandage, its wealth will arouse the covetousness of its neighbors. If these are at a lower state of civilization, less fond of comfort, less spoiled, they will multiply like rabbits; their numbers increasing, their brutality persisting, they will soon grow strong, will fall upon the richer people, lay waste its fields, demolish its factories, confiscate its capital.”¹

(1) *L'humanité et la patrie*, p. 244.

The passage just read, is inspired by the old notion that the Roman Empire was destroyed by a popular invasion of the Germanic peoples. It has been repeated again and again that Germany was in the fifth century of our era an *officina gentium*. Germany is imagined as swarming with a vast population, which it was unable to feed, as pouring forth a deluge of field-tilling clans over the provinces of the Western Roman Empire. Now, of course, nothing of the kind ever occurred. In the fifth century of our era Germany was one vast forest, a country almost uninhabited. There was barely one inhabitant to two square kilometres. What have been called "the great invasions" were not at all an *economic* event, like the clearing and settling of the Dakotas or of Wyoming, which we see in progress. The great invasions were *political* incidents. They meant the conquest of a domain by warrior chiefs. Clovis did not lead German colonists into Gaul; he only established his dominion over that country; he undertook to rule it in the name of the Roman emperor whose capital was Constantinople. So, also, the Huns did not pass into Europe because they had not fields enough to till in their original country, which was even less thickly populated than Germany. Attila was a warrior chief, a brigand, as were Pizarro and Fernando Cortez. He was looking for peoples to pillage and rob, not for fields to till.

Whence has M. Naquet derived the notion that barbarous peoples or savage peoples multiply rapidly? Supposing even that their birth-rate were very high (which is not proved, since there are no statistics to consult) the fact would not be clear. That the population may increase inordinately, there must be a very great excess of the birth-rate over the death-rate. But among barbarous and savage peoples the death-rate is so enormous that any excess of the birth-rate must needs be slight. In three centuries after the passengers of the "Mayflower" effected their landing, the white population of the United States will have reached one hundred millions. But the Redskins—savages within the borders of the United States—hardly reached two millions after having occupied that vast region since the Quaternary Epoch. The barbarous populations do not, then, swarm. Where are the dense populations of the earth? In Europe, in the Indies, in China; that is to say, in the great centres of civilization. Great progress must, in fact, have been attained, before one hundred inhabitants to the square kilometre can be supported.

The picture drawn by M. Naquet is absolutely untrue. On the one hand, the barbarous peoples do not increase rapidly; on the other hand, the more civilized the nations are the less they are able to attack each other. After the disasters of 1870 the military organization of France was perfected. Nowadays, if an order for the mobilization of the army

should be issued at Paris three million soldiers would be immediately massed at the indicated points. How was this marvelous result attained? It is solely due to the high civilization of the French which permits them to organize their state in an almost perfect fashion. Today Bismarck would not risk a declaration of war against France because he would know that the country was no longer so easy to conquer. As long as certain populations of the earth remain savage and barbarous, they are not very dangerous, because scattered and poorly armed.¹ But as soon as all the nations of the earth shall have become civilized, and consequently have a very dense population, they will reach the state at present obtaining in Europe. They will no longer be able to destroy one another, and must consequently give up their spirit of conquest.

I have not even alluded to those forces that increasingly work for solidarity. A panic on the New York exchange now causes a similar panic in London and occasions enormous financial losses. Think, then, what a war between England and the United States would mean today;—whereas in 1812 the war almost escaped notice, it would be today for both countries a catastrophe of which history has no example. It would mean the instantaneous stopping of all the machinery of social life. In England the bakers would not be able to furnish bread nor the butchers meat.

The knowledge of the facts which I have been setting forth will at length become public property. It will finally penetrate the consciousness of the least cultivated men. Then the social atmosphere will be utterly changed. Another air will be breathed. The period wherein perpetual butchery seemed in harmony with the natural order of things will end. The period wherein the association of all mankind will seem in harmony with the natural order of things will begin. But what will then have happened? When speaking of Franco-Italian relations I pointed out that what had changed since the times of Crispi and those of Signor Prinetti, was not concrete realities, not the natural situation of France and Italy, but only the *ideas* of those in charge of the government of the two countries. It is just the same with the entire race. From the most ancient times the most advantageous combination for mankind has been an association of the entire race to combat other animal species and to modify to their profit the unfavorable conditions of our

(1) The question of equipment has acquired an importance of the very first order. A regiment, with rifles of an improved type, can destroy an entire army provided with guns of an older model. To have always a rifle of the very latest type, a nation must be very rich, that is, very highly civilized. Barbarians are barbarians just because they produce little.

planet. It has always been so, in the time of Rameses the Great, that of Alexander of Macedon, that of Cæsar, that of Charlemagne, and that of Napoleon.

A well known Belgian political economist, M. de Molinari, has written in recent years many works to prove that war is *already* a speculation of the most utterly ruinous sort even for the victor. But he affirms that war had once its utility, because it served to repel invasions of barbarians. The learned Belgian falls into a one-sided error. He does not, it seems, perceive that the onslaughts of the barbarian hordes were also wars. If M. Molinari had said that though war existed, civilization was saved because it was able to repel and overcome those barbarians, he would be in the right. But when he says that war was in the past useful because it saved civilization, he falls into the gravest of errors; for a moment's thought suffices to make clear that if the barbarians had never gone to war civilization would have already attained a glory the splendor of which we can hardly imagine.

The association of all men has always been the combination most advantageous for each of them. Only, as men were ignorant, they did not realize that it was so. That is to say, they did not see what was to their *real* interest. They were, then, in *error*. It is this very error that engenders their antagonism.

But the fulness of time has come. We are no longer ignorant as were our rude ancestors. Science has extended our intellectual horizon. We include the whole earth at a single glance.¹ A man like Mr. Pierpont

(1) There is a constant parallelism between the extent of our intellectual horizon, and the extent of the social tie. In primitive times when the means of communication and the methods of instruction had not yet, so to speak, been invented, man could know only what he saw directly with his bodily eyes. At that period, human association did not extend beyond the limits of vision, and those of the reach of the voice; it consisted of barely a few hundred individuals. But, little by little, as the means of communication and the methods of indirect representation have been perfected, human associations have become larger. There are now some that comprise several hundred millions of people. We are doubtless at the dawn of the day, in which, thanks to wireless telegraphy, every one of us will enjoy a certain sort of omnipresence. An apparatus, set in my office, will make it possible for me to communicate, every minute, with my friends in Chicago or in Burlington. By the help of this device the reach of the human voice will have embraced the whole surface of the planet. Geographical maps and charts and photography have also helped to extend the limits of human vision to include all the continents. For instance, thanks to our illustrated newspapers, all civilized people were able to imagine the catastrophe at Venice of the fall of the Campanile of San Marco, just as if they had been themselves on the spot. Under these new conditions, the association of all mankind becomes not only quite possible but I shall not hesitate to say, inevitable.

Morgan moves his financial arms over a chess-board that comprises the five continents. I repeat it, we understand from now on quite definitely that the maximum of happiness for each individual can be realized only by the complete association of the race. We understand that the formation of such an association constitutes our most concrete, most immediate, most material, and most selfish interest. There is, then, good reason to think that, since the fundamental errors of the ancient ideas are exposed, we shall be willing no longer to make them the foundation of our principles of conduct, and we shall inaugurate in the future policies diametrically opposed to those of our rude forefathers.

Those men who were still closely akin to the brute, considered brute force the only power in international concerns. But the resort to brute force means anarchy and universal disorder. It is towards reason, then, that our sympathy and our respect tend. Now reason shows us that the rights of societies should be as sacred as those of individuals. For centuries a struggle has been carried on within the state to procure for the citizens that supreme good,—personal liberty. The struggle must continue without truce and respite until the same right shall have been assured for nations. But on the day when the nations shall be free to order their own destinies, there will no longer be slaves and masters. Political unions will then be founded on the will of the peoples. There will be no more brutalities and conquests, no more disorder and anarchy. The nations will be *conscious* of their solidarity; whereas at present the solidarity *exists* but they do not feel it, imagining on the contrary that their interests are in hopeless conflict. When the general federation of mankind shall have been realized, truth will at last have overcome error.

THE RECENT AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE

RUSSELL STURGIS

NEW YORK

ARCHITECTURE, even in its most limited sense as significant and attractive building, may be a fine art or it may be an industrial pursuit and an industrial manufacture without any artistic side to it whatever. The architect, even he of approved ability and quality, even he of great social influence and of immense success as a highly paid professional adviser, may be either a decorative artist of extreme subtlety and power or he may not be a decorative artist in any sense of that word. The chief of a great office may be constantly engaged with the production of works of fine art in the way of the general masses and groups which he brings into being, or in the way of delicate and bold or effective detail, or of both; and he may be, equally well, indifferent to all those considerations and concerned merely with doing honestly his duty as a builder of buildings and as a provider of homes, of shelters for congregations and audiences, of business investments.

It is this curious existence of contrary possibilities that makes modern architecture the puzzling thing it is. Articles in our periodicals, articles written by men of light and leading, are seen which deal exclusively with the physical side of architecture, so to speak,—which deal only with the vast sums of money spent and spent intelligently, with the vast number of huge and showy buildings added to the world's possessions in a year, with the great size, the novel proportions, the bold employment of new materials, the commercial and the wonder-working side,—the money-spending and money-making side, and with nothing else.

Now the word commercial has a bad and a good sense, and while we must employ the term, for it is rather closely descriptive of an important modern fact, we must also beware that our use of it is not misunderstood. An excellent paper in the "Atlantic Monthly" for October "calls down" those who denounce commercialism, and points out that commercialism tells for peace, for free intercourse, for the comity of nations, for the gradual and wholesome advance of civilization, and that it is the worst enemy of war and of all other forms of barbarism. Those same statements may be accepted as truths while yet we have to urge that commercialism also tends to destroy simplicity, originality, significant individuality, and wise association in the production of the work of art. In a com-

mercial age, at least in one having the characteristics of modern commercialism, the fine arts are in their worst conceivable situation as regards the world at large,—the worst conceivable except only that of savagery. Fine art may flourish in times of war, in times of brutal and ignorant tyranny, in times of national poverty, in times of national confusion and internecine war, but so far as we know now, any great triumph in fine art is incompatible with a controlling commercialism.

Commercialism in matters of fine art is nearly equivalent to this,—to the producing of so very many objects that there is no time to treat them artistically. As long as the family expects to possess only a few vessels, a few garments, a few chests and chairs, each piece may be solidly made by hand, and will probably be the subject of some interesting artistical treatment. When the community has but one important building, in the erection of which it steadily occupies itself for five or six years, that building may very probably be full of thought expressed in delicate handiwork. But when, as we are told every day, a community is spending more money in a year than the cities and the little states of the great artistic times spent in a half century, the conditions change. Thirty buildings are started in a year, each costing as much as a Gothic cathedral; so we are told. They are also finished within the year; and under these conditions the capacity of the town would have to be superior in proportion to the capacity of Florence in the fifteenth century in order that any success in the way of artistic treatment should be reached.

With regard to our sauce pans, coffee pots, earthen pitchers and platters, they are made for us by great companies so cheaply that even a poor family has an immeasurably greater stock of such conveniences than the wealthier people of a century ago; and evidently they cannot be carefully designed. This obtains so strongly and so universally that we have ceased expecting the vessels which we buy cheaply for our everyday service, intending to throw them away after a few months, to be in any way comely. A remedy for this uninteresting condition is in the way of being sought for, with some prospect of a successful result to the search, by the societies, the companies, the manufactories, and the single private work people who are now engaged in making their vessels of porcelain or rougher pottery, their simple, enameled cups and jars, their inexpensive but carefully designed personal jewelry, their book covers to which intelligent thought has been applied, and their weaves of simple floor cloths and rough curtains. The land is full of such experiments, and they promise well. If this paper were a treatise on the general question of the prospects of decorative art, the tone of it would have to be rather hopeful, because, while the epoch is truly said to be one in

which the intelligence is turned to other things rather than to decoration, there are yet possibilities of a great change coming gradually, so that the twentieth century may not have quite such a bad reputation as had the second half of the nineteenth. The purpose of this paper is to inquire how far the same possibilities of good are visible in the case of the chief of the decorative arts, that great complex of many industries and many fine arts which we call architecture.

A word must be said about the difference of outlook in the case of those arts which have much to do with the representation of natural facts, and those which are very nearly indifferent to natural fact and appeal almost altogether to the adornment of objects of utility. That is the only distinction between the arts of expression and representation on the one hand, those which we sum up generally under what has grown to be almost a compound term, "painting and sculpture," and the arts of decoration, so far as they are separated from the expressional arts. And there, also, in that same distinction, lies the reason why the arts of one group may flourish greatly while those of the other group may be far less successful, far less masterful. For see what has naturally happened. The result of the changes which took place between 1790 and 1820, changes which were not political merely, but affected the whole social organization of Europe, was such that the fine arts were at a low ebb during the years immediately following. And since that time there has been no style of decoration generally accepted and worked upon cheerfully by all; no style of architecture, no style of internal carving and painting, no character of surface pattern, no sculpture of leaf form and flower form or of conventionalized animal form, as to the nature of which all men were in a sense agreed, no system generally accepted of using cast or embossed metal work, no development of design in book-binding or in the adornment of furniture, no natural evolution of costume. The years from 1830 to 1850 were more barren in this field of purely decorative art than has been any other epoch of which we have knowledge. Then, when a very slight movement began in 1850, it was naturally unintelligent, because the would-be decorators had no uniformity of purpose; each tried for himself and each failed. There have been fine art movements since 1850, and some not so very long after that fixed epoch. Certain French goldsmiths and jewelers made attractive things in the "early fifties"; Parisian furniture makers have always been ambitious in a good way; an interesting building or two was built here and there, and in many cases these buildings have been already destroyed because they were not costly enough or stately enough for the growing demands of the great urban communities which possessed them. Such

slight experiments were making; but there is no difference of opinion among observers as to the general fact that the years between 1830 and—say 1880—formed a half century of terrible barrenness in the way of decorative art. Painting, however, was in a very different condition, and so, *mutatis mutandis*, was sculpture. Magnificent results in painting have come from movements that began as long ago as 1840. In some respects the second half of the nineteenth century saw a definite advance in the technical art of painting, and in one or two departments a novel departure even in the recondite and supreme matter of thought expressible only in painting. In sculpture the achievement is not so noticeable. That is, the development from older into newer forms is not as marked; but there is noble sculpture in Europe and America, and not for two hundred years has the production of sculpture been on the whole so sound, so wholesome, so permanently valuable to the world.

The distinction, indeed, is very marked. One says hesitatingly that the second half of the nineteenth century was not a great artistic epoch, and then is inclined at once to take back the words as he remembers the names of great artists, the noble paintings, the pure and dignified groups and figures which the epoch produced. If it is not one of the great artistic epochs, an epoch to be compared with one or two in antiquity and two or three since the recommencement of civilization in the twelfth century, it is, in matters of expressional art, so very near to being one of them that we who have belonged to it are not quite sure yet of its relative standing. But nobody can have any such feeling about the decorative side of it. We did not during that epoch, and we do not yet, know how to adorn the buildings that we build, nor to so build that adornment will be in the work itself, or will come naturally and easily. We have absolutely no power to produce a building which will be a delight to the community, except for its bigness and its cost. The descriptive and expressional art we can handle; the art of beautifying the useful is beyond us. Nor is the reason for this distinction far to seek. The sculptor of portrait or of ideal impersonation or of semi-historical or patriotic subject, and in like manner the painter of landscape, of the human form in dignified composition, or of subject such as we generally class under the term illustration, has always the wholesome intercourse with nature to set him right. There is no exception to the nature of the historical event which has occurred so often. The arts decay; they are felt to be decaying; their practitioners suffer from the feeling; they plunge into this bath which nature has ready for them, and they come out refreshed. Over and over again the seemingly dying art surprises those who look mournfully upon its struggles for life with its renewal of youth. But the spirit of decora-

tive art has no such powers of renovation. There is no such great school for it to go to, there is no all-wise mistress ready to point the path the moment it is inquired for with any singleness of mind, and to say, Do this! Success in decorative art has always depended upon slowly developing tradition. There had always been an unbroken chain of methods of design. The more we study it, the more that modern men have brought semi-scientific methods to bear upon the subject, the more certain it becomes that the arts of design, never distinguished as they now are, expressional art, never separated from decoration, were the fruit of constant though, of course, irregular development from times of unknown antiquity down to the civilization of which we have spoken above as being the end of the Old World—the world to which art was an important factor in life. The thread was broken and cannot be united. The very working men and women who are trying to design in a simple and natural way in earthenware, in leather, in glass, or in metal, are themselves aware that no development is possible. No one will take up the course of thought. This artist stops working and there is no one who has learned from him how that work is to be done and who proposes to do it better. Even in the artist's own workshop the new year is thought to require a new fashion; the artist dare not repeat with slight modifications his work of last year. He knows that in order to sell he must produce something which has not been seen before; if he offers to a would-be purchaser an object not wholly unlike something which he was making two years before, he is perhaps met with an insulting suggestion that he is trying to force old goods upon a new purchaser, and that such doings as that are not commercially honest. I have myself seen many cases of carefully designed objects of decoration, thought of by the producer as of permanent value and as producible today as they were ten years ago, thrown back upon the maker with the remark that it is improper to offer such things "as new goods because Mr. X has exactly such a piece in his dining-room which was finished two years ago." As far as present information goes no one has refused to buy a Homer Martin of 1875 because there are Homer Martins of 1890. It is doubtful whether the most benighted of would-be purchasers has ventured to express a protest against the offering on the part of the artist or the acceptance on the part of a committee of a piece of work over which several years had passed; but with the piece of decorative art fashions change as they do in the cut of skirts and of coats, and where fashion enters, the art spirit steps out or hides in an unvisited corner.

It is difficult, except in the actual presence of the building or else by means of ample pictorial illustration, to treat of the purely artistic merit

of a building or a detail; but the moral significance of a design may be explained or qualified, and this is still more obviously true of the practical intelligence shown in the treatment of the problem involved—for there is always a problem involved in days of rapid change and of the trying of experiments. Thus, the newest of New York buildings, that of the Stock Exchange, now completed except for its sculpture, may partly be judged; judged partly from its plans, partly from a sight of the building, partly from the sculpture itself as seen in the large model which in its complete form was shown publicly for a moment in this current month of November, 1902. There is a building in which for purposes of utility the most has been made of a lot really too small for its purpose, and incredibly, almost inconceivably, inferior in size and availability to that which would have been given in any European city to a building of this cost and dignity. No courtyard, whether of entrance (“*cour d’honneur*”) nor yet central and surrounded by buildings to which it gives light, no showing in any one direction of the whole building or of any large mass of it, two façades on two parallel streets and nothing else, those are the untoward external conditions. As to the disposition of the main structure it was essential to provide one very large room abundantly lighted and perfectly ventilated, and the modern conditions of elevator service and the like allowed this room of constant recourse to be raised above two stories of minor apartments. This possible and on the whole convenient disposition has suggested to the architect the idea of using a huge Roman colonnade for the principal feature of the principal front and to make the building more useful by the very employment of this usually non-utilitarian detail. Ordinarily, in recent times at least, the colonnade is an adjunct of purely decorative purpose and often seriously mars the interior by diminishing the amount of daylight received or wholly excluding that which might come directly from the sky. What, however, would happen if the enclosed building with glazed openings were to be treated as a great portico? Ordinarily the columns of a colonnade have responds, one to each; that is to say, each column is backed by a pilaster or if the colonnade is broad, the pillars coming far from the enclosing wall in the rear, the separate responds disappear in a continuous wall. This latter way of proceeding has been followed by the architect of the Stock Exchange, and he has built a portico of which the row of columns is removed very far from the opposite wall; he has then put in a continuous window, glass carried by iron frames and sashes, filling the whole open space immediately behind the columns. The result of this is that the passage of daylight is hindered only by the rounded and fluted shafts of Corinthian columns, the open spaces between which are much wider than

the columns themselves. It is evident that this is an extremely practical solution of the difficulty, and that while it may be too early to speak of its final artistic effect it is safe to say that here has been a wise experiment boldly tried.

We have not done with this building, however. There is to be in the great pediment above the colonnade in question, which pediment stretches a hundred and ten feet from north to south, and fronts almost due east, a great composition in sculpture which, to judge by the model and by the smaller studies made in connection with scale models of the whole front of the building, is to be, it may safely be said, the most important piece of sculpture ever produced by an American artist or put up in America. It is one, moreover, which will be of the very highest rank of undertakings in modern sculpture wherever to be found.

It is to be noted, then, that while no opinion is expressed here of the merit of the design of this principal front of the Stock Exchange building, nor of the perfection of plan, nor of the secondary or minor front on New Street, that this building will claim attention from all students of the achievements and of the possibilities of modern architectural art. It is my own belief that no one can do as much for architecture, just now, as by combining with it important sculpture; reasons have been given above to show in part why this seems true. The two men most concerned are, then, to be greatly congratulated on their achievement in this respect, G. B. Post for the renewed instance of his noble ambition to add the most important work in sculpture and in mural painting to his numerous costly buildings, and J. Q. A. Ward, whom I take to be the most successful of American sculptors in matters of great design.

A complete contrast in the character of the achievement, as of the very scheme itself,—in the problem set for solution,—is furnished by the Museum of Science and Art connected with the University of Pennsylvania. This building is the work of the Philadelphia architects, the firm of Cope and Stewardson, the firm of Frank Miles Day and Brother, and Wilson Eyre, the names being arranged in alphabetical order. It has not proved practicable to distinguish the work of one architect from that of the others. The group, as seen from the street which passes in front of the open quadrangle, consists of a long two-story building closing the quadrangle in the rear and two wings lower, because set at a lower level, which advance toward the street and the line of the main entrance, the fourth side of the court being closed by a wall rising perhaps ten feet above the street but not more than four feet above the level of the quadrangle. Now as to the larger details; the long building in the rear is cut in the middle by a much higher structure serving in front as the entrance

hall; it has on either end a square pavilion with a hipped roof, the two wings in advance, that close the sides of the quadrangle, are also two stories high, and also have their line of roof broken by higher pavilions, with the roof ridges at a right angle with those of the long stretches of building.

The pavilion, on either side and in advance, has a polygonal apse which advances well toward the line of the street. Such description is hard to follow, but it is inevitable here because it is necessary to point out that these buildings get their most prominent architectural charm from the play of light and shade, which is a colored light and shade because of the materials used, and which is greatly aided by this constant succession of up and down, of in and out, of shadow-creating eaves contrasted with smooth gable walls, and by the long series of round arched openings continually varied as it is in the size and grouping of the minor parts. The buildings are everywhere of brick with very sparing introduction of bands and other patterns of color, and the general effect is warm red, the shadows of which run to purple, or as reflections fill them, to ruddy brown, while the roofs are everywhere of those brownish scarlet tiles in strongly marked ridge and furrow, which ridge and furrow, when handled with perfect taste, is so powerful a decorative element.

The general character of the design is not fully understood without the statement that a high double perron of approach occupies the middle of the bounding wall on the street side and has a drinking fountain set in its parapet wall. This double "stoop" is repeated two hundred feet further on, at the foot of the central mass of the main building in the rear; but here it is much higher and leads to the main entrance of the whole structure.

The conditions, then, are those of a deliberately accepted style of extreme simplicity, from which it is proposed to get much architectural emphasis by means of varying and contrasting parts: brick walls, brick arches, only the central doorway at the head of the inner double flight of stone stairs adorned with a cut stone porch of quasi-Renaissance style, the porch roof sheltering a heraldic composition in the pediment; this porch being the more important and emphatic in that the gable wall in which it is encrusted has no other opening whatever, and only a sunken panel above a lintel with decorative mosaic to fill it.

It is well to note the extreme diversity in the scheme of each building from that of the other. A suburban site, low walls and roofs which though low pitched are plainly in evidence, contrast of color freely used, great diversity of skyline within severely set limits, a great number of rather small rooms so placed that they lead easily into each other and can

all have windows in plenty, simplicity, tranquility, and a kind of rustic air given to the whole by such features as the sheltered gateway of entrance with a roof of its own like a "lych-gate," while still the building is so handled as to look larger than it is, and never to be taken slightly. It has no added ornament except in the few details named. So much for the Philadelphia building; as for the New York Stock Exchange building, it is entirely citylike and entirely Roman of the Empire. It is of marble, without contrast of color or even gradation of tone; it depends upon a stately and somewhat conventional sort of dignity for its principal effect—upon a dignity which is in a way accepted as necessarily a part of the "high Roman fashion" of building. It has the most splendid sculpturesque adornment obtainable in our time.

When praise is to be given to the significance of a design and to the expression in all parts of it, of the character of the plan, of the internal disposition, of the material, and of the way in which the material is used, this praise is very apt to be given to a building whose principles of design are mediæval, as contrasted with those of classical antiquity. This comes of the fact that we know only so much of classical antiquity as had to do with the vast monuments of Rome and her kindred cities, or the smaller but equally abstract and simple buildings of religion and of city life left by the Greeks of antiquity. We do not study Pompeian houses or the ruins of villas in Gaul and in Britain, and therefore we do not know them; our needs do not require such dwelling houses as those; our studies of the Greco-Roman past are of the very grandiose monuments alone. On the other hand, our studies of the Middle Ages include everything, dwelling houses and little village churches as much as large cathedrals. There is also, of course, the distinction that the work of the Middle Ages was that of poor, scattered populations using the stones of their nearest quarries or where no quarries were, then such rough brick as they could make, and always and in great abundance, the timber of the forest-clad hills. The taste of the people,—it is safe to speak of the United States alone and of its urban communities chiefly,—the taste of the people is evidently for classical gravity and classical grandeur; and yet, if one has to build a utilitarian building, he makes a mistake if he tries to build in any of the classical styles, and that because there has been as yet no solution of the problem: how to treat those styles nobly while turning them to humble uses. If there was money for the encouragement of architectural design one of the great ways of employing it would be to give prizes for realistic treatment of the classical styles, to encourage in this way the modern designer to hold those styles plastic in his hands and to dare much for the sake of the great result. How would a Greek, not of Pericles' time, but of

a later and more splendid and more spending age, have treated the problem of that Pennsylvania school of which there is mention above? The little building by Messrs. Cram, Goodhue, and Ferguson at Pawtucket, a public library on a small scale, is in part an answer to the question, although it is evident that the difficulties have been avoided in great measure, avoided or turned. The necessity of a more complex plan or of two stories in the height of the building would have changed the problem bravely; and one would like to give a thousand dollars for that firm's solution of the supposed more difficult problem. Meantime as to the building itself, it is within resolvable into two straight oblong galleries, the pilasters within studied from the responds of Ionic porticoes carrying the horizontal roof beams beyond which are the lights of the skylight. The reader sees at once that it is a question of good taste and of restraint in the use of ornament, and a little more. The question of greater or less charm of proportion is one that we can hardly discuss without illustrations, opinions on that matter being so very difficult to collect and even to form; but here at least is no fault in good taste, and on the contrary a due proportioning of height to width, of pilaster to intercolumniation and the rest, altogether satisfactory to the eye. In the exterior there is a chance for more display of ability and more chance to go astray. At the same time, nothing unfavorable can be said of the general conception. The necessary height of the wings is not added to by false attics and the like; the suggested entablature crowns the walls in a perfectly simple and natural way; the great window openings are on each side of the porch, a group of three set much lower than the pilasters which separate them, which pilasters then carry the main entablature and enclose between them above the three windows three panels of relief sculpture, each panel a suggestive or symbolical composition, the work of Lee Laurie, who has certainly achieved a success in architectural sculpture well worthy of a more decided record than can be given here. There is one detail to be mentioned which is very peculiar and which may well be questioned: the break out of three or four inches on either side, which throws this whole window piece into horizontal relief or projection from the flat wall of the wing. The entablature, of course, breaks also through its whole height and thus an architectural feature is formed not unlike a broad ressaute of slight projection. This, however, cannot properly be estimated except in connection with the fact that beyond these wings so adorned is a much more projecting porch of four Ionic columns with pediment very agreeably proportioned, and having this unusual merit in a modern Greek building, that the columns have work to do; for, by some artistic legerdemain, the weight and mass of the stone structure forming the entablature and the

pediment above with the double-raking cornice, puts on an air of solidity which one does not often see in such a case. Back of this porch rises a square central mass of perfectly blind attic, half as high as the whole wall below.

It must be repeated that there is no fault whatever to be found with this building, which is one of the most charming constructions of its time. It is only a little less important to our studies in that the building is, as it were, forced to conform to the Greek style whereas we are longing to see just the reverse of that, the Greek style compelled to give up its secrets for the use of the modern building.

Years ago at a convention of the Institute of Architects, a paper was read on the possibility of adapting Greek architecture to modern uses, and a speech was made upon the subject of the paper, in which speech the point was made that this had all been tried and proved seventy-five years ago, in France, when the neo-grec style was inaugurated. Now, the neo-grec style had nothing Greek in it, nothing whatever! There is not a building in the Greek style among all the works of the neo-grecs. The term was given to those who had studied Greek art earnestly, finding in it a purity of design and a simplicity of artistic purpose not found in the statelier works of the great empire. Their movement was caused largely by the publication of Stuart and Revett's great book, a revelation which might well have caused delight and which in every case set them to studying the true bases of design. It was not in the line of French tradition, and it perished, very properly; nothing could have come of it, at least at that time, except confusion and the snapping of threads well worthy of being kept unbroken. But in this country we have no traditions; in this country we are not as France is, we are not, as I think, nearly French enough. It would be a blessed thing if there were not that screen of difference of language between us and the true inspirers of what is great in modern art. With us there is no reason in the world why the principles of design should not hold as a Greek would have conceived them had he modern resources, modern gold and iron, had he known the arch and the vault as working systems, the tie rod and the girder of indefinitely greater resistance than stone or timber to cross strain. Given a steel cage building still *in the cage*, as one may say, its iron columns and interties and braces rising like a skeleton against the sky,—given that necessary groundwork, to invest it with beauty of architectural design in the fashion that a Greek would have thought natural and therefore noble,—that would be an interesting problem, but unfortunately too “academic.” Given, also, the law-made necessity of boxing it all in out of the way of fire, and the question of doing all that in a Greek way

becomes more doubtful, harder to answer, but not less interesting for that!

Contrast with this imagined plan of action the treatment actually given to a sky-scraper by certain Chicago architects. Louis Sullivan invests his sheathed steel cage buildings with very plain boxing covered by embossed ornament; an elaborate system of foliated sculpture of a quasi-Byzantine look, about the merit of which the opinions of architects differ very widely. It must be noted with regard to this that our architects are almost absolutely unfamiliar with the process of designing sculpture. Since Richardson's time we hear of no attempt to invest buildings with newly designed sculpture except one may say in these very buildings by Sullivan. One of our most artistically minded and most thoughtful architects, a man in whose charge are buildings of great importance, said to me not two years ago that he took it for granted that no living American architect designed his own sculpture—"that they take the Renaissance panel and hand it to their draughtsman and bid him alter a little the length as compared with the width to fit the new conditions, and to draw it over again to the smaller (or larger) scale required, and the work is done." It is not, therefore, the imperfectly considered opinion of an active and busy architect or even of a number of them agreeing fairly well that is to be considered final in such a case as this. If there be anywhere a sculptor who has given his attention to the sculptural decoration of buildings, it is his opinion that I should like to have concerning Sullivan's leaf work.

That, however, is not now the question; we are talking about general principles of design and especially the general character of the exterior, and it is noticeable that designs by certain western men are rationalistic in their treatment of the exterior of such buildings. One of the best of designs considered in a wholly abstract way and without reference to what lies behind the outer shell, one of the best of designs for the sky-scraper is that of Bruce Price for the American Surety building in New York; but in that case the whole wall is sheathed with limestone, and the whole design is exactly that which would have been given to the building if the walls had been ten feet thick at the basement, as, indeed, they would have been of necessity were not the steel cage construction employed. In the very top of that building, from the seventeenth to the twentieth story, there are massive stone columns, a whole order raised above that gigantic architectural basement. In Hardenbergh's spirited and picturesque building, the Astoria Hotel, the great north front is wonderfully helped by an order of banded columns which is carried right through the middle of the front above a high basement and between two wings; but this order is composed entirely of hollow

drums of terra cotta which are threaded so to speak like beads by the steel uprights which do the work. In the Chicago designs all this pretence of traditional ways is at once denied and rejected; for them no huge columns of solid stone, or apparently of solid stone, or its equivalent, nor yet on the other hand, any great arches when there is nothing for the arch to carry and when the arch is and must be but a sham. The steel skeleton has to be covered from the weather and from the effects of conflagration across the street or near at hand, for American cities have a plague of fires from which European towns are almost free. The beautiful possibilities of the exposed iron structure worked with its architectural design carried out for itself alone are denied to us on this side of the Atlantic. It is for the artist, then, so to protect and cover that sensitive metal structure that he may not belie it wholly; and this is what the Chicago men have done. The All Souls' building by Mr. Wright and Mr. Perkins, several buildings by Holabird and Roche, and the McCormick building by Sullivan are all in the city of Chicago. By Louis Sullivan there are also the Guaranty Building at Buffalo, now called the Prudential, and in New York, one front on Bleecker Street, a front of less importance but still in many ways characteristic.

Several thousand photographs of American buildings not thirty years old are piled up here and have been searched through again and again. Such pictures remind the student of what he has seen, and to the practiced student they give, when one is compared with another and each with a plan or, lacking the plan, when views of the same building are brought together, almost what a sight of the building would give. This wide field of criticism is open before me excepting only the unfinished or just now finished buildings that are not within easy reach, geographically speaking. And it seems better to insist upon the few general points that are worth making and to elucidate those as far as may be by a more full discussion of two or three structures, than to make brief allusions to the two or three score buildings which might perhaps be named and criticized off-hand. Let this paper conclude, therefore, with some allusion to the slight contradiction there is to the dictum given above,—the statement that modern architects do not consider sculpture. Wilson Eyre of Philadelphia does consider sculpture and that in the most intelligent way. "Intelligent" is the word; the sculpture is not quite inevitable enough to be artistic in the highest sense. Thus, in a Philadelphia street front where two corbels carry a lintel there is carved upon each corbel a seated figure holding a shield and the two support a scroll cut with a slight rippled surface suggesting though not representing a flexible material and upon the scroll is incised the house number of the building. There is no

other carving upon this house except a rondel on a narrow face, where the angle of the house is taken off below an oriel window; this rondel is filled with a spirited design of slightly indicated vase, scroll, and rays. So in another house the lintel beneath the arch spanning the entrance doorway is carved with a shield bearing the house number, and here again the corbels are sculptured. The house formerly occupied by the St. Anthony Club has hood mouldings over the principal windows and the posts where these terminate on either side are wrought into bodiless cherubs, into leafage combined in a single design with a floating *putto*, and again into leafage encircling human masks very perfectly worked; an oculus,—a circular window near the front door,—is elaborately adorned with a frame of leafage and fruit and *putti*, a circular panel is filled with a cipher and the uprights of the oriel window are elaborately carved with a scroll pattern of much elegance. There are as many more examples in the photographs before me and one at least of these examples I have seen in place, and the conclusion seems inevitable that ingenuity and that kind of mental energy without which nothing good is done under difficult circumstances, are there in abundance and that a refined taste has controlled the selection of material and the use of it; but again it is to be said that these are the careful studies of an artist of insight and feeling applied to, rather than inevitably growing out of, the general design.

Our American architects, those of them who try to design for themselves, not content with simple reissuing of ancient ideas, may be considered as falling into two classes with respect to their use of sculpture. There are those who disregard it altogether, apparently thinking that it cannot be had in modern American work except with great expense of money and thoughtful labor, and of these are, among the older men, C. C. Haight, famous in our time for the extraordinary results which he knows how to produce without any such means of adornment; and the firm of Pond and Pond, in Chicago, who have been employed hitherto in fitting together material to produce logical and seemly results, with thought of the mass and thought of the resulting color, but with avowed disregard, for the moment, of significant detail. Among those who care for sculpture there is mention above of Post, the author of the Stock Exchange building, who finds means of employing sculptors (as also painters) of distinction to whom he gives opportunities for carrying out their designs without the interference of architectural necessities—all this in the spirit of modern Parisian work in which sculpture is used in the form of portrait statues and the like relieved against the fronts of buildings and not forming part of their design. Such work has been added to buildings by Bruce Price, Clinton and Russell, R. W. Gibson, and several others. It

has always seemed that R. H. Robertson's buildings show more feeling for sculpture as a necessary part of the architectural design than do others; but this way of using sculpture is indeed foreign to our modern habits—we have not even France to look to for guidance in this; since Wight struggled with the problem in the spirit of the English Gothic Revivalists and produced those studies of natural form with which the now destroyed Academy of Design building was adorned, there has been no other serious attempt of this kind; nor does it appear that that result should be aimed at in a community so self-conscious, so archæological, so elaborately taught by books and lectures, and so incapable of hammering at the stone fearlessly but with artistic purpose in every blow.

In this way a few names of respected artists may be used to explain one's full meaning as to tendencies and as to possibilities in architectural art. To the reader, who thinks that the list of names is but small, it may be suggested that there are several score names in even the most restricted list of men who in this "giant aggregate of nations" are trying with more or less determination to express something in their buildings, and also that any attempt at doing comparative justice to the members of that body of workmen would be but dull reading unless a small monograph could be devoted to each. It is to the general result and the general tendency and the signs of the times as each observer sees them that these pages must be devoted.

The Quarterly Chronicle

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FIRST YEAR

JOSEPH B. BISHOP

NEW YORK

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT has entered upon his second year of service with an amount of popular support that is incomparably larger than that which he enjoyed when he acceded to the office upon the death of McKinley, and confessedly larger than that which only a very few of his predecessors have been able to command. It is conceded that if the nominating convention had been held this year, he would have been named for reëlection without a dissenting voice. The Republican conventions of fifteen States, including the two which cast the largest number of votes in the national convention, have pledged themselves formally to his renomination in 1904, giving him assurance two years in advance of the votes of two-fifths of the delegates. All other conventions which were held warmly approved his course as president, there being in no quarter a sign of anything like hostility toward him. Formal pledging two years in advance is a proceeding without precedent in this country. No other president has received like mark of approbation, not even from a single State. It is all the more remarkable in that Mr. Roosevelt was elected vice-president, and no vice-president in our history, who has succeeded to the presidency through death, has been nominated for that office at the close of his term.

What are the reasons for this double departure from long-established usage? In seeking these, it is necessary to look for a moment at the circumstances attending Mr. Roosevelt's nomination for vice-president. He was at that time governor of New York, and was certain of reëlection to that office in case of his renomination. By his course as governor, he had made himself a powerful personality not only in New York, but throughout the country. It is no secret that as a personality he was too powerful to be satisfactory to the leading politicians of his party. They had found out that they could not control him in matters in which his ideas and convictions ran counter to theirs, and they had, in the vernacular of politics, "no use" for him. They feared that a second term in the governorship would make his nomination for the presidency in 1904 as certain as any future event could be, and they were determined to

prevent it if possible. They did not dare to oppose his renomination directly, so they hit upon the device of shelving him in the office of vice-president, feeling sure that in that position he would be so far removed from the public gaze that his popularity would wane if not disappear entirely.

Mr. Roosevelt's most devoted friends saw through this scheme and did their utmost to thwart it. When the national convention assembled in Philadelphia, they went there resolved to do everything possible to prevent his nomination, but they found themselves powerless because of his overwhelming and irresistible popularity among the delegates, especially those from the West. So great and dominating was this popularity that there was scarcely a moment during the preliminary sessions of the convention when that body was not in danger of a stampede to Roosevelt for the first place on the ticket. Every one who is familiar with the temper of that convention will admit that nothing but the fact that a great majority of its delegates came to it virtually pledged to McKinley prevented it from nominating Roosevelt by acclamation in an outbreak of uncontrollable enthusiasm. They were loyal to McKinley, but their hearts were for Roosevelt. The inevitable consequence of this was that Roosevelt could not refuse absolutely to accept second place without injuring his party. To do so would be to dampen the enthusiasm of its workers, and to send them disappointed and half-hearted into the campaign. The politicians who wished to get rid of him were able, as they supposed at the time, to accomplish their purpose through the irresistible enthusiasm of his admirers. It may well be that the politicians added fire and fury to this enthusiasm by arts in which they are past masters; but if it had not existed in the first place, they could not have used it to carry their point.

It should be borne in mind, therefore, in considering President Roosevelt's strength before the country today, that he was a very popular man when he entered the vice-presidency—had, in fact, an amount of popular following which made him a formidable candidate for the presidency. In this respect he differed radically from the usual nominee for second place. It had been, previous to his nomination, the almost invariable custom to select for second place some man who had not been thought of for first place, but whose nomination would for one reason or another strengthen the ticket in a particular State or section. Very often the nomination was made carelessly by a convention thoroughly exhausted with the work of nominating a candidate for first place. More than once a candidate has been put into second place in this way who has proved subsequently to be a dead weight on the ticket. Mr. Roosevelt

was not in this category, and it is not surprising that he should be the first vice-president to succeed to the presidency who, from the moment of his entrance upon that high office, was regarded as almost certain to be chosen to the presidency at the end of his term.

The one doubt that disturbed the public mind in relation to him when he became president was as to his steadiness. His critics had dwelt so persistently upon his impulsiveness, his disposition to pugnacity, and his impatience of guidance by others, that they had created a quite general impression that he was in some respects an unsafe man to trust with great responsibilities. His impressive words on taking the oath of office did much to allay this uneasiness, and his conduct since that time has done a great deal more by showing that those words embodied the dominating spirit of the man. "I desire to state," he said, "that it shall be my aim to continue absolutely unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the peace, prosperity, and honor of our beloved country." No fair-minded person can study the record of his first year in office and deny that he has kept this pledge in spirit and in letter. He began by calling the members of President McKinley's cabinet together and requesting every one of them to continue in his service. Since then there have been three changes, but in each instance the member who retired did so of his own volition, because he preferred private to official life, and not because the President wished him to go out. The strong men of McKinley's cabinet, Hay and Root, who did more than all others to shape his policy, who were his closest advisers in all matters of large statecraft, hold the same position in Roosevelt's cabinet and are in as complete harmony with him as they were with his predecessor. The new members who have come in have not disturbed in the slightest degree the even tenor of the administration or caused any deviation in its policy. So far as that policy itself is concerned, it has been carried on unswervingly on the lines laid down by McKinley. I showed, in the *Chronicle* of the preceding number of the "*Quarterly*," how completely this has been the case in regard to our new possessions, the Philippines and Porto Rico. Everything that has been done there has been simply the carrying forward of the work which McKinley outlined, and has been carried forward either with the agents whom he selected or by men of the same high type. That great advance has been made is not disputed. The end crowns the work, and the end is peace and steady progress toward civilization and ultimate self-government. In regard to Cuba, great progress was made there till Congress blocked the efforts of the President to fulfill literally the pledges of McKinley and carry forward his policy to its generous and just fruition. For broken faith there, not only toward

McKinley's policy, but in respect to the nation's plighted word, Congress is solely responsible.

As a peacemaker, this strenuous and impulsive president has accomplished some really notable results. When he came into office, the Sampson-Schley controversy had been raging for several years and had attained a degree of acrimony that was doing infinite harm to both branches of the military service. It had demoralized discipline in both the army and the navy, and had divided the country into two hostile camps that were daily thrusting the quarrel a little further into politics. Nothing more harmful to the military service than this could be devised. One by one army and naval officers were forgetting the rules and regulations which forbade them to take public part in a controversy affecting fellow members of the service, and were expressing their views in the newspapers and in public speeches with as much freedom as politicians in a political campaign. President Roosevelt by his rebuke to General Miles silenced every offending officer in both branches of the service, and by his action in reviewing at Schley's request the findings of the naval court of inquiry, put an end instantly and forever to the controversy. Scarcely less valuable service was done by him for the discipline and honor of the army when he took personal charge of the accusations of cruel and inhuman conduct against officers and men in the Philippines, and saw to it that the accused were brought to trial and the guilty properly punished.

But all other achievements in the direction of peace are dwarfed by the settlement of the coal strike. No task that he had undertaken previously had involved so large an element of political risk as this did. It was an entirely new departure. Nothing like it had ever been done by a president. The great body of conservative opinion in the country had serious doubts about either the wisdom or the justification of the step. He had no authority in law and no precedent to sustain him. He was fully aware of this and he succeeded by never losing sight of the fact that he had neither. He felt moved to act because of the great public need and great public peril involved, and he could not escape the conviction that it was a matter of simple duty for him, as the people's president, to exert all the moral influence he had in the interests of the people. Criticism did not affect him at all, no matter what its source, once he had made up his mind. He did not count the chances of success or failure, and when he was told, as he was repeatedly, that failure would ruin him politically, he went steadily and fearlessly ahead. While both sides to the quarrel repulsed his first efforts and refused to step up to the high ground of public welfare upon which he stood and to which he invited them, he persevered in his appeals to them till both came in the end, if not will-

ingly, at least with recognition of the fact that he had offered to them a way out without surrender. He succeeded in this, as he succeeded in all other like endeavors, by being open and straightforward in all his proceedings. He had no hidden end to serve; he leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but said simply, "I offer you my services as mediator in order that this contest which so seriously threatens the welfare and the peace of the whole country may be brought to an end." His obvious sincerity and singleness of purpose so impressed the whole country and, indeed, the whole world, that the contending forces were fairly compelled to yield to his proposals. The chorus of praise which arose from all quarters of the land, and from all the leading countries of Europe, when success was recorded, was something that no other president had ever received. He himself was unable to comprehend it and thought it undeserved. When it was spoken of in his presence, he said to his intimate friends, "I am being very much overpraised by everybody. I do not deserve it. It really seems to me that any man of average courage and common sense, who felt as deeply as I did, the terrible calamity impending over our people, would have done just what I did."

In that modest estimate of what he had done is to be found the secret of President Roosevelt's popularity. He does what he believes to be his duty in every instance, and cannot understand why other men in his position would not do the same. He says, and believes it thoroughly, that it requires only "average courage" to do this; but every close observer of men in high office knows that the amount of courage which the President exhibited in the coal strike was far above the average. He simply refused to count the cost of failure; all he would consent to look at was "the terrible calamity impending over our people." Very few of our public men have shown themselves capable of that amount of courage. They think of political consequences first, and of the public welfare second. Few of them have had that strong human sympathy which is the dominating attribute of President Roosevelt's character. He is a democrat in every fibre of his being, fulfilling literally the original meaning of that word—a man who believes in political and natural equality, as opposed to arbitrary or hereditary distinctions of rank or privilege. His conception of his duty as president is that in his eyes the humblest and poorest citizen is entitled to just as much consideration as J. Pierpont Morgan. Both are citizens of the United States, and he as president of the American people, will accord to one the same measure of impartial justice that he accords to the other. When he asked Booker Washington to dinner, he did not think of his color for a second. He thought of him as a citizen who was performing a great and useful work for the civiliza-

tion and advancement of his race, and he was both startled and grieved by the outburst of race prejudice in the South because of his act. He was president not of white Americans alone, but of the whole American people, and he was as far above racial prejudices as he was incapable of injustice.

It is this human sympathy that makes President Roosevelt not only a leader of his party, but the most powerful leader that any party has had since Lincoln. When he becomes convinced that the people are deeply concerned about a subject over which he has any power, it immediately becomes a duty with him to take it up. In this manner, during last summer, he took up in his speeches in different parts of the country, the questions of trusts and of tariff revision, not heeding the remonstrances of anybody, either within his party or outside of it, as to the political expediency of that course. He spoke about them with that directness which is his unvarying characteristic, talking in public precisely as he had talked in private about them with his friends; and the result was to allay at once a vast amount of demagogic clamor which had been started for purely partisan purposes. He took the leadership of his party on both these questions and in doing so strengthened it immeasurably before the country. Its success in the recent elections was due in great measure to his course. He convinced the people not only of his sincerity, but of the wisdom of conservative methods in dealing with these problems. One of the most striking evidences of the political wisdom of his conduct was the effect which his recommendations about trusts had upon the more violent leaders of the opposite party. They went at once to flat socialism as the only course left open for them to follow. In doing this, they confirmed his view of the case. It was his human sympathy with the people that prompted him to advocate conservative but unswervingly just treatment of the trusts. He foresaw that the worst sufferers from violent and unjust assault upon them would be the masses of the people. A reaction in national prosperity, a sudden shrinkage in values, due to failure in the crops or to other causes,—anything in the nature of hard times, would furnish the golden opportunity of the demagogue for a violent assault on the trusts, and such an assault, supported by an unreasoning outbreak of popular wrath, would mean incalculable disaster to the common people. The trust magnates could weather the storm in safety, great capitalists can always do that, but the masses of the people could not. Destruction of the trusts, of the great combinations which not only secure dividends for thousands and hundreds of thousands of small holders of stock but give employment to hundreds of thousands of men, would be a national calamity of really appalling proportions. If

he could prevent that, surely President Roosevelt would be doing a great service to the people. He would not have been Theodore Roosevelt had he not first felt this peril as a possibility of the future, and having felt it, done his utmost to ward it off.

THE COAL STRIKE.

The coal strike which was ended through the intervention of the President in October last was not only the most serious contest of the kind this country has ever known, but the most serious that the world has known. Other strikes have involved a larger number of men and have entailed nearly or quite as much financial loss, but none has affected the people of the entire country to anything like the extent which this one did, simply because none stopped the production of what has come to be regarded as a necessity of life. Of course anthracite is not an absolute necessity of life. If the supply were to be exhausted this year, substitutes for it as fuel would be found. The world would have to learn to get on without it; but so long as people regard it as a necessity, and so long as they know it exists and can be obtained, they will not submit to having the supply cut off without protest, more or less violent, according to their needs and sufferings. That virtually all the people did believe in October that anthracite was a necessity both to their comfort and their health, is not to be questioned. They believed it so implicitly that nothing which could be said to the contrary had any appreciable effect upon them. Their conviction was so strong that the mere threat of a coal famine sent a panicky feeling throughout every large city in the land. In the country districts a sufficient supply of wood could be obtained, but in the cities there was little or no hope of doing so. Bituminous coal was an insufficient substitute because nearly all existing heating apparatus was not adapted to its use. Without anthracite, every household in a large city was threatened with discomfort and peril. It came about, therefore, that the whole population had an intense personal interest in the strike based upon two very strong reasons—first, danger to their individual well-being; and, second, a heavy tax upon their resources to meet the higher cost of fuel of any kind.

In estimated cost the coal strike exceeded greatly that of any previous strike in this country, even taking the most conservative figures. The highest estimate is \$142,500,000, of which about \$30,000,000 is in wages of employes, and \$55,000,000 to operators in price of coal. The rest is divided among the railways, business interests in the coal regions and elsewhere, expense of maintaining troops, damage to mines and machinery, and similar items. The lowest estimate is about \$120,-

000,000. The strike on the Southwestern Railway system of 1886, which became a "sympathetic" strike ultimately, involved 12,000 men and paralyzed 4,500 miles of railway, yet the loss it entailed was nothing approaching that of the coal strike, for all the strikes of the year 1886 entailed an aggregate loss of only about \$28,000,000, of which one half was in wages. The steel strike of 1901, which involved 150,000 men, entailed a loss in wages of about \$30,000,000, but no such loss in other directions as the coal strike, with its 147,000 strikers entailed. The longshoreman strike of 1887, which began among the coal heavers at Elizabethport, New Jersey, and extended sympathetically till 27,000 men were involved, entailed a loss of \$3,000,000 in wages, and of \$44,000,000 in other directions.

Let us turn aside for a moment to consider the enormous losses which this country has been called upon to sustain from strikes during the past twenty years. During that period there have been nearly 23,000 strikes, involving nearly 118,000 establishments and throwing over 6,000,000 of persons out of employment. The total loss has exceeded \$480,000,000, of which \$291,000,000 fell upon the employés in wages, and \$190,000,000 upon employers. The average loss to each employé involved has exceeded \$42, and the average loss to employers has exceeded \$2,000. Only a little more than half the strikes ordered have succeeded. The others have either failed wholly or succeeded partially. It is quite generally supposed that a majority of the laborers of the United States are members of unions, but this is far from being the case. Mr. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, puts the number of wage earners in the country, men, women, and children, at nearly 18,000,000 and the membership of labor organizations at 1,400,000, or not more than eight per cent. This is in marked contrast with conditions in England where with a total population only half of ours, there are over 1,800,000 registered members of labor unions. In the coal strike it was claimed by the mine operators that only about one half of the laborers in the coal region were members of the organization which, under Mr. Mitchell's leadership, ordered the strike; that the other half were either members of local unions or non-union men. The highest estimate which the operators made of the number of persons whom they were able to induce to work while the strike was in progress was 17,000. Under the Pennsylvania law, no person can be employed as a miner in the anthracite mines until he has passed an examination by a state board created for the purpose and has received a certificate or license. One of the conditions of such license is "not less than two years' practical experience as a mine laborer" in the anthracite fields. It was this requirement which most

seriously hampered the operators in their efforts to work the mines without the aid of the strikers, for men brought from other sections could be employed only in violation of the law. The strikers claimed that they controlled ninety-five per cent of all the licensed workers, and this was probably true.

One of the most interesting aspects of the President's commission for final adjudication of the questions at issue between the operators and their employés is the principle of arbitration embodied in it. This is a very different principle from the one insisted upon by Mr. Mitchell at the outset of the struggle. It will be remembered that the Civic Federation, under the leadership of Senator Hanna, made an earnest and prolonged effort to settle the strike when it was first threatened in April last. A conference between the conflicting parties was held, and although an armistice of thirty days was secured, failure ensued because the operators refused to recognize the union by consenting to an arbitration with it. In an arbitration of that kind the claims of non-union men would have no standing whatever, for there would simply be two parties to it, the operators and the union. Under the President's plan, the commission is to consider "all questions at issue between the respective companies and their employés," and it is especially stipulated that pending its findings all miners shall return to work and all interference with and persecution of non-union men at present working or hereafter employed shall cease. It is also stipulated, and the stipulation has been accepted by both parties, that when the commission shall have reached its findings these "shall govern the conditions of employment between the respective companies and their employés for a term of at least three years."

The President's commission is a body completely outside both operators and men. Neither side has a representative upon it. It is composed of seven members and can be properly styled a body of experts in the full sense of the term. At its head is Judge George Gray of the United States District Court of Eastern Pennsylvania in which the mines are situated, he being a resident of Delaware and an ex-United States senator from that State. With him are associated General John M. Wilson, on the retired list of the army in which he held the rank of chief of engineers; E. W. Parker, chief statistician of the coal division of the United States Geological Survey and editor of "The Engineering and Mining Journal" of New York City; E. E. Clark of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Grand Chief of the Order of Railway Conductors, whose selection is especially pleasing to the miners; Thomas H. Watkins of Scranton, Pennsylvania, who was for twenty years actively engaged in anthracite mining, but who retired from the business about four years ago; the Rt.

Rev. John Lancaster Spalding, Roman Catholic Bishop of Peoria, Illinois. Bishop Spalding was chosen by the President, in addition to the five members originally suggested by the operators, as a beloved prelate who is looked on as a father confessor by hundreds of thousands of working men throughout the middle west. Over ninety per cent of the anthracite workers are Roman Catholics. The presence of Bishop Spalding on the board will invest its findings with an authority which would hardly obtain through any other means. Finally, the President appointed Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Immigration, as recorder of the commission, and subsequently, with the consent of operators and miners, made him a commissioner.

The demands of the miners which led to the strike were as follows:—

1. That there shall be an increase of twenty per cent to the miners who are paid by the ton—that is, for men performing contract work. These men involve about forty per cent of all the miners.
2. A reduction of twenty per cent in the time of per diem employés. The mines are operated about two hundred days per year, ten hours per day. This demand, if granted, would result in reducing the day to eight hours (twenty per cent), so that the mines would be operated two hundred and forty days at about the same pay; hence an equivalent of twenty per cent increase in the earnings, no increase in the rates of per diem employés being demanded.
3. That two thousand, two hundred and forty pounds shall constitute the ton on which payment is based for all coal mined where the miners are paid by weight. This would apply in any district where weighing coal would be practicable, and to those miners who are paid by the quantity and not to those paid by the day.

The position of the operators, as defined by themselves at the time, was this:—

First—The anthracite companies do not undertake in the slightest manner to discriminate against members of the United Mine Workers of America; but they do insist that members of that organization shall not discriminate against nor decline to work with non-members of such association.

Second—That there shall be no deterioration in the quantity or quality of the work; and that there shall be no effort to restrict the individual exertions of men who, working by the ton or car, may for reasons satisfactory to themselves and their employers, produce such a quantity of work as they may desire.

Third—By reason of the different conditions, varying not only with the districts, but with the mines themselves, thus rendering absolutely impossible anything approaching uniform conditions, each mine must arrange either individually or through its committees, with the superintendents or managers, any question affecting wages or grievances.

No experiment in arbitration quite like this has been made in this country. The commission is the first body of the kind to be appointed by the President of the United States. All the authority he had to select

it came from the joint request of the contending parties. As president he he had none and assumed to have none. He simply appealed to the contestants to settle their difficulties in the interest of the whole people, and they yielded to his request. The selections which he made were in accordance with the spirit of his appeal. He chose them with the single object in view of getting a decision in accordance with right and justice. It is the unanimous opinion of the country that a more competent or more impartial tribunal could not have been constituted. It is in every way superior to the Civic Federation as an arbitrating body, for it contains no member who is identified directly with either party to the controversy. The Civic Federation was, furthermore, a self-constituted body and can only offer its services in labor controversies. It was not asked to arbitrate the coal strike, and it could not get the consent of the operators to such arbitration. The President's commission enters upon its duties under the high moral authority, if no other, of the highest officer in the land, and with both the consent of the contestants and their promise to accept its decrees.

Arbitration in various forms has been undertaken in this country with steadily growing frequency since 1866. New York and Massachusetts established state boards for arbitration and conciliation in that year, and their example has been followed by California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Minnesota, Ohio, Utah, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Michigan, Connecticut, and Indiana. These boards have usually consisted of three members, an employer, an employé, and a neutral. Little has been accomplished anywhere except in Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, and even in those States the number of disputes settled has been only a small percentage of the whole number in which arbitration was attempted. The main trouble is the same everywhere,—lack of power to compel arbitration. The most that a board can do is to go to the scene of the trouble, open a headquarters, and hang out a sign, "Arbitrating Done Here." If nobody applies, or if one side expresses willingness while the other refuses, then nothing can be done. The only arbitration which can be uniformly successful is that which is compulsory, and the obvious injustice of that precludes its adoption by any State or by the national government.

The coal strike with its really appalling possibilities, has aroused a general feeling that in controversies which affect the production of a necessity of life, some legislation peculiar to the needs of the case should be enacted. Just what form this should take nobody seems able to say. There is plenty of feeling on the subject, but very little thinking that has led to a definite proposal. It has been suggested, among other

things, that when the miners are given their license by the State, they should be required to make a contract with the State binding themselves not to strike save after duly specified notice, and stipulating that when striking they should refrain from intimidation or violence of all kinds. Another suggestion is that the President's commission be taken as a precedent, and that in all future disputes the questions at issue be referred to a national tribunal on this model, without a strike. This surely seems rational and practicable, but it may be objected to as a form of paternalism.

Senator Hanna remarked a few months ago, in speaking of the work of the Civic Federation:—

“The large aggregations of capital, feared at first by labor, may prove to be labor's best friend, in that control of a trade being thus centralized, there is opportunity to establish friendly relations which shall make uniform conditions throughout the country, or rather large sections thereof, and reduce the basis of competition to the quality of the product rather than to the concessions forced from labor.”

This sanguine view was completely blasted by the coal strike. We had in that the control of the entire anthracite industry centralized in a few men, and we had the workers in the anthracite mines centralized in a solid body against them, and the situation, instead of leading to friendly relations, led to a most bitter contest, a contest which lasted for six months, aroused such violence and murder that ten thousand militia were scarcely equal to the task of preserving order, brought the country face to face on the verge of winter with a coal famine with attendant coal riots in every large city, and was only settled by the intervention of the President of the United States. The lesson from this experience seems to be clear that the greater and the more compact the forces on each side, the less chance is there for amicable agreement. It becomes a contest of endurance between two powerful and equally matched forces, and, in the case of an industry whose product is a necessity of life, the public in the end become the worst sufferers. Nobody will deny, in view of the crisis from which the country has just emerged, that this possibility is one that must be guarded against in some way in the future. It may be that the President's plan will point the way. At all events, the work of his commission is certain to have great moral weight on the side of arbitration as a method of settling such disputes, and for this there is reason for thankfulness that his sense of public duty, and his deep interest in the welfare and safety of the people impelled him to interfere as he did.

There has been some talk of national ownership of the coal mines as a remedy, and the platform of the Democratic state convention in New

York advocated "national ownership and operation by the exercise of the right of eminent domain." The insuperable obstacle to this remedy lies in the fact that the national government has no power to exercise the right of eminent domain for that purpose. The Supreme Court has laid down the rule that the government can only act under powers expressed or implied in the Constitution. The power to operate coal mines is neither expressed nor implied in the Constitution, hence the government has no such power. In regard to eminent domain, the Supreme Court has held that the government can exercise it "to appropriate lands or other property for its own use and to enable it to perform its proper function. It is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses and not for those of another. Beyond that there exists no necessity, which alone is the foundation of the right." Obviously the national government could not take and operate the coal mines for the uses of the general public. It has been suggested that the government may exercise the power of eminent domain under the "general welfare" clause of the Constitution, but this interpretation of that clause is contrary to a long line of opinion and Supreme Court ruling extending back for a century. Jefferson's dictum laid down one hundred years ago has been steadily upheld since. He said :—

"Congress are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States ; and, as they would be the sole judge of the good or evil, it would also be a power to do whatever evil they pleased. Certainly, no such universal power was meant to be given them."

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